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ABSTRACT 
 
The governance of private equity-backed companies is a “black box”: relatively little is known 
about the decision-making structures in these economically important businesses.  This 
thesis looks inside that black box and, by studying the corporate governance arrangements 
in a unique sample of predominantly small and mid-size UK private equity-backed 
companies, proposes a theory to explain them. 
The dominant theoretical framework for UK legal scholars is grounded in the notion that 
separation of ownership and control within large companies creates an “agency problem” 
which either the market, or regulators, or a combination of both, needs to fix.  In this thesis, I 
explain the structure of the typical private equity-backed company and conclude that – 
although there is no separation of ownership and control in the sense that the shareholders 
lack economic incentives and wherewithal to intervene – agency problems do need to be 
solved by private ordering, and I describe how that is achieved in practice.  However, I also 
describe two parallel functions of the decision-making structures that are established: to 
ensure that the company makes better, and more legitimate, decisions; and to protect the 
specific and separate interests of the investor. 
I then explore how well these three objectives can be achieved within the framework set by 
UK company law, and the ways in which the actors adopt or vary default rules, and seek to 
contract around apparently mandatory rules, in order to accommodate their multiple 
objectives.   
In the final part of this thesis, I describe the evidence that private equity-backed companies 
outperform their peers, and consider existing empirical research that seeks to explain that 
outperformance.  I argue that the corporate governance systems are a significant 
explanatory factor and that, by re-conceptualising private equity corporate governance in the 
way that I have suggested, we can adopt alternative academic frameworks to better 
understand the drivers of that outperformance.  Finally, I draw out lessons for policy-makers 
and practitioners and suggest avenues for future research.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2012, funds managed by DPW Capital – a respected and long-established UK private 
equity firm1 – acquired a majority stake in Topbox, a fast-growing services business.  Jane 
Smith, a partner at DPW, developed the investment opportunity, sourced a new 
management team, led the due diligence process, and then took a seat on Topbox’s board, 
as DPW’s nominated non-executive director.   
By 2014, things were progressing well: the relationship between Jane and the management 
team was good; the outside chairman was really adding value; the business was ahead of 
an ambitious budget, with a rapidly growing customer base; and there were several potential 
buyers in the wings.  Topbox had even won an award for employee satisfaction.   
In fact, the business had grown so quickly that Topbox needed to move to larger premises 
and, for a small company, that would mean a significant additional financial commitment.  It 
was important to get the decision right.  When the time came to discuss the move, the CEO 
and some senior managers took the lead: before the next board meeting, they went to see 
some potential sites – one of which they particularly liked.   
But there was a problem: it quickly became clear that there was an important difference of 
view between Jane and the chairman on the one hand, and the three executive board 
members on the other.  “There was quite a stroppy debate,” Jane explained.  “We said: ‘You 
can’t move five miles down the road to somewhere that’s five times the rent, because a 
whole heap of your people won’t follow you, and it’s too expensive’.   They were a bit 
unhappy because they’d been to see this lovely place five miles down the road, they all drive 
in, and they’d quite like to work there.” 
The ensuing debate lasted around 45 minutes, weighing up the relative merits of various 
locations.  By the end of the discussion, some parameters had been set and the 
management had agreed to look at other options.  At the next board meeting, the CEO 
proposed an alternative that was much closer to the current premises, and much less 
                                               
1 The names of the private equity firm, the portfolio company and the nominated director 
have been changed to preserve anonymity. 
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expensive than the management’s original suggestion.  The move was successful, Topbox 
continued to thrive, and DPW sold the business for a healthy profit a few years later. 
This story was one of many told during the interviews conducted for this research project.  
Jane was explaining how one important decision was made in a private equity-backed 
company that her firm had invested in; she was keen to stress the “partnership” that the 
private equity investor had with the other key decision-makers, and the role played by the 
non-executive board members.  But the background context for all of these discussions was 
a sophisticated framework for decision-making, hard-wired into the company at the time of 
investment and operated flexibly on a day-to-day basis.  It is those governance structures – 
claimed by many private equity insiders to be a mechanism for significant value creation – 
that are examined in detail in this thesis.   
Topbox’s decision – significant for the company, but not exactly unusual or complex – raises 
some very interesting questions for a scholar of corporate governance.  For example, who 
had the balance of power, given that Jane and the non-executive chairman represented a 
minority on the board?  What duties does each of the decision-makers owe to the company 
and to each other, and were they conscious of those duties at the time?  Was the 
management team’s initial recommendation motivated by self-interest, or was this a 
straightforward disagreement about the best interests of the company?  Did this process 
optimise long-term value for the company, viewed as a separate economic entity – or just for 
its majority shareholder, who clearly had plans to sell the company in the near future?   
Such questions are interesting to scholars in part because they have important societal 
implications.  Customers, employees, creditors, pension fund beneficiaries, investors and tax 
authorities are among those affected by the decision-making processes that private 
companies adopt, and politicians considering the failure of BHS have recently been made 
acutely aware of the potential fall-out when things go wrong2.  The government may be 
                                               
2 The failure of retailer BHS was the subject of a widely-reported in-depth enquiry by 
Parliament in 2016 which concluded that “weaknesses in corporate governance contributed 
substantially to [its] ultimate demise” (UK Parliament House of Commons Work and 
Pensions Committee and Business Innovation and Skills Committee (2016) at page 46).   
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about to step in3 but, unfortunately, there is very little to guide policy-makers in shaping any 
such intervention: outside of a few high profile cases, little is known about the governance 
frameworks that exist in private companies, their contribution to economic success and 
failure, and the extent to which they exacerbate externalities for outsiders and for society at 
large.  Moreover, the population of private companies is far from homogeneous, and very 
different approaches to governance may be taken by companies with different ownership 
structures or in different stages of development.  Meanwhile, if policy-makers look to 
academia for guidance, they will find that the dominant theories would seem to counsel a 
“hands-off” approach, perhaps even among those legal academics who advance more 
interventionist theories in the context of widely-held companies4, leaving the shareholders, 
managers and other stakeholders to negotiate whatever arrangements suit them.  Without a 
better understanding of the costs and benefits (including any externalities) of such a 
strategy, policy-makers are unlikely to be satisfied with such a prescription. 
While private companies come in all shapes and sizes5 – from fairly anonymous owner-
managed SMEs6, through well-known multi-generational family-owned businesses, to high 
                                               
3 The Parliamentary report concludes (at page 57) that the BHS saga “brings into question 
the adequacy of existing company law and corporate governance regulation, particularly in 
relation to large private companies” and goes on to assert that “if large public or private 
companies do not behave in accordance with the ethical standards that society expects, 
further regulation may need to be considered.” The nature of any such additional regulation 
is not specified, but there is a promise to return to that question in future.  In addition, a 
government Green Paper published in November 2016 tentatively proposes voluntary 
corporate governance standards for large, private companies and greater reporting 
obligations, although very little detail is given (see BEIS, Corporate Governance Reform, 
pages 43-49, available at 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/573438/beis-16-56-
corporate-governance-reform-green-paper-final.pdf [Accessed 2.03.2017]). 
4 See Chapter 1 below for a discussion of the contractarian approach to company law and fn 
84 below for references to the work of scholars, such as Paddy Ireland and Marc Moore, 
who argue that as a theory it has significant positive and normative weaknesses, especially 
in the UK.  However, these latter scholars explicitly limit their critique to widely-held 
companies – see, for example, Moore (2014) at page 6 and Ireland (2003) who says (at 
page 456) that “history reveals the attempt to view the public company (as opposed to the 
closely-held or private company) through the prism of contract to be fundamentally 
misguided” (emphasis added), and Ireland goes on to explain why the contractual lens is 
appropriate for closely-held companies (see, for example, pages 478-480).   
5 For an instructive review of the various different types of closely-held company see 
McCahery & Vermeulen (2008), whose comprehensive analysis focuses on the “three 
pillars” of company law, contract and voluntary guidelines.   
6 SMEs are “small and medium sized enterprises”.  According to the European 
Commission’s definition, these are companies with fewer than 250 employees and either a 
turnover of up to €50 million or a balance sheet total of up to €43 million (Commission 
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street names controlled by a single wealthy individual – private equity-backed companies 
are an important and ubiquitous subset of this universe; indeed, it is virtually impossible to 
live a day in Britain without interacting with one7.  Although most people would not know it, 
hundreds of household-name businesses and thousands of lesser-known ones, touching the 
lives of millions of people every day, are owned by private equity firms, and the choices they 
make matter enormously to the economy at both a macro and a micro level.  However, in 
common with other private companies, the governance mechanisms determining the 
decision-making processes within these companies are something of a “black box”8, as are 
the motivations of those making the decisions – not just to the public, but also to policy-
makers, regulators and academics.  If that is a societal problem, it is one that is perhaps 
exacerbated by the fact that the objectives and motivations of the private equity firms that 
control or influence the decisions of those companies are generally not well understood by 
customers, suppliers or employees.   
This thesis looks inside that black box in order to describe and evaluate governance 
mechanisms in this under-researched and economically powerful sub-set of companies.  
Through mapping the governance structures established and operated in a unique sample of 
UK private equity-backed companies, examining the extent and nature of private ordering, 
explaining their interaction with mandatory and default legal rules, and evaluating them by 
reference to existing theories of corporate governance, I find the dominant agency theory of 
governance does not have sufficient explanatory power, and an alternative theory of private 
equity corporate governance is proposed and then proved.   
It is further argued that the relatively inflexible corporate governance framework established 
by UK company law provides a sub-optimal foundation for the decision-making and 
oversight structures that are built by the key stakeholders, and sometimes gets in the way of 
contractual arrangements that would be more efficient.  For example, rules that make it hard 
for directors appointed by significant shareholders to look after the separate interests of that 
                                                                                                                                     
Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized 
enterprises, Official Journal L 124 , 20/05/2003 P. 0036 – 0041). 
7 One journalist tried it for a week.  For an account of her experiences see: 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303289904579199882032714804 
[Accessed 2.03.2017]. 
8 “Data constraints mean that corporate governance is usually a black box”, Cornelli et al. 
(2013) at page 478. 
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investor might actually diminish efficiency and, at the very least, necessitate formalistic and 
inefficient work-arounds to render apparently mandatory rules redundant.  While clearly not 
inhibiting private equity activity, I argue that the role of the law should be to facilitate rather 
than obstruct private ordering.  At the same time, if society wants to encourage certain 
behaviours in order to enhance social welfare, or in pursuit of other social objectives, we 
should look beyond private ordering, and beyond company law, to ensure that those 
responsible for directing the actions of the company are compliant with those societal norms.  
In these respects, the conclusions set out in this thesis are consistent with prevailing 
academic theory and the direction of contemporary policy, although it is argued that 
company law has taken a wrong turn. 
Finally, this thesis suggests that, even though there is ample evidence to suggest that 
private equity-backed companies experience efficiency gains relative to other types of 
company, the empirical evidence does not yet enable us to pinpoint the precise reasons for 
that outperformance.  It is likely that the specific corporate governance mechanisms 
observed in private equity-backed companies contribute to observed operating 
improvements, and other academic insights that may help to explain these different 
(generally more efficient) outcomes are suggested.  These conclusions have important 
implications both for further research and for policy-makers, as well as being of interest to 
practitioners who wish to understand current practices among their peers.   
In the remainder of this Introduction, the scope of this enquiry is more specifically defined, 
and its importance explained: the “private equity-backed company” that is the subject of this 
research is described in more detail, and the scope of the term “corporate governance” is 
discussed.  
Private equity-backed companies 
A private equity-backed company9 is a company (or, more likely, a group of companies) 
whose shares are not traded on a public market and which has one or more significant 
                                               
9 There is no universally-agreed definition of the phrase, but the one adopted here would be 
widely accepted by practitioners and academics (although some would use the term “private 
equity” to include only investors who take controlling stakes).  The phrase “portfolio 
companies”, the term most often used by private equity practitioners, is also used 
synonymously in this thesis. 
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professional investors who, from the moment of investing, have a declared intention to sell 
their investment at some defined point, usually between three and seven years after initial 
acquisition.   
This definition would include companies with investors who take minority positions in start-up 
companies, usually referred to as “venture capital” investors, as well as those who invest in 
(or acquire) more established businesses.  However, this thesis focuses predominately on 
more established companies, because these tend to be more economically significant and 
their governance arrangements have not been as extensively studied10.   
Typically, these private equity-backed companies are acquired by a private equity investor in 
a transaction described as a “buy-out”11, in which the target company (or, sometimes, its 
assets) is purchased by a newly-incorporated company.  The ultimate shareholders of the 
newly-incorporated company are the private equity fund(s) and, usually, some members of 
the executive management team12.  However, these ultimate shareholders are often several 
companies removed from the acquired company that operates the underlying business, 
because it is usual to incorporate one or more new companies to act as holding companies 
of the acquired company for tax and other reasons.  The rationale for that attenuated 
structure, and its effects on the legal relationships of the parties, are explored later in this 
thesis13. 
                                               
10 Examples of academic studies that look at governance characteristics of or venture capital 
investments include: Kaplan & Strömberg (2004); Kaplan & Stromberg (2003); Gompers 
(1995); Sahlman (1990); and Levin (2006). 
11 Buy-outs may be referred to as “management buy-outs” (MBOs); “management buy-ins” 
(MBIs), where a new management team is an integral part of the transaction; BIMBOs, 
where a combination of new and incumbent management are involved; or “institutional buy-
outs” (IBOs), where no management team is involved at the outset (sometimes also called a 
“bought deal”).  Alternatively, the term “leveraged buy-out” (LBO) is often used, especially in 
the US, making reference to the fact that a significant proportion of the acquisition cost of the 
target company is usually funded by third-party debt.  In this thesis I use the generic term 
“buy-out” to refer to a transaction in which a target company (or its assets) is acquired by a 
new company and a private equity fund ends up with a significant or controlling equity 
ownership interest in the resultant structure, whether with or without the participation of new 
or incumbent management, and whether with or without external debt.  For a full list of terms 
commonly used in the industry see Talmor & Vasvari (2011) at pages 709-716. 
12 Sometimes the other shareholders may include founders or other non-management 
investors.  For a full description of the structure of buyout transactions see Talmor & Vasvari 
(2011), Chapter 12 (especially pages 266-267 and Exhibit 12.6); Witney (2007); and Kaplan 
& Strömberg (2009), especially pages 6-7. 
13 See Chapter 9.1 at pages 189-192 below. 
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The dominant professional investor in this ownership paradigm is generally14 a collective 
investment vehicle (a “fund”) acting as an aggregator for many other ultimate financial 
investors15.  Often organised as limited partnerships16, these funds usually comprise a 
number of “limited partners”, or passive investors, who are typically institutional investors 
such as pension funds, insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds and endowments17.  
The investors will appoint a discretionary manager, a “private equity fund manager”, who is 
generally also the promoter of the fund, to make investment and divestment decisions on 
their collective behalves within the confines of an agreed investment strategy.  The manager 
will charge a management fee and take a share of any profits18.  This discretionary manager 
is, in effect, in control of the day-to-day decisions of the fund while it acts as a shareholder of 
a portfolio company.  It is not (or, at least, it is not necessarily) in day-to-day control of the 
portfolio company itself: in general, the avowed strategy of the private equity fund manager 
will be to appoint an executive team, overseen by the company's board of directors, to take 
on that role19. 
A simplified structure chart showing a typical private equity fund and its portfolio companies 
is shown on the next page. 
                                               
14 Although not always: the investor could be, for example, a sovereign wealth fund acting on 
its own account rather than on behalf of outside investors.  These types of investor, although 
increasingly important, are not the subject of this thesis.  
15 Within the sample, one participating private equity firm was a “captive”, meaning that it 
had just one ultimate investor who also owned the private equity fund management 
company; another was “evergreen”, meaning that it was constituted as a company with no 
set liquidation date and the right to re-invest proceeds of realisations rather than a duty to 
distribute them.  The remaining participating firms were all independent firms managing 
limited life private equity funds of the type described here. 
16 Exceptions include those organised as listed companies (in the UK, usually investment 
trusts or venture capital trusts for tax reasons), but these are less common than limited 
partnership funds. 
17 For a more detailed breakdown see, for example, 
http://www.investeurope.eu/media/476271/2015-European-Private-Equity-Activity.pdf at 
page 13 [Accessed 2.03.2017].   
18 For more detail on the organisation of private equity investment funds and their legal form, 
see, for example, Blake & Robinson (2015). 
19 See Invest Europe (2015) at page 31, who say: “The responsibility for execution of 
strategy sits with the board and management team of the portfolio company.”  (Invest 
Europe is the pan-European private equity industry association, previously known as the 
European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association, or EVCA.)  See also Gilligan & 
Wright (2014) at page 17, who say: “While [private equity fund managers] do not generally 
exercise day-to-day control, they are actively involved in setting and monitoring the 
implementation of strategy.”  The actual involvement of the private equity fund manager in 
decision-making is, of course, a central question addressed in this thesis. 
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The prevalence of private equity-backed companies 
 Some might regard private equity-backed companies as a sideshow, and much less 
economically or societally important than publicly-traded companies, or even than owner-
managed or family-owned businesses.  But that would be a mistake: although their 
economic impact may still be relatively small compared to those populations20, private 
equity-backed companies are now very important actors in Europe and the United States21, 
and increasingly so elsewhere.  Estimates suggest that, in 2014, there were around $3.8 
                                               
20 For example, a report published in 2014 by Business in the Community found that the 
FTSE 100 companies employed around 6.3 million people worldwide (see 
http://www.bitc.org.uk/sites/default/files/bitc_workwell_public_reporting_benchmark_summar
y_report_2014_1.pdf [Accessed 2.03.2017]), while a private equity industry report attributes 
259,000 employees to 57 of the largest UK private equity-backed companies as at the date 
of their acquisition (see 
http://www.bvca.co.uk/Portals/0/library/Files/Research%20&%20Publications/Research%20
Reports/BVCA%20EY%20annual%20report%20on%20the%20performance%20of%20portfo
lio%20companies%20VIII.pdf [Accessed 2.03.2017]).  While these figures are not directly 
comparable, they demonstrate that the largest private equity-backed companies are 
dramatically smaller than the largest listed companies.  See also fn 23 below. 
21 For a brief history of the emergence of private equity in the US and continental Europe 
see Kaplan & Strömberg (2009) and Talmor & Vasvari (2011) at pages 5-6. 
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trillion of assets under management held by private equity firms globally22, and around 
18,000 private equity-backed companies in Europe alone, employing around eight million 
people23.  More recently, the UK industry association, the British Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Association (BVCA), has said that its members are investors in over 2,200 UK 
companies, employing a combined total of 800,000 people24.  Many of these companies are 
household names, but most businesses that are owned using this model are less well 
known; in fact, the BVCA claims that, by number, 80-90% of private equity investments in 
the UK are made into small and medium-sized businesses25.   
The media, trade unions and politicians have certainly noticed the growing importance of 
private equity, and a series of high profile protests26, critical reports27 and enquiries28 
culminated in the first pan-EU regulation of private equity fund managers in 201129.  Since 
                                               
22 Preqin (2015b) at page 13.  This total includes the value of unrealised investments and 
funds available for investment. 
23 Reliable estimates for aggregate numbers of private equity-backed companies and their 
employees are hard to find and should be regarded as approximate.  The figure quoted here 
was published by Invest Europe in its 2012 Yearbook 
(http://www.investeurope.eu/media/17134/yearbook-2012-press-release.pdf [Accessed 
2.03.2017]) in May 2013 and an update has not been published since, although 
correspondence on file with the author confirms that Invest Europe currently estimates the 
total employees of European private equity-backed companies to be 7-8 million.  The same 
correspondence suggests that there may now be as many as 25,000 private equity-backed 
companies in Europe.  
24 BVCA, Investment Agenda, 2015, http://investmentagenda.co.uk/national-impact/ 
[Accessed 2.03.2017].  Correspondence on file with the author suggests that the total 
employees of companies backed by UK managed private equity and venture capital funds 
now stands at approximately 900,000 full time equivalents. 
25 Correspondence with the BVCA on file with the author.  The BVCA quotes a figure of 84% 
of investments by number (not by value) for 2015 investments and 88% for 2014, and uses 
employee numbers as a proxy for size, classing a company with 250 or fewer employees as 
an SME.  According to Frontier Economics (2013) at page 22, “over 80%” of European 
private equity investee companies are “SMEs”, but no definition or source is quoted.  See fn 
6 above for the European Commission definition of an SME. 
26 See, for example, Financial Times, 15 February 2007, “Union's stunts seek to embarrass 
its corporate victims”, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bf4e3688-bc99-11db-9cbc-
0000779e2340.html?ft_site=falcon&desktop=true#axzz4J5avEtue [Accessed 2.03.2017], 
which documents protests against Permira, then a private equity co-owner of The AA.   
27 See, for example, ITUC Report, Where the house always wins: Private equity, hedge 
funds and the new casino capitalism, 2007, available at http://www.ituc-
csi.org/IMG/pdf/ITUC_casino.EN.pdf [Accessed 2.03.2017], and Report of the PSE Group in 
European Parliament, Hedge Funds and Private Equity: A Critical Analysis, 2007, available 
at http://www.nyrup.dk/cgi-bin/nyrup/uploads/media/Hedgefunds_web.pdf [Accessed 
2.03.2017]. 
28 In the UK, see UK Parliament House of Commons Treasury Committee (2007).   
29 Directive 2011/61/EU. 
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then, the industry has continued to grow and its influence remains strong, despite some 
setbacks during the financial crisis30.   
What is “corporate governance”? 
A broad view of corporate governance is adopted in this thesis: my enquiry is into the 
various structures and processes that regulate who takes decisions in private equity-backed 
companies, in whose interests the decisions are taken, and the process for taking them31.   
These relatively broad terms of reference for this enquiry are necessary because we might 
expect a greater role for shareholders (and perhaps other stakeholders, including lenders) in 
a private equity-backed company than in a widely-held company, given that some of the 
reasons investors are likely to delegate power to a separate board may not be present32.  
Such an expanded role for shareholders is certainly suggested by, for example, Invest 
Europe which says, in its Handbook, that private equity investors – as shareholders – 
"demand rigorous accountability, transparency (through monitoring and reporting), and 
adoption of best practices by their portfolio companies” 33.  It is clear from the text that 
follows this general statement that, for Invest Europe, the board is an essential part of the 
corporate governance structure (and its composition, decision-making procedures and 
competencies are therefore matters of concern to the investor34), but that there are other 
important transmission mechanisms that are also integral to it.  These include far more 
extensive requirements for shareholder approval than are established by the default rules 
                                               
30 For the most recent European figures available see Invest Europe’s 2015 activity report, 
available at http://www.investeurope.eu/media/476271/2015-european-private-equity-
activity.pdf [Accessed 2.03.2017], which shows that fund raising by private equity firms in 
Europe stood at €48 billion in 2015, which compares to a post-financial crisis low of €19 
billion in 2009. 
31 Although there are many different approaches to the subject, within legal scholarship this 
approach is not unusual.  It is, for example, similar to that adopted in Moore (2013), whose 
book focuses on the “the causes and consequences of the allocation of power within large 
economic organisations”; and to that of Bainbridge (2011) who (at page 2) defines corporate 
governance as “the institutional structures, legal rules, and best practices that determine 
which body within the corporation is empowered to make particular decisions, how the 
members of that body are chosen, and the norms that should guide decision-making.”  It is, 
however, broader than viewing corporate governance as “a set of mechanisms through 
which outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders", which La 
Porta et al. (2000) said (at page 4) was “to a large extent” its function.   
32 For a clear description of the reasons shareholders in a widely-held company, acting 
rationally, might prefer to delegate decision-making to the board see Bainbridge (2006) at 
page 1744-1746. 
33 Invest Europe (2015) at page 4.  See fn 19 above for more information on Invest Europe. 
34 Invest Europe (2015), Section 3.4.5 at pages 35-36. 
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laid out in company law35; detailed reporting requirements that are specified by the 
shareholder36; a clear role for the shareholder in influencing the management of 
environmental and social risks37; and well-aligned incentive mechanisms that promote “long-
term growth and good corporate governance”38.  The Invest Europe Handbook also says 
that private equity investors bring “experience and knowledge as well as networks” to their 
portfolio companies39, although it is not clear whether these are delivered through the 
governance systems or in some other way. 
In short, private equity governance is more complicated than in a widely-held company.  The 
board is important, but other mechanisms also matter.  We will therefore look broadly at the 
role of the various protagonists in the governance structures of private equity-backed 
companies – including the investor in its shareholder capacity, as well as those who sit on 
the board – and the structures within which they operate. 
Structure of this thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into four distinct Parts.  Part 1 (comprising Chapters 
1-3 plus Appendix) describes the key theoretical frameworks upon which this research 
project draws in seeking to frame the key research questions, particularly the contractarian 
approach to corporate governance law, agency cost theories and the literature on 
incomplete contracts.  These theories all lead to certain predictions for corporate 
governance structures in companies, and also to certain conclusions for the role of law, and 
these are the departure point for describing the corporate governance arrangements actually 
observed in private equity-backed companies.   
Chapter 2 then lays out the main features of private equity funds as owners or investors.  
These set them apart from investors in other types of company, and lead to a series of 
testable hypotheses that indicate that a theory of corporate governance in private equity-
backed companies would predict multiple and somewhat diverse objectives in the actual 
decision-making and oversight mechanisms that are constructed by the parties. 
                                               
35 Invest Europe (2015), Section 3.3.7 at pages 29-30. 
36 Invest Europe (2015), Section 3.4.1 at pages 32-33. 
37 Invest Europe (2015), Section 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 at pages 33-34. 
38 Invest Europe (2015), Section 3.4.4 at page 34. 
39 Invest Europe (2015) at page 4.  
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Chapter 3 (supplemented by an Appendix) explains how these hypotheses will be tested, 
with an explanation of the way in which private equity firms arrange the contracts that 
determine the governance structure, the methods used in conducting this research and my 
reasons for adopting those methods.  Part 1 concludes with a description of my sample of 
private equity firms, private equity-backed companies and interviewees.   
Part 2 (comprising Chapters 4 and 5) begins the process of testing these hypotheses.  In 
Chapter 4 we first look at the various ways in which private equity-backed companies 
mitigate managerial agency costs and then, in Chapter 5, we examine the mechanisms that 
pursue other objectives not adequately explained by agency cost control. 
Part 3 (comprising Chapters 6-9) further considers the contractual bargains to explore the 
extent to which private equity-backed companies make positive use of, or seek to avoid, UK 
company law rules.  Chapters 6 and 7 deal with key aspects of the duty of loyalty; Chapter 8 
looks at rules affecting the exercise of power by shareholders; and, finally, Chapter 9 
examines whether firms engage in regulatory arbitrage to avoid the impact of inappropriate 
mandatory rules.  In concluding this Part, it is argued that the current rules are not, in fact, 
inhibiting private equity activity, but they do create problems that should be addressed by 
law-makers.   
The last section of this thesis, Part 4 (Chapters 10 and 11), considers whether private 
equity-backed companies outperform their peers and, if so, how academics have sought to 
explain that outperformance.  In Chapter 10, we find some support for the proposition that 
private equity-backed companies perform better, but it is argued that the evidence that this 
arises from governance improvements is, as yet, incomplete.   
Finally, in Chapter 11, it is argued that governance mechanisms are, in fact, likely to be a 
vital part of the reason for private equity’s success and that selected existing academic 
insights could be adopted and developed to explain the mechanisms identified and the 
performance improvements observed.  This leads to lessons for policy makers, and for 
academics wishing to undertake further study in this area.   
In conclusion, it is argued that mandatory rules are unnecessary and largely irrelevant in 
practice, but may have some negative effects; that private ordering can be expected to 
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allocate decision-making power most efficiently; and that theories dealing with effective 
decision-making, including those in the resource dependency school, have more explanatory 
power than those based exclusively on agency cost analysis.  An expanded version of 
agency cost analysis is used to describe how shareholders can be expected to protect their 
own interests – potentially at the expense of the economic efficiency of the company, but 
usually in a way that is likely to have positive societal impacts.  However, there are also 
potentially welfare-destructive effects of the freedom-to-contract model and, if society has 
other interests that it wants companies to protect, these need to be specifically addressed – 
but through more direct regulatory interventions, rather than by interfering with the internal 
decision-making mechanisms of the company. 
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PART 1: THEORISING PRIVATE EQUITY GOVERNANCE 
 
CHAPTER 1: MAPPING AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
As discussed in the Introduction, private equity-backed companies constitute a significant 
part of the private company universe, corporate governance mechanisms seem to matter to 
their shareholders, and those mechanisms are structurally more complicated than in a 
widely-held company.  The central objective of this enquiry is to make sense of – and to re-
conceptualise – the role of corporate governance in such companies.  But first, we must 
establish how we should understand the firm, and the role that corporate law should play in 
organising and structuring it.  In this introductory Chapter, we explore the prevailing theories 
of the firm, which we will then use to contextualise our analysis of private equity governance.   
1.1 Selected theoretical frameworks40 
At the outset, two important points should be noted.  First, most scholarly theories of 
corporate governance emanate from the United States and, as Moore (2014) has pointed 
out, the UK lacks a “home-grown conceptual framework”41.  There are, in fact, important 
differences between UK and US company law, and it is at least arguable that the descriptive 
(as opposed to the normative) value of these theories is somewhat limited when applied to 
the UK42.  Secondly, much of the scholarship on corporate governance relates to public (as 
opposed to private) companies.  Any attempt to utilise or test theories that have been 
developed in that context must, therefore, proceed with caution.  However, my purpose in 
describing and adopting various theories and analytical frameworks is to explore the extent 
to which the theories help us to explain what we observe in a private equity-backed 
                                               
40 Although not covered in this Chapter, we will return to some alternative theoretical 
perspectives in Chapter 11.2, particularly resource dependence theory – see pages 225-236 
below.  
41 See Moore (2014) at page 694. 
42 Although (as Moore (2014) points out at page 696) the Companies Act 2006 “is 
established on a default mandatory footing”, UK company law’s origins are more firmly 
rooted in freedom of contract than in the US – see Kershaw (2012b) and pages 23-24 below.  
An illustrative example cited by Kershaw is that of liability waivers: it was not until statute 
intervened in 1929 that duty of care liability waivers were outlawed in the UK; until then the 
courts had respected contractual freedom by enforcing them, and they were routinely 
included in articles of association.   
Page | 22 
 
company, and to use them as the starting point for a new theoretical framework that is more 
apposite for those companies.   
1.1.1 The company as a “nexus of contracts” 
The starting point for most modern theoretical analysis in this area is often said to be Coase 
(1937), whose ground-breaking work in defining the boundaries of the firm offered a view of 
the company as a vehicle for an authority structure to mitigate the transaction costs that 
would otherwise be required in the negotiation (and continual re-negotiation) of numerous 
individual contracts.   
However, Alchian & Demsetz (1972), although agreeing that firms are driven by transaction 
cost economics, took issue with an important aspect of Coase’s work and argued that 
“contract”43 (rather than authority) governs relationships inside the firm, as well as between 
the firm and outsiders.  They pointed out that it is just as easy to tell your grocer to sell you 
fish instead of bread as it is to tell your employee to type a letter instead of filing a document, 
and (they said) you can “fire” your grocer for not following instructions (by buying your 
groceries somewhere else) just as you can dismiss an employee44.  They maintained that 
the notion of authority was “delusion”, and adjectives such as “fiat” are not relevant in 
understanding why the firm exists.  Instead, Alchian & Demsetz (1972) developed an 
alternative theory, based on the idea that those in a firm are engaged in joint production, that 
any such activity requires someone to act as monitor of the various participants, and that 
those entitled to the residual benefits of the activity were best suited to take on that role.  In 
companies with widely-dispersed shareholders, managers are appointed by the residual 
claimants (shareholders) to undertake the monitoring role, because it would not be efficient 
for them to undertake it themselves.  
                                               
43 “Contract” is used in this context in a very broad sense.  It includes legally enforceable 
obligations, including the company’s own constitution, but also extends to unenforceable 
agreements – including some which may not even be explicitly stated – which determine the 
relationships between the parties in practice. 
44 A UK lawyer would, of course, take issue with the suggestion that there is no difference in 
the relationships between a customer and a shopkeeper on the one hand and an employer 
and an employee on the other; however, the analysis adopted is not a legal one, but seeks 
to characterise the commercial reality of the interactions rather than their strict legal basis 
and the consequences that follow from that.  However, even on that basis, the assertions 
made by Alchian and Demsetz are questionable: for example, as Hart & Moore (1990) have 
pointed out, if an employee needs to make use of firm-specific assets owned by the 
employer in order to do his job most productively, then the employer will have considerable 
power over the employee (and more so than he has over his grocer). 
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Although Alchian and Demsetz’s thesis is controversial45, their understanding of companies 
as being the focal point for a web of contracts between various actors who are involved in 
the generation of the company’s profits – equity and debt financiers, senior managers, 
employees, suppliers and the like – is now the dominant academic lens through which 
corporate law is analysed46.  And while proponents of this “nexus of contracts”47 model took 
much from Coase’s transaction cost analysis48, the contractual view of the corporation is 
reminiscent of aggregation theory, which posited that corporations were a set of voluntary 
relationships between the various actors, rather than artificial entities created by the state49. 
In fact, such a framework readily appeals to a student of the history of UK corporate law, as 
the nineteenth century antecedent of a registered company, the deed of settlement 
company, was an inherently contractual vehicle, having its own roots in private partnerships.  
As Kershaw puts it, companies were “viewed from inception as the endogenous product of 
private contract”50, unlike in the United States, where private incorporations evolved from the 
                                               
45 See Bainbridge (2003) at page 567-8 for a discussion of the theory's limitations.  See also, 
however, Blair & Stout (1999) who build upon the theory in their “team production” model. 
46 See, for example, Jensen & Meckling (1976) at page 311: “There is in a very real sense 
only a multitude of complex relationships (i.e., contracts) between the legal fiction (the firm) 
and the owners of labor, material and capital inputs and the consumers of output.”  See also, 
for example, Fama (1980); and Fama & Jensen (1983).  McGaughey (2015) claims that the 
“first formulation of the idea” can be traced to Johannes Zahn in 1934 (see page 1066), and 
see also Bratton (1989) who reminds us (at page 1513 and elsewhere) that legal scholars 
have always seen contract as integral to the theory of the corporation, even if that was not 
always clearly articulated and was, at times, subordinated (and see also references at fn 49 
below).  Note that the contractual lens is the framework adopted by many scholars who 
would not call themselves “contractarians”, because they believe that mandatory rules are 
useful and necessary.  See, for example, Bebchuk (1989) at page 1409 who says: “I believe 
that the contractual view provides a useful and illuminating framework of analysis, and I also 
believe that the law should have a substantial mandatory role”.  
47 Although the idea of the firm as a nexus of contractual relationships appeared earlier (for 
example, in Jensen & Meckling (1976)), this actual phrase seems to have originated in 
Fama (1980); see, Moore (2014), footnote 24. 
48 Although Coase’s work influenced contractarian scholars, his theory of the firm was not 
itself “contractarian”.   
49 See Taylor (1884) and, for a review of the artificial entity and aggregation theories, see 
Joo (2010) at pages 158-160.  Some scholars have argued that these explanations for the 
role of the firm have not given sufficient weight to the role of the law, and in particular to the 
proprietary foundations of corporate law and separate legal identity of the “firm” – see, for 
example, Armour & Whincop (2007) and Deakin et al. (2016).  Such critiques are 
compelling, but the conceptual framework of the firm as a nexus of contractual relationships 
remains helpful. 
50 Kershaw (2012b) at page 404. 
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state’s role in granting statutory charters51.  Perhaps for that reason, even though there are 
now a number of mandatory rules in the UK52, British company law remains relatively 
enabling53. 
1.1.2 Authority structures and incomplete contracts 
Despite Alchian and Demsetz’s rejection of fiat, scholars have continued (following Coase) 
to characterise the central role of certain participants in the firm as one of authority, some 
arguing that such an authority structure is the main distinguishing feature of a modern public 
company54.  Bainbridge (2003) explains several ways in which authority mechanisms can 
reduce transaction costs: for example, the need for multiple parties to work together on a 
repeated basis would incur significant search and bargaining costs which a central decision-
maker can alleviate; and such a decision-maker can also control the opportunism that would 
otherwise arise from incomplete contracting.  Bainbridge goes on to explain why, in a 
modern corporation, this decision-making structure cannot be consensus-based, as it might 
be in a small firm or partnership, but requires the exercise of fiat55.  These scholars have 
tended to take a broader view of the nature of the relevant contracts, pointing out that 
authority structures or relationships are consistent with a contractual analysis because they 
can be (and, in practice, are) established by contract56.   
It is worth noting that, if one adopts the contractual lens, the requirement for a system of 
corporate governance (and more general authority structure), arises because, as Hart 
(1995b) pointed out, there are non-trivial transaction costs associated with writing complete 
contracts; if there were not, contracts between all relevant actors could be comprehensive 
and specify all future actions in advance57.  According to a contractarian scholar, these 
                                               
51 In fact, evolution of corporate law in the US is complex, and the very early cases did 
respect contractual freedom, even if the state intervened earlier to impose certain norms.  
See, for example, Kean v Johnson, 9 N.J. Eq. 401 (N.J. Ch 1853).   
52 A number of these are described in Part 3 of this thesis. 
53 See Moore (2013), Chapter 5. 
54 See, for example, Bainbridge (2003) at page 555. 
55 See Bainbridge (2003) at page 554-559.  Many contractarian scholars have more recently 
focused on the board of directors (usually including some, and often including a majority of, 
non-executive directors) as the central authority, rather than the executive directors – see, 
for example, Bainbridge (2006), at page 1741 in particular. 
56 Relational contract theory acknowledges that contracts often establish “command-and-
subordinate positions of an ongoing nature” (Macneil (1978) at page 890).  
57 See also Hart (1995a) at pages 679-680. 
Page | 25 
 
contracts would together give rise to the optimal set of decisions, which would maximise 
overall welfare (at least for the contracting parties).  But it is self-evident that comprehensive 
contracts are not cost-free and would carry significant transaction costs; indeed, in most 
circumstances it would be impossible to write them because it is not plausible that all future 
events could be predicted (or that all parties would have equal access to all relevant 
information)58.  That implies that the contracts have to establish procedures for making 
decisions in future that cannot be anticipated at the time of writing the contract (or that could 
be anticipated, but in relation to which it makes sense to make the decision at some later 
point), and in doing so (as Grossman & Hart (1986) identified) to allocate residual decision 
rights59. 
1.1.3 Managerial agency costs 
It is clear that establishment of an authority structure carries its own risk of inefficiency.  As 
Adam Smith famously observed60, those responsible for “other people’s money” may have a 
tendency to pursue their own interests ahead of those they are supposed to serve.  That 
idea was taken up in the context of the modern company by Berle & Means (1932) and 
further developed by Jensen & Meckling (1976) who, in their work on the theory of the firm, 
argued that relationships within companies are affected by “agency costs”, and that certain 
actors – if they are unconstrained and aim to maximise their own utility – will operate the 
company in ways that are sub-optimal for others.  Underlying many contemporary theories of 
the firm is this basic intuition that unconstrained managers in positions of authority will incur 
agency costs, and that seeking to control these – without stripping the managers (or, 
                                               
58 As we shall see in Chapter 2 below, the conditions may exist in a private equity context for 
more complete contracting than in widely held companies, but it remains true that fully 
complete contracts will not be feasible. 
59 Although the existence of an authority structure is now widely accepted – and it seems 
self-evident that (in a world of incomplete contracting) a company with a large number of 
small investors and many other stakeholders is likely to find it efficient to give specialised 
appointees authority to make the key decisions – there is some continuing debate about 
whether this authority is original in a widely-held company (a company which, in the phrase 
famously coined by Berle & Means (1932), has experienced a “separation of ownership and 
control”) or whether it is delegated by shareholders, both as an empirical question and as a 
normative matter.  There is also a related disagreement about whose interests should be 
pursued by those with authority – see, for example, Blair & Stout (1999) and Stout (2012).  
These questions are very important, but they are outside the scope of this thesis. 
60 Smith (1776) at page 700. 
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perhaps, the directors) of their authority, which would itself be inefficient – is an important 
part of the role of company law.   
As explained by Jensen & Meckling (1976), agency costs arise whenever there are 
incentives for one party to a relationship to act otherwise than in the best interests of the 
other, and were defined by them as the sum of (i) monitoring expenses of the principal (the 
shareholders) and the costs of restrictions on managerial authority imposed by them; (ii) 
bonding expenditures incurred by the agent (the managers); and (iii) the residual loss61.  
Such managerial agency costs are sometimes (and over-simplistically) referred to arising 
from incentives to “steal” and to “shirk”62 arising whenever a manager is not the sole 
shareholder of a company63.  The former category (“stealing”) would include the temptation 
to divert corporate assets to the managers, including through self-dealing, excess 
remuneration and perquisites, and the diversion of profitable corporate opportunities; the 
latter (“shirking”) would address a tendency for agents64 not to do their best for the company 
because the benefits of doing so do not accrue to them (or at least, not enough of the 
benefits)65.   
However, as some scholars have pointed out66, effort aversion is not really the central issue 
for most companies, at least as regards the relationship between management and the 
shareholders.  A question that is at least as important is whether the agent would take the 
same decisions as the principal (because, for example, the principal is more risk averse than 
the agent, or lacking in some expertise that the principal has).  If not, then a cost to the 
                                               
61 See Jensen & Meckling (1976) at page 308, and Fama & Jensen (1983) at page 304.  
Jensen & Meckling point out that these costs can arise whenever there is joint production, 
and not only when there is a relationship of agent and principal, and highlight the similarities 
between their definition of agency costs and the discussion of the need for monitoring in 
Alchian & Demsetz (1972).  
62 See Roe (2008) at page 373, who adopts this alliterative categorisation and then critiques 
its over-simplification.   
63 See Kershaw (2012a) at pages 171-179 for a fuller description, including some specific 
examples.  Kershaw categorises these wealth transfers as either “direct transfers of value” 
or “indirect agency costs”.   
64 It is, of course, true that the relationship between a shareholder and a manager is not one 
of principal and agent in a legal sense.  However, that is not relevant to the analysis, which 
only assumes that the job of the managers is to serve the interests of the shareholders. 
65 Kraakman et al. (2009) call this (at page 35) “skimping on the quality of his performance”, 
while Roe (2002) defines shirking (at page 235) as “pursuing goals other than shareholder 
value”. 
66 See Kaplan (1984) at page 405; Roe (2008) makes a similar point (at page 374). 
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principal of using the agent is the difference between the outcome of the decision that the 
agent took and the decision that the principal would have taken67.  Alternatively, or in 
addition, the “agency cost” would be the costs incurred by the principal in defining the scope 
of the agent’s authority (perhaps stipulating the risk profile that it finds acceptable, or setting 
out rules requiring the agent to act in accordance with the principal’s instructions in areas 
where the agent lacks the principal’s expertise), together with any costs incurred by the 
principal in monitoring the agent to ensure that she does not exceed her authority (and/or 
costs incurred by the agent to facilitate such monitoring).  Some principals – for example, 
those with a very clearly defined risk tolerance, or those with particular expertise – will wish 
to define the scope of the agent’s authority more narrowly than others in order to ensure that 
the agent complies with its wishes.  
These types of cost (we shall call them “subjective judgement agency costs”) do not arise 
from misalignment of incentives, nor from any bad faith on the part of the agent, and are 
therefore different in nature to those that are discussed above.  Rather, they are an extra 
cost of an agent’s “honest mistakes” (or of processes that aim to avoid such mistakes) 
arising because the agent’s own subjective assessment of a situation will differ from that of 
the principal in a welfare reducing way.  It is meaningful to describe them as agency costs 
because they are costs that could have been avoided if the principal had acted for himself 
rather than appointing an agent.  Of course, there are also benefits from appointing the 
agent (including, usually, its superior expertise in certain matters68) and, if these benefits do 
not outweigh the costs, the principal is unlikely to make the appointment.  Nevertheless, the 
subjective judgement agency costs reduce the total welfare arising from the appointment.   
                                               
67 It should be noted that this “cost” might be hard to quantify, especially if it results in 
financial gain for the principal (shareholder) because, for example, a more risky strategy 
pays off.  For example, if I appoint an agent to invest my money in low risk bonds and 
instead she takes it to the casino and wins (and gives me back my initial outlay plus the 
whole of the profits), then I have incurred an agency cost viewed ex ante (up until the 
roulette wheel stops spinning), although the financial calculus may change when the agent’s 
action is viewed ex post.  It might turn into a financial benefit for the principal; or it may still 
be a “cost”, if it offends my religious beliefs or harms my hard-won reputation as someone 
who never gambles. 
68 These might be called “subjective judgement benefits”, but (at least in the context of 
expertise) are more usually referred to as the benefits of specialisation or the division of 
labour – see, for example, Smith (1776), Chapter 1. 
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Although a number of scholars have recognised that agency costs can include these costs 
of subjective judgements, some have not been very clear about where to draw the line 
between these costs and pure mistakes69.  It is clear that even this expanded definition of 
agency costs, going beyond diversion of resources or lack of effort occasioned by 
misaligned incentives, does not cover pure mistakes: decisions that are flawed because 
neither the agent nor the principal knew any better.  Some scholars have referred to 
managerial incompetence as an agency cost70, but (unless this is intended to cover 
incompetence arising from effort aversion) it does not seem meaningful to ascribe this as a 
cost of the agency relationship if the principal would have made the same decisions (or 
worse ones) itself.  It may well be, as Roe (2008) argues, a function of the corporate 
governance system to hire competent managers (and fire incompetent ones) and to optimise 
decision-making, but that is a function that is distinct from its role in mitigating agency costs.   
It is also worth noting at this point that corporate law principally addresses the “stealing” 
aspect of agency costs, and only very partially addresses (through prescribing a standard of 
care) other aspects, whether shirking, subjective judgement mismatches, or sheer 
incompetence.  As Roe (2002) points out (in the context of US law), sub-optimal decisions 
made by managers are almost entirely forgiven by corporate law, because law-makers have 
confirmed the historical judicial aversion to second-guessing commercial judgements71. 
Although they are most often analysed in the context of widely-held companies, these 
managerial agency cost problems are not confined to companies with remote 
                                               
69 See, for example, Roe (2002) who (at page 235), argues that agency costs include 
mismanagement, and that the law does little to address mismanagement costs, but does not 
clearly distinguish between mismanagement that arises because an agent is appointed and 
that which would not have been avoided by the principal acting alone. 
70 See, for example, Roe (2008) at page 373. 
71 In the UK, the duty to promote success in Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 is a 
subjective one, confirming the approach of the common law – see, for example, Smith v 
Fawcett ([1942] Ch. 304) per Lord Greene at page 306: “[Directors] must exercise their 
discretion bona fide in what they consider – not what a court may consider – is in the 
interests of the company”. It is true that the standard of care in Section 174 of the Act is 
somewhat more demanding than the standard established in Delaware law, but it remains a 
review of the process and not the content of the decision: see, for discussion, Kershaw 
(2012a) at pages 339-51 and 473-475.  That is not to say, of course, that other mechanisms 
do not exist to discipline incompetent or lazy managers; on the contrary, product market 
competition, the labour market, the market for corporate control, and many other 
mechanisms act to control such behaviours – see Roe (2002) at page 234. 
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shareholders72.  Indeed, the very structure of a modern corporation, which assumes a 
separation of the role of “owner” from that of director, creates a potential managerial agency 
cost that needs to be dealt with, and whenever shareholders delegate authority to others 
(rather than running the company themselves) they need to address that issue.  No doubt 
the various forms of agency cost will be easier to address in a closely-held company, but the 
problem does not disappear.  Indeed, if the shareholder has particular expertise, or is less 
able to diversify firm-specific risk, there may be greater need for processes to address the 
subjective judgement form of the agency cost that arises by delegating authority.   
This thesis will examine the ways in which private equity-backed companies control agency 
costs through the corporate governance system that is put in place.  It seems likely, because 
of the difference in structure, that these agency cost control mechanisms will differ from 
those that may be observed in a widely-held company with relatively remote shareholders, 
and the extent of, and reasons for, the differences will be explored. 
There is also a wide recognition that agency costs are not confined to managers: where 
there is a dominant shareholder, for example, the main agency cost may be between that 
shareholder and minorities, with the dominant shareholder being inclined to act in ways that 
capture value for itself at the expense of the other shareholders73.  As we shall see in 
Chapter 11.2.1, the desire of a private equity investor to look after its own interests can be 
described as a form of controlling shareholder agency cost, although such costs are not the 
main focus of the corporate governance mechanisms examined in this thesis. 
1.2 The contractarian’s normative conclusions 
As an analytic framework, the nexus of contracts model has much to recommend it74, and 
the insight that authority structures could give rise to agency costs is an important one for 
                                               
72 See Hart (1995a) at page 680. 
73 There is an extensive literature on the private benefits of control obtained by controlling 
shareholders – see, for example, Grossman & Hart (1986), La Porta et al. (2000), Johnson 
et al. (2000) and Dyck & Zingales (2004).  Some academic analysis (see, for example, 
Kershaw (2012a), page 774) also considers the agency costs that affect third parties, such 
as creditors and employees, but these are less often analysed by corporate governance 
scholars.  
74 That is perhaps particularly true in the context of closely-held companies, where (as noted 
in the Introduction to this thesis at fn 4) even scholars who take issue with the descriptive 
force of the contract-based view of widely-held companies often acknowledge its accuracy 
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scholars and law-makers alike (and is, of course, a problem recognised in many other areas 
of law).  However, although neither of these insights inevitably implies any particular 
normative conclusions, they have been adopted by "contractarian" scholars as the basis for 
a theory of corporate governance that severely limits the need for, or legitimacy of, state 
intervention. 
1.2.1 The hidden hand of the market 
Having discussed the potential for agency costs, Jensen & Meckling (1976) observed that 
the corporate form remains hugely popular despite these potential inefficiencies – and even 
though, in a widely-held company, managers have a relatively free hand to determine the 
“contract” with shareholders – which implies that the costs are in fact controlled.  After 
analysing the agency costs of debt and equity, they hypothesise that contracts and 
ownership structures are designed to mitigate agency costs, and that such mitigation is the 
equilibrium state of the world.   
This framework was developed by scholars including Easterbrook & Fischel (1989), who 
argued that diverse corporate governance arrangements are the result of the “hidden hand” 
of market mechanisms: bespoke contracts are facilitated by a generally “enabling” corporate 
law.  These contractarian scholars argue that managers are driven by the market “to act as if 
they have investors’ interests at heart”75, believing that the market could price for even 
relatively detailed features of a governance system.  Among the transmission mechanisms 
cited in support of this contention are the market for corporate control, the capital and 
product markets, and the internal and external employment markets76. 
An efficient market is an essential part of the contractarian thesis as it applies to companies 
with widely-dispersed owners because it is the transmission mechanism that could 
incentivise managers to offer corporate governance terms that are optimal for shareholders, 
and mitigate the agency costs that otherwise arise.  Much of the modern academic 
discussion relating to corporate governance in large companies is therefore focused on the 
                                                                                                                                     
as a description of private companies.  Nevertheless, it is not the only helpful framework, 
and its limitations must also be acknowledged – in this regard, see, in particular, Bratton 
(1989) who traces the history of various theories of the firm.   
75 Easterbrook & Fischel (1989) at page 1419.  See also Easterbrook & Fischel (1991). 
76 See Bainbridge (2003) at page 568, fn 103. 
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extent to which the governance mechanisms employed do indeed address agency costs 
and, therefore, whether the market is in fact performing that role77.   
1.2.2 Mandatory corporate rules 
This contractarian view of the firm appears to leave little or no room for mandatory corporate 
governance rules on efficiency grounds (at least insofar as there are no negative 
externalities associated with any particular rule).  As a positive matter, it argues that those 
who determine the corporate governance structure of the company will have incentives to 
choose mechanisms that “maximise the aggregate returns to all claimholders”78, and in a 
world of perfect information, efficient markets and no externalities, we would expect them to 
do so without any legal intervention.  On this analysis, if shareholders are given residual 
decision rights it is because, as Easterbrook & Fischel (1983) argue, they have the most to 
gain and the most to lose if the company is badly managed79.  As every company will have a 
different ownership structure and distinct market challenges, contractarians would not expect 
all companies to agree identical mechanisms and to allocate decision rights in the same 
way.  That implies that, although there may be a role for law-makers in helping to facilitate 
the market mechanisms that will give rise to optimal contracting, mandatory legal rules that 
constrain the ability of the actors to negotiate bespoke contracts are not helpful, and may be 
value-destructive (if they do not simply replicate the contractual term that fully informed 
parties would invariably adopt).  Default rules, on the other hand, could be helpful in 
reducing the transaction costs associated with agreeing optimal contracts, especially if they 
give the parties a choice of pre-drafted terms to adopt, depending upon the governance 
structure that suits their situation best.  In some cases, such as limited liability itself, the 
transaction costs involved in reaching the optimal contract, even though such an outcome is 
theoretically possible, might be prohibitive; in these cases, the default rules are particularly 
important to replicate the hypothetical bargain that the parties would conclude if they 
                                               
77 See, for example, Klausner (2006) referred to in fn 91 below, and Klausner (2013). 
78 Hart (1995b) at 686. 
79 See also Hansmann & Kraakman (2001).  Analysis of contracts in venture capital-backed 
companies seems to bear out this idea that residual control rights can be optimally allocated 
by contract; for example, analysis by Kaplan & Stromberg (2003) demonstrates that the 
allocation of control rights between entrepreneurs and investors varies according to a range 
of company-specific factors. 
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inhabited a world with no transaction costs80, as long as the parties can agree to oust them if 
they do not suit. 
Furthermore, while contractarians might argue for repeal of any mandatory rules on grounds 
of economic efficiency, many would go further and conclude that there is no legitimate basis 
for state coercion because economic interactions with the company (including those with 
creditors, customers and employees) are based on the principle of unanimous consent81.  
However, it is clear that even a staunch contractarian would accept that a case for state 
intervention can be made in the face of established market failures, including, most 
obviously, where unrestrained corporate behaviour gives rise to negative externalities82.  
Nevertheless, it can be argued with some force that such negative externalities are more 
effectively and legitimately dealt with by rules that are external to the corporate governance 
structure in order to prohibit, impose liability for, or tax activities that have external costs; in 
this way, democratically accountable (and, therefore, legitimate) governments can require 
the external costs of an activity to be internalised in decision-making processes without 
interfering with the fundamentally private nature of the core corporate governance system83. 
1.2.3 Contractarian explanations for mandatory rules 
Despite the widespread influence of the analytical framework that underpins it84, many 
academics have identified empirical evidence that seems to undermine the descriptive value 
                                               
80 See Bainbridge (2001) at page 865. 
81 See Moore (2014) at page 705-6 for a fuller description of this ground for rejecting 
mandatory rules as illegitimate, although Moore does not himself accept it.  An alternative 
approach is to regard the company as a creature of the state rather than a product of 
individual contractual freedom.  On that view, the state confers powers on shareholders 
because it regards that as efficient, and it is therefore legitimate for the state to limit or 
withdraw that privilege from shareholders if it considers that a more efficient solution is 
possible.  For a clear articulation of that approach see, for example, Grantham (1998), 
especially pages 585-6. 
82 The provision of public goods is another justification offered for regulatory intervention that 
is arguably consistent with the contractarian paradigm; see, for example, Moore (2013) at 
pages 233-238 and 267-271. 
83 See, for example, Jensen (2001) at pages 11-12 and 16; see also Moore (2013) at pages 
233-238.  An alternative approach to that more usually adopted by economists is advocated 
by Coase (1960). 
84 Although acceptance has not been universal; see, for example, Clark (1989), who argues 
that the dominance of this theory is unhelpful, and whose own work implicitly rejects it; 
Ireland (2003), who argues that UK corporate law – although originally derived from the law 
of partnership – is now more accurately characterised as a body of law designed to protect 
rentier’s property rights because they have lost meaningful contractual connections;  and 
Moore (2013), discussed further below.  See also Bebchuk (1989) and the work of other 
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of the contractarian thesis, and have consequently challenged its normative conclusion that 
mandatory rules should be avoided.  First, scholars have pointed out that mandatory rules 
do in fact exist and therefore, as a descriptive matter, the theory does not offer an accurate 
picture of company law in the US or the UK85.  Of course, a contractarian could argue that 
these mandatory rules are no more than evidence that law-makers have made mistakes, 
and that the rules should be repealed because they hamper private ordering and diminish 
overall efficiency.  In fact, however, many contractarians in the US86 have reasoned that the 
apparently mandatory rules that are present as a matter of US law are entirely consistent 
with the descriptive aspect of their theory because companies are free to incorporate (or re-
incorporate) in any state, each of which competes for business and offers a different set of 
rules.  This, it is argued, means that incorporators can, in practice, opt out of any mandatory 
rules prescribed by any one state87.  Moore88 has pointed out that, even if this defence has 
force in the US, it is somewhat diluted in the UK, where there is no direct equivalent for the 
freedom to choose between states – although in this thesis I argue, in Chapter 9, that there 
is, in fact, significant freedom to contract out of mandatory rules for closely-held private 
companies89.  But in any event, this defence of the descriptive power of contractarianism 
does not explain why the UK includes mandatory rules in its company law at all90. 
A potential justification for that emerges from a second challenge to the contractarian thesis: 
that there is serious doubt whether, in practice, the market does strongly encourage widely-
held companies to adopt an optimum set of corporate governance rules.  There is, for 
example, some evidence about what happens at what is, perhaps, the time at which the 
contractarian predictions are most likely to hold: when a company offers equity securities to 
the public for the first time (an “IPO”).  Contractarians would predict that pre-IPO 
                                                                                                                                     
scholars cited in that article, who argue (inter alia) that imperfect information issues 
undermine the case of those who favour freedom of contract.  
85 See, for example, Moore (2013), especially Chapter 6.  Part 3 of this thesis includes a 
detailed description of some important mandatory rules in UK law. 
86 See, for example, Bainbridge (2008) at page 33. 
87 That is, of course, if there is another state offering a different choice and the mandatory 
rule in question is not universally adopted by all states, or mandated by federal law. 
88 See Moore (2013) at page 232.  
89 As well as entering into shareholders’ agreements, it is possible to incorporate holding 
companies outside of the UK or to utilise limited liability partnerships (which are more 
contractual in nature than limited companies).  See further Chapter 9.2 and 9.3 at pages 
192-201 below. 
90 See Moore (2013) at page 233. 
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shareholders would adopt rules that mitigate agency costs most effectively, because the 
market would assess and price these rules, and would pay more for shares in companies 
that had optimised them.  Klausner (2006) is among those who have argued that this is not 
what happens in reality, saying that contractarian theory is based on an “entirely plausible, 
but, in fact, imaginary, world of contracting”91.  The normative content of the contractarian 
view, which prescribes no mandatory rules, is based on the assumption that companies 
have a diverse range of governance needs.  That would lead us to expect a wide range of 
terms to appear in IPO charters, especially as, in the United States, firms are not only largely 
free to choose the terms of the charter, but are also free to choose the state in which they 
incorporate (and therefore the set of mandatory and default rules that will apply to the 
company).  However, Klausner, following an empirical enquiry, says that there is little 
evidence that firms do in fact vary their charter terms, or that they choose their state of 
incorporation based on the content of its corporate governance rules.  In reality, pre-IPO 
firms largely adopt the default rules, and generally choose Delaware as their place of 
incorporation, probably because of the positive externalities that these choices carry with 
them, but perhaps also as a result of power disparities, blunted incentives, and imperfect 
and asymmetric information.   
If the positive aspect of contractarian theory – that companies adopt welfare-maximising 
governance structures without legal intervention – is incorrect, then that has very important 
normative consequences.  First, it implies that mandatory rules might improve the welfare of 
the parties, if regulators are able to choose rules that are more welfare-maximising than the 
market does.  That, however, is a critical proviso: it would require evidence (in the absence 
of a real world voluntary contractual solution to mimic) that the mandatory rule chosen was 
superior to that which is adopted by market participants without intervention; and, because it 
would not be a solution grounded in unanimity, would need to justify its legitimacy otherwise 
than as an expression of individual contractual freedom92.  Secondly, Klausner’s finding that 
default rules are usually adopted also has other implications: it suggests that such rules are 
more important than contractarians would have predicted, and so it is more important to 
                                               
91 Klausner (2006) at page 784. 
92 See Moore (2013) at pages 238-256 for a fuller exposition of the weaknesses, inherent 
contradictions and implications of the “market mimicking” justification for mandatory laws. 
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make sure that they are optimised, or perhaps to make companies choose between several 
default rules rather than provide a “one size fits all” solution.   
The existence of mandatory rules in UK law and stock market regulations would certainly 
suggest that UK policy-makers have not accepted that public company shareholders, even 
with the assistance of market mechanisms, are willing and able to engage in comprehensive 
“negotiation” of the corporate contract without legal intervention; indeed, there are also 
considerable doubts as to whether shareholders are likely to conclude welfare maximising 
contracts even if they do engage with managers – at least in some types of company93. 
This view of the company, and the conditions in which mandatory rules might be justified by 
it – essentially when there is a market failure that prevents welfare maximising rules from 
being negotiated by shareholders, and when regulators are able to supply alternative welfare 
enhancing rules94 – forms the starting point for the analysis that follows.  In the next 
Chapter, we set out the structure of ownership of the private equity industry and the 
conditions that ought, in theory, to facilitate and encourage extensive private ordering.  That 
will, in turn, lead to a series of testable hypotheses, which together form an expanded theory 
of private equity corporate governance, and the consequent research questions that will 
enable us to test that theory.   
 
  
                                               
93 See Ferreira et al. (2013), who argue that banks that were more engaged with 
shareholders performed poorly during the financial crisis.  
94 Contractarians might also accept some mandatory rules to deal with externalities, 
although that case is not well made out and it is often argued that such externalities are 
better dealt with by other regulatory interventions (see page 32 above) – and in practice that 
is the usual way that they are dealt with in the UK.  It is clear that most of the rules that 
circumscribe corporate behaviour, and the behaviour of those involved in directing the 
company’s actions, in order to protect stakeholders and outsiders, are not part of the firm’s 
internal governance structure.  That would include the most important protections for 
creditors, which emanate from the Insolvency Act 1986 (see, in particular, Sections 213 and 
214), but see also the discussion in Chapter 2.1.5 (at pages 42-44 below) relating to rules 
that attribute liability to dominant shareholders and directors for breaches of various 
statutory provisions by the company and/or the board.  One important reason for adopting 
that approach is because directors’ duties, even if mandatory, can be avoided by 
incorporating in another jurisdiction – see further discussion in Chapter 9.2 at pages 192-196 
below.   
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CHAPTER 2: PRIVATE ORDERING IN PRIVATE EQUITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
 
The most important feature of the archetypal private equity-backed company is, of course, 
the dominant position of one professional shareholder (or a small consortium of 
shareholders), who is likely to have a significant influence over the company’s strategy and 
operations.  Although this is in marked contrast to the position in a widely-held listed 
company, where investors may face collective action problems or lack the incentives, 
expertise and/or resources to act95, it might be thought similar to the structure of many other 
companies: concentrated shareholding structures are hardly unique to private equity.  
However, as demonstrated by Thomsen & Pedersen (2000)96, the identity of a company’s 
shareholders matters, as well as their degree of concentration, and the characteristics and 
objectives of private equity funds (as shareholders in UK companies) differ in many ways not 
only from typical investors into UK public companies, but also from investors in other 
privately-held firms, including those usually associated with the "insider" model developed by 
Franks & Mayer (1995) to describe a corporate ownership structure that is common in much 
of continental Europe97.  These differences – to the extent that they might be expected to 
influence the incentives to invest resource in devising and operating a sophisticated 
governance framework – are examined in detail in this Chapter.   
                                               
95 Bainbridge (2006) at page 1744-1746 explains why rational shareholders in a widely-held 
company may prefer to delegate decision-making to a small group of directors or managers.  
It is true that the ownership structure of UK listed companies has changed dramatically in 
recent years, with a shift from retail to (foreign and domestic) institutional investors, and that 
this change could (partially) alleviate collective action problems – see Cheffins (2008) and 
Cheffins (2010); however, these investors still lack the incentives to act for reasons 
explained by, among others, Gilson & Gordon (2013).  See also Kershaw (2012a) at pages 
179-185, who says (at page 183) “…an assumption of large-scale rational apathy on the part 
of shareholders in large UK companies is a reasonable one.”  
96 For a review of some recent contributions to the debate on the relative impact of various 
types of investor on corporate actions, see Kumar & Zattoni (2015) who cite, among others, 
Tilba & McNulty (2013), who look at pension fund investors, and van Essen et al. (2015), 
Kavadis & Castañer (2015) and Pindado et al. (2012), who look at the behaviour of family-
controlled firms.  See also Bratton & Wachter (2013), who point out (at page 508) that 
private equity investors, like hedge funds and corporate managers,  “are under-diversified 
(and thus highly incentivized to improve performance at individual firms) and well informed 
about the business (and thus positioned to offer productive planning and performance 
inputs)”. 
97 For example, in Germany, large block-holders are common and voting power is highly 
concentrated.  A study by Becht & Bohmer (2001) concluded that more than 50% of all 
German listed companies were controlled by a single majority block and “only 17.4% are 
without a block-holder with at least a veto minority (25%)” (page 142).  Similarly, Franks & 
Mayer (2001) find that other companies, families and (through proxy voting rights) banks are 
the holders of highly concentrated control power in German companies. 
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2.1 Typical private equity investor characteristics 
2.1.1 Individually significant investments 
Private equity investors tend to make a small number of relatively large investments, 
meaning that they have the time and financial incentive to invest significant resource into 
each one.  Not only is the value of each investment relatively high in absolute terms98, it will 
also represent a relatively large proportion of the total assets that the firm manages99.  Most 
private equity funds are subject to diversification rules imposed by investors that limit the 
amount of the fund that can be invested in any one company, which will typically mean that 
they must hold at least 5-8 investments in each fund100.  In practice, this sets a floor for the 
number of investments, and each fund will usually invest in more companies than this 
minimum.  However, even when added to investments from older funds that are no longer 
investing101, the average number of investments is still relatively small: research by Lopez-
de-Silanes et al. (2015) reveals that the average private equity management company holds 
17 investments at any one time. 
Further, the structure of the industry is such that private equity fund managers generally 
have to raise further funds every three to five years.  This is because their funds are usually 
"self-liquidating", meaning that amounts drawn down from investors can only be invested 
                                               
98 The average value of each investment held will clearly vary with the size of the fund and 
the manager's strategy.  According to the BVCA, a “mid-market” private equity fund will 
typically invest equity of between £10 million and £100 million in each deal – see: 
http://www.bvca.co.uk/PrivateEquityExplained/FAQsinPrivateEquity.aspx [Accessed 
2.03.2017]. 
99 It is important to note that the ultimate investors in the portfolio companies – the mainly 
institutional investors who invest in private equity funds – will be much more highly 
diversified than the private equity fund itself and will only own (on a look-through basis) a 
relatively small proportion of the equity of each portfolio company.  However, the 
management of the shareholding is undertaken by the private equity fund manager, whose 
own incentives are driven by the structure of the fund(s) it manages and the fee structures 
built into it. 
100 Talmor & Vasvari (2011) say (at page 24) that the diversification limit is usually set at 
15% , while Preqin (2015a) reports (at page 55) that 20% is the limit for 80% of 2014 and 
2015 funds and those yet to begin investing.  For general discussion of the use of restrictive 
covenants in fund documents see McCahery & Vermeulen (2008) at pages 189-191. 
101 Investors typically impose strict limits in the limited partnership agreement on the number 
of funds that managers can actively manage at any one time in order to ensure that the 
manager's time and attention is not excessively diluted.  See, for example, Gompers & 
Lerner (1996) who find (at page 485) that this type of covenant is found in the overwhelming 
majority of a sample of partnership agreements signed between 1988-1992.  Preqin (2015a) 
confirms (at page 55) that a manager is generally prohibited from launching a follow-on fund 
with a similar strategy until the end of the investment period of the present fund, or (if earlier) 
the point at which the present fund has invested a certain proportion of its commitments. 
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once, in a single stream of investments, with very limited re-investment rights102.  After the 
end of the investment period, or once the fund is fully invested (if earlier), the firm will need 
to return to its investors and try to raise a successor fund103.  Therefore, the success or 
failure of any one fund has a very real impact on the ability of a firm to survive (or, at least, 
an impact on the size and economic terms of the next fund that it raises). 
Given that each fund makes a relatively small number of investments, a few unsuccessful 
investments can make the difference between survival and failure for a firm.  Therefore, the 
fund manager has a very significant financial incentive to ensure that each investment is 
successful.   
This financial incentive is magnified by the fee structure that prevails in the private equity 
industry.  Fees are charged on assets under management104, but these are supplemented 
by investor-driven requirements for co-investment by the executive team, and by “carried 
interest”105.  The fact that most investors require individual fund management executives to 
make a significant investment in the fund106 means that each has a strong personal interest 
in successful outcomes, and “carried interest” – which usually means that the individual 
executives share 20% of any profits made (so long as the profits exceed a “hurdle” rate) – 
further increases that incentive.   
It is noteworthy that this characteristic of a private equity investor does not only distinguish it 
from a typical investor in a publicly-held company, but also from many other large financial 
investors in private companies (such as those typically found in Germany and certain other 
continental European countries107), which may have many equity holdings across a more 
                                               
102 See Gilligan & Wright (2014) at page 56. 
103 See Blake & Robinson (2015) at page 33. 
104 See Talmor & Vasvari (2011) at page 32, who report that fund managers typically charge 
a management fee of between 1% and 2% of the total committed capital of the fund during 
its investment period, and a similar percentage of the cost of investments held by the fund 
thereafter.  See also Gilligan & Wright (2014) at pages 41-43. 
105 See, for example, Talmor & Vasvari (2011) at page 32-33, for a description of carried 
interest.   
106 Preqin (2015) reports, at page 58, that the median level of co-investment for recent 
buyout funds was 4.35% of fund size, and the mean was 6.47% (reflective of the fact that 
some funds have very high levels of co-investment); this can translate into a personal 
investment for senior executives of several hundred thousand pounds each, which is clearly 
a significant amount even for a wealthy individual.  
107 See Franks & Mayer (2001) for a discussion of the ownership structure of German 
companies. 
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diverse range of companies, and are likely to have a different incentive structure, so that 
there is less at stake from the outcome from any one particular investment (with, perhaps, a 
resulting dilution of the incentive to invest heavily in designing optimal and bespoke 
decision-making processes for each investment)108.   
2.1.2 Illiquid investments 
The ability of a disaffected private equity investor to sell shares is severely constrained, 
unlike investors in listed companies (but, in this respect, similarly to investors in many other 
private companies).  The shares can normally only be sold in a single block, and (in order to 
maximise the price that can be obtained) usually with the co-operation of management.  In 
some cases, the most profitable route to realisation of the investment will be an IPO, in 
which case active participation of the management team is essential.  The incentive to 
engage with the company in order to achieve the desired outcomes is therefore greatly 
increased. 
This position is not only a matter of commercial reality – because it is hard to find a buyer 
quickly and cheaply, and without warranties being given to a buyer by the management 
team – but it is also built into the ownership structure: there will often be restrictions on 
transfers of shares by the investor, at least without also negotiating a similar “exit” for the 
management shareholders109.  These transfer restrictions are generally designed to ensure 
that all of the shareholders are aligned in their incentives to achieve a sale of the company 
at some point in the future for the mutual benefit of all. 
The inability of investors to trade their shares also imposes another important requirement 
on private equity shareholders, which means that – even if it would be most efficient to put 
all decisions in the hands of the directors or managers – they usually cannot do so, given the 
mandate they have from their own investors.  A private equity investor will often be subject 
to geographical or sectoral restrictions that constrain its investment mandate110, will be 
                                               
108 In contrast, family-owned enterprises are likely to have shareholders who are significantly 
less diversified than a private equity fund, which may, in turn, affect their attitude to risk. 
109 See the analysis of the empirical data collected for this thesis in Chapter 4.2 at pages 82-
87 below for a description of the extensive share transfer restrictions. 
110 Although investment restrictions of this type are not universal, they are relatively common 
in private equity funds – see Gompers & Lerner (1996), who find some restrictions on the 
fund’s permitted investments in most of the limited partnership agreements they analysed 
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obliged to undertake extensive due diligence before investing, and to invest on the basis of 
its informed view of the business proposition and business plan111 that the company has 
represented to it (or that the investor has devised or contributed to).  It is therefore vital that 
the investor has a way to ensure that the company actually pursues that particular 
proposition and plan.  If the directors of a company, or the controlling shareholders in cases 
where the investor does not hold a majority, were able unilaterally to change the business of 
the company, or make significant changes to its strategy, that would be problematic for the 
investor.  Unlike investors in publicly-traded companies, private equity investors cannot sell 
their shares in response to a strategy change.  The investor therefore has to find some other 
way to protect its position112.   
It is noteworthy that, in protecting its own position, the investor may well be required to 
frustrate an action that would be in the company's best interests, whether the company is 
viewed as an economic entity in its own right or as the composite of its current and future 
shareholders.  It is also important to note that this situation could equally apply to a majority 
shareholder, who might find that it has the power to block the putative strategy change in 
one way or another, but only if it pursues its own goals and not the long-term success of the 
company viewed as a separate economic unit. 
2.1.3 Ability to influence management, specialist knowledge and lack of co-
ordination costs 
Another important feature of private equity shareholders is that they acquire a significant 
proportion of the shares in the underlying company.  This means that they will have enough 
voting power to make a difference to corporate decisions at shareholder level.  Even where 
the investor is not in control of a majority of the shares, there will usually be relatively few 
other shareholders and so the costs of co-ordinating collective action will not be a significant 
barrier to action.  However, in most cases the balance of the shares will be held by 
                                                                                                                                     
that were signed 1988-1992.  In this respect, a private equity fund investor may well differ 
from other block-holding investors in private companies, who may not be subject to similar 
sector based or geographic restrictions.   
111 The typical business plan is described in more detail in Talmor & Vasvari (2011) at pages 
249-250. 
112 Put another way, the potential for management to change strategic direction without the 
knowledge and consent of the shareholder creates a potential agency cost, which has to be 
controlled through the governance system because it is not controlled by the stock market. 
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management, which establishes a potential conflict at shareholder level between the private 
equity investor and the executive managers, who may have different views about the 
appropriate course of action for the company, and/or different incentives to pursue one 
course of action rather than another. 
Although private equity shareholders share this characteristic with other investors in private 
companies, one important difference compared to many such investors is that private equity 
firms tend to have specialist knowledge of a particular sector and a clear vision for how they 
wish their investee company to develop its business.  Therefore, not only do they have the 
power to influence management, but they may also have the specialist knowledge to do so 
and will want to design the governance structure so that this expertise can be brought to 
bear in the most appropriate way.  Large financial institutions with significant holdings in 
private companies might well feel that they lack the skills to confidently overrule 
management on key decisions, whereas private equity investors might be expected to 
restrict the delegation of power to management and to reserve decisions on certain strategic 
and, perhaps, significant operational matters for themselves (or delegate it to a decision-
making body in which they are represented). 
2.1.4 A defined holding period 
The commercial structure of private equity funds gives private equity fund managers a 
compelling incentive to focus on the realisation of their investment.  The funds are limited 
life, with performance-related profit shares only arising on realisation (and not generally 
based on unrealised uplifts in value, as is common in the hedge funds industry).  Therefore, 
it is generally not optimal for private equity firms to hold assets indefinitely and to rely on 
dividends and other sources of income for their financial returns113.  The targeted holding 
periods will vary from firm to firm, from sector to sector, and from investment to investment, 
and will generally be longer in growth capital firms than for those following a buyout strategy.  
However, in general, firms will want to hold for a sufficiently long period to show a significant 
                                               
113 In some types of alternative investment fund, some of which are sometimes referred to as 
private equity funds, income generation may be a primary objective.  This is true in, for 
example, the infrastructure sector.  However, this is not the case for most traditional venture 
capital and private equity funds. 
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increase in value, but one that fits within the life cycle of a 10-year fund term114.  In practice, 
private equity funds tend to hold investments for around 3-6 years on average, although that 
will vary at different points in the cycle115. 
The incentives to be actively involved in the improvement of a portfolio company are 
therefore focused on a specific time horizon, which could be said to be “medium term”.  
Funds do not often buy and sell assets quickly, but nor do they expect to hold them 
indefinitely (as other professional block-holders, or shareholders in family-owned companies, 
may do).  Perhaps more significantly, a private equity firm will have a broad idea as to its 
expected holding period from the moment at which it acquires its investment.  That means 
that, although achieving the best outcome for the company in purely financial terms is a key 
objective, the corporate governance structure has to accommodate another, equally 
important, objective: to ensure that the company is an attractive candidate for IPO or sale to 
an available buyer.  That could mean pursuing a strategy that differs in a material way to that 
of a company whose sole goal is the maximisation of its long-term value as an independent 
entity, and it may be hypothesised that the power of the managers and the board has to be 
constrained so that this additional objective can be fully accommodated in decision-making. 
2.1.5 Legal risk for shareholders 
As a general principle of UK law, shareholders in limited companies are only responsible for 
the obligations of the underlying company to the extent of any capital contribution that they 
                                               
114 As described in Talmor & Vasvari (2011) (at page 28), the fund’s life is usually set at 10 
years at the outset, but usually can, and often will, be extended.  One recent industry report 
suggests that the average length of a limited partnership private equity fund is just over 13 
years (see http://blog.palico.com/2015/03/pe-data-snapshot-median-pe-fund-life-hits-record-
13-2-years  [Accessed 2.03.2017]). 
115 Kaplan & Strömberg (2009) find that the median holding period in their sample of funds 
from 1970 – 2007 was around six years.  However, there is a wide spread of holding 
periods: they report (in Table 2) that around 12% of deals are exited within two years, a 
further 30% are held for between two and five years, while around 24% have not been sold 
after 10 years.  In May 2015, the data provider Preqin reported that the average holding 
period of companies sold by private equity funds in 2014 was 5.9 years, a significant 
increase from a comparable period of 4.1 years in 2008 (see 
https://www.preqin.com/docs/press/Holding-Periods-15.pdf [Accessed 2.03.2017]).  
However, in a survey of UK private equity-backed buyouts, Jelic (2011) found an average 
holding period of 3.3 years, which is similar to the 3.5 years found by Wright & Nikoskelainen 
(2007).  See also Wright et al. (1995) and Wright et al. (1994) who emphasise the 
heterogeneity of buyouts and the impact of various factors on longevity. 
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have made, or agreed to make116.  To a significant extent, that principle applies to 
shareholders in private equity-backed companies as well as to investors in publicly -traded 
companies with a large number of investors each with a relatively small stake.  However, 
there are a number of ways in which shareholders owning a significant proportion of the 
share capital can become liable for actions taken by (or omissions of) underlying companies.  
The clearest example is when a company has been found guilty of involvement in a cartel in 
breach of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in which case 
the concept of parental liability means that an investor with “decisive influence”, even if 
entirely innocent of any wrongdoing, can be jointly and severally liable with the underlying 
company for any fines imposed117.  There is also the risk that the director appointed by the 
private equity fund to sit on the portfolio company board (who would no doubt expect to be 
indemnified by the fund, and/or covered by their insurance policy) may inherit responsibility 
for certain regulatory obligations of the company (for example, relating to anti-corruption 
laws, environmental and health and safety laws and so on) and that, even if such a director 
is not appointed, liability will be attached to a shareholder if they are deemed to be a 
"shadow director" of the company118. 
This legal liability risk means that a private equity fund manager, in common with any 
majority or significant minority and “active” shareholder in a company, needs to take extra 
care to ensure that its portfolio companies do not engage in activities for which it can be held 
liable.  As with any shareholder, the entirety of its investment in the company is clearly at 
risk if the portfolio company incurs a liability that it cannot meet, but in certain specific 
circumstances the risk may be greater, and other resources of the fund or the fund manager 
might also be at risk.  There is, therefore, a clear incentive to design a corporate governance 
                                               
116 For discussion of the arguments for and against limited liability see, for example, Cheffins 
(1997) at pages 497-508. 
117 For a useful summary of the doctrine of parental liability as applied to cartels by the 
European Commission, see Kar & Franchoo (2015).  A 2014 decision of the European 
Commission, in which it imposed liability on Goldman Sachs for the involvement of its 
portfolio company Prysmian S.p.A in an illegal cartel (Case AT.39610 — Power Cables), 
illustrates the risks for a financial investor.  In the UK, the Competition and Markets Authority 
has issued warnings to private equity firms that they may face liability for the actions of their 
portfolio companies – see https://www.altassets.net/private-equity-news/by-region/europe-
by-region/uks-competition-watchdog-in-reminder-to-pe-firms-about-their-compliance-
obligations.html [Accessed 2.03.2017]. 
118 See Chapter 8.2.3 at pages 186-188 below. 
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system that makes it unlikely that any liability will be incurred that will be passed on to the 
controlling shareholder119. 
2.1.6 Reputational issues  
Reputational issues are also at stake for private equity investors to a far greater extent than 
for small shareholders in companies with a large investor base.  If problems arise within the 
company, the investor is very likely to be linked to these problems.  Trade unions, 
customers, politicians and the press will associate actions of the company with the private 
equity shareholder.   
These reputational issues can even arise long after a company ceases to be owned by a 
private equity firm, as illustrated by the press comment relating to Southern Cross in 2011.  
It was widely reported that problems at this UK listed provider of care homes for the elderly 
could be attributed to Blackstone, the private equity firm that had owned the company before 
its flotation five years earlier, in 2006120.  The fact that the identity of the shareholder is so 
closely associated with the company, and the important reputational impacts that this can 
have, adds another important incentive for the shareholder to intervene in its 
management121.   
For most private equity firms122, their investment in any one company, while a very 
significant contributor to their financial success, is (in game theory terms) only one in a large 
number of repeated interactions with various stakeholders123.  They will have an important 
                                               
119 There are, of course, two parts to this incentive: (i) to ensure that the company does not 
engage in the illegal activity and (ii) to protect the shareholder from liability if it does.   
120 See, for example, “£1bn gamble of the care home sharks revealed: Southern Cross 
predators sold off almost 300 homes to RBS” reported by the Daily Mail on 4 June 2011 
(http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1394118/Southern-Cross-predators-Blackstone-
sold-300-care-homes-RBS.html#ixzz2nkq3315D [Accessed 2.03.2017]).  In fact, the 
evidence that Blackstone was responsible for the subsequent problems at Southern Cross is 
tenuous, at best. 
121 It is perhaps interesting to contrast this with the position of shareholders in listed 
companies.  In August 2007, 94.5% of the RBS shareholders who voted supported its 
acquisition of ABN Amro, now widely regarded as a major mistake significantly contributing 
to RBS's subsequent financial difficulties.  The shareholders who voted in favour of that 
acquisition appear not to have suffered any significant reputational damage as a result of 
their endorsement of management’s actions. 
122 With the possible exception of those who are at the end of their life and know that they 
are very unlikely to raise another fund. 
123 de Fontenay (2014) explains the impact of the fact that private equity firms are engaged 
in “repeated games” in Appendix A of her paper on the agency costs of debt.  As she 
explains, in an "end-game" (i.e., their only or last interaction), a highly leveraged private 
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incentive not to act (or fail to act) in ways that are detrimental to their reputation, even if 
expedient in the short-term.  This is clearly a factor that differentiates private equity investors 
from most investors into publicly-held firms (because they are not publicly associated with 
the investee company), but also from many other types of privately-held companies, 
including family-owned firms (where the family will probably only own one company and 
have fewer market interactions) and financial investors with a wide range of diverse 
investments where the reputational impact can be expected to be somewhat diluted and, in 
any event, their market power may negate any possibly detrimental impact. 
One aspect of this, demonstrated by de Fontenay (2014) in her paper on the gatekeeper role 
of private equity firms in the debt markets, is the incentive that private equity firms have to 
ensure that bank lenders to their portfolio companies are repaid124.  Unlike a shareholder in 
a widely-dispersed company, or one playing a “one-shot game”, a private equity firm will 
want to ensure that lenders are willing to lend to similar companies in the future and to do so 
on attractive terms.  The ability to borrow on good terms is a driver of business success for 
the firm, and there is therefore a strong incentive to cultivate and preserve a good reputation 
with possible future lenders.   
It may be speculated that similar incentives exist as regards other stakeholders.  Long-term 
relations with trade unions may matter more to a private equity firm than the potentially 
positive financial consequences that may arise from a single opportunity to treat employees 
badly in one portfolio company.  Similarly, the reputational effects of lax safety standards 
adopted in one company are likely to mean that the practices have wider financial 
consequences that will make the cost/benefit calculations look different to those that exist in 
companies with “anonymous” shareholders125.   
                                                                                                                                     
equity-owned firm would succumb to moral hazard and invest in “bad” projects that the 
lender would prefer it to avoid.  Given that, lenders will tend to charge a higher interest rate.  
However, if the game is a repeated one (i.e., one that is expected to be repeated multiple 
times), de Fontenay demonstrates that the pay-offs for the private equity firm are enhanced 
if it repeatedly chooses to invest in the "good" projects and is rewarded with lower interest 
rates.   
124 See also Demiroglu & James (2010) who found that “deals sponsored by high reputation 
[private equity firms] are less likely to experience financial distress or bankruptcy”, and that 
such firms have access to less expensive debt with fewer covenants. 
125 For example, the news coverage of revelations that horsemeat had been found in beef 
lasagne sold by Findus in February 2013 often identified the private equity firm Lion Capital 
as the company’s owner (even though they only owned a minority of the shares at the time), 
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Investors into private equity funds126 are also increasingly concerned about their own 
reputation, and are less likely to entrust their investments to a manager with reputational 
issues or one who does not pay attention to “environmental, social and governance” (ESG) 
issues127.  According to one recent survey of 102 investors by IAG & Thompson Taraz 
(2015), 20% of investors require, and a further 69% “prefer”, their fund managers to have 
reputational risk policies in place, and key concerns include bribery, tax avoidance and 
“unsafe working conditions”.  A report by PwC (2015), based on interviews with 60 investors, 
finds that 83% have “responsible investment policies” in place that apply to their private 
equity investments, 71% (of 58 investors) would decline to invest in a fund or would turn 
down a co-investment on ESG grounds, and 18% had withdrawn from an investment or 
withheld capital on ESG grounds; and Cornelli et al. (2015) argues that – driven by investor 
demands – environmental, social, governance and ethical issues now permeate down to 
core investment professionals128.  In October 2015, one very significant investor into 
European private equity funds, Dutch pension fund ABP, announced that it would target “the 
most sustainable and responsible investments” and was seeking to use its influence to 
contribute “to a sustainable society”129 and the UN Principles of Responsible Investment 
                                                                                                                                     
and sometimes also referred to the other food brands that it also owned or had owned in the 
past (see:  http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/feb/08/horsemeat-lasagne-scandal-
findus-reputation [Accessed 2.03.2017]).  Some coverage suggested that pressure to reduce 
costs at the company had been responsible.  No doubt in part motivated by a desire to 
protect its own reputation, Lion Capital publicly criticised the way in which Findus’ 
management handled the crisis and said that if it had owned a majority stake it would have 
behaved differently (see http://news.sky.com/story/1051171/horsemeat-crisis-to-widen-
findus-backer-says, [Accessed 2.03.2017]). 
126 According the Invest Europe, one quarter of the capital raised by European buyout funds 
in 2015 came from pension funds, with significant amounts from insurance companies, 
sovereign wealth funds, banks and endowment funds (see 
http://www.investeurope.eu/media/476271/2015-european-private-equity-activity.pdf 
[Accessed 2.03.2017] at page 13).  See also Gilligan & Wright (2014) at page 39. 
127 The reputational damage that a fund can do to its own investors is well illustrated by the 
press concerning the Church of England investment fund’s investment in the private equity 
fund that co-founded the payday lender, Wonga.  See, for example, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/10203492/Church-of-England-pension-fund-linked-to-
Wonga.html [Accessed 2.03.2017]. 
128 Cornelli et al. (2015) at page 2.  A fascinating recent experiment by Crifo et al. (2015) 
suggests that private equity firms will pay significantly less for a company with socially 
irresponsible environmental, social and governance practices, but do not appear to adjust 
prices upwards for companies that exhibit better than average practices. 
129 See press release issued on 14 October 2015: https://www.abp.nl/english/press-
releases/new-responsible-investment-policy.aspx  [Accessed 2.03.2017].  It is unclear 
whether the adoption of responsible investment practices by fund managers, apparently 
motivated by investor requirements and preferences, is based on a conviction that such 
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(UNPRI) reported that, by the end of 2013, more than 130 private equity investors (LPs) and 
150 private equity managers (GPs) had signed up to the PRI130.  Given the need to raise 
funds regularly, reflecting the preferences of its key investors is clearly a business critical 
issue for a private equity firm.   
Furthermore, in an environment with increased media and political scrutiny of the private 
equity industry, and the ever-present threat of greater regulation, there is a strong financial 
incentive for the industry as a whole to maintain a positive reputation with governments and 
regulators.  This effect may be more diluted, but it is at least feasible that peer pressure and 
firm-specific effects of poor government relations for the industry as a whole have an impact 
on behaviours131.   
The impact of reputation on the behaviour of private equity firms has not been extensively 
researched and could be explored further.  It is clearly plausible that reputational issues 
have a significant impact, but there is as yet limited empirical academic evidence for that 
claim.  However, it is likely that private equity investors would design a corporate 
governance system in the portfolio company that gives adequate opportunity for them to 
protect their reputation and, in particular, to prevent the company from undertaking activities 
that might be financially attractive but could have an adverse effect on the investor’s 
corporate reputation or be contrary to its own ESG policies.  
So far in this Chapter, a number of characteristics of private equity investors that distinguish 
them from many other types of shareholder have been identified, and these are summarised 
                                                                                                                                     
practices improve investment returns.  The evidence that returns are positively affected by 
socially responsible investment practices is mounting; see, for example, a meta-analysis of 
the available data by Margolis et al. (2007), which shows a positive but small impact, and a 
more recent study of sustainability policies by Eccles et al. (2014) shows a significant long-
term impact.  In private equity, Cornelli et al. (2015) find evidence in their survey that socially 
responsible investment practices are regarded as creating value as well as mitigating risks, 
which perhaps suggests that it is not only investor requirements that are motivating the 
adoption of such practices; however, the same study identifies investor requirements as the 
main external motivating actor.  Similar conclusions emerge from PwC (2016), who find that 
investors and private equity managers increasingly agree that ESG issues are sources of 
value. 
130 See: https://www.unpri.org/download_report/3880 at page 4 [Accessed 2.03.2017].  In 
November 2016, Invest Europe released a standardised ESQ questionnaire for use by 
member firms: see: http://www.investeurope.eu/media/523237/Invest-
Europe_ESG_DD_Questionnaire.pdf [Accessed 2.03.2017]. 
131 The BVCA has created a website dedicated to publicising the responsible investment 
practices of the private equity industry – see: http://investmentagenda.co.uk/responsible-
investment-in-action [Accessed 2.03.2017]. 
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in the table below.  Although this list of features is not exhaustive, it is clear that there are 
significant differences between them and firms with purely internal shareholders (owner-
managed or family firms132) and also those with widely-dispersed share ownership.  In 
particular, individually large investments in private companies, with a significant share of the 
voting rights, combined with economic and reputational incentives to intervene in 
management to affect outcomes, will drive “active ownership”.  Consequently, it seems likely 
that firms will employ appropriate specialists to give them the ability to intervene effectively, 
and will benefit from economies of scale in bringing that expertise to bear in a number of 
different companies.  They also have the wherewithal and the incentives to negotiate 
exhaustive and bespoke documentation with other stakeholders covering (among other 
things) the company’s corporate governance rules133.   
Typical investor 
characteristics 
Private equity-
backed company 
Family-owned 
company 
Listed UK 
company134 
Holds individually 
significant 
investments 
✓ ✓ x 
Holds illiquid 
investments 
✓ ✓ x 
                                               
132 Although the characteristics of “family-owned” firms are heterogeneous, the main points 
of difference with a private equity-backed company are likely to be the shareholder(s)’ 
anticipated investment horizon, and the level and impact of legal and reputational risk faced 
by such shareholder(s) in the event that an issue affects the underlying company – see fn 
135 and fn 136 below.    
133 Although there is scant evidence of the terms of the legal documents entered into on a 
buyout, more is known about the terms of venture capital contracts, and academic analysis 
demonstrates that there is a high level of customisation in the allocation of voting and control 
rights, liquidation rights and economic rights.  For example, in analysis by Kaplan & 
Stromberg (2003) of 213 investments in 119 portfolio companies by 14 US venture capital 
firms, comparisons were made between real world venture capital contracts and financial 
contracting theory.  The authors found that different allocations of rights were agreed in 
different circumstances, and different classes of shares are used to allocate rights in 
complex ways.  They found that, consistent with theory, many of the allocations were “state-
contingent”, so that the investor would have greater control and better economic rights when 
outcomes were poor than they would in circumstances where the investment was doing well.  
Rights allocation was also consistent with financial contracting theories in other ways: for 
example, equity allocations are more sensitive to performance when incentives are less 
closely aligned, or when information asymmetries are more acute.  The empirical data 
demonstrates very clearly that extensive and financially sophisticated contractual 
arrangements are put in place by shareholders.  See also Gompers & Lerner (1996), 
Gompers (1995), Sahlman (1990), Levin (2006) and Bartlett & Bartlett (1995). 
134 It is assumed that there is no dominant shareholder, which is typical in a UK listed 
company, although there are notable exceptions.  For a comprehensive description of the 
structure of share ownership in the UK (and the reasons for it) see Cheffins (2008). 
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Typical investor 
characteristics 
Private equity-
backed company 
Family-owned 
company 
Listed UK 
company134 
Has ability to 
influence 
✓ ✓ x / weak 
Defined holding 
period 
✓ x x 
Legal risk ✓ varies135 x 
Reputational risk ✓ moderate136 x 
 
2.1.7 A separation of ownership and control? 
It will be noted that, at least to some degree, most private equity-backed companies do 
exhibit a "separation of ownership and control".  It is clear from the sources cited in the 
Introduction137 and the results of my own research presented later in this thesis, that private 
equity firms routinely engage senior managers to take control of the business, at least on a 
day-to-day basis and in most cases also to take a lead in strategic planning.  However, this 
measure of delegation is not the kind of separation described by Berle & Means (1932) in 
their now classic exposition of the nature of the modern corporation.  They noted that the 
shareholders (in their terms, “owners”) of a widely-held public company lacked the resources 
and incentives effectively to oversee those with "control".  However, it might be thought that 
the portrait they paint of the corporation in its earlier form138, before this separation took 
place, represents an accurate description of the modern private equity-backed company: 
                                               
135 Although a dominant family shareholder may be sued for actions taken by the company 
in the same way as a private equity firm, the value of the assets available to satisfy any 
successful judgement may be more limited, depending upon the level of wealth of the family 
and how accessible that wealth is to a judgement creditor; a private equity fund manager, on 
the other hand, may have considerable assets of its own and is likely to be indemnified by 
the fund (which is likely to own significant other assets) and may also have an indemnity 
from the fund’s investors.  The risk of enforcement action being taken against a private 
equity firm is therefore higher in most cases. 
136 The level of reputational risk clearly depends on the specific circumstances.  However, 
since most owners of family businesses have one main investment, the financial effect of 
any damage to their reputation is likely to be contained.  A private equity investor, with 
multiple investments and the need to perennially raise further funds from existing and new 
investors and lenders, is likely to feel the financial impact of reputational damage more 
acutely. 
137 See the Introduction to this thesis at pages 17-18 above. 
138 They say (at page 125) that the picture painted "probably was not unfair up to, say, 
1835". 
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We have the picture of a group of owners, necessarily delegating certain powers of 
management, protected in their property rights by a series of fixed rules under which 
the management had a relatively limited play.  The management of the corporation 
indeed was thought of as a set of agents running a business for a set of owners; and 
while they could and did have wider powers than most agents, they were strictly 
accountable and were in a position to be governed in all matters of general policy by 
their owners.  They occupied, in fact, a position analogous to that of the captain and 
officers of a ship at sea; in navigation their autonomy might be supreme; but the 
direction of the voyage, the alteration of the vessel, the character of the cargo, and 
the distribution of the profits and losses were settled ahead of time and altered only 
by the persons having the underlying property interest139. 
Separation of ownership and control in the sense described by Berle and Means is not 
present in a private equity-backed company, but there is usually a relationship of principal 
and agent140.  The fact that there is such a relationship means that there is a potential for 
agency costs and therefore a need for corporate governance mechanisms according to the 
theories of corporate governance discussed in Chapter 1141.  A central question for this 
thesis, discussed at length in Part 2, is: what governance mechanisms do these 
sophisticated actors put in place to deal with the agency problems that arise from this 
delegation of control, and with other issues that they decide to address through such 
mechanisms.   
Having described the features of the private equity model that facilitate private ordering, we 
are now in a position to suggest some testable hypotheses and consequent research 
questions that can be addressed in the remainder of this thesis.   
                                               
139 Berle & Means (1932) at pages 125-126. 
140 The terms “principal" and agent" are used here in the broader sense meant by 
economists; however, there is clearly a legal agency relationship as well: the managers are 
agents for the company and the shareholders are therefore directly affected by and acutely 
interested in the terms of that agency. 
141 See Chapter 1.1 at pages 21-29 above. 
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2.2 The working hypotheses of this thesis 
2.2.1 Bespoke and extensive contracting 
Whatever the position for widely-held (or “public”) companies, it is clear from the preceding 
analysis that the key stakeholders in a private equity-backed company are in a better 
position to negotiate bespoke contracts, and there is less reason to expect a market failure 
in this paradigm; these features include a closer alignment of interest with reduced inherent 
agency conflicts, an informed and influential shareholder, and significant incentives to 
organise governance efficiently.  We can therefore hypothesise that the descriptive aspect of 
the contractarian thesis will be more clearly in evidence in that environment.   
In this thesis, we will test that hypothesis by evaluating the extent to which such bargaining 
is observed in practice, and whether there is variety in the negotiated outcomes that, given 
heterogeneity among companies, a contractarian would expect.  If we find evidence of 
substantial private ordering, and if we find that there are no significant information 
asymmetries or other market imperfections that would restrict the ability of the parties to 
enter contracts that are optimal as between themselves142, that would seem to support the 
contractarian view, and mandatory rules would not be needed to play a “market mimicking” 
function (to supply the rules that the actors would adopt if they sought to negotiate welfare 
maximising contracts143).  In other words, there would be no justification for mandatory rules 
based on contracting failures among the parties to the bargain (although, of course, that 
would not necessarily indicate that the contracts that result are efficient, in the sense that 
they maximise social welfare144).  In addition, we should also question the value added by 
comprehensive default rules, and ask whether they could detract from optimal bargains if 
actors rely upon them to fill gaps in their contract when they could actually negotiate more 
                                               
142 There may, of course, be information asymmetries that could be adequately dealt with by 
private ordering (for example, contractual rights to certain information) and these would 
therefore not justify state intervention. 
143 See Chapter 1.2.3 at pages 32-35 above. 
144 Establishing that any given set of outcomes maximise overall welfare is, of course, highly 
problematic and I make no claims in this thesis that any particular corporate governance 
rules are more or less likely to maximise welfare for society at large (as opposed to the 
parties who are negotiating them).  For a discussion on the economist’s approach to welfare 
maximisation, and some of the difficulties in establishing whether an outcome is efficient, 
see (for example) Hausman & McPherson (2006), especially Chapter 9, and see Bratton & 
Wachter (2013) who argue that economically efficient companies do not necessarily 
enhance social welfare. 
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optimal rules themselves (in other words, whether such “one size fits all” rules actually 
exacerbate contracting failures).   
The presence of, and reasons for, variety in private equity 
At this point it is worth pausing to make some comments on some of the immediate 
implications if this research reveals heterogeneity among the corporate governance 
arrangements in private equity-backed companies.  As discussed above, contractarians 
would predict that, if private ordering is working as expected, corporate governance 
arrangements will vary from firm to firm – especially if the companies vary in ownership 
structure, size and sector – to reflect the needs of the business and the preferences of the 
key stakeholders.  Whether we see such variety is therefore a central part of my enquiry.  
However, there are two important points to note.  First, we will need to look beyond the 
documented contractual arrangements in order to determine whether in fact corporate 
governance systems are operated according to the needs of the company, even if on paper 
they look standardised.  For that reason, document analysis alone will not necessarily 
provide a reliable answer to the research question.  Secondly, the presence of variety would 
not necessarily demonstrate that the parties were actively adopting solutions to deal with 
firm-level specificities.  That variety could arise for other reasons.  For example, it could 
derive from the legal advisers that are retained.  Law firms might set a “standard form” set of 
governance provisions, which might vary from one law firm to another, and private equity-
backed companies might adopt these “default” provisions without detailed consideration, or 
perhaps because they carry network externalities145 .   
Therefore, it is important that the research undertaken for this thesis also seeks to illuminate 
the reasons for any variety that is present, and the reasons that in some areas it is absent (if 
that is the case).   
2.2.2 Maximising contractual completeness 
If it is the case, as suggested above, that contracting is more extensive and bespoke in this 
paradigm, we can also predict that the contracts will be more complete.  As a sophisticated 
                                               
145 For a description of the network externalities that arise from the use of standard form 
documents see Klausner (2006). 
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investor – with a detailed understanding of the company and its business, and a clear and 
agreed business plan at the time of investment – a private equity firm is likely to be in a 
better position to require more extensive constraints on management discretion in the form 
of clearly agreed operational or strategic actions that the management is directed to take, or 
prohibited from taking.  The research undertaken for this thesis will examine the extent to 
which managerial authority is restricted in the contracts that are negotiated in this paradigm.  
Any such increase in contractual completeness would itself reduce the scope of manager 
autonomy, and therefore automatically limit the potential agency costs.   
2.2.3 Further minimising managerial agency costs 
Drawing on existing theory – and taking into account that, even though private equity 
investors are in a better position to write more complete contracts than some other types of 
investor, a certain level of decision-making is delegated to management – we would expect 
that the governance structures would also seek to minimise managerial agency costs in 
each of the various forms referred to in Chapter 1146.  Taking these varieties of agency costs 
in turn, we would expect the investor to bargain for oversight of the exercise of managerial 
discretion, and approval rights over certain matters, in order to constrain the power of 
managers to divert corporate assets to themselves (through self-dealing, perquisites, excess 
remuneration, exploitation of corporate opportunities and the like).  Secondly, in order to 
discourage and aid discovery of effort aversion (“shirking”), allowing remedial action to be 
taken if needed, the investor is likely to require detailed reporting of financial and non-
financial performance.  With both “stealing” and “shirking” in mind, and in addition to these 
constraints on power and reporting requirements, we might also expect the investor to 
negotiate enforceable commitments from management that they will act loyally in the 
shareholders’ interests, manage any conflicts of interest, and exercise appropriate skill (or at 
least to rely on the corresponding duties provided by company law in these respects – 
although direct commitments from the managers to the investors might make enforcement 
easier and more effective).   
However, we would also expect to see mechanisms designed to mitigate a third type of 
agency cost: those that are labelled “subjective judgement agency costs” in Chapter 1 
                                               
146 See Chapter 1.1.3 at pages 25-29 above. 
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above.  These are the specific costs associated with the fact that the managers and the 
investor(s) may have different (but honestly held) judgements about the right decision to 
take in a given situation.   
In fact, as suggested in Chapter 1147, the potential for such subjective judgement agency 
costs is greater in this environment than in many other types of company, because the 
investor will have made its decision to invest on the basis of a strategy and detailed 
business plan agreed with the management at the time of investment, and will want to 
ensure that this strategy is being actively pursued.  In other words, having established a 
more complete set of contracts, laying out the business plan and specific actions in some 
detail, there will be a need for the investor to ensure that the managers do not deviate from, 
and that they actively pursue, that plan – even if they subsequently form a different business 
judgement as to the appropriate course for the company to take.  We would therefore expect 
the monitoring and approval rights to be sufficiently extensive so that the investor could 
check that the agreed plan was being effectively executed, and that any variations from it 
were only permitted with the investor’s approval.  We might also expect that the 
management team would make commitments not to diverge from this plan without consent 
(even if they felt that a variation of the plan would be in the best interests of the company).  
As a result of this third category of agency costs, we would expect more extensive 
monitoring and oversight rights to be built into the governance structure, and more matters 
requiring shareholder (or investor) approval, than would be needed merely to prevent 
“stealing and shirking” by management.   
The research undertaken for this thesis will examine the solutions that are actually adopted 
for these theoretical problems, and how those solutions differ from those offered by 
company law. 
2.2.4 Controlling dominant shareholder agency costs 
Private equity-backed companies also commonly include other minority shareholders, 
usually managers but also co-investors.  As discussed in Chapter 1 above, theorists would 
also predict that the governance structures will seek to offer some protection to these 
                                               
147 See Chapter 1.1.3 at page 29 above. 
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minorities from dominant shareholder agency costs, especially in relation to the 
expropriation of their shares or other economic rights.  To the extent possible, the research 
for this thesis will seek to identify the extent to which other shareholders are protected by 
corporate governance rules.  
2.2.5 Improving the quality of decision-making, and arbitrating disputes 
In mapping the actual results of contractual bargaining for governance structures – including 
the balance of power between the various stakeholders and the processes that are 
established to manage conflicts of interest, to make decisions and to resolve differences of 
view – we will examine whether other dominant objectives, beyond agency cost mitigation, 
can be discerned.   
One such objective may be to give the investor, who will generally  be well-informed, with 
specialist knowledge and experience of the company’s business and/or its sector of 
operation, a “seat at the table” when decisions are being taken – not just to monitor and 
mitigate agency costs, but also to improve the quality of management and strategic decision-
making.  This aspect of the governance mechanism might not involve the investor imposing 
its view on the management, but could consist of a mechanism to ensure that decisions are 
taken in a fully-informed, objective manner and provide a way to arbitrate disputes about 
corporate strategy or operational matters that is regarded by stakeholders (especially those 
who will need to implement the decisions) as robust and legitimate.  
2.2.6 Protecting the investor’s separate interests 
Given the increased potential for legal liability and reputational damage to accrue to the 
shareholder in this environment, we might also expect the governance structure to offer 
further protection for the investor itself than would be expected in a widely-held company.  
First, we might anticipate that shareholders would take action to protect themselves from 
liability in cases where, if the company is found to have breached a particular rule, parallel 
liability can be imposed on those responsible for directing corporate actions.  Similarly, we 
would expect that the shareholders would be in a position to insist that the company took (or 
refrained from taking) certain actions that would result in the investor being in breach of its 
own regulatory or contractual obligations, or that might lead to damage to its own (separate) 
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reputation as an investor.  Secondly, the investor is motivated (and, to a certain extent, 
contractually obliged by its own fund documents) to secure a sale of the company within a 
defined time horizon and we would expect the governance framework to facilitate (or at least 
accommodate) such an objective148.   
In each of these cases, it may be that the interests of the underlying company are not 
identical to those of the investor: they may be aligned (in the sense that both are incentivised 
to reach the same outcome) but the costs imposed on the shareholder by a particular rule 
may exceed those that accrue to it indirectly through its ownership of the company, altering 
the cost/benefit calculus.  In other cases it is possible that the interests are not aligned, and 
the outcome that is optimal for the company as a stand-alone entity is not optimal for the 
shareholder: for example, an opportunity to raise fresh equity capital from a new investor in 
order to pursue a profitable investment opportunity may be foregone if the original investor 
would suffer dilution that may make it more difficult to sell its own shares at a time of its 
choosing. 
2.2.7 Adapting the legal framework and dealing with mandatory rules 
Finally, given that UK law does have a number of mandatory provisions, we would expect 
the governance rules to attempt to deal with any such rules that are not regarded as 
appropriate ways to deal with the objectives outlined above.  This may be by contracting out 
(or mitigating the effects) of the rules in extra-constitutional contracts, by incorporating in an 
alternative jurisdiction, or adopting an alternative corporate form if one is available.     
In order to test the last of these hypotheses, the mandatory (or apparently mandatory) rules 
that apply to private equity-backed companies are described in some detail in Part 3, with an 
analysis of whether – at least in theory – these could be problematic for such companies and 
their shareholders.  To the extent that there are theoretical problems, this thesis describes 
the ways in which these are dealt with in practice by governance structures, if at all, further 
testing the efficacy of private ordering.  Before doing that, in Part 2 we explore whether and 
                                               
148 In Chapter 5.2, I adopt the label “external preferences” to indicate matters that arise from 
a separate interest or liability that the investor has which might be affected by actions 
undertaken by the company, and the label “internal preferences” to indicate its interest in the 
company as a shareholder with an objective to sell as distinct from being concerned with the 
long-term interests of the company itself – see further page 122 below. 
Page | 57 
 
how private ordering tackles the other plausible purposes of the governance structure that 
are outlined above.  Taken together, these findings will enable me to validate an expanded 
theory of corporate governance in private equity-backed companies, and to assess whether 
policy-makers ought to relax any of the existing rules in order to better facilitate optimal 
contractual solutions. 
However, before moving to Part 2, the final Chapter of Part 1 describes the dataset and the 
research methodology employed to test these hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 3: SAMPLE AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 The contractual nature of corporate governance  
Any analysis of the corporate governance arrangements in a private equity-backed company 
is predominantly an analysis of negotiated contracts149 and informal relationships and, while 
in a widely-held company most of the relevant contracts would have the company as the 
counter-party, in a private equity-backed company many of the contracts (or extra-
contractual relationships) may be directly between the various stakeholders and include the 
company only incidentally, or not at all.  The web of relationships (which will generally 
include those shown below) is quite complex, and most of them will not be publicly 
disclosed. 
 
An analysis of corporate governance that only considers relationships that directly involve 
the company is, therefore, likely to miss some crucial relationships.  There is evidence, for 
example, that the requirement for personal guarantees from shareholders often imposed on 
banks when lending to small companies has an effect on the behaviour of the company, 
                                               
149 For these purposes, I am taking the Articles of the company to be a “contract”, because 
they are negotiated between the parties and subsequently bind the parties even though, in 
law, they are a particular type of contract to which special rules apply – see further Chapter 
4.1.3 at page 76 below and Chapter 9.3 at page 198 below.  
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particularly as regards risk aversion and distribution of profits150.  Similarly, we might expect 
informal relationships to be more important in a closely-held company than in a public 
company; for example, a supplier may be willing to deal with a company because it has a 
trusted relationship with its main shareholder and might place more reliance on assurances 
from that individual than on the contractual obligations owed to it by the company151.  
Indeed, there is academic support for the proposition that a bank might lend (or lend more, 
or on better terms) to a private equity-backed company because it has dealt with the 
particular private equity investor before and attaches some weight to its previous 
experiences of dealing with that firm152, even if there is no direct legal relationship between 
the bank and the private equity firm153.  The decision of the private equity firm (as 
shareholder) as to how much to cause the company to borrow, and whether to rescue it if it 
risks defaulting on the loan, might, in turn, be influenced by the need to maintain a good 
relationship with the lender in order to maintain its "good standing".  Such decisions might, 
therefore, be taken without the involvement of the company, and with interests other than 
those of the company having an impact on the decision taken.  The governance of the 
company would in that case be driven (at least to some extent) by relationships that are 
external to the company, and the research undertaken for this thesis needs to acknowledge 
                                               
150 See, for example, Romano et al. (2001) and Wellalage & Locke (2011) at page 189: “The 
common requirement for personal guarantees from the owners to support business loans 
similarly distorts operational efficiency.  As personal risk is increased through granting 
guarantees, in the absence of a gambling mentality, overall risk taking is reduced and there 
will be a propensity to ignore potential favourable projects” and “The personal commitments, 
in terms of guarantees, can lead to the leverage levels of small businesses being 
misinterpreted where it would be more accurate to include owners’ personal loans as equity 
in the balance sheet.  The role leverage plays in shaping corporate governance in small 
business is important.”   
151 See, for example, Petersen & Rajan (1994), who show that the relationship between a 
company and a lender in a small business has an impact on the availability and cost of 
credit.  More broadly, the extensive literature on "social capital" suggests that corporate 
performance is affected by relationships between individuals – see Coleman (1988) and 
Dasgupta & Sarageldin (2001). 
152 See Demiroglu & James (2010), who found that private equity group reputation reduces 
the agency costs of debt; Ivashina & Kovner (2011), who found that repeated interactions 
between lenders and private equity firms allow banks to lend on more favourable terms; and 
de Fontenay (2014), who argues that private equity firms play a “gatekeeper” role in this 
regard. 
153 In fact, there usually will be some direct relationship between the private equity firm and 
the lender.  At the very least, there is likely to be an inter-creditor deed setting out the 
relative rankings of the claims of various financiers to which they may both be parties, and it 
is also possible that some part of the loan may be guaranteed by the private equity firm, or 
there will be an obligation to re-capitalise the company in the event that it is in breach of 
covenant.  However, these contractual relationships (even when they exist) would not 
explain the empirical findings referred to in fn 152 above. 
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those relationships in order to fully understand the dynamics of the corporate governance 
system. 
My analysis has therefore looked beyond the relationships that involve the company, and 
(where possible) included relationships between the parties directly.  The formal aspects of 
these relationships are largely included in an agreement between all shareholders that sits 
alongside the Articles of Association and includes almost all of the salient governance 
terms154, but there may be other, perhaps less formal, relationships that also matter greatly.  
It is important to note that company law has little to say about the content of extra-
constitutional documents, and even less about informal relationships155, serving to 
emphasise the mainly contractual nature of the arrangements that are put in place to 
allocate decision-making power in private companies. 
My research questions therefore pose a challenge: the data that is needed to answer the 
questions is not (or at least not all156) publicly available, which might explain why the 
questions have not been fully addressed by academics before157.  Furthermore, private 
equity firms have historically been characterised as “secretive” organisations158 that might be 
thought unwilling to share information, even on the basis that it would not be used to 
attribute any particular practices to their firm.  However, no doubt in part because of my 
status as a “semi-insider”159, I was able to gain access to documents and to interview private 
equity professionals on condition of anonymity.  Therefore, in the presentation of my findings 
                                               
154 See, for example, Witney (2007) at pages 579-581.  
155 That is not, of course, to say that shareholders’ agreements and informal relationships or 
“understandings” are irrelevant to the courts in applying company law to mediate disputes 
between the stakeholders; indeed, in the law of unfair prejudice for example, such extra-
constitutional arrangements can be of crucial importance – see Re Saul D Harrison & Sons 
Plc ([1995] 1 BCLC 14) at 19 -20 (per Hoffmann LJ) and Companies Act 2006 Section 994. 
156 Some documents are in the public domain; for example, in the UK, a company’s Articles 
of Association have to be filed at Companies House and are made publicly available.  
However, as noted above, these only provide a very partial picture of the company’s 
corporate governance rules. 
157 See further the discussion in Chapter 11.1 (at pages 218-225 below) on existing 
empirical research into private equity governance structures. 
158 For one of countless examples, see a press release issued by trade union Unite on 3 
December 2015: http://www.unitetheunion.org/news/call-for-probe-into-private-equity-firms-
as-northamptonshire-boat-builder-goes-into-administration/ [Accessed 2.03.2017].  The 
press release says that the “secretive machinations of private equity firms need to be 
investigated, after Northamptonshire luxury boat builder, Fairline Boats went into 
administration, with the prospect of more than 460 jobs being lost”.   
159 See further the discussion in the Appendix to this thesis at page 279. 
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and quotations from documents and interviews I have taken care to ensure that the terms 
that I agreed with each participant have been fully respected.   
3.2 Data collection and sample description 
Having identified that the data needed to answer the research questions were likely to be 
located in confidential documents and in informal relationships, it was necessary to define 
the population of companies to which this project would be addressed, identify an 
appropriate sample, negotiate with potential participants the extent and terms of access and 
decide upon an appropriate methodology and specific methods of analysis.  
3.2.1 Defining the population 
Although the universe of “private equity-backed companies” (as defined for the purposes of 
this thesis160) is very broad, it was clear – from personal experience, from discussions with 
industry participants and from the structure of the investments – that the corporate 
governance arrangements in venture capital-backed companies (that is, minority 
investments in start-up companies) were likely to be somewhat different from those in 
companies that were the subject of a “buy-out”, or where the investor took a significant 
degree of control of a portfolio company that was in a later stage of its development.  In 
addition, the corporate governance arrangements in such venture capital-backed companies 
have been the subject of prior academic study161, and (self-evidently) more established 
companies are likely to have greater economic impact (and therefore be subject to more 
intense public interest).  For those reasons, this research is focused on “later stage 
companies”162, but includes some where the investor had acquired all or a majority of the 
equity, and others where the investor had acquired a significant minority investment.  
Although, for comparison purposes, a small number of early stage companies were included 
in the analysis, these (venture capital-backed) companies were generally excluded163.   
The population was also restricted to UK-based portfolio companies – defined by reference 
to their main operating jurisdiction and/or corporate headquarters, rather than the company 
                                               
160 The definition is set out in the Introduction to this thesis at pages 12-14. 
161 See references at fn 10 above. 
162 There is no precise definition of “later stage companies”, but I use the term to mean 
companies that already have an established business and revenues. 
163 For more information on the size of the companies in the sample, see the table at page 
65 below. 
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law applicable to the ultimate holding company in the group.  Although comparisons of 
private equity governance structures across jurisdictions would certainly be interesting, and 
is a fertile area for further study, this study tests existing theory and my hypotheses in the 
context of the UK market against the backdrop of UK law. 
3.2.2 Sample description 
The sample comprised 50 private equity-backed companies164, and 30 industry practitioners 
with knowledge of the corporate governance structures in their portfolio companies were 
interviewed; all these interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim.  A further 12 
experts were also interviewed at an earlier stage of the research, which was instructive in 
formulating the research questions and defining the scope of the documentary analysis.  
Although extensive notes were taken, these additional interviews were not transcribed and 
any findings are not included in the analysis of interviews described below and reported 
throughout this thesis. 
Participating private equity firms 
Data relating to these 50 companies were drawn from 11 participating private equity firms 
(an average of 4.5 each165), which between them made investments of differing sizes in the 
buyout and growth capital market.  The table below describes each of the 11 participating 
firms (Firms A-K), together with the two firms who provided interviewees but no documentary 
data for their portfolio companies (Firms L and M), although specific information has been 
omitted to maintain anonymity.   
                                               
164 There were 47 different companies in the sample, but three companies (Companies 
13/23, 21/31 and 34/38) were coded twice because they were owned by two different 
participating private equity firms at different times.  This gave me an opportunity to compare 
the corporate governance arrangements in the same company when owned by different 
private equity firms, although any conclusions from such a comparison can only be 
anecdotal. 
165 The median was four companies. 
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   Firm strategy 
Number of 
portfolio 
companies 
contributed 
Number of 
UK portfolio 
companies 
(present) 
Maximum 
investment 
(£m) 
UK 
employees166 
Firm A UK buyout and 
growth capital 
12 More than 50 50-100 50-100 
Firm B UK buyout and 
growth capital 
9 10-50 0-50 50-100 
Firm C UK buyout and 
growth capital 
7 10-50 50-100 0-50 
Firm D European 
buyout 
5 0-10 100-500 0-50 
Firm E European 
buyout 
5 10-50 100-500 50-100 
Firm F UK buyout and 
growth capital 
4 10-50 50-100 0-50 
Firm G Global buyout 
and growth 
capital 
2 0-10 None 
specified 
0-50 
Firm H Global buyout 2 0-10 None 
specified 
50-100 
Firm I UK buyout and 
growth capital 
2 10-50 50-100 0-50 
Firm J UK growth 
capital 
1 More than 50 0-50 50-100 
Firm K Fund of funds 
and co-investor 
1 0-10 None 
specified 
0-50 
Firm L Global buyout  0 0-10 None 
specified 
50-100 
Firm 
M 
Global buyout  0 0-10 None 
specified 
50-100 
 
These firms provided me with unlimited access to relevant documents and with access to a 
selection of relevant interview subjects.  However, as shown in the table above, the number 
of companies drawn from each private equity house was not equal, ranging from one 
                                               
166 This refers to employees of the fund manager and not of the underlying portfolio 
companies. 
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company for each of two participating firms to 12 companies in the case of the firm (Firm A) 
contributing the most.  This imbalance meant that, when analysing the data, conclusions 
could not be drawn about the prevalence of particular market practices without correcting for 
the over-weighting of certain firms in the sample.   
Portfolio companies 
The 50 portfolio companies in the sample were acquired or invested in by the participating 
private equity firm between February 2006 and April 2015 although, as the chart below 
shows, over 80% of the companies were acquired between 2010 and 2014, with just over 
one-third acquired during 2013.   
 
This spread of acquisition dates was deliberate: most of the companies in the sample 
needed to have been owned for long enough for the corporate governance system to have 
been established and operated, whilst still being recent enough for interviewees to be able to 
recall sufficient information about its operation.  To make this research more current, it was 
important to capture relatively recent practices, rather than historic ones.  These criteria 
suggested an optimal acquisition date of between 2010 and 2014.  However, some 
companies that were acquired earlier were also included, partly to be able to compare the 
evolution of documentation across a number of years and partly so that the ownership of the 
same company through two different private equity owners could be traced, which was 
achieved in three cases. 
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The sample also ranged considerably in size and value.  At the date of initial acquisition or 
investment, the lowest enterprise value was approximately £3m, while the largest had a 
value of several billion pounds, with the amount of private equity investment ranging from 
£2m to more than £1bn167.  However, as the chart below demonstrates, these were outliers 
(included in the sample largely to act as a point of comparison) and the vast majority (92%) 
of the companies in the sample had an enterprise value of between £10m and £500m at the 
date of initial acquisition, with more than half of the sample (56%) having a value of between 
£10m and £50 million.  The median enterprise value was £45.5 million, with a median private 
equity firm investment amount of £25.8 million, and a median turnover for the portfolio 
companies of £27 million.  Although there was some variation, therefore, the research was 
predominantly concerned with smaller and mid-size companies, rather than large buyouts. 
 
As shown in the table below, most of the companies were acquired in private buyout deals, 
with just two being acquired in take-private transactions and the remainder (26%) being 
described by their investors as “development capital” (meaning that an investment was 
made into the company, although that would often also be combined with some acquisitions 
of shares from existing investors) or "replacement capital", which implies that the shares 
were acquired from an existing shareholder. 
                                               
167 The precise enterprise values and investment amounts have not been disclosed because 
they could facilitate identification of the underlying companies and investors. 
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Type of deal Number of companies % of sample 
Private buyout 35 70% 
Take private buyout 2 4% 
Development capital 10 20% 
Replacement capital 3 6% 
 
Private equity investors168 held a majority of the equity in 74% of the companies in the 
sample and, as the chart below demonstrates, held more than 40% in 86% of cases.  Apart 
from two growth capital investments, of 10% and 18% respectively, all investors held at least 
25% of the equity, and the median equity share for the investor was 68%.  In 30% of the 
companies, the investor(s) held more than 80% of the equity, although they only held more 
than 90% in two cases.  The vast majority of the remaining equity was held by managers 
and/or founders of the business and, in some cases, other employees169.   
 
                                               
168 For this purpose, I have aggregated the equity of all private equity co-investors, even 
when the investor participating in this research was only one of a number of private equity 
investors. 
169 In many cases, some equity was reserved for an employee share scheme, but the 
dilutive impact of that is not included in these proportions, which were measured at the time 
of initial investment in order to assess the balance of voting power rather than ultimate 
economic interests. 
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Perhaps surprisingly, not all of the firms participating in the research undertaken for this 
thesis could provide accurate employee numbers as at the date of their initial investment 
and reliable data was only available for 37 of the 50 companies.  The total number of 
employees in these 37 companies was more than 44,000, but the median was just 192170, 
indicating a very wide range: three companies had more than 5,000 employees and two of 
those had more than 10,000.  As the chart below shows, 65% of the companies in the 
sample had fewer than 300 employees on the date of acquisition, and 78% had fewer than 
1,000. 
 
At the time of analysis of the sample (March/April 2016), 20 (40%) of the companies had 
already been sold or taken public by their private equity investors and, of those that had 
been exited, one half had been sold to another private equity investor or financial acquirer; 
around one-third had been floated on the London Stock Exchange’s (LSE) main market or 
its Alternative Investment Market (AIM); and the remaining three (15% of those exited) had 
been sold to a trade buyer.  It would seem that the exited investments were, in general, 
successful ones for their investors: in the 14 (out of 20) exited investments for which data 
                                               
170 The arithmetic mean was 1,192, but that is clearly skewed by the outliers.  Excluding the 
three companies with more than 5,000 employees gives an arithmetic mean of 486, and 
excluding the eight companies with more than 1,000 employees gives an arithmetic mean of 
188, much closer to the median. 
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was available, all companies delivered positive returns for the participating private equity 
firm, with an average annualised return of 33%171. 
There is also some evidence that the companies in the sample that had already been sold or 
taken public by their private equity owners had significantly increased the number of 
employees during their period of ownership – of the 11 companies that had been exited and 
for which reliable data on employee numbers on acquisition and exit was available, only one 
saw a decline in employee numbers during the period of private equity ownership in 
question172, and all others showed an increase (and in most cases a very substantial 
increase)173.   
The portfolio companies in the sample were drawn from eight different sectors as follows: 
 
Law firms 
It is possible that the identity of the law firm engaged by the private equity firm to draft the 
key governance documents is an important factor in determining the contractual terms, given 
that much of the content of the documents is likely to be driven by law firm standard forms 
                                               
171 The median return was 26% pa.  Of course, these results are not generalisable, and 
(because of the six missing data points) do not accurately reflect the returns of the exited 
investments in the sample.   
172 Company 29 lost 7% of employees during the period of ownership before floating on the 
LSE’s AIM market.   
173 Of course, these numbers are not generalisable and we cannot conclude anything about 
the contribution of private equity firms to employment from them.  As to the effect of private 
equity investment on employment, see Chapter 10.1 at fn 566. 
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and boilerplate.  It was therefore important to ensure that the sample was drawn from a 
range of different law firms, but also had some overlap to be able to compare documents 
drafted by the same law firm for different companies.  This level of diversity was achieved: 
the 50 companies in the sample had a total of 24 different UK-based law firms representing 
the private equity investor (and therefore, in most cases, in charge of preparing first drafts of 
the key documents that were analysed).  Of these 24 law firms, 13 acted on just one 
investment.  The chart below shows the number of investments worked on by the various 
firms. 
 
No private equity firm used the same law firm for all of the deals they contributed to the 
sample (except, of course, the two firms that only contributed one deal each).  The table 
below shows the distribution of law firms to each private equity firm.  However, it is important 
to note that two firms (Firms A and J) insisted that the law firm appointed used the firm’s 
standard form documents (themselves drafted with help from external lawyers), which 
means that the variation within the documents used by these firms was much less than 
would otherwise have been expected.   
0 1 2 3 4 5
Law firms in my sample
Number of
investments worked
on by firm
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Number of deals contributed to 
sample 
Number of different law firms 
used 
Firm A 12 12 
Firm B 9 5 
Firm C 7 3 
Firm D 5 2 
Firm E 5 2 
Firm F 4 3 
Firm G 2 2 
Firm H 2 2 
Firm I 2 2 
Firm J 1 1 
Firm K 1 1 
 
50 35 
 
Interviewees 
The 30 interviewees (referred to as I1, I2, I3 … I30 in this thesis) were chosen to be 
representative of the private equity firms in the sample and, where possible, were individuals 
with knowledge of the corporate governance procedures in the portfolio companies in the 
sample or, where that was not possible, had direct knowledge of the approach taken to 
governance in the private equity firm that had contributed the portfolio company.  Two 
interviewees (I11 and I12) were drawn from firms that had not been able to contribute 
portfolio companies, and therefore provided a broader range of perspectives to draw upon.  
All interviewees were either on the board of a private equity portfolio company, or had been 
in the recent past, or were those with direct knowledge of the governance arrangements by 
virtue of their role in the private equity firm (for example, as general counsel or an “operating 
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partner”174).  More specifically, 14 of the interviewees sat on the boards of companies in the 
sample; 23 had direct board experience; 28 were employed by a private equity firm; and 
three of those were "operating partners".  Two interviewees were employed directly by 
private equity portfolio companies: one (I28) was a CEO and the other (I20) a chairman (and 
had been a chairman of several companies that had been owned by different private equity 
investors).   
The recordings of the 30 interviews run to 28 hours and 14 minutes, giving an average 
interview length of 56 minutes and a range of 40-81 minutes.  The table below shows the job 
titles for each of the interviewees, grouped into similar categories: 
 
Position Number 
Managing partner, partner or principal 13 
General counsel / counsel 4 
Investment director or manager 3 
Operating partner / director 3 
Head of ESG / sustainability or similar 2 
CFO / COO (of private equity firm) 2 
Head of portfolio / operations 1 
Portfolio company CEO 1 
Portfolio company chairman 1 
 
I also interviewed one highly experienced private equity lawyer (I31) who has advised 
private equity firms and management teams for many years.  This interview was undertaken 
towards the end of the research, principally in order to inform the discussion in Chapter 9.3 
of the reasons for using UK corporate structures.   
                                               
174 “Operating partner” is one of the terms used to describe a person employed by a private 
equity firm to provide assistance to a portfolio company with strategic or operational matters.  
In many ways they operate as outside consultants, but are often provided without cost to the 
portfolio company and probably have a different relationship with the company’s 
management because of their direct relationship with the investor. 
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The research methodology and specific methods, together with the limitations in the claims 
that can be made based on the size of the sample and the chosen methodology, are 
described in the Appendix to this thesis.  This Appendix also includes details of a focus 
group, which contributed to the design of the document analysis and interview questions, 
and the specific methods used to review 147 documents, systematically code and analyse 
107 of these documents – including 54 Investment Agreements (or equivalent) and 50 
Articles of Association (or equivalent constitutional document) – and to conduct, transcribe 
and analyse 30 interviews. 
Having explained the sample that formed the basis of the empirical research undertaken for 
this thesis, in Part 2 we begin the process of testing an expanded theory of private equity 
corporate governance by looking at the actual structure of contractual relationships and the 
negotiated outcomes. 
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PART 2: TESTING THE THEORY: EXPLORING THE 
STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF THE CONTRACTS 
 
CHAPTER 4: AGENCY COST MITIGATION  
 
It was pointed out in Part 1 that the delegation of power to managers, and the importance of 
ensuring that these managers stick to an agreed plan, implies that private equity-backed 
companies are, in common with shareholders in widely-held companies, susceptible to 
managerial agency costs, and we described the various forms that these agency costs can 
take: deliberate diversion of resources; effort aversion; and differences in subjective 
judgement175.  Theory would predict that such costs will be controlled by mutual agreement 
between the management team and the more remote shareholders and, in the first part of 
this Chapter, we explore the structure and extent of the negotiated contractual relationships 
to demonstrate that – as predicted, and unlike in widely-held companies – we do see 
extensive direct contracting between the stakeholders, which offers an opportunity to adopt 
bespoke agency cost mitigation strategies.   
It is, of course, possible to mitigate agency costs other than through governance 
mechanisms and, in the second part of this Chapter, we see how one aspect of the bargain 
between the managers and the shareholders of the private equity-backed companies in this 
sample – their contractually-agreed ownership structures – would seem to go some way 
towards mitigation of managerial (and dominant shareholder) agency costs, and thereby 
reduce the pressure on the corporate governance mechanism to do that work.  We 
nevertheless conclude that the ownership structure will not, on its own, deal with agency 
cost problems, and therefore we proceed to consider the extent to which, and the ways in 
which, the contested governance mechanisms supplement this contractual alignment of 
interest to further mitigate agency problems, testing the contractarian’s predictions in that 
regard. 
                                               
175 For discussion of the various forms of agency cost that might arise see pages 25-29 in 
Chapter 1.1.3 above. 
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4.1 The structure of the negotiated contractual relationships 
In Part 1, we hypothesised that, given the characteristics and incentives of private equity 
investors, we would expect the corporate governance structure in a private equity-backed 
company to be the result of detailed bespoke contractual agreement, and I now demonstrate 
that this is, indeed, the case.  I also show that there is no significant reliance on statutory 
default rules, which are often dis-applied in their entirety, or substantially modified, further 
suggesting that there is significant contracting.  However, similarities resulting from the 
choice of organisational structure and the use of law firm boilerplate can be observed, and 
may undermine the notion that the contractual bargains evident from the written contracts 
are welfare maximising. 
4.1.1 Extensive private ordering  
In Chapter 3.1 we noted the importance of looking beyond the company’s constitutional 
document – the Articles of Association – in order to understand the corporate governance 
arrangements in a private equity-backed company and, indeed, my analysis confirmed that, 
as described in various practitioner handbooks176, both the Articles of Association and a 
comprehensive shareholders’ agreement (usually called an Investment Agreement, 
Subscription Agreement or Shareholders’ Agreement)177 were the key documents agreed 
upon by the parties at the time an investment was consummated (sometimes amended later 
to accommodate a change in the ownership or capital structure). 
In the research sample, the Articles were adopted by unanimous shareholder consent, and 
the Investment Agreement (as I shall refer to it in this thesis) was between the company and 
all of the shareholders inter se.  In cases where the investor was contributing part of its 
capital by way of loan, it was supplemented by a loan note instrument.  Unless 
(exceptionally) the existing agreements were regarded as satisfactory, there were also new 
employment contracts for the management team negotiated directly between the investor(s) 
                                               
176 See, for example, Yates & Hinchliffe (2010), Chapter 5; Cooke (2015), Chapters 11 and 
12; Witney (2007) at pages 579-586; and Hale (2015) at pages 60-71.  
177 The BVCA has standard form venture capital investment documents available on its 
website: https://www.bvca.co.uk/Policy/Tax-Legal-and-Regulatory/Industry-guidance-
standardised-documents/Model-documents-for-early-stage-investments [Accessed 
2.03.2017] – although, according to the BVCA, bespoke versions are more often used.  
Although these are designed for venture capital deals, rather than buyouts, the content and 
structure of the documents is similar in many respects – see Witney (2007). 
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and the managers, setting completely new terms for their employment by the company, 
including salary and bonus entitlements, extensive non-compete obligations and other 
ongoing duties of confidentiality and loyalty to the company (which also appeared in the 
Investment Agreement, where they may be more likely to be enforced by the courts178).  If a 
chairman and/or non-executive director who was not employed directly by the investor was 
appointed to the portfolio company’s board, there was sometimes179 an appointment letter 
setting out the terms of that appointment.  In addition, other key stakeholders, in particular 
lenders to the company, insisted upon detailed legal agreements entered into not only by the 
borrowing company, but also by the other stakeholders themselves, especially to regulate 
the relative rights and priorities of those who may have claims against the company.  
Therefore, not only were there agreements pursuant to which the senior and more junior 
lenders agreed to lend to the company, and related security documentation, but there was 
also an inter-creditor agreement regulating the relationship between the lenders, 
management and other shareholders180. 
Restrictions on share transfers generally require that any new shareholders sign up to the 
same obligations as the existing shareholders by becoming a party to the Investment 
Agreement181.  It is therefore usually the case that every shareholder in the company, either 
at the time of investment or subsequently, has agreed to be bound by a comprehensive set 
of contractual rules, in most cases after taking detailed legal advice.  Of course, many of the 
provisions of these contractual agreements have no impact on the ultimate governance 
structure, but they provide an opportunity to design a bespoke governance and decision-
making process and to contest and agree the balance of power between the various 
stakeholders who have a claim to involvement in the decision-making process.  Before 
                                               
178 See references at fn 184 below.  
179 I did not have enough information to assess how frequently a separate appointment letter 
was used. 
180 This list is drawn from analysis of documents lists for those of the companies in the 
sample for which a document list was available, and is consistent with those set out in 
practitioner textbooks – see, for example, Cooke (2015) at page 397. 
181 See, for example, clause 13.2 of the BVCA standard form of Investment Agreement, 
available at 
http://www.bvca.co.uk/ResearchPublications/Publications/StandardIndustryDocumentsandG
uidance/Modeldocumentsforearlystageinvestments.aspx [Accessed 2.03.2017] and see also 
page 84 below. 
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assessing the extent to which these documents do relate to governance, however, we first 
examine the web of relationships that are created by them. 
4.1.2 Who are the protagonists? 
The various decision-making bodies and individuals identified in the sample and key to the 
documented relationships are as follows: the shareholders (making decisions deliberately in 
that capacity) and, a subset of the shareholders, the private equity investor(s); the board of 
directors (often led by a non-executive chairman) and its various committees; and the senior 
managers as a group.  The directors and senior managers are invariably also shareholders, 
of course, but may regard themselves as acting in different capacities at different times.  In 
addition, as expected, an additional actor present in the sample was the director(s) 
nominated by the private equity firm to sit on the board (who is at the same time acting as a 
representative of the shareholder and as an ordinary member of the board, although often 
with enhanced voting rights).   
4.1.3 The intricate web of contractual relationships 
The findings laid out in this thesis offer ample evidence that there is significant private 
ordering between the key stakeholders and, as expected, many of the contractual 
commitments include the company as a counterparty, either because they are included in 
the Articles of Association, which closely resembles a contract between the company and its 
members182, or in the Investment Agreement.  For example, in 98% of the companies in the 
sample, there are contractual commitments made by the company to the investor in the 
Investment Agreement and, in just over half of the companies (56%), these include 
warranties given by the company to the investor in relation to the position of the company 
and its subsidiaries.  In all cases, the senior management team acquiring or retaining shares 
made direct contractual commitments to the company in the Investment Agreement, and in 
all except one183 of these cases, these commitments included restrictive covenants and 
                                               
182 Section 33 of the Companies Act 2006 provides that: “The provisions of a company's 
constitution bind the company and its members to the same extent as if there were 
covenants on the part of the company and of each member to observe those provisions.”  
However, the company’s constitutional document derives its status from statute and is not 
treated in the same way as an ordinary contract for all purposes; see, for example, Bratton 
Seymour Service Co Ltd v Oxborough [1992] BCLC 693, per Lord Stein at 698, and see also 
page 198 below.   
183 Company 16. 
Page | 77 
 
other similar provisions that would normally be repeated in the service agreements of the 
managers184.  Other (less common) contractual commitments to the company include: 
obligations to comply with the Articles and to ensure (including by using powers as directors 
and shareholders) that all relevant group companies comply with their obligations under the 
Investment Agreement and other related agreements; commitments to maintain the 
confidentiality of information received; agreements not to sell or charge shares held by 
management other than in accordance with the Articles; and undertakings to pay to the 
company any tax due from the company that arises from management’s ownership of 
shares or other instruments. 
However, as expected, the web of contracts is more complicated than this: the company is 
not party to all of these contractual arrangements185, and in every set of agreements in the 
sample there is a wide variety of contractual commitments made between the stakeholders 
directly, and particularly between the investor and the managers.  Many of these relate to 
the way in which the business will be operated, including undertakings by the management 
team to use their powers as directors and their voting rights as shareholders to ensure 
compliance by the company with a detailed set of operational requirements (that are 
described in more detail later in this Chapter186).  Other commitments are more personal and 
relate to a manager’s knowledge of the company’s historical position, or their own future 
behaviour as an employee of the company or its subsidiaries.  Some of these are fairly 
standard: for example, in all except one187 of the occasions when the management entered 
into restrictive covenants in favour of the company in the Investment Agreement, they also 
                                               
184 According to practitioner textbooks, this is done to bolster the enforceability of the 
relevant covenants – see, for example, Cooke (2015) at page 227 (11-104).  It is well-
established that restrictive covenants are more likely to be enforceable in business sale 
agreements than in employment contracts (see, for example, Merlin Financial Consultants v 
Cooper [2014] EWHC 1196 (QB) dealing with a “goodwill agreement”) and see Kynixa Ltd v 
Hynes and others [2008] EWHC 1495 (QB) for an application of that principle to a 
shareholders’ agreement. 
185 The company (usually the main holding and, sometimes, one or two other companies in 
the group) is a party to the Investment Agreement in which these contractual arrangements 
are laid out; however, the company is not a “party” to many of the contractual commitments 
made in the sense that they are commitments given by the managers to the investors (or 
vice-versa) and would not be enforceable by the company. 
186 See Chapter 4.3.1 at pages 89-90 below. 
187 Company 9. 
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addressed these covenants to the investor directly188.  It is also common for an incumbent 
management team on a management buyout to give personal warranties about the condition 
of the acquired group and, in the sample, such warranties were given to the investor in 84% 
of cases.  On the other hand, there is also a high degree of variability in the personal 
commitments made by managers to investors: among many others, these can include 
specific commitments to comply with the terms of their service agreements and the Articles; 
commitments not to dispose of their shares otherwise than in accordance with the Articles 
and other relevant restrictions; agreements to procure enforcement of the terms of other 
agreements made by the company, particularly any to which they are themselves parties 
and in relation to which they therefore have a conflict of interest; and agreements to devote 
their full time and attention to the business of the company.  
It is therefore quite clear from this analysis that, as expected, there is extensive contracting 
on a wide range of matters between each of the various parties.  It is notable that these 
contracts are not all made through the medium of the holding company, even if they relate to 
the way the company (and its subsidiaries) will operate; it seems that the company is 
regarded as an important “nexus” for contracts, but is not regarded as the sole, or even the 
most important, counterparty.   
4.1.4 The relevance of default rules 
In Part 1, I suggested that, in an environment in which the parties do enter into extensive, 
bespoke contracts, default rules could lead to sub-optimal outcomes if the parties adopt 
defaults in situations in which they could have negotiated a more optimal rule themselves.  
                                               
188 It is not clear what additional protection may be afforded by giving these and similar 
covenants directly to the investor as well as to the company, given the well-established rule 
against recovery of “reflective loss” by shareholders.  If the loss suffered by the investor is 
merely reflective of the loss sustained by the company as a result of the same act by the 
managers, then it seems likely that the principle stated by the Court of Appeal in Prudential 
Assurance v Newman Industries ([1982] Ch 204), and affirmed by the House of Lords in 
Johnson v Gore Wood & Co ([2002] 2 AC 1), would apply to prevent recovery in an action 
brought by the investor.  It would only be possible for the investor to make recovery if the 
loss it suffered was in some way distinct from, and not reflective of, any damage to the 
company, or if for some reason the company did not have a cause of action.  Direct 
covenants might, however, allow an investor to seek an injunction to prevent a prospective 
breach, and it is possible that the court might not be prepared to deny that remedy in cases 
where there is doubt as to the applicability of the reflective loss principle (see comments of 
Neuberger LJ in Gardner v Parker ([2004] EWCA Civ 781) at [33] who says that the court’s 
jurisdiction to strike out a claim in advance of trial should be used when there is “no 
reasonable doubt” that the reflective loss principle applies). 
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My findings reveal that government-provided default rules are not, in fact, routinely adopted 
by private equity-backed companies without significant amendment; however, law firm 
defaults tended to replace them, possibly with an equivalent negative impact on effective 
contracting. 
In the research sample, approximately 60% of private equity-backed companies dis-applied 
all default model Articles in their entirety, although in many cases where the default Articles 
were dis-applied a number of specific Articles were included that tracked wording included in 
the relevant model Articles, so the statutory models are not, in effect, entirely excluded, but 
rather they are re-adopted to the extent regarded as appropriate.  Of the other 40%, around 
one-third adopted the 1985 Act Table A Articles (a function of the date of incorporation of the 
relevant company), one-third adopted the 2006 Act model articles for private companies189, 
while the remaining third (six companies) adopted the 2006 Act model articles for public 
companies190.  In all cases in which model Articles were adopted, however, there were 
extensive amendments and substitutions, with the result that only a relatively small part of 
the existing model Articles remained applicable to the company.   
In general, the approach taken to adoption or disapplication of Articles in the portfolio 
companies corresponded with the law firm acting, suggesting that private equity firms are 
content to adopt the approach recommended by whichever law firm is representing them.  
Two of the 13 private equity firms participating in the research regularly used a set of 
standardised documents that were imposed on the law firm acting for them, and in these 
cases, not surprisingly, the approach to default Articles is consistent across the portfolio 
companies.  However, the approach established in the standard form documents of these 
private equity firms may itself be determined by the law firm advising on those documents 
rather than the private equity firm itself191.  It is therefore clear from my analysis that the 
choices made by law firms are of fundamental importance in establishing the background 
governance terms adopted by private equity-backed companies, rather than the 
                                               
189 The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 Schedule 1. 
190 The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 Schedule 3.  One company adopted 
and modified the model Articles established by the law in the non-UK country in which the 
main holding company was incorporated. 
191 Firm A confirmed this to me in pre-interview discussions as regards the genesis of their 
own standard form documents.   
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government-enacted default rules: law firms establish their own “defaults”, which are 
routinely adopted by private equity-backed companies. 
This approach to document creation means that, even though the resulting balance of power 
and decision-making processes in the companies in the sample did vary to some extent from 
company to company, the specificities of the portfolio company were not the only, or even 
the dominant, influence on the terms of the key documents.  Because law firm boilerplate 
tended to displace the default rules, and supplied the vast majority of the text that replaced 
and supplemented those rules, striking similarities were observed in the companies studied.  
Indeed, even among the different law firm standard forms, the basic structure of the 
documents was similar and many of the terms closely resembled each other in effect, even if 
not in their precise terms.   
Such a finding is not surprising: there are many reasons why it is more efficient to adopt 
such standard terms than to create bespoke terms for each investment, including simply the 
costs of preparation and negotiation but also the network externalities that might be 
associated with standard terms that are extensively discussed by Klausner (1995).  
However, it is important to note that capturing these efficiencies might lead to contracts 
being concluded that are sub-optimal even if one accepts the contractarian hypothesis, as 
Klausner also explains192.   
Nevertheless, the findings of my research also demonstrate that boilerplate has much less 
impact on corporate governance mechanisms than this documentary analysis would 
suggest.  First, it was clear that much of the text built in optionality and the “gap-filling” 
exercise was done with the specificities of the company in mind.  For example, in the case of 
Firm A, which contributed 12 companies to the sample and had their own standard form 
documents used by all 12 law firms advising on those deals, in only seven of the companies 
                                               
192 See Klausner (1995), especially pages 813-815.  Research on boilerplate terms in 
contracts suggests that a boilerplate clause tends not to be amended unless a shock occurs 
that causes the parties to perceive the benefit of changing it to outweigh the costs of doing 
so – see, for example, Choi et al. (2012).  For a thorough review of the prevalence, 
stickiness and dangers and boilerplate clauses in contracts drafted by large law firms see 
Gulati & Scott (2012).   
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was the boilerplate text relating to frequency of board meetings left unamended193.  In the 
other cases there was some amendment to the wording, presumably following discussion 
and agreement amongst the stakeholders: in one case, meetings were to be held every 
other month unless there was a defined underperformance event; in other cases bespoke 
wording was included the effect of which was to require six, nine or ten meetings each year 
with various exceptions and rights for the investor director to demand more.  Therefore, even 
though the boilerplate does form a starting point and is often left unamended, there is 
evidence that the parties do focus on the commercial impact of the terms that they regard as 
important and agree variations when appropriate194.  Secondly, it was overwhelmingly 
evident from the interviews that, for much of the time, the formal rules laid out in the 
documents were not the ones that were operated in practice, with many interviewees 
asserting that the “partnership” relationship with management195 would usually develop over 
time and managers who were trusted by the investor would be given more autonomy than 
those with less experience or who were not perceived to be performing196.  The contractually 
negotiated rules are, in effect, a framework for the allocation of power and decision-making 
processes, giving residual rights to each of the parties based on boilerplate clauses, while, in 
reality, the actors involved adjust the processes according to what is perceived to be optimal 
at the time at which any given decision falls to be taken.  So, for example, the actual number 
of board meetings held in any one year is only partially determined by the contracts agreed 
at the time of investment; interview evidence suggests that more or less frequent meetings 
will be held when that is regarded as appropriate, and the chairman and/or the investor 
director will assess that on an ongoing basis.  The formal contracts are not irrelevant, but 
they omit an important part of the story, and (as explored later in this Chapter) there is, 
therefore, less similarity in the corporate governance procedures than the documents would 
suggest.   
                                               
193 The boilerplate text provided for at least one board meeting in every calendar month, 
unless the investor director agreed to vary that arrangement.   
194 Another example of such variability is given in Chapter 4.3.1 at pages 102-103 below. 
195 I1, I4, I9, I17, I19, I23 and I28 explicitly referred to the relationship with management as a 
“partnership” (in two cases in response to a prompt from the interviewer). 
196 For example, I11 said: “So at the beginning normally [the managers’ delegated 
authorities] are set … on the tighter end and then as matters come up to the board and you 
see whether things are being considered or being proposed that we agree with, then we 
might loosen them a little”; I1, I21, I26 and I27 made similar points. 
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We can therefore conclude that law firm boilerplate does play a significant role in the 
structure and content of the documents; however, it is tailored by the parties at the time of 
negotiation, and its baseline provisions are treated flexibly in practice to optimise the actual 
processes in practice according to the specificities of the company at the relevant time. 
4.1.5 The organisational structure 
There was an important respect in which all the companies in the sample did resemble each 
other:  they all chose a limited company as their organisational structure.  Furthermore, in 
84% of the cases, the main corporate governance vehicle was a UK company, and in the 
remaining 16% it was evident from interviews that tax, and not corporate law, was the driver 
of that relocation decision.  This finding is discussed in more detail in Chapter 9197, where it 
is argued that, at least to some extent, path dependence explains these choices, and that 
they suggest an inherent conservatism on the part of the actors involved.  This conservatism 
might give rise to inefficiencies in the bargaining process, and result in a sub-optimal 
allocation of power as between the contracting parties.  As explored in Chapter 9, it may, 
therefore, cast some doubt on my hypothesis that contracting is fully efficient in this 
environment.  
4.2 Contractual alignment of interest 
During the focus group held at the outset of this project, participants identified the “alignment 
of interest” among the investor and managers in their portfolio companies as a key driver of 
success in private equity.  More specifically, interviewees pointed to the fact that managers 
were incentivised, through their shareholdings, to seek financial gains through a sale or IPO 
of the company within a defined time horizon, and that this objective was supported by a 
detailed business plan agreed before initial investment198.  Such a finding is not surprising: 
existing research discussed later in this thesis199 confirms that equity ownership of senior 
managers is an important feature of the management buyout model, and (as explained in 
                                               
197 See Chapter 9.2 and Chapter 9.3 at pages 192-201. 
198 I6 was typical: “You’re all signed up to something where you know that the rationale for 
the investment is an exit at some stage.”  I1, I3, I7 and I10 also specifically discussed this.  
199 This aspect of the private equity model is widely acknowledged by academics, perhaps 
most famously by Jensen (1989) at page 68.  See Chapter 10.2, particularly pages 215-217 
below, for further discussion of the impact on outcomes of increased equity ownership. 
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Chapter 3200) significant equity ownership by managers was also a feature of the research 
sample in this thesis.  However, my document analysis, described below, confirms that such 
initial alignment of financial objectives is further reflected in, and entrenched by, the 
contractual bargains between the management shareholders and the private equity investor.  
This is achieved through various restrictions on transfers and new issues of shares. 
4.2.1 Transfers of shares 
In 98% of the companies in the sample, the company’s shares were not freely 
transferable201.  The actual restrictions varied considerably from company to company: 
sometimes no transfers by management were permitted without consent from the investor; 
in other cases, there were detailed pre-emption provisions to ensure that any shares held by 
a manager were only transferred to an outsider if the other managers did not want to buy 
them, and (in most cases) the company has declined to purchase them to warehouse them 
for future employees202. 
In 10 of the companies in the sample (20%), there were express restrictions on transfers of 
shares (by any shareholder) to competitors of the group, although the nature of these 
restrictions also varied considerably: in four cases, the restriction was absolute, while in the 
other six it was conditional on obtaining a consent; in five cases, the restriction applied to all 
shares, while in others it only applied to transfers of shares held by certain parties (in three 
cases managers, and in two cases the investors).  This is, therefore, a contested and 
bespoke restriction. 
4.2.2 Issues of new shares 
In every company in the sample, there were some restrictions on the issue of new shares to 
new or existing shareholders.  As described below203, in 96% of the companies in the 
sample, the issue of new shares was a matter requiring specific investor approval (except to 
                                               
200 See page 66 above.  In the sample used for this thesis, the median non-investor equity 
proportion was 32%, although there was a wide range. 
201 The only exception was an unusual growth capital investment made by way of loan note 
rather than equity. 
202 These findings are consistent with those of Zambelli (2012), who finds pre-emption rights 
in 78% of the companies in her sample of Italian deals, although it is not clear if these rights 
are only enjoyed by the investor, or by all shareholders. 
203 See Chapter 4.3.1 from page 94 below, which deals with a range of matters requiring 
investor consent. 
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the extent specifically contemplated by the investment documents or approved equity 
incentive schemes)204.  In addition, all but one of the companies in the sample included pre-
emption provisions applying to the issue of any new shares, even when issues were only 
permitted with investor consent205.  In most cases, these were dealt with by disapplication of 
the relevant statutory provisions206 (which are quite rudimentary), and replacement with 
more sophisticated provisions that apply on a class-by-class basis, although in seven cases 
the pre-emption provisions only applied to the extent provided by Section 561 of the Act and 
were not supplemented by more comprehensive or bespoke provisions207.   
As expected, it was universally a requirement of any transfer or issue of new shares to an 
outsider that the incoming shareholder signed a deed of adherence to the investment 
agreement208. 
4.2.3 Requirements to give up shares 
As well as regulating the (limited) circumstances in which new shareholders can be 
admitted, contractual terms also require management shareholders to give up their shares if 
their involvement with the company ceases.  In 48 out of the 49 relevant companies in the 
sample209, the management shareholders were subject to compulsory transfer provisions in 
the event that they ceased to be employed by at least one of the companies in the portfolio 
group.  These provisions were generally included in the company’s Articles210.  Furthermore, 
                                               
204 Investor consent was not required for the issue of new shares in only two cases.  
However, in one of these, the board had discretion to issue new shares pre-emptively, and 
the board was controlled by the investor; it is not clear why there was no restriction in the 
other case, and it may have been an oversight. 
205 The two companies that did not require investor consent to new issues did have pre-
emption rights, so in both cases where the investor had no right of veto it would have pre-
emption rights.  Interestingly, in this respect these findings seem to differ from those of 
Zambelli (2012), who finds in her Italian sample that only 80% of investors have anti-dilution 
rights, and only 40% have a veto on new issues.  That is likely to be a result of differences in 
the composition of her sample, which included a significant number of venture capital 
transactions.   
206 In the UK, these are included in Sections 561-577 of the Companies Act 2006. 
207 Of course, the investor’s right to prevent a new issue would enable it to consent on the 
condition that the shares were offered pre-emptively to existing shareholders on a class-by-
class basis. 
208 In one case, I was not able to verify whether this was required because I did not have 
access to the relevant document. 
209 In one case, I was unable to verify whether any such restrictions existed.  
210 In 44 of the 48 companies, the relevant provisions were found in the Articles.  In some of 
the cases where the provisions were in the Articles, they were also repeated in the 
Investment Agreement.   
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in order to incentivise aligned behaviours, there was a differentiation between the price that 
management would be paid for the shares that they were obliged to sell depending upon 
whether they were a “good” or “bad” leaver211.  The way in which a good leaver was defined 
varied a little from company to company, and appeared to be a matter of negotiation, but in 
most cases a manager who died or left through incapacity, and often one who retired at 
normal retirement age, was treated more generously than one who left in other 
circumstances before the company was sold, and especially if they subsequently competed 
with the company.  In some cases, the length of time between the initial investment and the 
date of leaving was also a relevant factor in determining the price to be paid. 
4.2.4 Exit-related provisions 
As expected, all companies in the sample had provisions designed to align the ultimate sale 
(or “exit”) expectations and obligations of all shareholders.  Although there was considerable 
variation in the terms, in substance the parties agreed that, once the investor had 
determined that it was an appropriate time to sell its shares or to undertake an IPO, all other 
shareholders were obliged to sell their shares on similar terms or co-operate in the IPO212.  
In a number of cases, the investor’s right to invoke a “drag-along” provision in the Articles 
was subject to conditions, the most common of which was that a certain period (often 
several years) had elapsed since initial investment.  There was also a corollary to this right 
for the investor to “drag” the other shareholders: the minority management shareholders 
were generally given the right to “tag-along” with any sale by the investor, meaning that they 
had the right to sell all (or an equivalent proportion) of their shares on similar terms and at 
the same time as any sale by the investor213. 
In addition to these forced transfer provisions, there was generally also a statement of 
intention regarding exit, which seems designed to ensure that all parties are aligned with 
regard to the investor’s expected investment horizon.  In most cases, this included a 
statement that the parties intended to seek a sale or IPO of the company’s shares within a 
specified number of years, and an agreement to work towards such an outcome (which may 
                                               
211 Such provisions appeared in 48 of the 50 companies in this sample.  See further Gilligan 
& Wright (2014) at pages 137-138. 
212 Zambelli (2012) finds drag along rights in 86% of the companies in her sample. 
213 Zambelli (2012) finds co-sale rights in 87% of the companies in her sample. 
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be unenforceable as a legal obligation, for lack of certainty214).  There was often an 
acknowledgment that the investor will not be required to give warranties on any sale, other 
than warranties as to title and capacity to sell.  In some cases, there were further statements 
of intention or agreement, including (for example) an acknowledgement by the managers 
that they will be required to give warranties, a non-binding commitment to structure the 
transaction in a tax-efficient way if possible, and an obligation to make full disclosure of all 
matters relevant to the exit, including approaches by prospective buyers and details of all 
consideration and other benefits received for the shares sold.  In some cases, these 
provisions amounted to a relatively short paragraph, while in others there were detailed 
provisions running across several pages, particularly in relation to the commitments of the 
parties on an IPO.   
It is therefore clear that maintaining a limited number of shareholders who are aligned in 
their ambition to sell the company for the maximum possible value within a defined period is 
both regarded as important by private equity investors, and achieved through contractual 
agreement at the time of investment.  The variation in the clauses observed demonstrates 
that the precise terms of these provisions are tailored to the company, and contested by the 
parties, although “house” views of law firms and private equity firms establish the starting 
point for the negotiation. 
However, this alignment of interest clearly only operates at a very high level, and by no 
means ensures that all shareholders will agree upon any specific issue, even if they have 
the same ultimate objectives, and, although it may mitigate some agency costs, would not 
therefore eliminate them.  Indeed, the entrenched equity ownership could, in theory, create 
certain mismatches that exacerbate agency costs: for example, the management 
shareholders are incentivised to achieve the highest possible value for the portfolio 
company, with no interest in how that may affect the value of the fund, while the private 
equity firm has wider legal and reputational issues to consider; the managers may have a 
significant proportion of their personal wealth invested in the company, which could make 
                                               
214 The usual authority for the unenforceability of “agreements to agree” for want of certainty 
is Walford and Others v Miles and Another ([1992] 2 AC 128); however, enforceability will 
depend upon the specific contractual terms: see, for example, MRI Trading AG v Erdenet 
Mining Corporation LLC ([2013] EWCA Civ 156). 
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them more sensitive to the failure of the company, while the private equity fund is more 
diversified.  On that basis, we would expect to find more specific agency cost mitigation 
strategies, and mechanisms to determine how differences of opinion between shareholders 
(management and investors) about how to maximise value are resolved.   
4.3 Using governance structures to mitigate agency costs 
In Chapter 2.2.2, it was hypothesised that, rather than relying only on decision-making 
structures, certain strategic and operational actions would be specified in advance, in order 
to reduce the scope for managerial agency costs by limiting managerial discretion.  In this 
respect, more complete contracting might be possible, given the investor’s relatively well-
informed position.  However, it was also predicted that investors would seek to address the 
residual agency problems (in their various forms) inherent in the corporate structure, and in 
the previous section of this Chapter it was argued that this remains important, 
notwithstanding the entrenched equity ownership of managers.  These agency costs go 
beyond the traditional “stealing and shirking” variety, and extend to honestly held differences 
of business judgement between the relatively expert investor and the incumbent 
management.  A further prediction was that the governance devices would seek to protect 
minority shareholders from controlling shareholder agency costs. 
The remainder of this Chapter includes a description of how such agency cost mitigation is 
addressed in the governance systems that have been observed in the empirical research 
undertaken for this thesis.  However, as a preliminary matter, it is important to note that 
untangling the different purposes of the governance mechanisms established in a private 
equity-backed company is not straightforward because many of the mechanisms have 
multiple purposes, and can be used to further a different objective (or, indeed, several 
aligned objectives) at any given moment.  For example, a board of directors will, no doubt, 
play an important role in monitoring management, thereby mitigating the agency costs that 
might otherwise arise from a delegation of power; however, giving decision rights to that 
board and assembling an expert group to populate it could also improve the quality of the 
decision-making process.  Similarly, reserving certain matters for decision by the 
shareholders would restrict agency costs (by removing power from the “agent”), but also 
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provides a mechanism for the investor to ensure that its own separate interests are 
protected.  The detail of the mechanisms that are negotiated, supplemented by interview 
evidence on the way in which those mechanisms are operated and for what reasons, is 
employed to seek to disentangle those multiple objectives. 
In practice, of course, the extent to which the various documented procedures are actually 
followed will depend upon the relative level of importance of each objective at any given 
moment in time, but the private equity firm will want to know that it has formal power to 
operate a particular governance mechanism if it feels that it needs to do so.  Whilst following 
formal processes when things are progressing well may seem unnecessary, and potentially 
unhelpful in creating the “partnership” with management that many of the interview subjects 
stressed as being important215, when needed, each of these various mechanisms is used to 
ensure that the management team is behaving in ways that the shareholders believe to be 
optimal, both as regards creating value in the business and in protecting both the business 
and the shareholder from downside risks.  So, for all or much of the time, an objective of a 
governance mechanism in a particular company may be dormant – but that does not mean 
that it is unimportant. 
As discussed in Part 3 of this thesis, it is well established that controlling both managerial 
self-interest and the abuse of power by a dominant shareholder are important functions of 
the mandatory and default rules that permeate company law, and the more sophisticated 
structures that are established for large businesses whose shares are widely held and/or 
those that have a block-holder.  As we shall see, private equity-backed companies tend to 
make much more extensive provision than company law to mitigate these costs.   
It is argued that there are three main ways in which these agency costs are mitigated in the 
sample, and these are dealt with separately below; they are: by restricting the power of 
management through more complete contracting and provision of approval rights; by 
providing more effective monitoring rights; and by ensuring that minority shareholders 
(sometimes the management team members and sometimes the investor) are protected 
from abuse of power by a block-holder, or block-holding group. 
                                               
215 See above at fn 195. 
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4.3.1 Restricting management discretion 
Minimising contractual incompleteness 
If managerial agency costs are an issue for private equity firms, then it is clear that one way 
in which they can be mitigated is to restrict the power given to the managers and/or the 
board.  Private equity fund managers are well placed to define the extent of management 
autonomy (and to tailor its extent to the particular company) because, as expert investors 
with a clear business plan at the time of the investment, there will be certain matters in 
relation to which the actions that they wish management to take will be foreseeable and 
easy to define, whatever the circumstances in which the company finds itself.  For these 
matters, complete contracting is possible and no (or limited) discretion needs to be left with 
management216; no other decision-making mechanism needs to be constructed, and positive 
covenants to undertake them are given to the investor by the company and/or the managers. 
Provisions of this type were clearly evident in the research sample assembled for this thesis: 
for example; every company included a requirement to maintain appropriate insurances217, 
58% included a requirement to operate and comply with an anti-corruption policy, and in 
many of these cases the broad content of the policy was specified; and 56% of companies 
were required by the Investment Agreement to comply, in general terms, with any applicable 
laws218.  However, the most interesting requirement in this respect was an obligation to 
prepare and/or agree with investors and/or subsequently to comply with a 100-day plan 
and/or annual business plan.  The documentation for every company in the sample219 
included reference to a business plan or detailed annual budget, and formed a reference 
                                               
216 Although, of course, in some cases there may be some discretion as to how a particular 
requirement is implemented, and there will be an allocation of the power to take such 
decisions.  However, that will typically be a discretion as to how to do something, rather than 
whether to do it. 
217 There were two companies (Companies 16 and 39) for whom this data was not available 
and so they were excluded for the purposes of this analysis.  In most cases, the level of 
insurance cover required was subject to approval by the investor’s appointed director. 
218 It is not clear why investors contractually require managers and companies to do things 
that the general law already requires them to do.  It could be that such requirements are 
otiose, and simply an example of “over-lawyering”, or there may be a belief that such 
provisions do offer some level of additional protection – for example, a right to seek specific 
performance if a management team decline to act in a way that is consistent with the 
contractual obligation or a right to terminate the contract and regard them as a “bad leaver” 
for the purposes of the compulsory transfer provisions. 
219 There were two companies (Companies 16 and 39) for whom this data was not available 
and so they were excluded for the purposes of this analysis.   
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point for the autonomy of management.  Such plans include detailed line-by-line expenditure 
budgets and revenue forecasts, as well as strategic goals and more detailed implementation 
steps, and enable the investor, at the time of undertaking its due diligence and establishing 
its investment proposition, to design and hard-wire a strategic direction for the company, 
delineating the boundaries of the discretion within which management and/or the board are 
then able to operate.  The plan is intended to be updated annually220 and the revised version 
must be approved by the investor (or by a director appointed by the investor), as must 
amendments to or deviations from the plan, and it is often supplemented by a “100-day 
plan”, which requires managers to address specific issues identified before investment221.  
This clearly enables the investor to act to protect its own vision for the company against 
changes that it may not want, and goes significantly beyond protecting against the narrower 
concept of agency costs, characterised by the phrase “stealing and shirking”, to include 
subjective judgement agency costs.  As hypothesised in Part 1, the research findings of this 
thesis confirm that contracts are concluded that are as complete as possible.  Interestingly, 
they also reveal that where there are limits to the completeness of a contract – for example, 
because a business plan only looks forward for a year, or circumstances change so that the 
previous plan becomes outdated – there is a requirement to agree a new contract and a 
mechanism stipulating how such agreement will be reached. 
Instruction rights 
Another possible way in which agency costs could be mitigated would be to allow the 
investor to direct the board to undertake specific actions, entirely removing management 
discretion in relation to certain decisions.  Under the default rules included in the Model 
Articles222 (and, for older companies, Table A223), such a right is reserved for shareholders 
                                               
220 The available data did not allow me to test whether the plan was actually updated every 
year, but I found no evidence that it was not. 
221 In the sample assembled for this thesis, the investment documentation for 11 companies 
expressly included an obligation to prepare and comply with a “100-day plan”.  Typically, 
these dealt with such matters as updating an anti-corruption or health and safety policy that 
was found to be inadequate during due diligence, or implementing an agreed incentive plan 
for staff.  It is likely, but was not established, that many other companies in the sample had a 
“100-day plan” that was not referred to in the investment documentation. 
222 See Model Article 4, The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008, Schedule 1 (SI 
2008/3229). 
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acting by special resolution and, in 88% of the companies in the sample, a similar right was 
adopted for the shareholders as a general body, either because the default article was 
adopted without amendment or (in cases where all default articles were dis-applied) 
because it was provided for expressly.  This provision is likely to be more useful in a closely-
held company than in a public company with widely dispersed shareholders, simply because 
it is more likely that enough shareholders will come together to exercise it224.  However, in 
58% of the companies in the research sample used in this thesis, the private equity investor 
would not be in a position to pass a special resolution without support from other 
shareholders, and the interviews provide no evidence that this reserve power is an important 
governance mechanism225.  On the other hand, in most cases there was a right for the 
investor acting alone to give directions or instructions to the board if the company is in a 
“default” situation (as defined in the relevant documents), or otherwise to “flood the board” 
with directors that it nominates226, suggesting that usurping the power of the board is 
regarded as a downside protection, rather than a governance tool to be used when the 
company is operating in accordance with expectations. 
Consent rights 
The fact that instruction rights are not commonly exercised does not mean, however, that 
the power of the board is unrestricted.  On the contrary, and in addition to the positive 
obligations mentioned above, in 98%227 of the companies in the research sample of this 
thesis the powers of the board of directors were restricted by a wide range of “consent” 
                                                                                                                                     
223 See Regulation 70, Companies (Tables A to F) Regulations 1985 as amended by SI 
2007/2541 and SI 2007/2826. 
224 See Kraakman et al. (2009) who say (at page 73): “A supermajority vote is hard to come 
by; and, more to the point, a simple majority is generally enough to remove the board.” 
225 Of course, discussions at board meetings might well be conducted in the shadow of this 
right, particularly in the significant minority of cases where the investor(s), acting alone, 
could pass a special resolution to instruct the board.  The dynamics of board discussions 
will, no doubt, vary from company to company, depending upon a wide variety of factors, 
including the relative equity share of the management and the investors, but also many 
others (for example, the experience of the management team and the relative equity 
holdings inter se, the presence (and experience) of a non-executive chairman of director, the 
financial situation of the company at the time and so on). 
226 It was not possible to verify the position in one company.  Of the rest, in all but two 
companies – which were minority, venture capital style investments – the investor had the 
power to usurp the power of the board (by directing it or flooding it, or both) in “default” 
situations, even if it did not have the right to do so at other times.   
227 In the case of one company, there were no veto rights; however, the investor controlled 
the vast majority of the equity and had a majority of investor-appointed directors on the 
board. 
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matters, giving rise to obligations to seek specific investor consent before undertaking any of 
the matters listed, and/or giving a veto right to a director nominated by the shareholder.  In 
almost all cases228, some veto rights were given specifically to the investor (in its capacity as 
a shareholder) even where the investor’s nominated appointees occupied a majority of the 
board seats, or were able to do so because the investor had the right to appoint such 
number of additional directors as would represent a majority.  It therefore seems important 
that the investor is able – at least formally – to retain the power to prevent certain actions 
being taken by the company in its capacity as a shareholder, rather than simply through its 
control of the board, and to do so even when the company is operating in accordance with 
expectations.   
These consent rights were negative or preventative in nature229: they impose on the 
company an obligation to seek consent from the investor230 or a specified director before 
taking a certain action; they do not give the investor a power to direct the board to take a 
specified action.  However, the range of such restricted matters was fairly extensive.  In one 
interview (I2), these were described as rights to ensure that “the fundamental things which 
we used to value the business on the way in continue to be in place through the life of our 
investment”, but in many cases they would seem to go further and cover material operational 
business decisions.   
Structurally these consent rights are given in the Investment Agreement by way of an 
undertaking by the company to the investor not to undertake specified matters without 
consent, and then repeated in a separate (in theory, severable231) undertaking by the 
                                               
228 Only two companies gave all approval rights to investor-appointed directors, one of which 
was a Cayman company.  One other company designated one of the investor-appointed 
directors as an “investor representative” and gave that person approval rights in that 
capacity, presumably to make it clear that approval was not given (or withheld) by the 
relevant individual in his capacity as an investor.   
229 In a small number of cases, the Investment Agreement includes an obligation on the 
company to take action to effect a matter once it has been approved by the investor.  
230 In five companies, some reasonably extensive (but highly bespoke) consent rights are 
also given to the management shareholders, and in several others there are limited 
contractual minority protections (such as restrictions on changes to the Articles or on 
transactions that are not at arm’s length) – see further Chapter 4.3.3 at page 108 below. 
231 The reason for a separate and severable set of identical procurement undertakings by 
the management shareholders is driven by a concern as to the enforceability of covenants 
given by the company restricting its discretion to undertake matters that it is given the power 
to undertake by statute: see Russell v Northern Bank Development Corpn Ltd ([1992] 3 All 
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management shareholders to procure that the company does not undertake the specified 
actions without the requisite consent232.  In some cases – nine out the 50 companies in the 
sample – some of these rights are also included as class rights attributed to the class of 
shares held by the investor: any act taken by the company without class consent is said to 
be an abrogation of class rights.  There is some evidence that this mechanism is adopted in 
the belief that it increases the enforceability of the undertakings by the investor233.  
Various provisions of UK corporate law (and, for companies listed on the Main Market of the 
London Stock Exchange, the UK Listing Rules) do, of course, limit the board’s power to 
make decisions without shareholder approval234, although the limits imposed tend not to be 
extensive: Kraakman et al. (2009) suggest that they are generally limited to large 
transactions that create possible conflicts of interest for directors (even if the conflict does 
not amount to self-dealing)235, and Kershaw (2012a) adds a further category: “decisions 
[that] affect shareholders as shareholders"236.  Of course, corporate law and the Listing 
Rules are designed with relatively inexpert shareholders in mind, and where wide dispersal 
of shares makes regular shareholders’ meetings inefficient.  Given that these constraints do 
not apply in a private equity paradigm, it is not surprising that the matters over which the 
investor seeks a consent right are far more extensive.  It is also not surprising that the 
consent right is exercised by the investor, rather than all shareholders acting by majority or 
super-majority, especially when the other shareholders are principally the executive directors 
                                                                                                                                     
ER 161), Cooke (2015) at page 247, and the further discussion in Chapter 8.2.1 at page 179 
below. 
232 There may be some doubt as to the enforceability of the personal covenants on the basis 
that they restrict the future exercise of discretion by a director – see fn 384 below, where the 
enforceability of such undertakings, and the relevance of Section 173(2)(a), is discussed. 
233 See Cooke (2015) at page 249-250 and the discussion in Chapter 8.2.1 at pages 179-
181 below. 
234 Examples of provisions in the Companies Act 2006 that provide for shareholder approval 
of certain matters (in some cases subject to alternative provisions in the Articles) include: 
Section 77 (change of name); Section 188 (directors’ long-term service contracts); Section 
190 (substantial property transactions); Section 489 (appointment of auditors); and Section 
551 (allotment of shares).  The Listing Rules additionally require shareholder approval for 
“Class 1 transactions” (i.e., those that exceed certain size thresholds) and “related party 
transactions”. 
235 Kraakman et al. (2009) at page 184.  See also Kershaw (2012a) at page 204-207, who 
argues (at page 205) that the allocation of power should be determined by “the capability 
and knowledge of the decision-maker” and “the decision-maker’s incentives to pay attention 
to the decision at hand”, as well as whether the decision-maker is incentivised to make a 
decision in the interests of shareholder value. 
236 Kershaw (2012a) at page 208. 
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and other members of senior management.  Exclusion of the management shareholders in 
this way does not only apply where there might be conflicts of interest, but is important to 
ensure that the investor is in a position to protect its own specific interests, both to mitigate 
subjective judgement agency costs, and also to ensure that its own separate interests are 
fully protected237. 
One category238 of consent rights observed in the sample is concerned with the integrity, 
financing and capital structure of the company and its subsidiaries, and prohibits (without 
investor consent): the issue of new shares or share options; variation of the terms of any 
shares or class of shares; share re-purchases or reductions of capital; declaration or 
payment of dividends or other distributions; taking on more debt or discharging existing debt 
(otherwise than as contemplated in specified agreements); changes to the terms of any 
existing indebtedness; and the granting of security over the group’s assets.  These 
restrictions typically extend to making loans, granting guarantees and indemnities (to the 
extent that is outside of the ordinary course of business), invoice discounting and equipment 
leasing, and other arrangements that have the effect of increasing the leverage or risk profile 
of the group.  There is also commonly a restriction on establishing or liquidating any 
subsidiary, buying or selling shares in any other company, and taking any steps to organise 
a listing of shares or a sale of the company’s shares to a third party.  Arguably, such matters 
fall into the category of decisions affecting the shareholder as a shareholder, some of which 
are protected by company law approval rights.  However, it is clear that the consent rights in 
the sample are far more extensive than those provided by UK company law, and include (for 
example) changes to the financial risk profile of the firm.   
Another category of common restrictions on the board’s power relates to governance, 
shareholder reporting and protection mechanisms, including: appointing and removing 
directors and auditors; adopting annual accounts; establishing or delegating power to 
committees of the board, other than those specifically required by the investor; changing 
accounting policies or the accounting reference date; amending the Articles of any group 
company; and appointing a liquidator or administrator or commencing any insolvency 
                                               
237 See further Chapter 5.2 at pages 121-133 below. 
238 See Cooke (2015) at pages 207-212 for an alternative way to categorise consent rights.  
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procedure.  Since governance is dealt with extensively by contract, and is an area where 
contracts can be relatively complete, it is clearly important that the investor is able to protect 
the integrity of the arrangements for which it has bargained.  Unlike in many other types of 
company, therefore, most of the governance rules are fixed, and cannot be altered without 
positive investor consent. 
Echoing a common rationale for shareholder voting requirements in company law, consent 
matters will also commonly cover related party transactions, or those where there might be a 
conflict of interest for the management, such as: entering into agreements or transactions 
with (including loans or gifts to) senior management; and making determinations in relation 
to agreements to which members of senior management are parties (such as declining to 
enforce a term in a service or acquisition agreement) or under good and bad leaver 
provisions in the Articles of Association.  In four cases, “substantial property transactions” 
with directors (or persons connected with them) that require shareholder approval pursuant 
to Section 190 of the Companies Act 2006 are made subject to this investor consent 
procedure (in three cases with modifications to the value of a qualifying transaction and to 
include transactions with shareholders and persons connected with them as well as 
directors), rather than the Companies Act’s requirement for a shareholder vote.  However, 
there are well known (and difficult to understand) gaps in the coverage of Section 190, 
including the fact that it only applies to “non-cash assets” and to transactions above a certain 
size and, as discussed below, uses a limited definition of “connected persons”239. Perhaps 
for that reason, there are many other safeguards against transactions in relation to which 
there might be a conflict in the agreements entered into by private equity investors: for 
example, in 94%240 of the companies for which the relevant documents were available there 
was a prohibition, without investor consent, of any transaction that was not undertaken on an 
“arm’s length” basis241, while one typical agreement includes a complete ban (without 
                                               
239 See, for example, discussion by Kershaw (2012a) at pages 499-502. 
240 44 out of 47 companies; the remaining three companies all had other restrictions on 
entering into contracts that would protect the investor from uncommercial conflicted 
transactions (as did most of those including an arm’s length prohibition). 
241 The meaning of “arm’s length” no doubt depends on the specific context, but in 
Mansworth (HMIT) v Jelley ([2002] EWHC 442 (Ch)), the court said (in the context of the 
interpretation of capital gains tax legislation): “The words ‘by way of a bargain made at arm’s 
length’ suggested more than a transaction; they indicated a transaction between two parties 
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consent) on any transactions with or for the benefit of a director, shareholder or a person 
“connected” with them, and adopts a wide definition of connection that is significantly 
broader than that included in the Companies Act242.  As regards non-transactional conflicts, 
in 60% of the 40 relevant companies in the sample, any authorisation of a director’s conflict 
of interest pursuant to Section 175 of the Companies Act was also designated as a matter 
requiring investor approval (effectively sharing the power given to the board by the 2006 Act 
between the board and the investor)243.  It is therefore clear that, although company law has 
a number of provisions designed to protect shareholders from directors’ conflicts of interest 
that protect against certain types of agency cost244, in the research sample of this thesis, 
these are very extensively supplemented by specific contractual provisions that broaden the 
scope of the requirement for approval, and require the specific approval of the investor 
rather than shareholders as a whole.  
However, in addition to provisions dealing with capital structure, governance and conflicts of 
interest, there is a category of matters commonly included in the list of consent matters that 
could be regarded as dealing with material operational or strategic business decisions.  
These fall into the category of significant corporate actions, identified by Kraakman et al. 
(2009) and referred to above, but in a private equity context they extend significantly beyond 
those prescribed by default law or stock exchange rules, no doubt because private equity 
                                                                                                                                     
each of which had separate and distinct interests and both of whom had agreed terms with a 
mind to their own respective interests.” 
242 For example, the definition would include siblings, grandparents and grandchildren, who 
are not included in the definition of a person connected with a director in Section 252 and 
253 of the 2006 Companies Act.  In addition, Section 190 does not apply to transactions with 
shareholders; indeed, there is a specific exception (in Section 192) for transactions with a 
person “in his character as a member” of the company even if the transaction would 
otherwise require approval. 
243 It is, perhaps, interesting that Section 175(5) establishes a different default position for 
private companies and public companies, such that the default for a private company is to 
allow directors’ authorisation of conflicts, while a public company’s directors only have that 
power if specifically provided in the Articles.  However, it is, in practice, easier for a company 
with a small number of shareholders to obtain shareholder approval, and so it is perhaps not 
surprising that the default is often effectively overridden in a private equity-backed (private) 
company, while it is usually also reversed in a publicly listed company.  In this latter respect, 
see research by the current author: Witney (2016a) at page 169. 
244 See, for example, Companies Act 2006 Sections 175, 176, 177 and 182-230, and the 
discussion in Chapters 6 and 7 below.  
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investors are likely to be more expert and have more incentives to pay attention than 
investors in widely-held companies245.   
Consent rights in this category include significant changes to the nature or geographical 
reach of the business, including: selling any part of the business or acquiring or disposing of 
real property or other significant assets (and “significant” is usually defined by reference to a 
specified monetary value, or sometimes by reference to whether the transaction would be a 
Class 1 transaction under the rules of the London Stock Exchange if the company’s shares 
were listed); changing the name of any company in the group; entering into joint ventures or 
partnerships; making capital commitments that exceed a given threshold; taking on or 
terminating the appointment of “senior” (defined by reference to salary and/or length of 
notice period) employees or consultants; making changes to the terms of insurance policies 
held by any group company; commencing or settling significant litigation (other than ordinary 
course debt collection246); making gifts (sometimes subject to exceptions for small charitable 
gifts); opening or closing business premises; entering into agreements restricting the 
company’s freedom to do business; and establishing pension or employee incentive 
arrangements or determining the amount of any bonus (sometimes outside of agreed limits).  
As discussed above, the investor is also required to approve the annual budget and/or 
business plan and any variations to it, and in some cases there are financial limits on the 
company’s ability to fund any one particular activity (and therefore to be excessively 
exposed to it).  In fact, in many cases, any activity outside the ordinary course, and any 
transaction that is significant in the context of the business as a whole, is subject to a 
restriction of this nature, significantly curtailing the board’s ability to implement any decisions 
that go beyond day-to-day management.  That would not mean, of course, that the board 
could not discuss such matters and make a recommendation to the shareholder – that is in 
fact essential, because the investor can only exercise its “veto rights” on the basis of a 
request and recommendation – but (at least according to the documented governance rules) 
it would not be in a position to implement any such proposed course of action without 
                                               
245 See Kershaw (2012a) at pages 205-206. 
246 There is sometimes, but not usually, a relaxation of the requirement for investor approval 
before undertaking litigation when the litigation relates to action by the company to enforce 
its rights against the investor.  As regards this particular consent right, see further pages 
102-103 below.   
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investor consent, or (in many cases247) the consent of its nominated director.  Interview 
evidence248 confirms that discussing these issues and making recommendations to the 
investor is usually regarded as an important function of the board.  The veto rights in this 
category are not designed so that the investor takes the significant operational decisions, but 
so that it is able to ensure that any expertise it possesses has been taken into account and 
that there are no “subjective judgement” agency costs, that due process (as envisaged in the 
investment documentation or subsequently amended) has been followed in the board’s 
decision-making process, and that any separate interests of the investor are either not 
affected or have been protected. 
The role of the board and the nominated director in restricting management discretion 
Although present on every board in the sample for this thesis, the directors nominated by the 
private equity investor only outnumbered other members of the board in 12% of cases, even 
though the private equity investor held a majority of the equity in 74% of the companies.  
When combined with the chairman and other non-executives, the investor directors still only 
outnumbered executives on 34% of the boards; the number of executives was equal to the 
number of other directors on 22% of boards, and 44% of the boards had more board seats 
for executives than for other directors combined249.  It is true that investors will often have 
additional rights to control board decisions if the company is in a “default” situation, but 
during "normal" times the balance of power is more even, as shown in the chart below. 
                                               
247 See table at page 100 below.  
248 For example, I11 described a typical process: “So we’ve got [private equity firm 
appointed] directors on the corporate governance board; in order for the matter to come up 
to investors it’s normally considered by the corporate governance board – do they support 
it? If they support it then they know they need to go up to the shareholder … which 
[generally] means doing an investment committee paper.” 
249 Board numbers did change over the life of an investment, often with newly-appointed 
senior members of the management team joining the board as executive directors.  The 
percentages given here are based on information supplied by participating firms for the 
composition of the board immediately after the investment was made. 
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This analysis, supported strongly by interview evidence, suggests that many private equity 
firms are not particularly concerned whether its nominated directors control the board 
numerically, as long as they know that the board’s power is constrained so that it cannot 
take significant operational or strategic decisions without “investor” approval (which is 
generally given by the investor’s nominated director and occasionally referred back to the 
private equity firm's investment committee)250.  These firms maintain that the board is an 
important part of the company’s governance structure; however, its decisions on significant 
strategic matters amount to (usually highly persuasive) recommendations to shareholders 
(much as they would in relation to matters requiring shareholder consent in a listed 
company), even though in many cases the shareholder representative is also part of the 
board’s decision-making process, which would seem to make for an interesting dynamic. 
As discussed below, it is also very clear from the interview evidence of this thesis that in 
practice a line is drawn between reserved matters that can be approved by the nominated 
investor director(s) and those that need a separate approval from the fund manager acting 
explicitly in its capacity as shareholder, and that this line is not necessarily the same as 
appears in the documentation.   
                                               
250 For example, I19 said: “With the chairman we typically are the majority. The chairman is 
independent but our appointee but we also [have other protections:] the budget can only be 
approved with special director consent, and as soon as you get near breaching any 
covenant, boom, on the equity docs then our role becomes much more hands on or can be.” 
12%
22%
44%
22%
Balance of power on the board
PE nominated directors form
majority
PE nominated plus other non-
execs form majority
Management forms majority
Equal number of managers
and non-execs
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As regards the formal division of responsibility in the documents, practice varies among 
private equity firms (and their law firms, whose standard form documentation seems to 
prevail on this question).  The table below shows the allocation of responsibility for giving 
approval to restricted matters on behalf of the investor in the companies in the sample: 
Consent to all restricted matters is the responsibility of the nominated investor 
director 
2% 
Consent to all matters may be given either by the investor or its nominated director 37% 
The consent matters are split: some must be approved by investor and some by the 
nominated director251 
14% 
The investor must consent (qua shareholder) although the investor may designate 
the nominated director as authorised to communicate consent or, in some cases, 
may delegate responsibility 
47% 
Total 100% 
 
Some of the firms in the sample reported that they have a well-defined rule to determine 
where such approval rights fall, while most give discretion to the nominated directors to 
decide whether to refer the decision to a separate decision-making forum.  This rule, or that 
discretion, supersedes the formal allocation of responsibility in the investment documents.  
Where the decision is to be made by a separate body, most firms remit it to the “Investment 
Committee” (or similar), which consists of several senior directors (or partners) of the private 
equity fund manager, most of whom will not be directly involved in the specific portfolio 
company about which a decision is to be taken.  This Committee will usually be the same 
group that authorises the initial investment and, often, the overarching principle that 
determines whether intermediate decisions should be referred back to that Committee is 
whether the decision affects the basis on which the original investment was made.  
Therefore, examples of the types of decisions that would be referred to the Investment 
Committee would include: provision of new funding by the private equity fund; significant 
changes to the capital structure of the company; dramatic changes to business scope or 
strategy; removal or appointment of a key member of the management team in a way not 
                                               
251 Where a matter requires consent from the nominated director, it will generally be 
sufficient if the matter is approved at a board meeting at which the director is present and at 
which she indicates her approval. 
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envisaged at the outset; or decisions relating to the exit strategy.  Many other decisions are 
taken by the nominated director(s), even if these are structurally described in the documents 
as requiring “shareholder consent”, and even though the consent itself (if written) might be 
signed by the person concerned “on behalf of” the investor (rather than in their capacity as a 
director)252.  It therefore seems plausible that responsibility for approving certain decisions 
is, in many cases, formally allocated to the investor qua shareholder by lawyers structuring 
the corporate governance mechanisms, while the commercial expectation is that the power 
should be exercised by the nominated director, and this is in fact the practice.   
It is perhaps surprising that the formal allocation of power to exercise veto rights is often not 
the one applied in practice.  One explanation may be a concern on the part of the lawyers 
drafting the documents about liability arising from a director’s fiduciary liabilities (discussed 
in detail in Part 3), balanced by concerns that if the investor has too much power it will be 
characterised as a “shadow director” or a de facto director and subject to fiduciary duties 
itself253.  However, if that is the reason for the formal allocation of power, the concern does 
not seem to be widely shared by those making decisions in practice: there was no evidence 
of compliance in practice with procedures by the private equity firm that might mitigate this 
risk.  Interview evidence suggests that only a small number of firms are concerned about the 
liability risk implied by a director – who is subject to statutory fiduciary duties to avoid 
conflicts of interest and to act in the way he considers most likely to promote the success of 
the company – having the power to veto certain decisions, even where that would require 
the director to act in accordance with the interests or instructions of his appointing 
shareholder while the company is solvent.  On the other hand, many reported to have put 
into place procedures to ensure that this risk is managed if the company is insolvent254.  At 
                                               
252 I2’s comment was typical in this respect: “So there’s not a written down formula as to 
what you need to go back to your investment committee about. However, people have a 
common sense judgment as to whether something requires – if something requires new 
capital from us, then obviously you have to go back to your investment committee. If it’s a 
case of acquiring something out of the cash flow of the business, which is material to the 
size of your company then, again, we’re likely to go back to the investment committee. If it’s 
just our plan has always been going into this business to buy a lot more small mom and pop 
shop-type things to make your company bigger, then they’re not going to go back to the 
investment committee for every one of those”.  Similar comments were made by I1, I6, I7, 
I10, I11, I13, I25, I14, I15, I18, I19, I22, I23, I24, I26, I27 and I29. 
253 See Chapter 8.2.3 at pages 186-188 below. 
254 I2, I4, I10, I12, I13, I17 and I20 made similar points in that regard. 
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the same time, there is a clear demand for efficient and timely decision-making and a 
concern that regular references back to an investment committee would hamper that.  As 
one interviewee (I29) put it:  
I’m a big believer that it’s quite fatal for a [private equity nominated] non-exec 
on a board to be repeatedly saying, “I need to go back to my investment 
committee”. I mean, you’ve just completely disempowered yourself.  Why would 
the management speak to you? They may as well just go straight to the 
managing partner here. 
It has already been argued in this thesis255 that law firm boilerplate is an important starting 
point for the contractual governance provisions in the sample, but that there is variability in 
the detailed terms, and that the actual provisions are often operated differently in practice.  
My analysis of consent rights reveals further clear evidence of negotiated variance.  
Although there is a high degree of consistency as to the content and structure of these 
restrictions on the board’s and the managers’ powers between different deals undertaken by 
the same private equity firm (and between those using the same law firm), there is variability 
as regards the detailed provisions.  As already discussed256, in the case of the private equity 
firm that contributed 12 portfolio companies to the sample (Firm A), it was possible to 
analyse the variability of the apparently similar documents used.  As in other matters, there 
were important deviations from the standard form document used by the firm as regards 
consent matters.  To take the case of one specific restriction – the prohibition on 
commencing litigation without consent – of the 12 companies, four (33%) followed the firm’s 
standard form and prohibited all litigation except normal debt collections for amounts up to 
£15,000, while in another four cases, the threshold was varied: in one case the threshold 
was £20,000; in two others it was £25,000; and in one further company it was set at 
£35,000.  It is reasonable to suppose that these higher thresholds were agreed with the 
management team on the basis of the nature, frequency and size of bad debt collection in 
the specific company.  However, in the remaining four cases, the form and substance of the 
prohibition was very specific: in one case, there was a general threshold for all litigation and 
                                               
255 See Chapter 4.1.4 at pages 78-82 above. 
256 See Chapter 4.1.4 at pages 80-82 above. 
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a separate one for routine debt collection; in another the prohibition related only to “material” 
litigation and all debt collection was excluded from it; in another, all litigation (including debt 
collection) was prohibited where the value claimed exceeded £10,000; and in the final 
clause there was a prohibition on litigation with an exclusion for debt collection up to 
£25,000, but with a further carve-out for litigation between the company and the investor 
(presumably to prevent the investor from having the ability to veto enforcement of the 
investment documentation by the company against the investor).  These variations 
(repeated throughout the schedule of investor consent rights), and the interview evidence in 
this thesis, suggest that this list of consent matters is to some extent negotiated between the 
investor and the management team at the time of investment, to establish what both parties 
accept to be a satisfactory balance of power between the board and the investor (and 
shareholders as a whole), and – by delegation from the board – the powers of the managers 
themselves.  In general, the aim of such negotiations is to allow management, supervised by 
the board, to conduct the business in the ordinary course as envisaged in the business plan, 
whilst requiring other matters to be discussed and agreed by the shareholder or by the 
director appointed by the shareholder.  Such restriction of managerial power almost 
inevitably implies a mitigation of agency costs, and, in practice, the extent of the restriction is 
varied over time according to the level of trust that the monitors have over the managers 
and, perhaps, the perceived level of liability risk at the time a particular decision falls to be 
taken. 
However, the extent and level of similarity between the covenants included in this list of 
consent rights also strongly supports the hypothesis that risk-averse lawyers are providing 
boilerplate that goes beyond what is necessary to protect the position of the investor, is not 
necessarily what would be agreed between the parties if they addressed their minds to the 
question and negotiated bespoke covenants, and is not respected in practice.  We can 
conclude that, although the negotiated rights set a framework for the decision-making 
process and broadly reflect the balance of power between the parties, the detailed terms 
represent a fall-back position for the investor, the detail of which is rarely strictly applied.  In 
reality, the contract between the parties is adjusted on an ongoing basis to reflect the 
particular circumstances, no doubt in the shadow of the baseline provisions established in 
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the written contracts but with only secondary regard to their precise terms.  The constant 
interaction between the parties, and their close relationships, allow regular adjustments to be 
made to the actual balance of power.  
4.3.2 More effective monitoring  
Even though the discretion of managers to act unilaterally is restricted, a further way in 
which agency costs are controlled is through extensive monitoring of the exercise of 
management’s residual discretion, both to ensure that it is being exercised properly and to 
ensure it is not being exceeded: extensive information rights are given to the board and the 
shareholder, regular board meetings reviewing financial performance and (day-to-day) 
management decisions are held, and an engaged board with relevant business expertise is 
appointed.  Although we can broadly characterise these processes as mechanisms to 
“monitor” management, that monitoring role has a number of different purposes257.   
More specifically, it is clear that monitoring to control managerial self-interest does form part 
of the purpose of these private equity corporate governance systems, and the background 
legal rules are acknowledged to offer some support for that activity, although those rules are 
strongly reinforced by other (contractual) rules and processes.  However, some of the work 
that might otherwise be required in this regard is no doubt done by the alignment of interest 
that is inherent in the private equity model, and by the broad investor approval requirements, 
both of which have been discussed above. 
More significantly, monitoring the performance of management is a key part of the activity, 
and this is supported by reporting processes and obligations.  Some of these procedures are 
established by company law258, but these rules are clearly regarded as inadequate and the 
monitoring processes are mostly contractual.  For example, in the research sample 
assembled for this thesis, every company was obliged to provide detailed monthly financial 
                                               
257 One interviewee (I26) rejected use of the term "monitor” to describe what is being 
undertaken through the governance processes, because it is not the way in which he would 
articulate that aspect of the corporate governance process: “So it’s not about monitoring in 
the sense of catching out, it’s much more around driving a certain type of behaviour that we 
believe in into the business and ensuring that the board, by making good decisions, sets the 
tone for the rest of the organisation in the way that it implements it.” 
258 For example, financial and non-financial reporting requirements included in Part 15 of the 
Companies Act 2006 are, in part, designed to help shareholders to monitor performance.   
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information to the investor in a particular, specified format.  In addition, 46% of companies 
also included an obligation to make immediate disclosure to the investors of significant 
developments adversely affecting the business (and all companies included an obligation to 
notify specified “default” events), although the precise terms of these obligations varied 
considerably259. 
But the “monitoring” activity goes even further than overseeing conflicts of interest and 
management performance; as described in a number of interviews, the governance 
processes are aimed at making sure that management “sticks to the plan”.  As outlined 
above, at the time of investment, or sometimes shortly afterwards, the investor and the 
management team agree a business plan for the company (and usually an action plan for 
the first 100 days or so after investment), and this is reviewed and re-approved at regular 
intervals.  This plan is, in part, a way to address subjective judgement agency costs, 
ensuring that any differences of view are discussed and resolved at the outset.  It also sets 
expectations, making it easier to judge whether management is performing.  To a large 
extent, therefore, the role for both the board and the shareholder (and different investors 
struck the balance between those two separate instruments of governance differently) is to 
"monitor" progress against that plan.  As one (typical) interviewee (I8) put it:  
We are looking to hold the management team to account for the delivery of a 
strategy, typically through an operational plan that includes a whole load of 
KPIs and well-structured board packs that allow you to monitor how that 
management team is performing against that … strategic plan, and if they’re not 
then it’s very easy to see that they’re not performing.  You cannot hide.  There 
isn’t anywhere to hide within a private equity investment unless you’re lying.  
As regards the role of the board260, it is clear from the documents negotiated at the time of 
initial investment, and from interviews with practitioners, that the board of directors is an 
                                               
259 In some cases the obligation was to inform the board and/or the investor’s nominated 
director (who would then be permitted, under the waiver of confidentiality provisions, to pass 
that information to the investor). 
260 Usually the relevant board is the board of the holding company in which both 
management and the investor hold shares, rather than the operating subsidiary.  The 
implications of that are discussed in detail in Chapter 9.1(at pages 189-192) below. 
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extremely important governance organ for most private equity-backed companies261, even 
though its power to act by majority vote and/or without shareholder consent is severely 
restricted in the ways outlined above.  For all of the firms participating in the research 
undertaken for this thesis, the board was seen as the key decision-making forum, even if 
many of its decisions are subject (at least in theory) to a further approval.  As described 
above, the extensive presence of non-managers on this board is clear from this research, 
and is well documented elsewhere262.  In every case in the sample, the investor took up its 
right to appoint a director, and in most cases that was a “deal partner” who had been 
involved in the pre-investment due diligence and knew the company well.  Often (as further 
described above263) that “nominated director” had special rights, which belies the fact that 
the non-executive director(s) might form a minority of the board by number of directors.   
The importance of the board (and the consequent level of oversight and constraints on the 
powers of the executives) is also underlined by the relative frequency with which it meets.  In 
every company in the sample264, the minimum frequency of board meetings was specified 
by the investor (although the investor reserved the right to agree to fewer meetings).  In 62% 
of cases, the specified requirement was for monthly meetings, with a further 30% requiring 
10 per annum.  The remaining companies specified fewer than 10, but none specified fewer 
than six and the mean number of meetings required in any year was 11.  Interview evidence 
suggests that, in practice, the boards for most of these companies tend to hold routine board 
meetings 10 times a year (monthly but with no meeting in August or December), with 
additional meetings as needed to discuss more urgent issues or when the company is facing 
                                               
261 During the focus group conducted for this research, one private equity executive (not 
from a firm that ultimately participated in this research) said that for their firm the board was 
“very uninteresting” and “the least interesting part of our interaction with the portfolio 
company”.  It is clear, therefore, that private equity firms are not homogeneous in their 
regard for importance of the board of directors and, indeed, the extent to which it was the 
central focus for decision-making varied among the firms which did participate in this 
research.  However, the overwhelming majority of firms participating in this research 
regarded the board as central to the governance mechanism, and this finding is consistent 
with other studies – see, for example, Cornelli & Karakas (2008), Acharya et al. (2013) and 
Acharya et al. (2009). 
262 See page 98 above.  See also, for example, Cornelli & Karakas (2008), especially Figure 
3 on page 77, who found that after a company is taken private in an LBO transaction, around 
30% of the board is comprised of private equity firm partners or employees. 
263 See pages 98-99 above. 
264 There are three companies that I excluded for this part of the analysis because I was not 
able to access the relevant documents. 
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financial distress265.  It would appear that listed company boards tend to meet slightly less 
often; for example, a recent survey indicated that UK FTSE 350 boards meet on average 8.4 
times each year266.  However, it is not clear whether this is directly comparable, as the board 
committees might meet more often than their private equity counterparts, and may 
undertake some of the business that a private equity firm would undertake at a full board 
meeting267. 
In summary, there is considerable evidence in the empirical analysis presented in this thesis 
that monitoring the activities and performance of management to ensure that it meets 
expectations and conforms to a pre-agreed strategy is a key part of private equity 
governance mechanisms and underpins many of the structures actually observed.  The cost 
of this latter aspect of the governance structure – monitoring conformance with a plan – 
represents a subjective judgement agency cost268 that may be less likely to be present in a 
widely-held company (where business plans disclosed to shareholders, and therefore the 
public-at-large, would be far less specific and the non-executive board members may be 
more reliant on management to provide business and strategic expertise).  These findings 
offer further support for the hypothesis that private equity-backed companies engage in 
extensive contracting to establish ways to mitigate managerial agency costs, and cast 
further light on the specific form that these contractual mechanisms take. 
                                               
265 One firm in this sample (Firm D) opts for less frequent board meetings (4-6 each year) 
and stressed in interview that the board was not involved in management decisions.  
Another (non-participant) interviewee (I11 from Firm L) said that their boards meet quarterly, 
but also “meet” (usually by telephone) more frequently, on an ad hoc basis, to make specific 
decisions. 
266 Grant Thornton, Corporate Governance Review 2015, at page 23, available at 
http://www.grantthornton.co.uk/globalassets/1.-member-firms/united-
kingdom/pdf/publication/2015/uk-corporate-governance-review-and-trends-2015.pdf 
[Accessed 2.03.2017]. 
267 Acharya et al. (2009) suggest (at page 53) that both private equity and plc non-
executives spend approximately 15 to 20 days each year in “formal sessions”, but private 
equity non-executives spend considerably more than their plc counterparts in other “hands-
on interaction”. 
268 Economists accept that the costs of preventing management from engaging in unwanted 
behaviours is itself an agency cost – see, for example, Jensen & Meckling (1976) at fn 9: “As 
it is used in this paper the term monitoring includes more than just measuring or observing 
the behaviour of the agent.  It includes efforts on the part of the principal to ‘control’ the 
behavior of the agent through budget restrictions, compensation policies, operating rules, 
etc.” 
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4.3.3 Controlling dominant shareholder agency costs 
In all of the companies in the sample, there were at least two categories of shareholder: the 
private equity investor (and, in some cases, two or more private equity investors – each with 
a significant shareholding and who likely shared similar motivations and time horizons269); 
and management (and sometimes these managers were also the founders of the company).  
As described in Chapter 3.2.2270, the investor(s) held a majority of the shares in 74% of the 
companies and held more than 40% in 86%.  The investors were therefore focused on 
mitigating managerial agency costs, while the managers were usually the minority 
shareholders (either because they held a minority of the voting share capital, or because the 
investors’ shares were given extensive additional rights to protect them from managerial 
agency costs, reducing the actual level of control the managers could exercise even if they 
voted en bloc). 
The management shareholders would, therefore, be at risk of dominant shareholder agency 
costs, but these were generally dealt with by protections built into the sale of shares (as 
described earlier in this Chapter) and through the terms of their employment agreement 
(which was generally renegotiated at the same time as the private equity investor makes its 
investment).  In general, investors were not able to sell shares in the company without 
procuring an equivalent sale for the managers271, and it is likely that managers rely upon that 
alignment of interest, together with their position as senior executives with day-to-day control 
of the company, as their main form of protection.  As regards governance provisions, 
managers with significant equity (and/or perhaps those regarded as essential to the 
business) were able to negotiate certain protections: for example, in 34% of cases, a 
manager or founder was given an entrenched right to sit on the board of directors; while in 
22% of cases the managers were given some veto rights (although these were significantly 
less comprehensive than those given to the investor).  Any such rights were highly bespoke 
and subject to individual negotiation but clearly, in appropriate cases, minority shareholders 
                                               
269 Only four companies in this sample had co-investing private equity firms, and so it was 
not possible to draw any conclusions about arrangements between syndicate partners.   
270 See page 66 above. 
271 See further the discussion in Chapter 4.2.4 at page 85 above. 
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were concerned to protect their position through governance-related provisions and private 
equity investors were willing to concede such protection.   
4.3.4 The residual rights of managers 
The power given to the board272, subject in many cases to approval rights exercised by or on 
behalf of the shareholder, would seem to imply a relatively limited scope of decision-making 
power for executive directors273.  However, interviewees insisted that the management team 
does have significant power in practice, operating the business on a day-to-day basis and 
taking a lead in setting the strategy for the business, alongside the board, although it was 
noted that firms were not homogeneous in their approach274.  In general, the CEO, CFO and 
other senior managers are expected to lead the development of strategy by the board as 
well as to take day-to-day operational decisions.  For example, one interviewee (I10) argued 
that:  
Most times, direction of travel and strategy is set by the executives and almost 
if it’s not, then you’ve probably got a bit of a problem. 
Another (I25) said:  
The strategy you expect to come from the executive board members, which is 
then challenged and debated by the non-executives.   
                                               
272 Even when the board does not explicitly take power from the managers and give that 
power to itself, the requirement for shareholder or investor director approval to such a wide 
range of matters, combined with the frequency of board meetings and the high level of 
engagement of the non-executive board members, means that, in practice, any significant 
decisions, or those not in the ordinary course of business, will be discussed and agreed by 
the board for the vast majority of the companies in this sample.   
273 In nine (of the 50) Investment Agreements, there is either an explicit statement that the 
executive directors will conduct the day to day management of the business (although in two 
cases their authority was restricted to “minor day to day matters”) or an operational 
committee of the board is established to undertake such management.  However, four of 
these companies were invested in by the same private equity house, and the clause seems 
to be based on a standard document, which suggests that it is not a position negotiated by 
management. 
274 One interviewee asserted that the private equity firm he worked for (Firm B) left 
management with significant power to execute on a plan; however, he went on to say: 
“Other houses are much more aggressive than us in terms of the way that they view those 
managers within their portfolio.  So some houses will see managers as employees and 
minor shareholders.  We would see them as being a fundamental part of the fabric of the 
value creation story.  That’s a really important difference between stylistically how certain 
houses will work.” 
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It was also commonly argued that it would be impossible to impose a decision on an 
unwilling management team, and that therefore the board had to operate by persuasion and 
consensus275.  However, there is ample evidence from interviewees that the amount of 
power given to an individual management team within a particular company will vary from 
time to time depending upon the level of confidence that the investor has in that team, and 
also varies according to the style of the private equity house, with the powers of the investor 
and the investor’s appointed directors being reserved for cases where trust in the 
management team was lower, or the company was facing difficulties.  Many argued that, for 
most of the time, the precise constraints set out in the legal documents were irrelevant and 
the authority of the management team was much more fluid and bespoke than the structures 
would suggest – although, of course, all members of the board would be aware of the 
parameters and discussions at board meetings must inevitably be conducted in the shadow 
of the fall-back rights of the investor.  Typical quotes included: 
There are investor consents that are outlined pretty clearly in the legal docs that 
tend to govern key things that need to come up to the board for decisions, whether 
that be hiring and firing of employees, whether that be CAPEX spend, but in 
practice, although they’re there, that’s not really what governs the discussion that 
you’re having.  They’re sort of there as a backstop, but that’s not how you tend to 
operate.  So I would say that anything that is being done from a day-to-day 
perspective, so business as usual, that’s within the managers’ control. …. If you had 
a major strategic shift in the business that was likely to impact on strategic value, 
then that is a shareholder decision … (I8) 
You mentioned you’d looked at, you’d read the legals, you were familiar with them.  I 
never looked at them once after I signed them.  The relationship with that team 
around that board was very good, so they would just get on and do things, but they’d 
tell the board what they were doing, you’d have a bit of a debate about it; and, 
equally, they’d bring some things to the board before they did them, either because 
                                               
275 For example, one interviewee (I19) said: “… in many cases a lot of boards I sit on we 
don’t even go to board votes.  It tends to be unanimous or there’s going to be a problem, 
and that’s reality.” 
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they were unsure about what was the right thing to do, so they wanted some help, or 
they felt it was appropriate to bring it to the board. (I9) 
[Investor consents are] just a check and balance, really.  You know, if we agree an 
annual budget and we agree an annual plan and we crack on, again, you very rarely 
need to refer to those investor consents.  They’re really just a kind of basket of 
protections to ensure that the executive seeks our approval for something that is, 
like I say, ‘out of the ordinary’ or ‘out of the norm’. … The investor consent, in my 
view, should be set such that, as long as the budget and the plan are set sensibly, 
then we should never really need to refer to them, unless we’re talking about a very 
specific investment decision, which would be a board decision anyway, which would 
be visible to us. …So they’re useful to have as a background, a source of reference 
but, you know, of all the board seats I’ve sat on I can’t really… the number of times 
I've had to give out very specific investor consent and sign something off is a very 
small number. (I10) 
Those [investor consent matters] are then put out across all firms and depending on 
how big the firm is, depending what that firm’s doing, depending on how long we’ve 
owned the company those, delegated authorities get flexed.  So they start off quite 
tight and then as we work with the management team or we go into different aspects 
of the company’s life, so we might be on a buy and build, we might be on a sale 
process, depending on that they might be flexed around the strategy for the 
company but broadly they’re quite tight, at least initially. (I11) 
The balance of power between the board and the management is therefore bespoke to the 
particular company, even if the documents might suggest otherwise, with the board acting as 
the arbiter of how much management authority should be given to the managers at any 
given time, and which decisions need to be referred back to the board.  In that respect, the 
board clearly has a role in restricting a manager’s authority and monitoring their 
performance.   
As predicted in Part 1 and implied by existing theory, it is therefore evident that private 
equity-backed companies do stipulate a number of sophisticated and negotiated 
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mechanisms that aim to control agency costs, and that these mechanisms are actively 
utilised and adjusted in practice so that they strike an appropriate balance between 
restricting management discretion and delegating authority.  However, it was hypothesised 
in Chapter 2 that the investor would also pursue other objectives in its contractually agreed 
governance mechanisms; it is those possible parallel objectives that are considered in the 
next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: IMPROVING DECISION-MAKING AND PROTECTING INVESTOR INTERESTS 
 
5.1 Making better decisions and resolving differences 
In this thesis, I have hypothesised that it would not be possible to understand private equity 
mandated governance structures exclusively as a response to the agency costs that arise 
from a delegation of management authority to the executive directors (even when we include 
differences in subjective judgement as a variety of agency cost), and I have suggested that a 
second purpose of such structures (in common, no doubt, with the decision-making 
processes that can be found in all sophisticated businesses) is to improve the quality of 
decision-making and to establish a legitimate way to resolve disputes between different 
stakeholder groups276.  This aspect of the governance structure is not concerned with 
making sure that the object of the decisions is to maximise the wealth of the company and 
its shareholders; its objective is not to monitor the management, nor to align their interests 
with those of the shareholder277.  Rather, this is a mechanism designed to make sure that 
decisions that cannot be subject to complete contracting (and therefore stipulated at the time 
of investment) are taken according to a process that is regarded by the investor (and, 
perhaps, also by some other stakeholders) as most likely to optimise the decisions taken 
and ensure their effective implementation.  Businesses have to make decisions in conditions 
of uncertainty, and at least some of those decisions will have significant and lasting effects 
on value.  The object of this aspect of the governance mechanism is to try to make the best 
possible decisions, in order to maximise the value of the company, and to seek to ensure 
that key stakeholders accept the legitimacy of those decisions and so are willing to accept 
and implement them.   
The research undertaken for this thesis does indeed reveal this aspect of the corporate 
governance mechanisms established: economically important, long-term or strategic 
                                               
276 As noted at fn 606 below, there is increasing criticism of agency theory as the foundation 
for corporate governance research and reform in the context of widely held companies.  This 
research certainly supports the view that regarding agency problems as the only challenge 
for corporate governance would be misplaced. 
277 Alignment of economic interests is, of course, an important part of the private equity 
model and, as discussed above in Chapter 4.2 (at pages 82-87), this is achieved in other 
ways, including through the ownership structure.  Indeed, it is plausible that the alignment of 
interest inherent in the private equity model allows more room for the corporate governance 
structure to pursue other objectives. 
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decisions (including, in some companies, decisions that would be regarded as significant 
operational decisions) are taken away from the management team acting on their own, by 
the range of shareholder consent matters described above278.  Having taken the power to 
make such decisions away from the managers acting unilaterally, private equity-backed 
companies tend to establish a structure that involves the managers making a 
recommendation to a separate group of well-informed individuals who are able to examine 
the process, to challenge the recommendation and, importantly, to add the benefit of their 
own expertise.  
A key part of this decision-making process is the board of directors279 and (in some 
companies, for certain types of decision) its committees.  This process is not designed to 
usurp or second-guess the managers, but rather to pool the collective expertise of a group of 
people who are experienced in making decisions of the relevant type.  Two particular 
aspects of the way in which the board functions illustrate this aspect of the corporate 
governance mechanism: the frequent involvement of an outsider, and the size of the board.  
Although both no doubt also improve the board's ability to reduce agency costs, through 
more effective monitoring, they are more convincingly explained as a means to improve and 
legitimise the decisions made. 
5.1.1 The non-executive chairman 
It is clear from the document analysis carried out for this thesis that the composition of the 
board is a matter of huge importance to the investor and it is dealt with extensively by 
contract before an investment is made.  The contractual arrangements go beyond 
appointment rights for the investor, important though these are280 and, in 75% of the 
companies in the research sample, provide for the appointment of a non-executive, 
                                               
278 See Chapter 4.3.1 at pages 89-98 above. 
279 For an interesting analysis of the processes by which boards make decisions see Forbes 
& Milliken (1999).  For studies that look at the board in the context of private equity, see (for 
example) Cornelli & Karakas (2008), Acharya et al. (2013) and Acharya et al. (2009). 
280 All of the companies in the sample used in this thesis had at least one (and in most cases 
more than one) director who was a partner of, or employed by, the investing private equity 
firm – see Chapter 4.3.1 at pages 98-99 above. 
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outside281 chairman, who plays a key role in the governance and decision-making processes 
going forward282.   
The private equity firms that tended to use outside chairs regarded the identity and role of 
such person as crucial.  Indeed, in many cases a candidate is identified before the initial 
investment is made, and a number of private equity firms in the sample operate “chairman 
programmes”, pursuant to which a group of prospective chairmen is identified in advance 
(without a specific company in mind) so that an appointment can be made at relatively short 
notice.  In many other cases, interviewees referred to their network (including chairs of 
previous investments) as an important tool to source chairmen for future deals. 
The documentation entered into at the time an investment is made confirms the importance 
of an independent non-executive chairman to many private equity firms.  If a specific 
individual has been identified and agreed with the management team, that person will be 
identified in the investment documents and, because they will usually subscribe for shares in 
the company in order to align their incentives with the other shareholders, will usually be a 
party to the Investment Agreement (either at the time of investment, or by signing a deed of 
adherence after the original investment was made).  Where an individual has not been 
identified, there will generally be a description of the process for agreement and appointment 
of a suitable candidate, with the rights of the management and the investor clearly set out.  
As was made clear by interviewees, it is important that the investor and the management 
team are all comfortable with the chairman who is appointed, as boards tend to operate by 
consensus and the relationship between the chairman and the CEO is particularly important; 
as one interviewee (I2) put it:  
Nobody gets actually imposed on anyone because the last thing you want to do 
is alienate your management team in that way.  
And a seasoned private equity chairman (I20) said that: 
                                               
281 The term “outside” is used to indicate that the individual is not employed directly by the 
private equity firm. 
282 For a very different (practitioner lawyer’s) perspective on the value of a non-executive 
chairman and, indeed, the role of board meetings more generally, see Cooke (2015) who 
says (at page 132): “It is rare that the appointment [of a non-executive chairman] is really 
successful”, and (at page 133), “Board meetings suffer the same futility as the externally 
appointed chairman.”   
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The Chairman’s relationship, in a PE investment, is with the Chief Exec, it’s not 
really with the board.   
The importance of having a chairman acceptable to the investors was clearly evident from 
the documents in the sample: in 88% of cases a chairman could not be appointed without 
the investor's consent283.  However, the desire for consensus as to the identity of the 
chairman was also evident: in 80% of cases where the investor had a right to appoint284, 
there was a procedure specified to try to reach agreement with the management team first.  
In some cases, this was simply a duty for the investor to consult, but in many cases there 
was also a period specified (usually three months) during which the parties were obliged to 
seek to agree upon a candidate and the investor’s right to appoint only applied (in default of 
agreement) upon expiry of this period.  There is considerable variety in these provisions, 
suggesting that they are contested, rather than set by unamended standard form 
documents, but the fact that agreement from both the investor and the management team is 
regarded as important suggests that the board is designed to be an effective decision-
making body, rather than merely an oversight mechanism, and that it is important that it is 
regarded as a legitimate body by all shareholders (including managers). 
Although in a small number of cases the investor’s nominated non-executive director(s) (who 
would usually be employed by the private equity firm) was permitted to act as chairman 
during periods when no independent external chairman had been appointed, this was clearly 
not regarded as the optimal long-term position for most of the firms in the sample. 
While the fact that the private equity investor frequently insisted that a chairman was 
appointed was evident from the document analysis, their role was not generally set out in the 
documents and only evident from interviews.  All interviewees who used external chairmen 
agreed that a crucial part of the job was to coach and mentor the CEO, although the degree 
to which this was needed would obviously depend upon the experience and personality of 
                                               
283 In only one case was no procedure for appointment of the chairman specified.  In 43 
cases (88%), the investor’s positive approval was required; of the remaining cases, the 
board had the right to appoint the chairman in five cases; and the founder had an 
entrenched right to act as chairman in one case. 
284 In one case, it was not clear from the available documents whether there was a 
consultative procedure; I have excluded this company from the analysis for this purpose.  
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the CEO.  Good governance was also regarded as a key priority for the chair, with one 
interviewee (I26) asserting that the chairman was: 
The single most important thing to governance, I think, in our business.   
5.1.2 Board size 
Further support for the view that the board is designed as a decision-making body can be 
drawn from its size.  Private equity firms prefer relatively small boards of directors, with most 
interviewees arguing that 5-7 people was the optimum number.  For example, one 
interviewee, when asked about optimum board size, said:  
Not more than seven. If it’s too big, it stifles contribution because people get 
intimidated by the size, simply by the number of people.  
While another argued that: 
It helps having a relatively small number of people around the boardroom table 
because you can make decisions a lot quicker. 
In the research sample, the average board comprised 6.7 members; the range was from four 
to ten, with a mode of five and a median of seven.  These findings are fairly consistent with 
those of earlier studies: Cornelli & Karakas (2008), for example, find an average board size 
of five people four years after a public to private LBO, a marked reduction from the number 
in the years before285.  Acharya et al. (2009) find an average of 7-8 board members, and 
contrast that with the average of over 10 members found in listed companies286.  
The table below shows the composition of the boards in the sample: 
Average (median) number of executive directors 3.44 (3) 
Average (median) number of nominated directors287 2.22 (2) 
Average (median) number of other non-executives (including chair) 1.02 (1) 
Average (median) total size of the board 6.68 (7) 
                                               
285 See Cornelli & Karakas (2008) at pages 73-74 and Figure 5. 
286 See Acharya et al. (2009) at page 51. 
287 Nominated by, and employed directly by, the private equity investor. 
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The board clearly has multiple functions, but its composition and the overwhelming evidence 
from the interviews suggests that a key function is to be an effective decision-making body 
that comprises the key people who are well-equipped collectively to take high quality 
business decisions.  Indeed, the board structure would seem otiose if its function were 
limited to “monitoring” management: such an activity could be undertaken by an individual or 
a group appointed by the investor to act qua shareholder in giving or withholding approval or 
matters recommended by the CEO and key members of the management team288.  Instead, 
the investor insists upon the establishment of a body that meets regularly289, that is regarded 
by all concerned as having significant power, and that often includes at least one outsider to 
act as chairman.  The chairman is, in turn, given a significant role, and their relevant 
experience and expertise is regarded as crucial.  The shareholder is also represented on the 
board by a senior member of the private equity team, and the experience and expertise of 
the appointed individual – and their ability to contribute to commercial and strategic 
discussions – is also regarded as important.   
Not only is such a process likely to improve the quality of the decisions taken, ensuring that 
they are properly debated and challenged by experts and supported by evidence, but it also 
legitimises the outcome, making it more likely that management and investors will accept the 
decision reached and work together to implement it. 
It is, of course, true (as discussed in Chapter 4.3 above) that the power of the board is also 
severely constrained in the portfolio companies examined in the analysis for this thesis.  In 
many cases, the limitation on the power of the managers to make decisions was one that 
structurally transferred the ultimate power to the investor, acting in that capacity.  In other 
cases, the approval rights sat with the board, but the board would either have a majority of 
shareholder-appointed representatives or would be unable to take a positive decision unless 
the shareholder-appointed representative voted in favour when the matter was voted upon 
                                               
288 Such an approach could also have positive liability effects, as an individual who sits on 
the board will take on mandatory directors’ duties and potential statutory liabilities, as 
discussed extensively in Part 3.  However, see also the discussion in Chapter 8.2.3 at page 
188 below on the perceived liability limiting impacts of exercising powers as a de jure 
director rather than qua shareholder. 
289 As reported above (in Chapter 4.3.2 at pages 106-107), in the sample used in this thesis, 
the board had routine meetings approximately ten times a year, usually with several more ad 
hoc meetings to discuss and agree specific matters.  
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by the board.  However, such a structural re-allocation of power does not strip the board of 
its role in the decision-making process.  First, in all cases the approval rights of the 
shareholder, or the veto right of the shareholder-appointed representative on the board, was 
a negative one only, enabling it to respond to recommendations from the board but not to 
direct action (although, of course, in the 12% of cases where the shareholder-nominated 
directors controlled the board they would be able to make positive decisions290).  And 
although there may have been a residual right to direct the board when the investor(s) was 
in a position to pass a special resolution, interview evidence would suggest that this right 
would rarely be exercised, unless the investor had lost confidence in the management team, 
in which case their most likely course of action would be remove the CEO and possibly other 
senior managers and appoint alternatives.  Secondly, it was clear from the process for 
obtaining consent described by several interviewees that a board (or management) 
recommendation was crucial in deciding whether to exercise shareholder consent rights291, 
and in most cases (unless the decision was regarded as a “shareholder” decision) the 
nominated director was authorised to give the shareholder consent, meaning that even when 
the shareholder held the formal power, in reality the decision was made by those around the 
board table.  Finally, even though the shareholder-appointed nominated director may have 
had a right of veto over board decisions, it was also clear from interviewees that in reality the 
board would almost always operate by consensus (some describe the relationship with 
management as a partnership292).   
Of course, internal decision-making processes that are designed to improve the quality of 
decisions pervade most organisations, and the board processes described here are not 
fundamentally different.  However, an important feature of the corporate governance 
processes in a private equity-backed company is that they are hard-wired into the 
constitution of the company.  They are processes that exist as a condition of investment by 
the private equity fund, they are established by contract, and they are not alterable except 
                                               
290 See Chapter 4.3.1 at page 99 above. 
291 I14 was the most explicit: “You’ve got to … say [to management]: ‘well, you make that 
recommendation to me. I’ll make my mind up whether we’re going to do it or not’ because 
that’s the only way … because this one we’ve been quite intensive in making decisions and 
these guys … the previous managers had a habit of sort of absolving the decision to us and 
that’s a disaster because I’m not close enough.” 
292 See fn 195 and fn 275 above.   
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with the consent of the shareholders.  Although, as is evident from the responses given to 
various questions by the interviewees, there is considerable latitude in practice as regards 
how these structures are operated on a day-to-day basis, the fundamental structures 
(especially the role of the board) are respected by the private equity fund managers who 
participated in this research. 
5.1.3 Implications for company law 
UK company law is not silent on this aspect of the governance mechanism, but its impact is 
relatively weak, mainly because of the subjective nature of the core duty of loyalty293 and a 
reluctance on the part of legislators and judges to interfere in decision-making by managers 
and boards294.  Section 174 of the Companies Act 2006 establishes a duty of care, and 
Section 172 identifies (at least to some degree) a decision-making process that must be 
followed295.  However, although the interview evidence gathered for this thesis does suggest 
that duties to ensure that all directors are fully aligned to seek to achieve the best outcome 
for the company are helpful, there is no evidence that the duty of care skill and diligence, nor 
the “have regard to” factors listed in Section 172, are regarded as offering significant support 
to the stakeholders in a private equity-backed company. 
When evaluating company law structures, it will be important to bear in mind this particular 
aspect of the governance mechanisms that we see in practice.  Rules that in any way 
constrain the ability of companies to appoint people with appropriate expertise who can play 
a valuable role in decision-making processes might be sub-optimal, especially if those rules 
are mandatory or costly to contract around.  Examples of such rules might be those that 
concentrate on independence296 or the absence of conflicts of interest such that they make it 
difficult to appoint non-executive directors with relevant and current experience; or rules that 
make it hard to appoint a director with a particular but narrow field of expertise (perhaps a 
                                               
293 See fn 71 in Chapter 1.1.3 above. 
294 Roe (2002) argues that (US) corporate law does not regulate “straightforward 
mismanagement” (page 2), because of the business judgement rule, but (at least as regards 
UK law) that would seem to be an overstatement – see fn 71 in Chapter 1.1.3 above.   
295 Companies Act, Section 172(1)(a)-(f).  However, see the discussion in Chapter 6.1 
below, at pages 134-143, which also raises doubts about the impact of this duty in practice.  
296 The UK Corporate Governance Code requires (on a “comply or explain” basis) a certain 
number of board members to be “independent” and defines “independence” in B.1 – see 
Financial Reporting Council (2016). 
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technical skill, or a special understanding of the interests of the company’s employees), 
which the company needs but which make that person reluctant to accept wider 
responsibility for the company’s general decision-making and behaviour.  Of course, it would 
be possible to appoint such persons to other positions in the company, perhaps as 
consultants, but interview evidence – echoed by the current debate relating to employees on 
boards – suggests that (for some) there is a particular kudos associated with being 
appointed to the company’s board, which carries with it a sense of greater responsibility and 
influence that is valued by the company and the individual director297.   
5.2 Accommodating shareholder preferences  
In addition to controlling agency costs and embedding a superior decision-making process, I 
argue in this thesis that a third objective for private equity governance structures is to 
accommodate the specific ownership time horizons, risk and investment preferences, 
regulatory position and reputation of the private equity fund and its manager.  The need for 
such an objective arises from the structure of the investments and the funds within which 
they are held described in Chapter 2, and it is evident from the analysis of the data from the 
sample of private equity-backed companies. 
This objective manifests itself in two main ways: first, a requirement to control the timing and 
process of a sale of the company – which, because of the structure of the underlying funds 
and compensation mechanisms, is a crucial consideration for a private equity owner  – and 
over other matters that will affect the value to be obtained directly from the particular 
investment by the investor within its investment time horizon; and, secondly, to protect the 
investor from extraneous matters that, whether or not they generate (or reduce) value in the 
underlying company for the investor, will nevertheless have a wider impact on the investor in 
its own right.  An example of the first type of concern (which we shall label an “internal 
preference”) would be a proposal to make an acquisition that, although a profitable 
investment in its own right and synergistic for the company, would make the company less 
                                               
297 I15 said: “People think there’s a great badge of honour and kudos to be appointed as a 
board director to a company that has been successful. So they typically say, ‘I’d be happy to 
work with you, but I want to be a director’. So if you want the expertise, you have to … make 
a judgment on him being a director.”  However, that sentiment was not universally shared; 
I28 said: “Somebody doesn’t come in and you behave differently because they are a director 
or not a director.” 
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attractive to a potential short-term acquirer.  The second type of concern (which we shall 
refer to as an “external preference”) could be, for example, the damage to the investor’s 
reputation (and potential financial liability) caused by a corruption scandal in a portfolio 
company, but could also be a matter putting the investor in breach of its own contractual or 
regulatory commitments.  It is important to note that in many of these cases, particularly 
cases of the second type, the interests of the company and the investor could be fully 
aligned – a corruption scandal, for instance, would no doubt damage both the company and 
the investor; however, the magnitude of the damage will in aggregate be increased because 
the investor will also suffer damage, and that damage will extend beyond (indeed, it may be 
significantly greater than) the damage resulting from a loss in the value of its investment in 
the company.  The incentive to prevent such a scandal is therefore magnified (potentially 
greatly magnified) by the presence of a dominant and avowedly “active” investor.   
Whilst the first two purposes of the governance structures described above could fairly be 
said to be aimed at maximising the economic value of the underlying company (no doubt, in 
order to benefit shareholders), these further purposes – to accommodate both internal and 
external preferences – are aimed at enhancing or (more likely) protecting value for the 
shareholder as a distinct entity (and not indirectly by enhancing value in the portfolio 
company).  No doubt, the value of the shares in the underlying portfolio is an important 
consideration for the investor, but it is not the only one – and may not even be the dominant 
one – when considering how to exercise its influence over company behaviour.  As 
discussed more extensively in Chapter 2, this type of concern arises for private equity-
backed companies more acutely than in many other types of company, because private 
equity fund managers tend to be significant investors closely identified with their portfolio 
companies and because they are themselves subject to various constraints on behaviour 
(including restrictions imposed by their own investors and by regulators).  In addition, most 
private equity firms are “repeat players” who have to raise money regularly from their own 
investors, from banks (in relation to other portfolio companies) and who will, in future, need 
to persuade management teams and other equity investors that they can be trusted as 
investment partners.   
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5.2.1 Internal preferences 
There is ample evidence that protection of “internal preferences” – maximisation of liquidity 
and value at a particular point in time – is an important objective of the corporate 
governance system in the companies in the research sample assembled for this thesis.  
First, there are usually positive undertakings given by the company and the managers to 
disclose any approaches from potential acquirers and co-operate with any attempts by the 
investor to sell the company's shares or to list them on a stock market by way of IPO.  
Secondly, various protections are built into the consent rights reserved for the investor that 
relate to the timing and manner of the exit from the company.  For example, as discussed 
above, neither the board nor the managers are entitled to (among many other matters) 
interfere with the financing and capital structure of the company, undertake significant M&A 
or change the nature of the business of the company without shareholder approval.  These 
consent matters may be used to reduce agency costs arising from managerial self-interest 
and/or to ensure that the decision-making process is sound, but, as noted above, exercise of 
these powers in practice was generally by an Investment Committee, qua shareholder, 
rather than by the nominated director.  That suggests that the investor may regard these as 
mechanisms to protect its own separate interests, rather than to prevent an executive from 
using them to further their own interests or without proper consideration by a well-informed 
board.  Indeed, interview evidence confirms that it is envisaged that these rights will be 
exercised to protect the interests of the investor, and that private equity appointed directors 
are aware of these dual roles, and the potential conflict between them.  In fact, most argued 
that the dual roles were usually not in conflict and that it was possible to further both the 
interests of the company and the interests of the investor at the same time.  As one typical 
interviewee (I10) put it:  
The way I think about it is that sitting at that boardroom table, first and foremost, 
I am a director of that company and, therefore, the kind of fiduciary duty 
obligations that I have are paramount … But to imagine that I won’t have a 
[private equity firm] filter on that is probably a bit naïve … The difficulty comes 
when there is conflict between those two things because most of the time, 
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those things will be reasonably well aligned.  So the only challenge comes 
when you’ve got a bit of a conflict. 
There is also evidence that the discussions at board level are often concerned with 
achieving an exit for the shareholders, as well as with the longer-term interests of the 
company itself.  Six interviewees298 argued, for example, that, later in the holding period, the 
shareholders would be less likely to approve a significant M&A deal, or IT investment, 
because those were risky projects and could cause value to be lost on exit, or necessitate a 
deferral of the exit date; while earlier in the investment life cycle such projects might well 
have been undertaken because there would be more time to deal with any issues that arose 
before putting the company up for sale299.  Given that the managers and any non-executives 
will typically have a significant shareholding in the company (which, as described in Chapter 
4.2.4, they can often be required to sell when the investor decides to sell), there is a very 
deliberate alignment of interest among the directors so that they are all incentivised to focus 
on achieving a successful liquidity event for the company’s shareholders to a far greater 
extent than would be the case in, for example, a listed company.  So, although there may be 
a tension between the long-term interests of the company (judged as a stand-alone entity 
separate from its current shareholders) and the interests of the investor, to a large extent the 
interests of the managers and the investor will generally be aligned as regards exit time 
horizons, and creating this alignment was seen as important by many interviewees300.  
Indeed, when asked about any possible conflict between the company’s interests and the 
investor’s interests, one interviewee (I6), an in-house lawyer, asserted that:  
For most of the time, the interests of the shareholders are probably the most 
important factor as to what’s in the best interests of the company …so you’re 
typically aligned. 
                                               
298 I1, I6, I14, I17, I26 and I27. 
299 As one interviewee (I26) put it: “So the thing that you are thinking about with exit is if you 
make a crap acquisition early on in the investment period, you’ve got time to rectify that.  
Late on, you are thinking more about risk.” 
300 It is clear that, although this alignment can be assumed in a general sense, there is the 
potential for some misalignment: managers will often hold deferred or subordinated financial 
instruments and will usually not make profits unless the investors have recovered all or a 
significant part of their original investment.  On alignment of interest through significant 
management shareholdings generally, see Chapter 4.2 at pages 82-87. 
Page | 125 
 
5.2.2 External preferences 
This aspect of the governance structures is harder to isolate, especially because many 
interviewees asserted that the processes that protect value for the investor, and are clearly 
evident from this research, are in fact principally designed to protect value in the underlying 
company, and all interviewees who were asked to address the question claimed that the two 
objectives – protecting value for the portfolio company and protecting value for the investor – 
were always (or nearly always) fully aligned, at least while the company was solvent301.  As 
discussed above302, that latter assertion may in fact be correct, but there may nevertheless 
be an “over-investment” in such mechanisms relative to what would be rational for an 
investor without their own separate reputational issues to consider303.  In any event, it is 
clear, and interviewees widely agreed304, that the downside risks of a failure in a portfolio 
company, and (conversely) the upside gains from a success in a portfolio company, would 
very often be magnified in a private equity-backed company relative to those in other 
companies of equivalent size with different ownership structures305.  As described above306, 
                                               
301 Some interviewees argued that the protection of the investor was incidental and was not 
the main focus of the governance structures – for example, I7 was typical: “The vast majority 
of what we’re asking for is for the good of the company itself”.  Indeed, protection of the 
separate interests of the investor was not specifically mentioned as a purpose of the 
corporate governance mechanisms by any interviewee without prompting, implying that it is 
not a purpose of which private equity executives are strongly conscious.  However, when 
prompted, most accepted that it was, at least to some extent, one of the purposes of the 
systems that were in place. One typical interviewee (I16) said: “So a reputation issue that 
impacts a portfolio company could lose us client money if it destroys value. A reputation 
issue … that impacts on us, impacts on our ongoing business and ability to raise funds.” 
Later I16 added, in response to a prompt: “I’ve never separated it out and thought about it in 
those terms, but I think how we approach looking at companies and the level of involvement 
we want to get, we are very conscious that what happens in one company actually magnifies 
and reflects to a much wider extent across a portfolio, across our clients, and for ourselves.” 
302 See discussion in Chapter 2.2.6 at page 56 above, and Chapter 5.2 at pages 121-122 
above. 
303 Whether there is in fact “over-investment” in these mechanisms relative to other 
companies is an interesting subject for future research, but not something that could be 
tested in this research project because that the sample only included private equity-backed 
companies.  However, given the economic incentives described here, one would expect the 
investment to be higher and, from a purely economic standpoint, that investment would be 
inefficient for a minority shareholder without the same reputational or legal risks to take into 
account, or the same contractual restrictions limiting the type of investments that could be 
made.   
304 I1, I3, I4, I5, I7, I8, I9, I11, I16, I18, I20, I21, I22, I23, I24, I25, I26, I28, I29 and I30 all 
made comments supporting that view.  No interviewee disagreed with that view. 
305 That is, ownership structures where the investors are not closely associated with the 
underlying company and/or where they are not repeat players and/or where they are 
unregulated and/or do not have their own investor base imposing restrictions or concerned 
about their own reputations. 
306 See Chapter 2.1.6 at pages 44-47. 
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private equity firms are very aware of the risks to their own reputation, their liability risks and 
the investment restrictions that they face, and the terms of the corporate governance 
processes that are agreed with management at the time of investment reflect those 
concerns.  It is clear from the structure of private equity investments, and apparent from the 
documents reviewed in my research and discussions with interviewees, that private equity 
investors have an added incentive to ensure that certain types of activity are avoided in the 
underlying portfolio company, and that others are encouraged. 
5.2.3 Contractual provisions protecting separate interests 
Because most of the mechanisms identified below have (or could plausibly have) a dual 
purpose (to enhance value in the underlying company and to enhance value for the investor 
as a distinct economic entity), it has not been possible to assess quantitatively the extent to 
which processes put in place by the private equity investors in the research sample used in 
this thesis are driven by this objective.  However, while many decisions are left to 
management, or to the board – which invariably includes management, and which has a 
company law duty to act to promote the success of the company – what is clear from the 
research is that the corporate governance mechanisms of private equity-backed companies 
remove discretion from the board and the management in relation to certain issues, and the 
mechanisms to police compliance with rules relevant to those issues are often dealt with 
separately within the private equity firm – sometimes by people who are not directly involved 
in value enhancement at portfolio level – suggesting that one primary concern of the 
mechanisms is to protect the investor307. 
Perhaps the most common contractual provisions that fit into this third category are those 
corporate governance mechanisms – that is, contractual terms imposed upon the company 
at the time of investment – that deal with anti-corruption policies.  As already discussed, in 
58% of the companies in the sample, the investment documentation imposed specific 
contractual obligations on the company or the individual managers (or, in some cases, both) 
                                               
307 There is a second, plausible reason for giving this power to someone located in the 
private equity firm, rather than the portfolio company: to capitalise on economies of scale 
and specialist expertise.  However, the absence of board discretion over such matters 
suggests that the investor is less concerned about cost/benefit judgements being made at 
company-level and more concerned with an aggregate, fund-level (or manager-level) 
cost/benefit analysis.   
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to seek to ensure compliance with anti-corruption laws308.  The precise terms of this 
contractual obligation varied from firm to firm; in some cases, the obligation was quite 
general and simply required compliance with the UK Bribery Act, or other relevant anti-
corruption laws; in other cases, there were more detailed, specific requirements mandating, 
for example, regular reports to the investors, and the nomination of an individual director 
within the portfolio company to be responsible for anti-corruption compliance.  It is also clear 
from the research that corporate governance provisions dealing with anti-corruption 
compliance are increasingly frequent: in the research sample, 65% of the investments made 
from January 2012 included such provisions, and all six of the investments made since 
January 2014 included them.  One of the firms in the sample did not generally include 
provisions dealing with bribery and corruption until 2015, but then changed its standard form 
documents so that they are now routinely included. 
Although it is clear that a bribery offence could have value-destructive consequences for the 
portfolio company itself, it is also clear from the interview evidence that private equity firms 
are very aware of the potential damage to the fund manager in the event that one of their 
portfolio companies is convicted (or even accused) of a bribery offence, especially if the 
private equity investor cannot demonstrate that it took steps to prevent that offence309.  This 
creates a clear additional economic incentive for the private equity investor to insist on such 
procedures as part of the corporate governance mechanism of the portfolio company, 
beyond the direct incentive to preserve value in the company itself.  Such a rationalisation 
can equally apply to a variety of “responsible investment” type requirements and a number 
of firms require their portfolio companies to adopt these through direct contractual 
commitments negotiated at the time of investment.  For example, one firm (whose approach 
is more exacting in this regard than the others in the sample), specifically requires a portfolio 
company to comply with (or, where appropriate, take account of), and to report upon 
                                               
308 That is not to say, of course, that the remaining companies did not have anti-corruption 
policies, only that, at the time of the initial investment, anti-corruption policies were not 
imposed upon the company as part of the agreed corporate governance framework.  In 
some or all of the other companies it is possible (indeed, it is likely) that the board or 
management team would have put such procedures in place. 
309 Liability risk for the private equity firm and its appointed portfolio company directors arises 
from the Bribery Act 2010 (especially Sections 8 and 14(2)), and it may be that this Act 
accounts for the increasing focus on anti-corruption procedures that I observed. 
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compliance with, any “law, regulation, directive, or code of practice” affecting, among other 
things, the health and safety of employees, relationships with trade unions, and “best 
practice as regards corporate and social responsibility”.  It was clear from interviews with this 
firm that their own investors' requirements or preferences had been the chief motivator for 
the introduction of such requirements. 
In fact, there are a wide variety of different governance provisions that can be rationalised in 
a similar way: that one of their purposes, and in some cases their only or main purpose, is to 
protect the separate interests of a particular shareholder.  For instance, most private equity 
investors have an investment policy that has been agreed with their own investors, and may 
include restrictions on investment outside of certain sectors, or prohibit investments in 
certain products (for example, Sharia-compliant investment funds may be prohibited from 
investing in businesses that sell alcohol; biotechnology funds may have restrictions on 
investments outside of that sector)310.  When a private equity firm invests in a company it 
will, of course, ensure that the company is compliant with any such contractual restrictions 
on its mandate, but it must also ensure that the company cannot subsequently engage in 
prohibited activities.  In the research sample, all the companies needed to seek shareholder 
consent before changing their business strategy and it seems plain that, in deciding whether 
to give any required consent, the investor would have regard to its own investment mandate 
and would decline consent in cases where the proposed action would lead to a breach by 
the investor of its own separate obligations.  Some Investment Agreements also included a 
direct contractual commitment imposed on the company and/or its managers to work with 
the investor to ensure compliance with various (usually specified) regulatory requirements to 
which the investor is subject. 
There is already academic evidence that private equity firms engage in behaviours when 
involved in the affairs of their portfolio companies that are designed to protect their 
reputation with banks, rather than to protect value for themselves in the underlying 
company311, so it is not surprising that they negotiate corporate governance mechanisms 
that enable them to protect their reputation and other separate interests.  It is, however, 
                                               
310 See also the discussion in Chapter 2.1.2 at pages 39-40 above. 
311 See de Fontenay (2014) and the discussion in Chapter 2.1.6 at pages 44-47 above. 
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important to note that, as regards these external preferences (and unlike the position for 
internal preferences), the reward structure does not necessarily align interests between the 
managers and the investor.  The managers are rewarded by reference to the value of the 
company only, usually mainly by reference to its capital value on exit but also by salaries 
and bonuses that will no doubt vary with performance.  However, in so far as actions benefit 
the fund or the fund manager as a separate entity, the managers do not usually share in 
those benefits.  
5.2.4 Implications for company law 
Company law has traditionally focused on the interests of the company, represented (when 
the company is solvent) by the interests of its “members as a whole”312, as the object of the 
exercise of directors’ powers, and majority shareholders also have to concern themselves 
with the interests of the company when exercising certain powers qua shareholder in order 
to control the agency costs that might otherwise accrue to minorities313.  This approach does 
not therefore sit particularly well with protections for individual shareholders.  There is, of 
course, nothing to stop a company from reaching a contractual agreement with a particular 
shareholder (or group of shareholders) that it will conduct its business in a particular way 
(and this is, as we have seen, a very common requirement of private equity investors).  
However, limitations of contracting mean that in some cases it is not possible to contract at 
the outset for all eventualities and, in some cases, shareholder protection is achieved by 
giving a particular shareholder or group of shareholders (and, in some cases, the investors 
as a separate class) a decision-making right in relation to a particular proposed course of 
action.  Where that decision-making power is left to be exercised by a director nominated by 
the private equity firm, we shall discuss  at length in Part 3 that company law raises some 
difficult issues if the director purports to exercise that power in the interests of the private 
equity firm and not in the interests of the company; and even where the decision-making 
power is left to the private equity firm itself (qua shareholder – as is often, on paper at least, 
the case) there may be questions about whether the investor (certainly if it is a majority 
shareholder) can exercise that discretion unfettered or whether there is an obligation to 
                                               
312 See discussion in Chapter 6.1.3 at pages 140-142 below. 
313 See Allen v Gold Reefs [1900] 1 Ch 656 and other cases referred to in the discussion in 
Chapter 8.2.2 at pages 181-186 below. 
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consider the interests of the company.  It is clear from the interviews that, in practice, these 
risks are not regarded as material (because interests are aligned), other than when the 
company is insolvent314, but the fact remains that the law’s desire to protect shareholders, 
against both managerial and majority shareholder agency costs, could get in the way of this 
key purpose of corporate governance in private equity-backed companies. 
This raises an important normative question for academic company lawyers, which strikes at 
the heart of the UK conception of the company: should the protection of specific shareholder 
interests, which may not necessarily be the same as those of the company, be permitted by 
company law and, in order to protect the interests that cannot be dealt with at the time of 
investment by contractual agreement, is it acceptable to transfer decision-making power to a 
specified shareholder and for that shareholder to act only in their own interests in exercising 
that power?  Should these specific shareholder “agency costs” created by such 
mechanisms, which are analogous to the more familiar agency costs arising when there is a 
controlling shareholder, be controlled by law?    
An analysis of that question according to the traditional theoretical justifications for 
mandatory rules in company law described in Chapter 1 would suggest that – provided all 
shareholders are aware of the reallocation of power and the interests of those making the 
decisions, and voluntarily agree to the mechanisms on a fully informed basis – then, at least 
while the company is solvent, there is no reason to restrict contractual freedom.  Doing so 
might inhibit investment and lead to sub-optimal outcomes.   
However, it is also reasonable to question whether such an approach leads to inefficiencies 
for society, or to externalities that society would prefer to control and that could be controlled 
by prohibiting a particular shareholder from acting in their own separate interests in 
exercising discretion in directing the company’s affairs.  This research also offers some 
insights into the motivations of the private equity firms in the sample and, therefore, some of 
the effects that their ownership may have on the behaviour of portfolio companies. 
                                               
314 When asked about concerns relating to directors’ duties and other potential liabilities, I4, 
I6, I7, I9, I10, I12, I13, I15, I17, I20, I21, I22, I23 and I29 focused exclusively on companies 
with financial difficulties.  No interviewee expressed any serious concerns about the liability 
risk for directors in the UK unless a portfolio company was insolvent, except one minority 
investor, who also referred to the conflicts that arise when the company is fundraising. 
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As we have seen, private equity funds are not pure financial investors whose only interest 
when they invest in the company is to make the largest (after tax) financial return possible 
from that particular investment.  Of course, in that respect they are certainly not alone: most 
other shareholders have interests that extend beyond the direct financial interest that they 
have in maximising the value of their shares, and private equity funds are only one example 
of a type of investor who seeks to influence the company to pursue a broader agenda.  Even 
in a widely-held publicly traded company, where the assumption might be made by directors 
that shareholders are only interested in the pursuit of value maximisation at the level of the 
corporate entity because it is not feasible to ascertain and reconcile their heterogeneous 
interests315, it is likely that directors are, to some extent, influenced by the preferences of 
shareholders as a whole316, and certainly significant shareholders, as regards the level of 
risk taken, or even in the adoption of certain “responsible investment” policies.  In most 
closely-held companies, directors are influenced by the preferences of shareholders, 
including, no doubt, those preferences that do not accord with the maximisation of value at 
the company level.  However, in a private equity-backed company, the transmission 
mechanism is clearly evident in the corporate governance mechanisms of the company, and 
dictates that certain preferences must be accommodated by the company.  The decisions 
covered by these mechanisms go significantly further than those that corporate law or stock 
market regulations specifically remit to shareholders, such as approval of certain 
transactions with directors, or significant M&A activity317, and cover matters that are 
generally regarded as more operational, such as adoption of anti-corruption compliance 
procedures and approval of annual business plans and budgets.   
Of course, the interests of private equity investors that these mechanisms protect are many 
and varied.  As discussed above, they include their own regulatory and contractual 
                                               
315 It can be argued that this fact inhibits the pursuit of social and environmental goals by 
publicly-held companies.  See, for example, Bakan (2015) who says (at page 287) that 
companies are “controlled and commanded by law to limit their pursuit of social and 
environmental values unless such pursuit can somehow be aligned with their own financial 
interests”, and Talbot (2016).   
316 Although it is a noisy signal, the share price may be one way to ascertain the preferences 
of the general body of shareholders for particular policies or practices, especially those that 
affect the company’s risk profile.   
317 See fn 234 in Chapter 4 above for examples of matters reserved for shareholders in UK 
company law and stock market rules. 
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obligations, their reputation with a wide range of stakeholders, and potential legal liability.  
To the extent that these interests are aligned with societal concerns more generally – and 
one would certainly expect legal liability, regulatory issues and reputational concerns to 
motivate actions that are responsible and that might limit certain types of externality318 – the 
incentives for those involved in the governance of the portfolio company to ensure that the 
company adopts societally desired standards of behaviour are magnified.  For example, 
failure to promote adequate care quality in a healthcare setting may well lead to adverse 
consequences for the portfolio company that is found responsible for such a breach, and 
might lead to a significant loss of value for the shareholders in that company.  However, if 
the shareholder is a private equity fund, that investor is also likely to suffer additional 
reputational damage and, possibly, legal liability319, which means that its losses will not be 
confined to the direct financial loss associated with the shares it holds in the underlying 
company.  The fund’s financial incentive to ensure that there are no such breaches in care 
quality is therefore magnified320.   
These incentives to behave responsibly, or at least to be seen to be doing so, could lead to 
agency costs for the other shareholders, who may find that the private equity-backed 
company “over-invests” in processes that are designed to protect one investor’s own 
reputation, or to create a defence against liability for the shareholder.  However, those other 
                                               
318 For details of some of the specific concerns of private equity fund managers and their 
own investors see Chapter 2.1.6 at pages 44-47 above.  
319 The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, in common with many other similar laws aimed 
at bodies corporate, provides (in Section 37) parallel liability for an offence that “is proved to 
have been committed with the consent or connivance of, or to have been attributable to any 
neglect on the part of any director …”.  Any director appointed by a private equity firm is 
therefore at risk, and that director will usually be indemnified by the private equity firm, 
although the risk may be more remote if (as is usual) the private equity appointee sits on the 
board of the holding company, rather than the operating company – see further Chapter 9.1 
at pages 189-192 below. 
320 It could also be argued that the investor is imposing upon management a more informed 
view of the best way to optimise value in the underlying company, which is reminiscent of 
the other objective of corporate governance dealt with in this Chapter: making better 
decisions.  In the field of responsible investing, for example, it could be argued that private 
equity investors are better informed about the long-term financial advantages of adopting 
sound ESG policies – see fn 129 above – and therefore impose those on management in 
order to create value in the underlying company.  That explanation is consistent with data 
provided by Cornelli et al. (2015) and PwC (2016), who found that private equity managers 
adopt ESG policies because they believe that they preserve or enhance economic value to 
their portfolio companies.  That may be true, but it is also consistent with the argument made 
here that these mechanisms are also designed to protect the reputation of the private equity 
manager as a responsible investor, and/or to protect it from liability and/or to give effect to 
commitments it has made to its own investors. 
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shareholders are able to assess the extent of any such agency costs and to decide whether 
to accept them at the time at which they agree to buy shares in a private equity-backed 
company, and to contest any corporate governance procedures that are seen as inefficient.  
In that respect, more flexibility for shareholders and managers to agree their own rules, even 
if they seem to impose agency costs on minority shareholders, is likely to facilitate 
investment. 
In Part 2 of this thesis, we have mapped the various corporate governance rules and 
processes that are common to the companies in the research sample, and suggested that 
they have three distinct, although overlapping and broadly aligned, purposes: concluding 
more complete contracts and mitigating agency costs (in an expanded sense); making 
sound business and strategic decisions that are regarded as legitimate; and protecting the 
separate interests and preferences of the investor.  These purposes largely accord with 
those predicted in Chapter 2.2 above, and support the contractarian view that agency costs 
will be mitigated by private ordering.  However, these findings also support a theory that 
suggests an expanded role for governance beyond agency cost control, and provide some 
detailed examples of the ways in which these additional purposes are furthered.  In Part 3, 
we shall explore the impact that UK corporate law might have on these governance 
mechanisms, and how apparently mandatory rules are neutralised or modified by private 
equity-backed companies, whether through contract or otherwise.  
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PART 3: TESTING THE THEORY: CONTRACTUAL 
RESPONSES TO PROBLEMATIC MANDATORY RULES 
 
CHAPTER 6: THE RELEVANCE OF BUSINESS JUDGEMENT REGULATION 
 
In Part 1 of this thesis it was hypothesised that the sophisticated corporate governance 
structures in private equity-backed companies would fulfil various objectives and, in Part 2, it 
was demonstrated that there is evidence from the companies in the research sample that 
three of these objectives were indeed motivating the contractual design of various decision-
making and control mechanisms.  In Part 3, we examine a fourth suggested purpose of 
private equity governance, which is to amend or dis-apply provisions of UK company law 
that are regarded as inappropriate, including some that are, at least on the face of it, 
mandatory. 
6.1 The duty to promote success (Section 172) 
Our analysis of the core duties of directors that might be problematic for a private equity-
backed company321, given the governance structures and their objectives detailed in Parts 1 
and 2, begins with the core articulation of the duty of loyalty322 which, as codified in 2006, is 
now described as the duty to promote the company’s success323. 
6.1.1 The scope of the duty 
Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 requires every director to “act in the way he 
considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the 
                                               
321 There are, of course, other directors’ duties set out in Part 10 of the Companies Act 2006; 
I have not dealt with these specifically because they do not appear to give rise to any 
theoretical problems, are not dealt with contractually by the companies in the sample, and 
were not raised by interviewees.  The most notable of the other duties, the duty to exercise 
care, skill and diligence (Section 174), certainly seems consistent with commercial 
expectations for the role of the board and the senior management, and is no doubt 
supplemented by executive director service agreements. 
322 The other important aspect of the duty of loyalty, the duty to avoid and disclose conflicts 
of interest, is dealt with in Chapter 7 below. 
323 The debate about the meaning and impact of Section 172 continues – see, for example,  
Keay (2012), who argues that the reform did not achieve its objectives, and Collison et al. 
(2011) whose comprehensive review of the history and the impact of the reform suggests 
that it has had very little effect on behaviour, a view echoed (at page 125) by Big Innovation 
Centre (2016) (although see also Keay & Adamopoulou (2012) who point to some evidence 
of concern for non-shareholder stakeholders by company boards).   
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benefit of its members as a whole”.  This aspect of the duty of loyalty, a restatement of the 
common law duty to act in the company’s best interests, is mandatory and cannot be 
excluded by the members324 although, if the purposes of the company consist of or include 
the benefit of people other than its members, the duty is modified to that extent325. 
Although framed prescriptively by the Act, it seems likely that the duty is not, in fact, a 
positive duty to act, but rather a duty that regulates the exercise of powers326.  Such an 
interpretation would be consistent with the classic exposition of the duty to act in the 
company’s best interests by Lord Greene in Smith v Fawcett327, who said that the duty 
arises “where the articles of a company confer discretion on directors”.  However, the 
boundaries of this duty are not entirely clear, and plainly there are circumstances in which 
the duty of loyalty creates positive obligations: in Item Software (UK) Ltd v Fassihi328, Arden 
LJ found that a director had a duty to disclose his own misconduct (if he subjectively 
believed that to do so would be in the best interests of the company329) and argued that this 
was a fundamental part of his duty of loyalty330, and it seems clear that the duty to disclose 
relevant information could extend to other matters within a director’s knowledge331.  The fact 
that there is significant academic argument over the nature and extent of this duty to 
                                               
324 See Ahern (2011) who identifies limited (obiter) support in English cases (specifically, 
Hawkes v Cuddy and others; Re Neath Rugby Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 291 and Re Southern 
Counties Fresh Foods Ltd; Cobden Investments Ltd v RWM Purchaser Ltd and others 
[2010] EWHC 3334 (Ch)) for the view that attenuation of the duty to act in the best interests 
of the company is possible, but concludes that the scope for such attenuation is extremely 
limited, especially in view of the wording used in the 2006 Act 
325 See pages 136-138 below for further discussion of this possibility. 
326 Despite the Act’s apparently prescriptive nature, the common law is relevant to its 
interpretation: see Section 170(3) and (4) Companies Act 2006.  It is clear that the duty to 
promote the success of the company is based upon the common law duty to act in the best 
interests of the company. 
327 [1942] Ch. 304 at page 306. 
328 [2004] EWCA Civ 1244 at [34] – [68].  For a helpful discussion of the case, see Armour & 
Conaglen (2005). 
329 See GHLM Trading Ltd v Maroo [2012] EWHC 61 (Ch) at [192] – [195]. 
330 See also Bhullar v Bhullar [2003] EWCA 424 and Industrial Development Consultants Ltd 
v Cooley [1972] 2 All ER 162, which suggest that directors are liable because they failed to 
disclose information to the company.  However, in Item Software Arden LJ says that these 
cases are not authority for the proposition that there is a separate and independent duty to 
disclose. 
331 For example, in Shepherds Investments Ltd and another v Walters and others [2007] 2 
BCLC 202 Etherton J says, at [132]: “In the case of the acts of his fellow directors in 
promoting a rival business, the breach of fiduciary duty of the director is failing to disclose 
matters which are of relevance and concern to the company and which, if acting in good 
faith in the best interests of the company, the director would disclose.”  It is argued in Davies 
et al. (2013), at page 646-647, that Etherton J’s analysis preserves the prescriptive nature of 
fiduciary duties.   
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disclose332 indicates an unfortunate lack of legal clarity, and directors will be left in some 
doubt about when the duty requires positive action on their part.   
6.1.2 The role of this duty in a private equity-backed company 
As described in Part 2333, an important part of the governance framework in a private equity-
backed company is designed to ensure that a small, expert group of directors is actively 
engaged in making better decisions for the benefit of the company as a standalone 
economic entity.  However, although no doubt consistent with the commercial intentions of 
the parties as regards the role of the board as a whole, there is no evidence from the 
research undertaken for this thesis or elsewhere that private equity investors rely upon 
Section 172 itself to ensure that the board is discharging its function.  That does not mean 
that its relevance can be discounted entirely: the duty operates alongside the conflict of 
interest rules and, as we shall see in the next Chapter, it plays an active and important role 
in establishing a potential conflict of duties for both executive and non-executive directors.  
But there is no evidence that private equity investors regard Section 172 as having any 
meaningful role to play in ensuring that boards make good decisions for the company’s 
benefit. 
The absence of contractual modification 
Although Section 172(1) establishes a default position, subsection (2) makes it clear that the 
company’s constitution can set out purposes for the company other than the benefit of 
members, and that, in such a case, the duty of directors is to act in the way they consider 
would be most likely to achieve those purposes.  That does give an opportunity for the 
company’s shareholders to vary the duty of the directors to provide, for example, for a more 
stakeholder-driven approach to directors’ duties, or to identify the purpose of the company 
                                               
332 See, for example, Lee (2009), who concludes (at page 253) that fiduciaries can have 
positive obligations when there are acting in a way that may affect the interests of the 
beneficiary; Moore (2016), who offers a helpful commentary on the current legal position 
following Haysport Properties Ltd v Ackerman [2016] EWHC 393 (Ch) and says that: “It 
cannot be said with confidence that a positive duty of disclosure per Fassihi would survive a 
trip to the UK Supreme Court; Jensen (2010), who believes that the “proscriptive paradigm 
provides the better account of English and Australian fiduciary law” (page 334); Nolan (2009) 
at page 311, who also argues that duties “controlling power directly” are proscriptive and not 
prescriptive; and Conaglen (2005) who emphasises the prophylactic nature of fiduciary 
duties. 
333 See, in particular, Chapter 5.1 at pages 113-121 above. 
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as being to pursue the interests of a particular shareholder (in some or all respects).  Among 
UK companies more broadly, there does not appear to be any evidence that this option is 
widely taken up outside of the not-for-profit sector, but it is clearly available to commercial 
companies if they wish to use it, and may be expected to become more popular if the US 
“benefit corporation”334 continues to become more prevalent, or if recent suggestions to 
introduce the concept of embedded “purpose” to UK companies gain traction335.   
Given that the constitutions of private equity-backed companies are highly bespoke and 
sophisticated documents, contractarian theorists who argue that the private equity 
ownership model affords a greater opportunity for value maximising contracts to be 
negotiated336 might expect that – if it was optimal to allow directors to pursue goals other 
than purely shareholder value337 – Section 172(2) would be used to make appropriate 
adjustments to the company’s purposes.  If no such change is made, it might provide 
evidence that the optimal value-maximising contract is already captured by the 172 default.   
In fact, none of the private equity-backed companies in the sample took advantage of the 
opportunity to re-define the company’s purposes338.  A number of reasons might be 
suggested for that omission.  First, it could reflect a lack of awareness of the opportunity 
afforded by Section 172(2) but, given the relative sophistication of the legal advice taken by 
private equity firms, that seems unlikely.  Secondly, private equity firms might be concerned 
that such a provision would weaken the fiduciary responsibility of the executive directors, 
increasing agency costs; but, as mentioned above, there is no evidence to suggest that this 
duty is regarded as helpful in mitigating agency costs and other mechanism are adopted for 
that purpose.  Thirdly, it might be difficult for a private equity investor to justify such a 
modification to its own investors, who might be concerned that it would signal a dilution in 
their financial returns; but there is evidence339 that at least some private equity firms in the 
                                               
334 For a review of the US benefit corporation, and other similar corporate vehicles in the US 
and Europe (including the UK’s Community Interest Company), see Esposito (2012). 
335 See Big Innovation Centre (2016), especially Chapter 1, and Hutton (2015) at pages 137-
142. 
336 See Jensen (1989) and the discussion in Chapter 10.2.1 at pages 210-211 below. 
337 See, for example, Blair & Stout (1999), discussed briefly at fn 629 below. 
338 One company did in fact vary the purposes of the company, but only to make clear that 
the purposes of the company could include the benefit of group companies.   
339 See Chapter 5.2.3 at pages 126-129 above. 
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sample are actually responding to investor pressure to adopt stakeholder-friendly policies, 
rather than avoiding them.  Fourthly, the absence of contractual variation to re-define the 
company's purposes could reflect a view that such modification would offer no particular 
benefit in signalling alternative purposes to wider stakeholders, and that Section 172 is 
largely irrelevant as a device that affects boardroom behaviour.  It is submitted that this last 
explanation is the most likely, given that Section 172 already affords directors considerable 
latitude and the risk of enforcement action is low: if the conviction of the investor is that an 
“enlightened” approach to shareholder value (where other stakeholder interests may be put 
above the pursuit of short-term profit) is the best way to create value, then a modification is 
unnecessary, because the default provision in Section 172(1) already allows that 
approach340; if, on the other hand, the board wishes to prioritise short-term shareholder 
profits at the expense of long-term value then, provided the company is solvent, Section 172 
will not inhibit that.  Indeed, Section 172 may offer some “window dressing”: directors and 
investors can point to the duty to act only after “having regard” to stakeholder interests and 
long-term value, whilst knowing that a failure to do so would be unlikely to have any legal 
consequences.  In this sense, perhaps investors regard Section 172 as the optimal bargain. 
6.1.3 Problems that the duty might create for a private equity-backed company 
As well as owing a duty to promote the success of the portfolio company, a director 
nominated by a private equity investor may also owe separate duties to the investor to 
safeguard the investment that it has made and, therefore, to identify with the interests of that 
particular investor (rather than with the shareholders as a whole).  These duties may be 
contractual, or arise from a regulated relationship with the fund or its manager341.   
                                               
340 It has become commonplace to argue that pursuit of longer-term shareholder value 
requires a more socially responsible approach.  For a particularly influential contribution to 
this discussion see Porter & Kramer (2011).  
341 Where the director is nominated by a specific shareholder (in this case, a private equity 
fund manager) she may be referred to as a “nominee director”, and it is clear that such a 
nominee director does not automatically owe duties to her appointer (see Hawkes v Cuddy 
and others; Re Neath Rugby Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 291 at [32]).  However, duties to the 
appointor can arise by contract or from other circumstances; in the case of a non-executive 
director appointed by the private equity investor, the precise nature of the relationship with 
the private equity fund will vary considerably, depending on the structure of the fund 
manager and the level of seniority of the individual concerned.  If the UK manager of the 
fund is a regulated LLP, as is common, then the LLP will owe regulatory duties to the fund.  
For example, pursuant to the Financial Conduct Authority’s Conduct of Business 
Sourcebook (COBS 2.1.4) a fully regulated alternative investment fund manager is obliged 
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Moreover, the existence of such an obligation is not merely incidental: in Chapter 5.2, we 
saw that one aspect of the corporate governance systems observed in the research sample 
assembled for this thesis was specifically designed to protect the separate interests of the 
investor, and the nominated director might be expected to play a role in that.  Although the 
interviewees asserted that the interests of the investor and the company, as long as it is 
solvent, are generally aligned, it is clearly possible that the interests will diverge when some 
types of decision need to be made.  For example, it has been argued that the nominated 
director may be expected (and, indeed, personally incentivised) to protect the ability of the 
investor to realise its investment within a particular timeframe (I labelled this an “internal 
preference”).  No doubt all shareholders, and therefore senior managers, might share the 
same objective in this regard, but it might nevertheless not accord with the long-term 
success of the company as a stand-alone economic entity342.  Further, I explained that 
private equity investors have a separate interest in, for example, the protection of their own 
reputation or in avoiding legal liability (“external preferences") which might give them (at 
least in theory) an incentive to prevent the company from undertaking certain actions, or to 
cause the company to take certain action, which is against the company’s own interests (and 
therefore the economic interests of its manager shareholders). 
In such circumstances, and putting aside for the time being the potential application of the 
rules on conflicts of interest (which are dealt with in the next Chapter), it will be important for 
the appointed director to understand the extent of her ability to put the interests of her 
appointor ahead of the interests of the company, in light of Section 172343.  If she is unable 
                                                                                                                                     
to act in the “best interests” of the fund or its investors.  If, in turn, the nominated portfolio 
company director is a member of the manager LLP, as would also be common, then it is 
likely that he will have duties under the LLP deed act in furtherance of the interests of the 
LLP, and ensuring compliance with regulatory duties is clearly in the interests of the LLP.  In 
addition, the individual may be an “approved person”, obliged to comply with the FCA’s 
Statements of Principle for Approved Persons (APER 2.1A.3) which may (depending upon 
the function of the person concerned) include an obligation to ensure that the LLP complies 
with its regulatory obligations (see APER2.1A.3, Statement of Principle 7). 
342 The question of whether private equity investors are, in fact, incentivised to engage in 
short-term behaviour is addressed (briefly) in Chapter 11.2.1 at pages 229-230 below. 
343 A nominee director has no special status under English law, and remains subject to an 
overriding duty to act in the company’s interests, even if they may take their appointer’s 
interests into account (in this latter respect see Hawkes v Cuddy and others; Re Neath 
Rugby Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 291 at [33] and Re Southern Counties Fresh Foods Ltd; 
Cobden Investments Ltd v RWM Purchaser Ltd and others [2010] EWHC 3334 (Ch)).  For a 
more general discussion see Ahern (2011).   
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to do so, one objective of the corporate governance system may be undermined, or at least 
made more difficult to achieve.   
If the company is wholly owned, it may be supposed that there is no problem with Section 
172.  If the investment fund is the only shareholder, then the directors are surely entitled to 
act in accordance with the expressed wishes of the private equity fund manager appointed 
by that shareholder to look after its interests.  Such a course of action would certainly seem 
to provide good evidence that the directors of the company were motivated by a desire to act 
for the “benefit of its members”. 
However, the wording of Section 172 does not put that matter entirely beyond doubt.  
Section 172 does not say that the directors are required to act in the way they consider 
would promote the benefit of members, but rather that they are obliged to act in the way they 
consider would “promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members”344.  An 
act that harmed the company, but benefited its shareholder for an extraneous reason345, 
could hardly be said to be duty-compliant346, especially as it is clear that protecting the 
current shareholders is not the law’s only concern: Megarry J., in Gaiman v National 
Association for Mental Health347 said that the “interests of both present and future members” 
were relevant in determining the interests of the company.  Commentators have interpreted 
this as a requirement for directors to consider the “long-term value of the company”, as well 
as the short-term effects of their actions348.   
                                               
344 For a discussion of the law before the 2006 Act see, for example, Parkinson (1995) at 
pages 76-80, who stresses “the instrumental character of the prosperity of the business as 
far as the shareholders are concerned”.  As discussed above, it would now be possible to 
include a specific provision in the company’s articles permitting the directors to take into 
account the views of a particular shareholder, and thereby modifying the definition of 
“success” as contemplated by Section 172(2) – see Davies & Worthington (2012) at 16-74 
and fn 157 at page 547.  However, none of the companies in this sample did so. 
345 Such a situation might arise if, for example, a director acted to prevent the company from 
entering a new market for its products, in circumstances where it was clear to that director 
that to do so would be profitable and relatively risk-free for the company, but the director 
represented an investor with a financial interest in a company already operating in that other 
market.  For further discussion of this issue, see Chapter 7.1.3 at page 152 below.   
346 Cases on parent and subsidiary companies are instructive in this regard.  It is clear that 
directors are only entitled to have limited regard to the interests of parent companies, and 
must act in a way that promotes success of the subsidiary – see Davies & Worthington 
(2012) at 16-74.   
347 [1970] 2 All ER 362. 
348 See, for example, Kershaw (2012a) at page 337.  Davies & Worthington (2012) at 16-79 
say that the “better view ... is that the directors must take into account both the long- and the 
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On the other hand, UK company law puts considerable power in the hands of the current 
shareholders349.  Even if it is true that the shareholders cannot prospectively excuse 
directors from their duties wholesale350, they are able to pre-authorise an act that would 
otherwise be a breach351, or ratify an act ex post352, denying any future shareholders (or, 
indeed, a liquidator, unless the company is already approaching insolvency when the 
ratification resolution is passed) the right to bring an action; and they can remove the 
directors if they are not satisfied with the way they are performing their functions353.  
Furthermore, there are no minority shareholders who could launch a derivative action, or 
claim unfair prejudice.  So, although Section 172 (and the common law that inspired it) 
would seem to prohibit directors from actively taking steps that they know will be harmful to 
the long-term interests of the company as a distinct economic unit, in the absence of a 
looming insolvency354, the risk of enforcement action would seem to be remote in a wholly-
owned company.  
Where there are minority shareholders, the question becomes more difficult.  Section 172 
requires directors to consider the benefit of the members “as a whole”, and Section 172(1)(f) 
says that the need to act fairly as between members is one of the matters to which the 
directors must have regard.  If a director were to take the view that the objective of their 
appointing shareholder, even if that were the majority shareholder, was to pursue an agenda 
                                                                                                                                     
short-term interests of the shareholders and strike a balance between them”; and see also 
Parkinson (1995) at pages 80-81.  Section 172(1)(a) also requires directors to have regard 
to long-term consequences. 
349 It is also clear that the content of the duty is, to some extent, context specific; in the 
context of a takeover, for example, it is generally accepted that the duty of directors is to 
current shareholders only – see Heron International Ltd and others v Lord Grade, 
Associated Communications Group plc and others [1983] BCLC 244 at 265.  See also 
Arbuthnott v Bonnyman and others ([2014] EWHC 1410 (Ch)) at [276], where Asplin J 
confirms the limited role of directors in takeovers, holding that they have no duty to involve 
themselves in discussions regarding price but only to ensure that, where appropriate, offers 
are put to shareholders.   
350 See Companies Act 2006, Section 232. 
351 See Chapter 7.1.4 at pages 156-161 below for discussion of the rules on pre-breach 
authorisation by shareholders in the context of conflicts of interest. 
352 See Chapter 8.1 at pages 176-178 below for discussion of the relevant legal rules.  
353 See Companies Act 2006, Section 168. 
354 In fact, the risk may also be remote in the event of a looming insolvency because, when 
the deal is structured as a buy-out, the board on which the non-executive directors sit is 
usually the holding company rather than the operating company.  This holding company may 
have no debt and, therefore, no risk of insolvency even if one or more of the subsidiaries 
fails.  For further discussion of the impact of attenuated ownership see Chapter 9.1 at pages 
189-192 below.  
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inconsistent with the long-term financial value of the company, it would put her in a very 
difficult position – especially where the minority shareholders would want the directors to 
promote shareholder value.  On the one hand, the director may feel that acting otherwise 
than in the interests of the company as a distinct economic unit would not be “fair” to 
minorities, and may lead to an action under the statutory unfair prejudice or derivative action 
provisions; on the other hand, the majority (subject to the rules on connection, discussed 
below355) could ratify the act or omission, and might remove the director from office if 
dissatisfied with her failure to take account of their wishes. 
Finally, where the director is appointed to the board by a minority shareholder, it is even 
clearer that it will be impossible for her to act to protect the interests of her appointer where 
those interests are in conflict with the duty to promote the success of the company, except 
when very specifically authorised in a particular situation by a shareholders' resolution (but 
this seems unlikely in practice). 
However, even where the director is not appointed by a sole shareholder, a well-advised 
director might still conclude that the risk of successful enforcement of this duty is low.  Taken 
together, the difficulty of establishing proof of subjective intent and the limited opportunities 
for enforcement356, means that it may be more accurate to think about Section 172 as 
establishing a standard of expectation, rather than a standard of liability357.  The Section lays 
out what the law expects of a loyal director, but the law also makes it clear that directors will 
only be held to account for breach of the duty in extreme cases.   
However, even if Section 172 lacks teeth in its own right, there are two ways in which it 
matters, both dealt with later in Part 3.  First, and as noted above, the Section establishes 
the basis for a potential conflict of duties, and proving breach of the duty to avoid conflicts 
                                               
355 See Chapter 8.1 at pages 176-178 below. 
356 Only the company can bring a claim, and the statutory procedure that enables a 
shareholder to bring a derivative claim includes many safeguards, which means they are 
relatively rare in practice; see Keay (2016).  Liquidators can cause the company to bring a 
claim for breach of duty, although for cost reasons they may be reluctant to do so and in any 
event may not have a claim against the directors of the holding company (see fn 354 above).   
357 See, for example, Keay (2012) at page 95 who says: “It [Section 172] might well be seen 
as a general statement of principle, hopefully encouraging directors to aim for the long-term 
success of the company and to demonstrate enlightenment, but there is certainly an 
enforcement problem with the provision”.  A similar argument could be made about the duty 
to exercise independent judgement, dealt with later in this Chapter. 
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may be easier.  Secondly, a device that appears to be designed by practitioners and their 
advisers at least in part to mitigate the risk of a breach of duty – the significant expansion of 
shareholder consent rights358 – is unnecessary and wasteful.  These issues are discussed 
further below in Chapters 7 and 8 respectively. 
6.2 Duty to exercise independent judgement (Section 173) 
6.2.1 The scope of the duty 
A second important aspect of the duty of loyalty is the requirement in Section 173 of the 
Companies Act 2006 that directors must exercise “independent judgement”.  Although the 
common law had been clear that the duty of loyalty required the director to exercise her own 
judgement as to the company’s interests, and Section 172 codifies that by stating that a 
director “must act in the way he considers” to be most likely to promote the success of the 
company, Section 173 turns that requirement into a separate duty.   
Section 173 also confirms that directors can delegate their authority if and to the extent 
permitted by the company’s constitution (Section 173(2)(b)), and that the company is not 
prevented from entering into contracts that might restrict the future discretion of its directors 
(Section 173(2)(a)).   
The duty to exercise independent judgement was summarised by Lord Denning MR in 
Boulting and Another v Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians359, 
who said (obiter dictum, in a dissenting judgement): 
Or take a nominee director, that is, a director of a company who is nominated by a 
large shareholder to represent his interests.  There is nothing wrong in it.  It is done 
every day.  Nothing wrong, that is, so long as the director is left free to exercise his 
best judgment in the interests of the company which he serves.  But if he is put upon 
terms that he is bound to act in the affairs of the company in accordance with the 
directions of his patron, it is beyond doubt unlawful (see Kregor v Hollins by Avory 
J.), or if he agrees to subordinate the interests of the company to the interests of his 
                                               
358 See Chapter 4.3.1 at pages 91-98 above. 
359 [1963] 2 Q.B. 606 at 626-7; and see also Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life 
Nominees Ltd ([1991] 1 AC 187) where the Privy Council held that nominated directors were 
not agents of their appointors.  See Ahern (2011) for a comprehensive discussion and 
evaluation of the legal position of nominee directors. 
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patron, it is conduct oppressive to the other shareholders for which the patron can be 
brought to book: see Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd. v Meyer. 
6.2.2 Potential problems for a private equity-backed company 
Although for the executive directors, and any outside chairman or non-executive director, 
this duty would seem likely to accord with commercial expectations, it is possible for it to 
cause problems for an individual who is appointed by a private equity firm, in circumstances 
where the commercial expectation (of all directors and shareholders) is that the director will 
act in the way directed by that appointing shareholder360.  The private equity firm may feel 
that the director should have a duty to consider its interests, and even to take its instructions, 
where the right to participate in the management structure is granted to the shareholder, and 
the director only occupies his board position as a result of that shareholder right.  However, 
that is very clearly not the default legal position, and the director would be in breach of duty if 
she subordinated her judgement to that of the shareholder. 
6.2.3 Contractual modifications to the duty 
Provisions in Articles 
Section 173(2)(b) says that the duty to exercise independent judgement is not infringed “by 
[the director] acting … in a way authorised by the company’s constitution”.  This provision 
looks very helpful, but its scope is not entirely clear, given the restriction on exemptions from 
liability in Section 232.  The question is whether a provision in a company’s constitution 
authorising a director to act in accordance with the instructions or wishes of a specified 
shareholder would be enforceable.   
One could argue that such a provision is not an exemption from liability with which Section 
232 is concerned, but a variation of the duty to exercise independent judgement, as 
envisaged by Section 173 itself.  However, such a wholesale variation of a duty – to the 
extent that it is in fact nullified – seems likely to be viewed by the court as equivalent to an 
exemption from liability (unless, perhaps, it was combined with a variation of the purposes of 
                                               
360 Of course, for the reasons given above, the director would also breach Section 172 if she 
did not herself believe that a particular course of action was the correct one and was only 
following instructions given by a shareholder, and Section 173 only compounds the problem 
created by that Section. 
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the company as envisaged by Section 172(2)).  Given that the clear prohibition on 
exemptions is not explicitly ousted by Section 173(2), the courts might feel compelled to 
interpret Section 173(2) narrowly.  In any event, Section 172 will always also apply and, as 
discussed above, this also requires a director to use her own judgement. 
In fact, the Articles of just seven of the UK companies in the research sample of this thesis 
(17%) specifically allowed a director to represent the interests of a shareholder (in one case, 
including an indirect shareholder), even if that shareholder’s interests were in conflict with 
those of the company.  In only four of those cases was specific reference made to the duty 
to exercise independent judgement as laid out in Section 173 of the Act, with a specific 
assertion that no breach of that duty would arise if the director “took account of” the interests 
or wishes of the appointing shareholder.  It is perhaps surprising that other companies in the 
sample did not attempt to legislate for this potential conflict between the interests of any one 
shareholder and the director’s good faith assessment of the interests of “the members as a 
whole”.  
Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that it is doubtful whether the theoretical difficulties posed 
by Section 173 are likely to be problematic in practice.  It would be very difficult for a 
claimant to demonstrate that a director did not believe that a particular action was the right 
one for a company and was acting on the instructions of another.  One could perhaps 
imagine a scenario where the minutes or some other contemporaneous note recorded the 
fact that a director voted in favour of a course of action even though she felt it was not likely 
to promote the success of the company, but was “obliged” to vote that way following 
instructions given by a third party, but that would be a very unusual circumstance, and a 
director who was aware of her duties would be unlikely to leave such an evidence trail.  And, 
even then, unless the company entered an insolvency proceeding shortly afterwards, it is 
unlikely that anyone would seek to enforce a breach. 
Once again, perhaps the absence of contractual modification could be attributed to a desire 
not to give signals that might create an unhelpful implication in the eyes of other 
shareholders or wider stakeholders.  If the duty of loyalty as expressed in Sections 172 and 
173 does not in fact affect behaviour in any material way, because the risk of enforcement 
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action is regarded as negligible, then it may in fact be optimal to perpetuate a default rule 
that is, in theory, problematic but, in reality, easy to avoid or ignore.   
As mentioned earlier in this Chapter, another aspect of the duty of loyalty, the duty to avoid 
(or, in some cases, disclose) conflicts of interest is also likely to be of particular relevance to 
a private equity-backed company, and it is that duty which is considered in the next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7: DEALING WITH THE DUTIES TO AVOID AND DISCLOSE CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST 
 
7.1 Situational conflicts of interest (Section 175) 
Having considered two important instantiations of the duty of loyalty in the previous Chapter, 
we now consider a third: the duty to avoid conflicts of interest, dealing first with so-called 
“situational conflicts”. 
7.1.1 The scope of the duty 
Section 175(1) of the Companies Act 2006 provides as follows: 
 A director of a company must avoid a situation in which he has, or can have, a direct 
or indirect interest that conflicts, or possibly may conflict, with the interests of the 
company. 
Section 175 does not apply to a transaction or arrangement with the company, and is 
therefore not concerned with self-dealing transactions.  Section 175(7) makes it clear that 
Section 175 applies to a conflict of duties, as well as to a conflict of interests, and so would 
apply to a director owing conflicting duties to the company and the investor (even if she has 
no personal interest in the matter). 
Section 175(4)(a) excludes situations that could not reasonably be regarded as likely to give 
rise to a conflict.  This may be a statutory form of Lord Upjohn’s “real, sensible possibility of 
conflict” test in Boardman v Phipps361, but it seems that the legislature intended it to go 
further than this362.   
7.1.2 The role of the duty in private equity-backed companies 
As described in Part 2, the private equity investors in the research sample afford 
considerable day-to-day management discretion to managers and some decision-making 
authority to outside directors, most notably the chairman.  The extent of this discretion is less 
than in a typical widely-held company and, given the presence of investor appointed non-
executive directors, it was argued in Chapter 4 that the board's strong oversight and review 
                                               
361 [1967] 2 AC 46. 
362 See discussion in Kershaw (2012a) at pages 572-3, and Chapter 7.1.3 below at page 
167.  
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function, alongside the aligned incentive structure entrenched in the contractual agreements, 
helps to control agency costs363.  Nevertheless, we would also expect the investor to bargain 
for additional ways specifically to ensure that those with day-to-day managerial authority are 
exercising it in the interests of the company and its shareholders, rather than their own, and 
seek to regulate conflicts of interest that might incentivise self-serving behaviour.  We would 
therefore expect investors to confirm, and perhaps even to bolster, the law’s mandatory and 
default conflict rules in their negotiated contracts with management.   
These private equity investors do indeed negotiate specific provisions to mitigate the risk of 
managerial conflicts of interest.  As described in Chapter 4.3.1364, at least in part they do so 
by reserving veto rights over matters where management may have a conflict of interest365; 
however, as is now demonstrated, they also look to the general law for protection, making 
interesting modifications to the default provisions and ensuring that they are in a position to 
enforce breaches. 
Authorisation of conflicts by independent directors 
First, all of the companies in the sample to which the UK’s 2006 Act applies, and where the 
Articles were adopted after the new conflicts of interest provisions became effective in 
2008366, included the default procedure allowing the independent directors to authorise a 
situational conflict of interest pursuant to Section 175(4)(b)367.  However, in 90% of those 
cases, the Articles did not merely rely on the default position in the Act, but repeated it and 
in most cases modified it.  For example, the relevant provision often says that any 
authorisation of a matter may extend to any actual or potential conflict of interest that 
subsequently arises out of the authorised matter, and explicitly allows the independent 
directors to impose conditions on the authorisation and subsequently to terminate it.  In a 
                                               
363 See, in particular, pages 82-107 above. 
364 See pages 91-98 above. 
365 Such veto rights more obviously cover matters where there is a self-dealing conflict, dealt 
with later in this Chapter; however, significant corporate transactions, which are also subject 
to investor consent, might be motivated by an executive’s interest in, for example, growing 
the size of the company for her own benefit.  
366 A total of 39 companies met these criteria. 
367 This mechanism was available under the common law only if specifically provided in the 
Articles (and, even then, its validity was not beyond doubt – see discussion in Kershaw 
(2012a) at page 560).  The 2006 Act’s procedure and its limitations are discussed further 
below at pages 154-155. 
Page | 149 
 
number of cases, the director who had received the authorisation was also automatically 
exempted from any requirement to disclose confidential information to the company, or to 
use it for the company’s benefit, where the information arises from the authorised matter (or 
the independent directors were permitted to stipulate such an exemption)368.  Almost all of 
the relevant Articles369 also stipulate that the director shall have no duty to account for any 
benefit or remuneration received by the director as a result of the matter authorised, and in 
many cases also specifically state that accepting such remuneration shall not be a breach of 
the separate duty not to accept benefits from third parties under Section 176 of the Act370.   
Perhaps more importantly, although all relevant companies in the sample either expressly 
adopted or did not dis-apply the 2006 Act’s default rule allowing independent director 
authorisation, 59% of these companies further provided that the board’s power to authorise 
a conflict cannot be exercised in relation to executives without an additional consent from 
the investor (either acting qua shareholder, or in some cases by requiring consent from the 
investor’s nominated director).  At least to some extent, therefore, this additional contractual 
provision effectively reverses the effect of the default position, perhaps not surprisingly, 
given the ability of the investor to monitor such behaviour and to give consent; indeed, 
perhaps it is surprising that the remaining companies did not adopt such a rule.  However, in 
that respect, it is noteworthy that, because of the composition of the boards in those 
companies, in only two companies would the independent executives be able to authorise 
another executive’s conflict without the support of at least one non-executive.   
                                               
368 As to the enforceability of such waivers of confidentiality, see Chapter 7.1.4 at pages 
168-170 below.  
369 This provision was present in 38 of the 39 relevant companies. 
370 Of the relevant companies in this sample, 67% (26 out of 39) specifically provided that 
acceptance of a benefit arising from an authorised matter would not be a breach of the duty 
not to accept benefits from third parties (and in one further case, providing only that such 
acceptance would not be a breach of duty under the Act).  In all other cases the Articles 
were silent on this specific point, except in one case where it was provided that acceptance 
of a benefit was only permitted if the requirements of Section 176(4) were satisfied (which 
are that “acceptance of the benefit cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a 
conflict of interest”).  It is not clear why such a provision is thought necessary, although it 
may be a response to some continuing uncertainty over the scope of Section 176 – see 
Witney (2016a) at page 152. 
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A contractual substitute for the derivative claim procedure 
Secondly, private equity-backed companies do not confine themselves to the enforcement 
mechanisms established in law to identify and restrict the scope for conflicts of interests 
between the investor and the executive directors: they also adopt other specific rules in 
cases where there is concern that managers may put self-interest above that of the 
company or its other shareholders.  A common (but by no means universal) example of such 
a provision resembles the statutory protection that UK law makes available to shareholders 
through the derivative claim procedure (set out in Part 11 of the Companies Act 2006), but 
which avoids the safeguards for management built into that procedure by the law.   
In just over half of the companies in the sample, the constitutional documents included a 
right for the investor to direct the company to take any reasonable action in relation to the 
enforcement of certain of the company’s rights, or to take conduct of any such enforcement 
action.  These provisions were found in documents used by four371 of the private equity firms 
in the sample, and different firms used different formulations.  The common feature of all 
provisions related to rights to take action to enforce provisions in the service contracts of the 
directors (or other senior managers) and, in some cases, against the seller in acquisition 
documents (particularly where the sellers were, or were related to, the managers).  In 13 
companies (around 25% of the full sample), most but not all of which had the same investor, 
the right extended to include any claims that the company might have against the director(s), 
including claims for breach of fiduciary duty.   
This extra protection may be regarded as unnecessary in many of the companies in the 
sample, given their other rights to take action or require action to be taken by the board: 
indeed, there were only five companies (10%) in which there was no right to take conduct of 
litigation for breach of duty, not enough votes to pass a special resolution directing the board 
to bring an action, and no contractual right to control the board.  It is also noteworthy that 
two of these were cases where the investor held less than 20% of the equity, and in one 
case the investor was a relatively passive co-investor.  Where this right was included in 
                                               
371 These were Firms A, B, C and F.  In the case of Firm F, only some of the companies 
included this right, and Firm E also contributed one company where this right was present, 
but it was not present in its other portfolio companies. 
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cases in which it seems unnecessary, we might speculate that this was a result of “belt and 
braces” boilerplate.  However, the additional protection would seem to be valuable in the 10 
cases (all of which had the same investor372) where the investor neither had the power to 
control the board nor to pass a special resolution without support from other shareholders.   
This research therefore confirms both that situational conflicts of interest are an important 
consideration for investors in private equity-backed companies, or at least are perceived to 
be by the law firms that draft the documents, and that contractual mechanisms are used to 
amend or supplement the mandatory and default provisions provided by the law so far as 
they apply to managers.  Different investors adopt different approaches as regards these 
provisions, which is most likely explained more by reference to law firm boilerplate than by 
bespoke contracting.  We can conclude that, at least as they apply to executive directors, 
the mandatory conflict rules are commercially sensible for a private equity investor, although 
they are not regarded as going far enough and are invariably supplemented to provide 
stronger protection. 
As we shall now see, however, the position is different for non-executives. 
7.1.3 Potential problems for non-executives 
As discussed above373, as well as owing duties to the portfolio company, a director 
nominated by a private equity investor may also owe duties (in their role as an employee or 
director of the fund manager) to the investor to safeguard the investment that it has made.  I 
have suggested that this puts her at risk of a breach of Section 172, but for the same reason 
it gives rise to a potential conflict of duties374, and might give rise to an actual conflict, both 
of which will need to be managed.  In addition, the director may also have duties to exploit 
new investment opportunities for the benefit of a person other than the company.  There are 
two main situations in which such conflicts may plausibly arise, and each is dealt with 
separately below. 
                                               
372 Firm A. 
373 See discussion at fn 341 above. 
374 A “potential” conflict of duties is seemingly outlawed by the words “possibly may conflict” 
in Section 175(1), a phrase included in the formulation of the no-conflicts rule adopted by 
Lord Cranworth LC in Aberdeen Rail Co v Blaikie Brothers ([1843-60] All ER Rep 249 at 
252). 
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Outside interest conflicts 
The first type of conflict concerns a proposal that is both (i) under active consideration by the 
board and (ii) that a director subjectively believes to be in the company’s interests.  In such a 
case, the director is obliged to support the course of action by virtue of Section 172, but the 
director, or the shareholder to whom she owes a separate duty, may not wish the company 
to take that course of action for some external reason375.   
For example, there may be circumstances where the company identifies a potentially 
lucrative opportunity to expand its operations into a new market.  Such expansion might, 
however, bring the company into competition with another company owned by the investor, 
or on whose board the director sits, and therefore be in opposition to the investor’s, or the 
director’s, interests (an “external preference”).  Alternatively, the investment may be in the 
long-term interests of the company, but the increased risk in the short-term may delay the 
opportunity to realise the investment (an “internal preference”).   
We will call this an outside interest conflict376.  It would include multiple directorships where 
the interests of the companies conflict, or may come into conflict in the future, and the 
director would therefore owe conflicting duties to both377. 
                                               
375 A similar issue would arise if the director wanted to propose a course of action, motivated 
by her own or a specific shareholder’s interests, which she did not believe to be in the 
company’s interests. 
376 Of course, failure to comply with Section 172 would be a breach of duty in itself, but it is 
in principle possible for the director to simultaneously be in breach of Section 175 in relation 
to the same factual circumstances: Section 179 makes clear that more than one general 
duty may apply in any given case.  Moreover, it would be entirely consistent with the 
philosophical foundations of fiduciary duties for both to be in issue: Section 172 is a 
subjective duty, and breach is hard to prove; for that very reason, Section 175 is intended to 
have a prophylactic effect and the courts generally do not allow fiduciaries to put themselves 
in the position of having to choose between conflicting interests (or duties) – see Conaglen 
(2009) who says (at page 123) that the fiduciary doctrine will not tolerate a risk that a 
fiduciary “will prefer one of the sets of conflicting duties over the other, whether consciously 
or not”.   
377 There may be some doubt as to whether the prohibition on conflicts and potential 
conflicts actually extends to multiple directorships or, indeed, “outside interest” conflicts at 
all.  It certainly seems clear that Lord Blanesburgh in Bell v Lever Bros ([1931] All ER Rep 
1), approving London and Mashonaland Exploration Co, Ltd v New Mashonaland 
Exploration Co, Ltd ([1891] WN 165), did not think that the strict rule set out in the self-
dealing or corporate opportunity cases applied to multiple directorships, and affirmed the 
view that there was no absolute bar to a director acting as a director of a company 
competing with another company of which he was a director.  However, the more recent 
cases have expressed the position in a more demanding way, and have applied the no-
conflicts rule to cases of competing directors.  In applying the rule, the courts’ approach 
certainly seemed more flexible than in corporate opportunity cases, and the role of the 
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As well as arising in the ordinary course of deliberations by the board, such a conflict could 
also arise if the director was specifically given the right to veto such proposed actions378.   
Corporate opportunities 
Non-executive directors appointed by a private equity firm will be constantly seeking 
opportunities to make further investments in other companies on behalf of the fund(s) that 
they manage – that is an important part of their job.  Some of these opportunities may be of 
interest to the company (or companies) on whose board(s) they sit.  However, the 
opportunity will usually have arisen as a result of their position as an executive of the private 
equity firm, and not as a result of their position as a director of a particular portfolio company 
(although in some cases it may be hard to distinguish those roles).   
The question is then whether the director has a duty to offer the opportunity to the company 
or companies on whose boards she sits, or whether she is free to take the opportunity to the 
private equity fund that is paying her salary (as she is probably contractually obliged to do).   
We will refer to these as corporate opportunity conflicts, consistent with the terminology used 
in many cases and textbooks. 
7.1.4 Contractual solutions to the potential problems posed by Section 175 
On the face of it, Section 175 is a mandatory rule: Section 232(1) of the Act renders void any 
provision that "purports to exempt a director ... from any liability that would otherwise attach 
to him in connection with any ... breach of duty ...”  However,  the Act itself provides three 
main ways to deal with the problems that such a mandatory rule could create, and these 
                                                                                                                                     
director in the company is relevant in deciding whether there has been a breach of the no-
conflicts rule, but the application of the general rule seems to have been accepted.  Most 
notably, obiter dicta of Sedley LJ in Plus Group Ltd v Pyke  suggests that a modern court will 
treat the “Mashonaland principle” as a very limited one.  It does therefore seem that the 
common law had already moved towards applying, in a flexible way, the no-conflicts rule to 
cases beyond those involving self-dealing and corporate opportunities, to cover outside 
interest type conflicts, and that approach seems to be further supported by a literal reading 
of the Act.  See also Conaglen (2009). 
378 The BVCA Model Documents (available at: 
http://www.bvca.co.uk/ResearchPublications/StandardIndustryDocuments/Modeldocumentsf
orearlystageinvestments.aspx) include such “investor director” consent rights, as did many 
of the companies in the sample used in this thesis – see Chapter 4.3.1 at page 100 below.  
Similar provisions were considered by the court in Breckland Group Holdings v London & 
Suffolk Properties [1989] BCLC 100, and the court said that the director would have to 
consider the interests of the company (not its own interests) in deciding how to vote at the 
board meeting. 
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were also available (to varying extents) under the common law: authorisation by the 
disinterested directors (Section 175(4)(b)); authorisation by the members (Section 
180(4)(a)); and compliance with provisions in the company’s Articles (Section 180(4)(b))379.  
It may be expected that some or all of these mechanisms would be observed in private 
equity-backed companies to manage conflicts of interests that might be encountered by the 
non-executives, but the operation of each is unlikely to be problem-free in that context.  
Therefore, these mechanisms, the likely problems arising from each, and their prevalence 
among the companies in the sample, will now be dealt with in turn. 
Authorisation of conflicts by the directors 
As noted above, the 2006 Act includes a mechanism, applicable by default to private 
companies, enabling disinterested directors to approve conflicts of interest, and this 
provision was made available to directors in all relevant companies in the sample380.  
However, there are problems for a director in seeking approval of conflicts from the 
disinterested directors.  First, any approval could only cover conflicts in relation to which 
there was sufficient information to make full disclosure to the board, and could not provide a 
more general approval for future conflicts381.  The limits of any such consent (albeit in the 
context of consent by shareholders) were the subject of the Court of Appeal’s decision in 
Sharma v Sharma382, where Jackson LJ ruled that it was sufficient for a director to have 
disclosed that she would acquire some dental practices in her own name, even before the 
practices had been identified.  However, although in that case the disclosure provided was 
specific enough to make the approval valid, it seems clear that some details about any 
potential conflict are required, and that a blanket authorisation would not be effective.   
The second problem with using this authorisation mechanism is that, in exercising their 
powers to approve a conflict situation, the independent directors remain bound by their duty 
                                               
379 In addition to Section 180(4)(b), Section 232(4) expressly permits a company’s Articles to 
make “such provision as has previously been lawful for dealing with conflicts of interest”. 
380 See discussion in Chapter 7.1.2 above at page 148. 
381 See, for example, Gwembe Valley Development Company Ltd  and another v Koshy and 
others [2003] All ER (D) 465 (Jul) at paragraph 65, although that pre-dates the 2006 Act and 
is dealing with disclosure to shareholders under the common law.  See also Witney (2016a), 
where some of the following discussion on conflicts of interest is developed in a wider 
context. 
382 [2013] EWCA Civ 1287. 
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to act in the way that they consider most likely to promote the success of the company.  A 
general future waiver of conflicts might be hard to justify on that basis.  As regards a specific 
conflict, in relation to which full disclosure has been made, the independent directors may 
feel that the “success of the company” would be better served by not having a conflicted 
director at the board table.   
Thirdly, the approval mechanism cannot be used if all directors are conflicted by the relevant 
situation, or the independent directors cannot together constitute a quorum383, which could 
be problematic if a board is mainly or solely comprised of directors appointed by the same 
private equity house.   
In practice, therefore, the ability of directors to authorise conflicts may be of limited value to 
a private equity-backed company and its appointed director.  Furthermore, a private equity 
appointed director may be unwilling to take the risk that the independent directors will 
decline to give the approval required at the requisite time, and may want some advance 
assurance that authority will be forthcoming.  With regard to that specific concern, in three of 
the companies in the sample there was a specific contractual provision obliging the 
“managers” (who were both executive directors and shareholders) to approve any conflict of 
interest of an investor’s nominated director pursuant to Section 175 when requested to do 
so.  It seems that this device to ensure that conflicts of interest are approved by the board 
would be enforceable given certain facts384, but it was relatively rare in this sample. 
                                               
383 This is because Section 175(6)(a) states that neither the conflicted director nor “any other 
interested director” can be counted in the quorum.  Note that some private equity Articles 
modify the quorum requirement in cases where some directors are prohibited from being 
counted by this section, to ensure that the disinterested directors can constitute a quorum for 
the purpose of authorising conflicts. 
384 Although it is clear from Section 173(2)(a) of the Companies Act 2006 that directors can 
restrict their discretion to act in the future “in accordance with an agreement duly entered 
into by the company”, this statutory exception to the duty to exercise independent judgement 
does not say that an individual director can bind himself in a personal capacity to act against 
what he subjectively regards as the best interests of the company at some time in the future, 
nor that carrying out the contractual agreement would not put the director in breach of  
Section 172.  However, similar covenants on the part of directors were considered by the 
Court of Appeal in Fulham Football Club Ltd v Cabra Estates ([1994] 1 BCLC 363) and it 
was held that undertakings by directors that fettered their discretion to act freely in future did 
not amount to a breach of duty, and were enforceable.  The Court of Appeal rejected the first 
instance judge’s finding that the fetter was lawful because all shareholders had been a party 
to the agreement pursuant to which is was fettered on the slightly puzzling ground that “the 
duties owed by the directors are to the company and the company is more than just the sum 
total of its members”, arguing that creditors (“both present and potential”) and employees are 
also interested in the directors’ decisions.  Instead, relying on an Australian case, Thorby v 
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Authorisation of conflicts by the general meeting (or included in the Articles or Investment 
Agreement) 
Section 180(4)(a) says that the general duties (which include the duty to avoid conflicts385) 
“have effect subject to any rule of law enabling the company to give authority, specifically or 
generally, for anything to be done (or omitted) by the directors, or any of them, that would 
otherwise be a breach of duty …”.  This preserves the common law rule allowing 
shareholders to pre-authorise an act or omission that would otherwise be a breach of duty.  
It also seems clear, applying general principles,  that if the members could authorise an act 
or omission by ordinary resolution they would be able to do so by including an appropriate 
provision in the Articles or, if all shareholders386 signed it, the Investment Agreement387.   
Evidently, this reserve power for shareholders to approve conflicts was regarded as useful 
by the companies in the research sample of this thesis: in 16 cases, shareholder approval 
was expressly permitted by the Articles; in other cases, it would in any event be available by 
virtue of the Act’s express saving of the common law.  However, in five cases – all with the 
same private equity investor388 – the point was dealt with even more comprehensively: the 
class of shares held by the investor was able to authorise conflicts, without other classes of 
shares having the right to vote.   
                                                                                                                                     
Goldberg [1964] 112 CLR 597, Neill LJ appears to have accepted that the facts of the 
present case were analogous to a situation where a company had entered into a contract 
which fettered the power of the board to cause the company to act in future, and it was 
significant that the arrangements were part of a set of contractual arrangements that 
conferred benefit on the company.  Distinguishing two other cases, Rackham v Peek Foods 
Ltd (1977) [1990] BCLC 895 and John Crowther Group plc v Carpets International plc [1990] 
BCLC 460, Neill LJ concluded that directors may bind themselves as to the future exercise 
of their powers, apparently even in a case where their undertakings were not given on behalf 
of the company, as long as there were some benefit to the company.  Although it would turn 
on the specific facts, an executive director would, no doubt, argue that if such an 
undertaking were a condition of the investor agreeing to invest in the company, and if the 
directors took the view that any conflict of interest held by an investor nominated director 
would be unlikely to damage the company, it would be legitimate for them to conclude that 
entering into the agreement was in the best interests of the company, and that they did in 
fact reach that conclusion.   
385 See Section 170(1) of the Companies Act 2006, which refers to the “general duties” 
specified in Sections 171-177 of the Act. 
386 Sometimes the shareholder itself does not execute an Investment Agreement, but the 
fund manager.  Where it does so "on behalf of” the shareholder (and is appropriately 
authorised by the Management Agreement between it and the fund), this will have the same 
effect as if the shareholder signed.  However, where it signs on its own behalf, as manager 
of the fund shareholder, it is arguable that the shareholder has not given the consent as 
required by Section 180(4)(a). 
387 Applying the unanimous consent principle in Re Duomatic Ltd [1969] 1 All ER 161. 
388 Firm C. 
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At this point it is worth noting that interested shareholders are allowed to vote on any 
shareholders’ resolution to authorise a conflict (or adopt Articles that include such an 
authorisation).  Section 239, which disqualifies certain interested shareholders from voting 
on a resolution to ratify a breach of duty (and is discussed in Chapter 8.1 below), does not 
apply to a pre-breach authorisation.  We are therefore left with the common law rules, which 
in general did not disqualify interested shareholders from voting on authorisation 
resolutions389. 
Unfortunately, however, the common law rules that are preserved by the Act were 
themselves not entirely clear on the permitted scope of pre-breach shareholder 
authorisations.  In particular, not all breaches of duty were capable of authorisation by the 
shareholders390, unless perhaps with unanimous consent391, and when a company is on the 
“verge of insolvency” it seems that the directors could not authorise a breach, even if they 
thought that was in the company’s best interests392.  In addition, any authorisation that is 
given by shareholders would need to be specific enough to cover the actual situation that 
arises393.  
                                               
389 See North-West Transportation Co Ltd and Beatty v Beatty [1887] 12 App Cas 589, 56 
LJPC 102. 
390 Davies & Worthington (2012), Chapter 16 at 16-195 – 16-199.  The apparently 
contradictory case law may be reconcilable on the basis that, in Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 AC 
554 (where the shareholder resolution ratifying the directors’ breaches was not valid) there 
was a clear misappropriation of profits, while in other cases (for example, Regal (Hastings) 
Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134, where Lord Russell said (at page 389) that it would have 
been open to the shareholders to ratify the wrong), any profit was incidental and there was 
no intention to harm the company or the minority shareholders – see Parkinson (1995) at 
pages 233-235, Lim (2015) at pages 282-283 and see further Kershaw (2012a) at page 654, 
who also argues that the exclusion of interested votes by Section 239 may allow the courts 
to relax the rule that prohibited ratification of certain wrongs by interested shareholder 
directors.  In this latter regard, however, note that Section 239(7) explicitly preserves “any 
rule of law as to acts that are incapable of being ratified by the company”, a provision 
applied by the court in Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel ([2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch) at [44]). 
391 See, for example, Rolled Steel Products (Holdings) Ltd. v British Steel Corporation and 
Others [1986] Ch. 246, where Slade LJ said, at page 296: “the clear general principle is that 
any act that falls within the corporate capacity of a company will bind it if it is done with the 
unanimous consents of all the shareholders or is subsequently ratified by such consents”. 
392 See the judgement of Street CJ in Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd (in liq) (1986) 4 
NSWLR 722 at 730, approved by Dillon LJ in West Mercia Safetywear Ltd (in liq) v Dodd 
and another [1988] BCLC 250 at 252. 
393 A general waiver of duty would fall foul of Section 232(1) of the Act.  Also see Gwembe 
Valley Development Company Ltd and another v Koshy and others [2003] All ER (D) 465 
(Jul), referred to in fn 381 above. 
Page | 158 
 
Therefore, despite companies appearing to want to preserve as much flexibility as possible 
for shareholders, including those with a connection to the director, to approve conflicts, the 
validity of such authorisations – even if specific – will not be beyond doubt, particularly in 
circumstances where minority shareholders vote against or are otherwise prejudiced and an 
expropriation of property (which could include authorisation to exploit a corporate 
opportunity) is in issue. 
In any event, specific shareholder authorisation is likely to be problematic for a private equity 
appointed director for several reasons.  The first is that it is only available for pre-breach 
authorisations.  As we shall see, different rules apply to ratification resolutions, and there 
may be occasions when the precise circumstances only come to light after the event and so 
pre-breach authorisation is not possible.  This is a particular issue for conflicts, because an 
actual conflict – which itself constitutes the breach of Section 175 – is likely to arise 
suddenly, and before a shareholder resolution could be passed.  Of course, in practice, the 
director could seek authorisation as soon after becoming aware of the conflict as practicable 
and, if she does that, the issue may be somewhat theoretical.  However, it would seem that 
she would have been in technical breach of the provisions of Section 175 for so long as the 
conflict subsisted until it was appropriately authorised394.  
Secondly, and more importantly, the details of the actual conflict (particularly if it is a 
corporate opportunity) may be confidential and commercially sensitive, and the director may 
be subject to a duty not to disclose those circumstances to the company and its (unrelated) 
shareholders395.  That is a particular problem because full disclosure would be needed in 
                                               
394 It may be arguable that the law does not prohibit the existence of the conflict, but rather 
prohibits acts in which the conflict is in issue (such as exploiting an opportunity).  The 
decided cases are, in general, dealing with situations where an opportunity has been taken, 
because in other cases no loss would have been suffered by the company and no “profit” 
made by the conflicted director.  However, it is submitted that the actual “no conflict” rule (as 
opposed to the “no profit” rule) would prohibit a position of conflict, and a technical breach of 
Section 175 would arise from the mere existence of a conflict which was not actively 
“avoided” even if not acted upon in a way that secures any advantage to the director or 
disadvantage to the company.  In other circumstances, fiduciaries are often prevented from 
acting in positions of conflict even when no harm has been suffered – see, for example, 
Marks and Spencer plc v Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer  [2004] EWHC 1337 (Ch). 
395 There is an interesting discussion of the corporate opportunity problem for an investor in 
a US company in Woolf (2001), where a similar problem is identified in the context of the 
varying US approaches to the regulation of corporate opportunities.  In that context, it is said 
(at page 487): “Simply put, the fiduciary may owe a duty of loyalty to more than one 
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order to render any resolution valid: in Gwembe Valley Development Company Ltd and 
another v Koshy and others396 Mummery LJ said: 
Disclosure requirements are not confined to the nature of the director's interest: they 
extend to disclosure of its extent, including the source and scale of the profit made 
from his position, so as to ensure that the shareholders are “fully informed of the real 
state of things,” as Lord Radcliffe said in Gray v New Augarita Porcupine 
Mines [1952] 3 DLR 1 at 14. 
As discussed above397, the recent case of Sharma v Sharma398 did establish limits to the 
duty to make disclosure, but it remains clear that sufficient details must be disclosed to allow 
shareholders to make an informed decision.  In cases where the opportunity arose to the 
director while acting in a separate capacity, such specific disclosure is unlikely to be 
possible; the fact that the opportunity exists and its details may be commercially sensitive, 
and the director will probably owe duties of confidentiality – and duties to exploit the 
opportunity if it is a profitable one – to the company (or fund) on whose behalf she was 
acting when the opportunity was discovered.   
Thirdly, a question remains as to whether any pre-breach authorisation, even though it may 
permit a breach of Section 175, can also sanction a breach of the duty to promote success 
in Section 172.  According to analysis in Davies & Worthington (2012), following the 
judgment of Vinelott J. in Movitex Ltd v Bulfield399, the common law position (preserved by 
the 2006 Act) is that Articles could modify or remove the general rule that directors may not 
have potential conflicts of interest, but does not allow them to permit a director to prefer 
other interests over those of the company400.   
                                                                                                                                     
company, making disclosure untenable, especially in cases where the director or officer 
cannot disclose proprietary corporate information without prior approval or waiver.”  The 
author examines the costs of fiduciary duties in the context of an investor with board 
representation and concludes that the law should permit the shareholders in a closely held 
corporation to opt out of them if appropriate; in fact, that is the position in Delaware and 
several other states, as discussed at fn 407 below. 
396 [2003] All ER (D) 465 (Jul). 
397 See discussion at page 154 above. 
398 [2013] EWCA Civ 1287. 
399 [1988] BCLC 104. 
400 Davies & Worthington (2012), 16-203.  It is not clear from their analysis whether the 
authors believe that the Articles can permit a director to have an actual conflict, provided she 
prefers the company’s interests. 
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Of course, when a specific conflict is known at the time of investment, authorisation of that 
conflict could be included in the newly-adopted Articles.  The difficulty is that – although the 
Articles could include a general authority giving approval for some or all directors to have 
potential conflicts of interest arising out of their dual position as a director of the company 
and the nominee of a particular shareholder – it may not be feasible to include more specific 
waivers.  It seems likely that such a general authorisation would be effective to prevent the 
breach of Section 175 that might otherwise arise from the potential conflict, since: it is as 
specific as it can be, given the known facts at the time the Articles are adopted; the Articles 
are adopted by special resolution; and, in practice, all shareholders at the time of adoption 
will usually vote in favour401.  However, it seems less likely that a general provision in the 
Articles could effectively authorise an actual conflict, as it is unlikely to be sufficiently 
specific. 
In practice, general authorisations of potential conflicts are indeed included in the Articles of 
private equity-backed companies402: in 85% of the UK companies in the sample that were 
formed pursuant to the 2006 Act, there was a specific Article that expressly authorised 
investor directors to act in other capacities403.  A typical example of such an Article was as 
follows, although there was significant variation in the actual wording used: 
[A director appointed by the Investor may] be a director or other officer of, or 
employed by, or party to any transaction or arrangement with, or otherwise 
interested in, [the Investor] or any undertaking in the same group as [the 
Investor], or any undertaking in which [the Investor] or an undertaking in the 
same group as [the Investor] is interested404. 
                                               
401 For a general discussion on the distinction between authorisations included in the Articles 
and a shareholder resolution see Davies & Worthington (2012), 16-188. 
402 They are also included in the Articles of publicly listed UK companies – see Witney 
(2016a) at pages 169-177. 
403 Authorisation would only be necessary if there were a direct or indirect conflict, or 
possible conflict, arising from such other capacity; however, it seems likely that the 
documents take a “belt-and-braces” approach, and pre-authorise a range of alternative 
capacities even where it is not anticipated that a conflict will arise (or, to put it in the same 
terms as the Act, even when the situation “cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give 
rise to a conflict of interest”). 
404 Note that this Article also authorises the director to enter into contracts with the company, 
although disclosure would still seem to be required under Section 177 of the Act.  It would be 
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In two of these cases, the permission did not extend to acting as a director of a competing 
company, but in the remaining 31 cases there was no such restriction.  In all but one of the 
relevant companies, the documents specifically stated that the investor director was not 
obliged to account for any benefits received while acting in that separate capacity, and in 
many of those it was further provided that receipt of any benefits in that capacity would not 
be a breach of the duty not to accept benefits from third parties in Section 176 of the Act405.  
As discussed above, whilst protecting against the breach of duty that can apparently arise 
from a potential conflict of interest, such a broad general exclusion of liability for conflicts 
may be of doubtful utility in the case of an actual conflict, given its lack of specificity, and 
such uncertainty is likely to generate costs and means that it is difficult for a director to 
assess the level of risk406. 
In that regard, it is noteworthy that in only one portfolio company in the sample did the 
Investment Agreement include a specific exclusion of any obligation to bring corporate 
opportunities to the company, or to use them for its benefit, and this was a case where the 
company was a Luxembourg company and, significantly, the exclusion was specifically 
subject to the obligations of an investor appointed director “to act in the best interests” of the 
company.  This might suggest that some UK private equity-backed companies would seek to 
exclude the duty to avoid conflicts (at least in so far as it relates to corporate opportunities) 
for some directors if UK law permitted such an exclusion407.  However, such a blanket 
exclusion is not available.  
                                                                                                                                     
possible to deal with the disclosure requirement by a general disclosure under Section 
177(2)(b). 
405 See discussion at fn 370 above relating to Section 176. 
406 In the case of this particular Article, there is an argument that it would be held to be valid 
because it closely follows the wording of a provision in Table A (but not in the Model Articles 
established under the 2006 Act), which allowed a director to be “a director or other officer of, 
or employed by, or a party to any transaction or arrangement with, or otherwise interested in, 
any body corporate promoted by the company or in which the company is otherwise 
interested” (Companies (Tables A to F) Regulations 1985 as amended by 2007/2541 and SI 
2007/2826, Regulation 85(b)), an earlier version of which was considered by Birds (1976).  
However, the Article used by the private equity-backed companies in the sample used in this 
thesis is broader, as it extends to companies connected with a shareholder, as well as those 
connected with the company. 
407 The possibility to contract out of the duty to bring corporate opportunities to the company 
has been available in Delaware since 2000 and several other states have followed suit.  
According to a recent empirical analysis by Rauterberg & Talley (forthcoming), US public 
companies “have an enormous appetite for tailoring the duty of loyalty when freed to do so” 
(page 4) – see further at fn 525 below.  For an interesting US perspective, see Brudney & 
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Compliance with procedures set out in the Articles 
The final way in which private equity-backed companies may try to deal with the conflict 
problem arising from appointing nominated directors to the board of the portfolio company is 
to include provisions in the Articles to enable a director to manage an actual conflict of 
interest without resigning from the board.   
Section 180(4)(b) permits Articles to mitigate the effect of the no-conflict duty, although the 
extent of that permission is not clear.  Section 180(4)(b) provides as follows: 
The general duties – … where the company’s articles contain provisions for dealing 
with conflicts of interest, are not infringed by anything done (or omitted) by the 
directors, or any of them, in accordance with those provisions. 
The Section might appear to allow a company’s Articles to go beyond enabling a director to 
manage a situation that would otherwise be a breach of Section 175, and to allow her to 
breach her Section 172 duty to promote success provided that she complies with the 
provisions in the Articles.  The Section also appears on its face not to be constrained by 
restrictions in the common law. 
But, despite its apparent breadth, Davies & Worthington (2012) argue convincingly that this 
provision only extends so far as the previous common law had permitted provisions in the 
Articles to be effective408.  Certainly, there must be some restrictions on the scope of Section 
180(4)(b); otherwise, in cases of conflict of interest, it could potentially represent a wholesale 
exception to the prohibition on waivers of liability included in Section 232.  Indeed, Section 
232 itself, as noted above, does specifically provide that the prohibition on exemptions does 
not prevent a company’s Articles from “making such provision as has previously been lawful 
for dealing with conflicts of interest”.  Taking these sections together, therefore, one could 
conclude that the 2006 Act preserves the common law rules on provisions in Articles that 
allow a director to manage conflicts of interest, mainly by recusing herself from discussions 
and decisions relating to that matter. 
                                                                                                                                     
Clark (1981), who recommends a different approach for private and public companies and, 
in the latter case, for executive and outside directors. 
408 Davies & Worthington (2012), at 16-201. 
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As noted above, the approach of Vinelott J. in Movitex409 is that provisions in the Articles 
cannot allow the director to prefer other interests over those of the company, and so could 
not allow the director to behave (or use her vote) in a way that could damage the company.  
In fact, it is argued in Davies & Worthington (2012) that the common law was even more 
restrictive than this.  In the discussion on multiple directorships, it is argued that an article 
that permits multiple directorships will be effective in cases where taking up two or more 
directorships does not give rise to any actual conflict, but says that “it is far from clear that 
Section 232(4) legitimates an article that allows the director to simply withdraw from acting 
on behalf of either company" in cases where the  duty to promote the success of two 
different companies is forcing the director in different directions410.   
Among the UK companies in the sample, it was the normal practice for Articles to permit the 
director to withdraw from discussion or decision-making in relation to a conflicted matter that 
is either known at the time the Articles are adopted, or specifically disclosed and authorised 
thereafter.  It would seem that these would be effective to allow the director to remain as a 
director without being in breach of her duties411.   
                                               
409 [1988] BCLC 104. 
410 Davies & Worthington (2012), at 16-206.  But see also 16-172, which suggests that 
Articles permitting withdrawal are effective, and could even be effective to avoid a breach of 
the core duty of loyalty.  It appears that the different approach depends upon whether the 
Article in question is suitably specific: an Article permitting the director to withdraw when any 
conflict arises that is not disclosed would not be effective, but one that applies where a 
specifically disclosed conflict arises would be.  The generally proscriptive approach of the 
duty of loyalty, discussed in Chapter 6.1.1 at pages 135-136 above, would seem to support 
the view that withdrawal is permitted, even if positive action that damages the company is 
prohibited. 
411 It is possible that such a director might have liability arising from the Section 174 duty to 
exercise due care, skill and diligence if she fails to act, or perhaps under Section 172 for 
failing to promote the success of the company.  See the discussion in Chapter 6.1.1 at 
pages 135-136 above on the question of whether duties are prescriptive; however, it is quite 
clear from the modern cases that non-executive directors can delegate their functions, but 
cannot simply abrogate responsibility for their discharge – see, for example, the statement of 
Jonathan Parker J in Re Barings plc and others (No 5) ([1999] 1 BCLC 433) at 436, 
approved by the Court of Appeal ([2000] 1 BCLC 523 at 536).  By analogy, it could be 
argued that a director who declined to participate in a particular decision might, if it was a 
sufficiently important decision in relation to which he had particular knowledge, be held in 
breach of Section 174 by allowing other directors to make the decision without the benefit of 
his special knowledge.  There is no evidence emerging from this research that this risk is of 
concern to private equity-appointed directors, and in any event it seems remote: the Section 
requires a director to exercise “reasonable care, skill and diligence” and it may not be 
reasonable to expect care to be taken in relation to matters in which she has a (disclosed) 
conflict of interest. 
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Dealing with outside interest conflicts 
In addressing outside interest conflicts using any of these devices, a significant commercial 
problem remains: according to the analysis in Part 2, one reason for nominating a director to 
sit on the portfolio company’s board is to protect the “outside interests” of the investor.  
Provisions that allow management of the conflict would simply disqualify the director from 
looking after these interests at precisely the moment at which they need protection.  So, for 
example, if the question under discussion is whether to expand operations into a new 
territory, the Articles could forgive the conflict and allow the director to participate in the 
discussions and decision, but could not allow her to vote against such a course of action if 
she believed that course of action was in the interests of the company412.  If the director was 
of the view that the conflict was irreconcilable – and that she would be in breach of duty to 
the shareholder if she acted in furtherance of the expansion, and in breach of duty to the 
company if she acted against it – then suitably-worded Articles that allowed her to recuse 
herself would prevent a breach of duty (including the duty to promote success), but that 
would not protect the appointing shareholder’s interests.  Other methods of protection for the 
shareholder are therefore needed.  These include investor veto rights, which are discussed 
in Chapter 4.3 and again in Chapter 8.2413. 
As noted above414, some private equity-backed companies include provisions in their 
Articles that require that any decision of the board, or sometimes any decision relating to 
certain specified matters, should only be made at a meeting at which the director appointed 
by the shareholder is present and votes in favour.  This mechanism is effective to ensure 
that only decisions that are supported by the investor’s appointee are taken by the board.  
However, for the reasons given above, it would not seem to allow the appointee to protect 
the shareholder’s interests in a positive way, where these interests are in conflict with those 
of the company.  When combined with an Article that permits a conflicted director to decline 
to participate in the decision-making process, such a provision could, in theory, prevent a 
positive decision from being taken to pursue a particular course of action, while protecting 
                                               
412 A fortiori if the Investment Agreement gave the director a power of veto, by saying that 
any positive decision of the board required the nominated director to vote in favour, as is the 
case for some private equity-backed companies – see fn 251above. 
413 In particular, see the discussion at pages 91-98 above and pages 178-188 below. 
414 See fn 251above. 
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the director concerned.  However, the director would need to navigate the provisions of the 
Articles very carefully to ensure that she was following the procedure laid down for 
managing conflicts, and not acting positively to frustrate an action in the company’s 
interests. 
Dealing with corporate opportunity conflicts 
As mentioned above, it is in the nature of a private equity executive’s job to continually seek 
out profitable investment opportunities on behalf of the fund.  Many executives will be sector 
specialists and so will operate solely or predominantly in a single segment of the market, 
making it more likely that the opportunities will be in the same line of business as an existing 
portfolio company.  The difficulty for them is that the UK courts have historically been very 
strict in their approach to these types of conflict, and Section 175 largely codifies that 
approach415.  The cases are mainly concerned with executive directors, which (as is argued 
below) may offer some way to distinguish them from the case of a non-executive director.   
The main problem that the common law posed for non-executive directors arises from the 
judgement of Jonathan Parker LJ in Bhullar v Bhullar416.  In that case, it was held that a 
director who discovered an opportunity in his “spare time” was nevertheless bound, under 
conflict rules, to offer that opportunity to the company.  It had been argued that, following 
Regal (Hastings) v Gulliver417, a director who had discovered an opportunity in another 
capacity (such as in a personal capacity, in her “spare time”) would be free to pursue that 
opportunity in that other capacity, even if it would be of interest to the company.  This was 
referred to as the "no profits" principle, and could be broadly formulated as a prohibition on a 
director making a profit by reason of her position as a director.  
However, Jonathan Parker LJ rejected that approach in Bhullar, and said that the “no profits" 
rule is simply an application of the "no conflicts" principle (as Lord Upjohn, and arguably the 
                                               
415 Although outside the scope of this thesis, it is interesting to contrast the approach of the 
UK courts with the approach to corporate opportunities in the US.  The Delaware courts 
have adopted a proprietary, rather than a conflicts, lens to analyse opportunities cases.  
See, for example, Broz v Cellular Information Systems 673 A s2 148 (Del; 1996) and (for 
example) Brudney & Clark (1981).  Some UK scholars have argued that the UK should 
follow a similar path – see, for example, Lowry & Edmunds (1998); however, for a critique of 
the Delaware approach see Kershaw (2005b).   
416 [2003] EWCA 424. 
417 [1942] 1 All ER 378. 
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majority, had held in Boardman v Phipps418), and that if there is a conflict of interest 
(meaning that the company might be interested in pursuing the opportunity), then the 
director has an obligation to offer it to them419, even if discovered in her spare time.  That 
leads us to wonder what the approach would be where a director does have different 
capacities – such as where she is acting as a director of two different companies. 
One might think that the problem would be solved if the director could point to an absence of 
conflict, either because she knows that the company would not be interested in the 
opportunity (for example, because it is outside its “line of business” or agreed strategy), or 
she knows that it could not pursue it (for example, because of a lack of available finance or a 
need for shareholder approval that would not be forthcoming).  However, in both cases the 
courts have suggested that the apparent lack of a conflict will not assist the director.   
First, as to a company’s lack of interest in an opportunity, it had been thought (especially 
following Wilkinson v West Coast Capital420) that there was no conflict (and therefore no 
breach of duty) in cases where the opportunity fell clearly outside the company's “line of 
business”, even if that might be hard to define421.  However, the Court of Appeal decision in 
O’Donnell v Shanahan422, although looking through the no-profit lens423, ruled out line of 
                                               
418 [1967] 2 AC 46.  A number of cases since have treated the rules separately; for example, 
per Lewison J in Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding [2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch), which gives rise to 
an argument that applications of the no-profit rule in the pre-2006 Act cases are no longer 
relevant.  For further discussion see Kershaw (2012a) page 532 and Witney (2016a), 
especially pages 148-163. 
419 See Kershaw (2012a) page 543.  For a discussion of the application of the no-conflicts 
and no-profits rules see, for example, Beck (1971) from page 85.   
420 [2005] EWHC 3009 (Ch).  See discussion in Kershaw (2012a) page 551-553, arguing 
that this aspect of the decision in Wilkinson is consistent with Bhullar v Bhullar, from which it 
is clear that “there are business area constraints on the meaning of a ‘company’s interests’”. 
421 See Armour (2004), who says (at page 34) that some “proximity” of the opportunity to the 
company’s interests is required.  However, see also Prentice & Payne (2004) who argue (at 
page 201) that, although “the test is probably that the opportunity must be one that falls 
within the company's line of business”, “it would be in keeping with the approach 
in Bhullar to treat anything of economic value to the company as potentially within the 
company's line of business”. 
422 Re Allied and Financial Consultants; O’Donnell v Shanahan [2009] 2 BCLC 666. 
423 The present author has argued elsewhere that the 2006 Act’s approach to situational 
conflicts means that pre-2006 Act cases looking at conflicts through the no-profit lens are of 
little continuing relevance – see Witney (2016a).  As to whether the no-profits and no-
conflicts rules are independent rules or separate, see, for example, Koh (2003), who argues 
(at page 406) that, “it is perhaps more accurate to say that these are really independent 
rules”; but c.f. Kershaw (2005a) who says (at page 539) that “the weight of authority 
provides that the no-profit rule operates within the parameters of the no-conflicts principle”.  
See also Lowry (2012) and Keay (2014) at pages 268-275. 
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business restrictions.  As Kershaw (2012) puts it: “directors of aerospace companies cannot 
take macrobiotic organic baby food opportunities”424.  
Commentators have questioned, however, whether the Companies Act 2006 changes the 
common law position in this regard.  Even though O’Donnell was decided in 2009, it was 
applying the common law425.  There is an argument that Section 175(4), providing that there 
is no breach of duty if the situation “cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a 
conflict of interest", means that there is now more scope for the court to take account of line 
of business arguments.  It is at least arguable that there is no reasonable possibility of a 
conflict if the company would not want to take the opportunity because it is outside the scope 
of its business.  Of course, it is true that a similar limitation to the scope of the no conflicts 
rule has been applied by the courts since Lord Upjohn used the phrase "a real sensible 
possibility of conflict" in Boardman v Phipps426, but it may be that the courts will apply the 
different wording of Section 175(4) to expand that limitation.  A different and more 
permissive meaning does seem to have been intended by the legislature427. 
In any event, even if Section 175(4) does have this effect (or O’Donnell was either wrong428 
or – because it used the no-profits lens – of no ongoing relevance), that is only of limited 
value to the private equity appointed executive, because it is quite likely that business 
opportunities will be, at least in some way, related to the line of business of the company on 
whose board she sits429.   
Secondly, the courts have long held that "capability facts" are irrelevant in determining 
whether there is a conflict, at least to the extent that the director might have a role to play in 
changing those facts.  The fact that the company could not pursue the opportunity even if it 
                                               
424 Kershaw (2012a) page 559. 
425 Companies Act 2006 (Commencement No 5 Transitional Provisions and Savings) Order 
2007, Schedule 4, Pt 3, Section 47, provides that Section 175 applies only to situations 
arising on or after 1 October 2008.  
426 [1967] 2 AC 46. 
427 Kershaw (2012a) page 572-3. 
428 See Lim (2013) for a more detailed discussion of Rimer LJ’s reasoning.  Lim argues that 
Rimer LJ was wrong to reject the scope of business test even in applying it to the no-profits 
rule. 
429 In fact, as discussed in Chapter 9.1 below, it would be more common for the non-
executive directors to sit on the holding company’s board, and not the operating company.  
The implications of this are discussed below, and may serve to mitigate the impact of the no-
conflicts rule.  
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were offered to them was deemed to be irrelevant by the majority in Boardman v Phipps, 
and subsequent cases (including Bhullar itself) have confirmed that.  Section 175(2) of the 
2006 Act now seems to codify this approach by providing that the "no conflicts" rule in 
Section 175(1) applies whether or not the company could take advantage of the opportunity 
(although there remains some debate among commentators as to whether all capability facts 
are irrelevant430). 
So, applying the 2006 Act against the backdrop of these authorities, one might be drawn to 
the view that the mandatory no-conflicts rule applies to corporate opportunities discovered 
by a non-executive director while not acting in her capacity as a director of the company, 
and (absent appropriate authorisation) that she would be in breach of duty if she did not take 
the opportunity to the company concerned.  That would be the case even if she knew that 
the company (or, perhaps, one of its subsidiaries) was unable to take advantage of the 
opportunity (for example, because it would require shareholder consent or further funding to 
do so, and that would not be forthcoming431), and even if it was outside of the company’s (or 
a subsidiary company’s) known "line of business” (assuming that O’Donnell remains good 
law following implementation of the 2006 Act).  
A solution to that problem might be provided by a provision that is commonly found in the 
Articles of UK companies, including 93% of those in the sample for this thesis and those of 
many listed companies432, which purports to protect a director from any duty to disclose 
information to the company where that information was acquired otherwise than in the 
course of her directorship and is information in relation to which a duty of confidence is owed 
to third parties.  The value of such an article is clear, especially given that in both Bhullar v 
Bhullar433 and IDC v Cooley434 the courts held that the directors were under a positive duty 
to disclose corporate opportunities of which they were aware435, and many non-executive 
                                               
430 See, for example, Kershaw (2012a) at page 573. 
431 This is especially true given that the private equity-appointed director would play a key 
role in seeking any further funding, or persuading shareholders to approve the opportunity. 
432 See Witney (2016a) at pages 173-176. 
433 [2003] EWCA 424. 
434 [1972] 2 All ER 162. 
435 See further Item Software v Fassihi ([2004] EWCA Civ 1244) and the discussion in 
Chapter 6.1.1, at pages 134-136 above, as to whether fiduciary duties are prescriptive or 
proscriptive. 
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directors are likely to become aware of information that the company would be interested to 
know but which they are prohibited from disclosing.  However, the validity of any such Article 
needs to be tested against the provisions of Section 232.   
As I have argued elsewhere436, there are strong arguments that the non-executive director 
can be protected from a duty to bring all corporate opportunities to the company because the 
courts have always accepted that directors can act in different capacities at different 
times437, provided that the company has given informed consent to that separate capacity 
(which was not the case for the directors in either Bhullar or IDC v Cooley, the two cases 
most commonly relied upon to establish the proposition that a director’s capacity is not 
relevant).  Indeed, in Bhullar, Jonathan Parker LJ stressed that the director “had, at the 
material time, one capacity and one capacity only”438, and in IDC v Cooley, Roskill J had 
stressed that the director was managing director of the company. 
It would, therefore, be entirely consistent with the Act and with case law for a court to hold 
that, if a company (Company A) (acting by shareholder resolution, or expressly in its 
constitution) acknowledges and accepts that a director has other interests and duties, then 
while furthering those interests or discharging those duties, the director does not owe duties 
to Company A (provided she is not at that time also purporting to act in her capacity as a 
director of Company A).  Similarly, it would also be open to the Articles to provide that the 
scope of the fiduciary duties is constrained such that the director is not under a duty to 
                                               
436 See Witney (2016a), and also Parkinson (1995) at page 232.  As discussed in Chapter 
6.1.1 above, there is ongoing academic debate about whether duties are proscriptive or 
prescriptive, and another way of analysing the duty to avoid conflicts would be to say that it 
(as with other fiduciary duties) is proscriptive and only controls the exercise of power; for an 
executive with no authorised outside capacities, one could argue that the director was (at 
least to some extent) usually exercising corporate power, whereas a non-executive with an 
explicitly part-time role is only exercising power when working for the company.  
437 The most obvious separate capacity in which a director is permitted to act is as a 
shareholder.  It is clear that a director is not bound by fiduciary duties when exercising rights 
qua shareholder in the general meeting – see, for example, North-west Transportation 
Company v Beatty [1887] 12 App Cas 589, more recently applied in Wilkinson v West Coast 
Capital and others [2005] EWHC 3009 (Ch) at [297] and [299].   Although in some cases it 
will be difficult to draw a clear line between a person’s different capacities, or roles, the 
courts would, no doubt, form a view based on the surrounding circumstances and mutual 
understanding of the parties.   
438 [2003] EWCA 424 at [41], adopting language used by Roskill J in IDC v Cooley.  It is also 
clear from the judgement of John Behrens QC in the High Court that the relevant directors 
were employed to work for the business and were closely involved in the day to day running 
of the business.  See Bhullar v Bhullar (unreported) 2002 WL 1654842, 10 May 2002, 
especially paras 42-51. 
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disclose confidential information acquired while acting in that outside capacity439.  Such a 
provision would be consistent with Section 232 of the Act because it helps a court to define 
the scope of the duty, rather than providing for an exemption from liability for breach of that 
duty440.   
Given that the default rules are quite clearly not optimal for a closely-held company whose 
shareholders wish to appoint non-executive directors to oversee and support the executive 
management, and given that these shareholders are able and willing to negotiate a bespoke 
contractual arrangement, defining the role and responsibilities of that director, the courts 
ought to respect that contractual arrangement and give legal effect to it.  However, it is not 
entirely clear whether the courts will choose to apply the law in that way and, if they do not, 
there are clear issues for non-executive directors441.  If the approach of the law to directors’ 
duties requires that directors are always under a duty to avoid conflicts, and if this duty is 
impossible or difficult to contract out of, then it is a paradigm that is not well suited to an 
environment in which professional non-executive directors are regarded as efficient by the 
various stakeholders and, indeed, by society more generally.  In any event, the prevailing 
uncertainty in relation to the state of the law is likely to create costs and may inhibit informed 
contracting.  
This research therefore strongly suggests that the lawyers who draw up the standard form 
contracts, and who negotiate them on behalf of private equity firms, regard conflicts of 
interest as an important area and make extensive provision for situational conflicts of 
interest, particularly as regards investor appointed directors (who, as we have seen, often 
have de facto control of the board’s most important decisions, even when they do not make 
up the majority of its members).  They appear to intend that – once a relevant situation has 
                                               
439 It helps that the courts apply fiduciary duties according the facts before them: Lord 
Upjohn famously remarked in Boardman v Phipps ([1967] 2 AC 46, at 123) that: “Rules of 
equity have to be applied to such a great diversity of circumstances that they can be stated 
only in the most general terms and applied with particular attention to the exact 
circumstances of each case.”  In Bhullar v Bhullar ([2003] EWCA Civ 424), Jonathan Parker 
LJ added that “flexibility of application is of the essence of the [no-conflicts] rule” (at [28]). 
440 Arguments to similar effect were made by Gower (1969) (quoted in Birds (1976) at fn 11) 
about Section 205 of the Companies Act 1948, the predecessor provision of Section 232. 
441 Further discussion of the unsatisfactory nature of the law as it stands, and suggestions 
for improvement, can be found in, for example, Witney (2016a), Gibbs (2015), Worthington 
(2013). and Churk (2015).  For a pan-European perspective, see Vicari (2007) especially 
pages 367-369. 
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been disclosed to the board and approved, or is subject to a general exclusion in the Articles 
– all matters that arise from that situation are also permitted.  And in this regard it is perhaps 
noteworthy that, on the whole, these conflict of interest provisions do not appear to be 
significantly contested442. 
Perceptions among non-executive directors 
As noted above443, there is strong evidence from the interviews conducted for this thesis that 
directors see this as less of a problem than their advisers seem to imagine.  Interviewees 
tended to reject the notion that conflicts of interest arose from their dual positions, unless the 
company was facing an insolvency (when, of course, different and additional rules apply), 
arguing that the interests of the investor and the company itself were, generally, fully 
aligned.  Even when asked about specific hypothetical situations, such as the imposition of 
restraints on the portfolio company arising from the investor’s own risk appetite or regulatory 
requirements, directors generally rationalised those as being for the benefit of the company 
as well as for the benefit of the investors, and pointed to the alignment of interest with 
management shareholders (who were also significant shareholders) to argue that 
differences with the management team would be rare.  As regards corporate opportunities, 
directors generally asserted that any appropriate opportunities would normally be disclosed 
to the company, rather than exploited in any separate capacity, unless the company would 
not be interested in them and/or was not in a position to exploit them444 (and note that, in this 
respect, the shareholder – whom the director represents – would invariably have a 
contractual right to prevent the company making the acquisition, as in Wilkinson v West 
Coast Capital445).   
However, given that most of the directors interviewed had a relatively limited understanding 
of the breadth of the duty to avoid conflicts, almost certainly less than the advisers who 
                                               
442 They mostly follow standard wording and, in this sample, substantive variation was rare. 
443 See fn 301 above and accompanying text. 
444 For example, I9 said: “If we’ve done a deal in a particular space, we won’t have another 
portfolio company that overlaps. I’ve looked at a few opportunities and thought, ‘Actually, I’d 
love to do this as a standalone, but it would overlap, so we’d have to do it as a bolt-on and 
that isn’t going to work, because this manager I’ve just met wants to do his own MBO’.” 
445 [2005] EWHC 3009 (Ch).  In that case, Warren J held that, when a director was in a 
position to block an acquisition in his separate capacity as a shareholder, that effectively 
acted as a restriction of his duty to bring the opportunity to the company. 
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drafted the relevant contracts, and would have a conscious or unconscious desire to present 
themselves as aligned with the portfolio companies, it is hard to draw definitive conclusions 
from their remarks in this respect.  It does seem that the weak nature of the Section 172 duty 
would mitigate the risk of outside interest conflicts – as a director has significant latitude in 
determining, subjectively, which actions promote the success of the company446.  Corporate 
opportunity conflicts seem more difficult to deal with in theory, given the apparently very 
broad scope of the duty, although the ability of the shareholder to block portfolio company 
acquisitions is clearly helpful.  
So far in this Chapter, we have looked at the issues that arise for a non-executive director 
appointed to the board of a portfolio company of a private equity shareholder where there is, 
or may be, a conflict of interest which does not relate to a transaction or arrangement with 
the company.  We shall now briefly examine the situation when self-dealing conflicts are in 
issue.   
7.2 Self-dealing transactions (Section 177) 
7.2.1 The scope of the duty 
As mentioned above, Section 175 of the 2006 Act does not apply to a conflict “arising in 
relation to a transaction or arrangement with the company”447.  Instead448, Section 177(1) of 
the Act requires directors who are “in any way, directly or indirectly, interested in a proposed 
transaction or arrangement with the company” to disclose the “nature and extent of that 
interest to the other directors”.  This Section clearly tries to strike a balance between the 
desirability of permitting directors to enter into self-dealing arrangements, while ensuring that 
                                               
446 Although the plausibility review undertaken by the courts in Regentcrest plc v Cohen 
[2001] 2 BCLC 80 would be relevant if the director’s action was likely to harm the company. 
447 Section 175(3).  It is clear from the wording of the Act, and from interpretation of similar 
wording by the courts, that Sections 175(3) and 177 cover situations where there is no 
legally binding contract; see Re Duckwari plc (No 2) [1998] 2 BCLC 315 at 319, where 
Nourse LJ, interpreting Section 320 of the 1985 Companies Act, said: “'Arrangement' is a 
word which is widely used by Parliament to include agreements or understandings having no 
contractual effect.” 
448 There is, in fact, some ambiguity as to the scope of the Sections, and it is not clear that 
all matters within Section 177 are outside Section 175.  That unfortunate ambiguity arises 
because the wording used in 175(3) to restrict the scope of Section 175 does not mirror the 
wording used to define the scope of Section 177. 
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there is appropriate oversight of such arrangements449.  On the other hand, Sections 190-
196 of the Companies Act reinstate the common law default position and mandate 
shareholder approval for “substantial property transactions” (that is, certain transactions 
exceeding a size threshold), although there are omissions from the coverage of that Section 
that are discussed above450.    
7.2.2 The role of the duty in private equity-backed companies  
As with situational conflicts, we would expect private equity investors to be concerned about 
the potential for executive directors to abuse their position and enter into contracts with 
themselves or associated persons or companies.  The research undertaken for this thesis 
confirms that this is indeed an issue addressed contractually by the parties at the time of 
investment, and that the resulting bargain is generally stricter than the Companies Act 
default, and fills the gaps left by Section 190. 
In all but one of the UK companies in the research sample451, there was a restatement of 
Section 177 of the Act, permitting directors to have interests in contracts or arrangements 
with the company subject to disclosure to the board, and in all cases the interested director 
was allowed to vote on the matter at the relevant board meeting452.  However, it is significant 
that in 90%453 of the relevant companies, an additional investor consent was also expressly 
required before a contract could be entered into (or modified) by the company in which an 
executive director had an interest (including service agreements).  Moreover, despite the 
absence of such an express restriction in four companies in the sample, there were 
restrictions that would in most cases prevent abuse: three cases required such approval in 
relation to service contracts, and all four required any contracts to be on an “arm’s length 
                                               
449 For a review of the history and policy of the “Anglo-American approach” to self-dealing 
see Farrar & Watson (2011). 
450 See the discussion in Chapter 4.3.1 at page 95 above, where there is also further 
discussion of the contractual provisions found in this research that support the argument that 
company law protections are significantly strengthened by private equity investors. 
451 The exception was an unusual company because the Articles were not amended at the 
time of the private equity investment or subsequently.  In addition, all of the Jersey and Isle 
of Man companies in this sample included a similar provision, allowing interests in contracts 
subject to disclosure. 
452 There were various exceptions to this right to vote, but in general the overall effect was 
permissive. 
453 There were four UK companies (out of 42) where such consent was not expressly 
required. 
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basis” and/or entered into in the “ordinary course of business”454.  It would therefore be 
unusual for any board, even if controlled by the executive directors, to be able to enter into a 
contract with a director (and certainly not one that was outside the ordinary course of 
business) without separate approval from (or on behalf of) the investor, despite the more 
permissive approach taken in the 2006 Act.  This approach seems consistent with the much 
closer control that the investor seeks over the managers in a private equity-backed company 
than would be observed in companies with different ownership structures.  It might also 
suggest that the policy of the Companies Act, which imposes a mandatory approval process 
for certain related party transactions but not others, is not regarded as sufficiently strict by 
informed and active shareholders.    
7.2.3 Potential problems with the duty in private equity-backed companies 
Although the mandatory nature of the “self-dealing” rule455 is less likely to be a concern for a 
non-executive director appointed by a private equity shareholder to the board of a portfolio 
company – in part because the disclosure procedures are relatively clear and the rules 
generally permissive and, in part, because the non-executive director will not generally be 
interested in contracts that the company enters into – there are circumstances when the 
rules can give rise to theoretical problems because non-executive directors will usually have 
a wide variety of financial interests and their “nature and extent” will vary frequently.  As a 
practical matter it might not always be easy to identify when an interest has arisen and when 
it has changed456 or when it might give rise to a conflict457, and any such interests might also 
be confidential.   
However, this may be a theoretical problem because, in the absence of further provisions in 
the Articles that require approval of a conflict (none of which were found for non-executives 
in the research for this thesis), a failure to comply with Section 177 is likely to have no 
                                               
454 For more details see Chapter 4.3.1 at page 95 above.  
455 A general waiver would seem to be a breach of the prohibition on waivers of duty in 
Section 232.  However, there does not seem to be any reason why they cannot 
subsequently ratify the breach pursuant to Section 239, subject to that Section’s voting 
restrictions (discussed below in Chapter 8.1 at pages 176-178 and the limits on ratification 
discussed in Chapter 7.1.4 at pages 157-158 above. 
456 Section 177(5) says that a director need not disclose interests of which she is unaware, 
but if she is aware of the interest then Section 177(1) requires disclosure of the extent of the 
interest.  
457 Section 177(6)(a) excludes from the ambit of required declarations interests that cannot 
reasonably be expected to give rise to a conflict of interest.   
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particular consequence, except to render transactions voidable by the company if there are 
no intervening third-party rights458 (which would be unusual in a typical private equity 
conflict)459.   
It is, therefore, situational conflicts that are most likely to raise issues for a non-executive 
director appointed to protect the specific interests of an investor, or one whose expertise is 
required but for whom the scope of their role is narrowly defined, with transactional conflicts 
less likely to be problematic.  As regards these situational conflicts, extensive contractual 
provisions do modify and supplement the legal position among the companies in the sample, 
as we would expect, and in some cases these contractual bargains cast doubt on the 
wisdom of the position taken by the Act.  In the remainder of Part 3, we shall consider other 
ways in which these potential issues with the statutory rules might be resolved, and 
problems with those other risk mitigation devices. 
  
                                               
458 See Davies & Worthington (2012) at 16-112. 
459 In addition, if the Articles include an ex-post directors’ approval mechanism, there may be 
no sanction at all – see Kershaw (2012a) who says (at page 496) that, in these 
circumstances, Section 177 may be “a mandatory rule without any sanction”.  In contrast, 
failure to comply with Section 175 can give rise to the usual remedy against a fiduciary: a 
duty to account for profits – see Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd 
(in administrative receivership) and others [2011] EWCA Civ 347.  Note that Section 182 
(the duty to declare an interest in an existing transaction) could give rise to similar problems, 
and here the director would commit a criminal offence if she failed to notify.  There seems to 
be no way of mitigating or overriding this duty. 
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CHAPTER 8: RULES AFFECTING THE EXERCISE OF POWER BY SHAREHOLDERS 
 
8.1 Ratifying breaches of duty and other liability mitigation 
So far in Part 3, we have discussed company law rules that might be problematic for a 
private equity-backed company.  In this Chapter, we first consider some company law rules 
that might assist a private equity appointed director who is concerned about a breach of 
duty: those that allow shareholders to ratify breaches by directors. 
As mentioned above460, since the Companies Act 2006 became effective, there are distinct 
rules on ratification of breaches of directors’ duties, which now differ from the common law 
rules on pre-breach authorisations.  The statutory rules on ratification, which amend and 
supplement the common law, are included in Section 239 of the Act.   
Section 239 allows ratification of a very broad range of acts and omissions by directors, 
including breach of duty, breach of trust, and negligence.  Section 239(7) suggests that the 
common law rules that may have rendered some acts incapable of ratification (or, where the 
company is approaching insolvency, incapable of ratification by the members) remain461, 
and this might give rise to a problem where the director has expropriated property, including 
taking advantage of a corporate opportunity.   
However, subject to those limited exceptions, it would be open to a majority of the 
shareholders to ratify a breach of duty, and where a private equity investor is a majority 
shareholder, or is able to persuade other shareholders to agree, such ratification may be 
appropriate following a breach by a nominated director.  Nevertheless, any such investor will 
need to consider the rules that exclude “connected” shareholders from voting462. 
One might assume that these rules on connection would seek to exclude the investor from 
voting in cases where the director concerned was, for example, employed by the manager of 
                                               
460 See Chapter 7.1.4, at page 157 above. 
461 See the discussion relating to pre-breach authorisations in Chapter 7.1.4, at pages 157-
158, and, in particular, fn 390 above.  Kershaw (2012a) argues (at page 654) that the 
common law prohibition on ratification of certain wrongs by shareholders is now rendered 
unnecessary by Section 239(3) and might not be applied by the courts.  However, given that 
(as I shall argue below) the statutory rules on connection are quite narrow, there may still be 
policy reasons to apply the rule in Cook v Deeks to ratification. 
462 Sections 239(3) and (4) and Section 252. 
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the fund that held the shares.  However, the statutory rules on connection are relatively 
narrow in their scope and, therefore, may be somewhat arbitrary in their effect. 
Private equity fund structures are complex and differ from fund to fund for various legal, tax 
and regulatory reasons.  In a very simple structure, especially one where there is a dominant 
member of the private equity manager who is also the director whose connection is in 
question, the director and the shareholder (that is, the fund vehicle) may be “connected” for 
the purposes of Section 252463.  However, in most cases, the structure will be more complex 
and there will be no such connection464.   
Section 252 is very clear that only persons who are connected under that Section are 
“connected” for the purposes of Section 239, and so it seems that the voting disqualification 
provisions in Section 239 will affect some, but not most, private equity investors seeking to 
vote on breaches committed by their nominated directors. 
Section 239(6)(a) says that Section 239 does not affect the validity of decisions taken by 
unanimous consent, which means that a connected shareholder could ratify an action by a 
director if it is the sole shareholder.  However, where there are other shareholders, even if 
they are a minority, the ability of a private equity firm to ratify the breaches of its nominated 
director will be a question to be determined on the basis of the fund structure in question and 
a careful application of Section 252. 
Whether or not ratification resolutions are legally possible, or are used in practice (which it 
was not possible to determine from the data available in the sample), there are other 
provisions built into the agreements that are aimed at relieving any liability if it arises.  For 
example, one company included in its Investment Agreement an obligation on all 
shareholders to ratify any act of the investor’s nominated director on request; another one 
included a waiver from all parties to the Investment Agreement in relation to any claims they 
                                               
463 For example, if a Scottish limited partnership (SLP) is the fund vehicle and registered 
shareholder of Company A, and the general partner of SLP (GP Co) is a company that is 
majority owned by the founder of the private equity firm (Mrs X), Mrs X will be connected 
with GP Co (under Section 254(a)) and therefore connected to SLP (pursuant to Section 
252(e)(ii)).   
464 In most cases, there will be intervening vehicles that will break the connection, or the 
director’s ownership interest in the management vehicle will be below the required threshold 
of 20%.  
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might have against an investor appointed director465; and a further two companies466 
included provisions which stated that any consents given by the investor’s nominated 
director were given in his capacity as a representative of the shareholder and asserted that 
such a director was therefore not bound by fiduciary duties in relation to that consent.  
Finally, all of the UK companies in the sample included a power for the company to 
indemnify directors for breaches of duty and to insure against such breaches on behalf of 
the director, to the extent permitted by law, and the vast majority did this explicitly rather 
than by relying on the relevant Model Article467.   
There is, of course, another way in which nominated directors can be protected from any 
liability that might arise from the commercial requirement to protect the interests of the 
appointing investor: by removing power to make certain decisions from the board and the 
nominated director(s) and placing it in the hands of the investor itself.  As was shown in Part 
2, this device is indeed in evidence in this sample, and I now turn to a legal analysis of that 
mechanism.  
8.2 Shareholder consent rights  
8.2.1 Use and structure of shareholder consent rights in private equity-backed 
companies 
As described in Chapter 4.3, private equity investors rely heavily on their rights as 
shareholders, rather than their board seat, for the protection of their own interests – at least 
as a matter of legal form, if not day-to-day practice.  There may be a commercial rationale 
                                               
465 Once again, the validity of these provisions needs to be tested against Section 232 of the 
2006 Act.  However, the case for validity is probably stronger here, given that the courts 
have held that it is open to shareholders to agree contractually with each other how they will 
exercise their votes as shareholders – see, for example, Russell v Northern Bank 
Development Corpn Ltd ([1992] 3 All ER 161), discussed below.  Agreements to ratify or 
waive claims made between shareholders are analogous and would not seem to amount to 
the type of liability exclusion dealt with by Section 232.  However, it is impossible to be 
definitive, given the uncertain scope of Section 232 and the absence of direct authority, 
which creates further uncertainty. 
466 These companies had the same investor and the same law firm acting. 
467 It was not possible for me to assess whether the benefit of this ability to grant indemnities 
and maintain insurance was actually given to the investor appointed directors in all cases.  In 
some cases, the indemnity and an obligation to maintain insurance were effectively 
extended by inclusion in the Investment Agreement with a right for third parties to rely on 
that provision, and in other cases they were included in a separate directors’ appointment 
letter.  However, I did not have access to all appointment letters (and in some cases it 
seems that none existed) and so I was not able to assess what proportion of investor 
nominated directors were given the benefit of this protection.   
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for this, but a likely additional reason is that lawyers advising on the structure of the 
corporate governance arrangements recognise that the mandatory directors’ duties 
discussed above may make it legally difficult for the directors nominated to sit on the 
portfolio company’s board to protect the shareholder’s interests (and follow instructions of 
the shareholder) consistently with their company law duties. 
Of course, the general law and default rules provide some important powers for large 
shareholders.  Most notably, shareholders with more than 50% of the voting rights will have 
the power to appoint and remove directors468.  If the investor has 75% or more of the voting 
rights it will generally have the right to give directions to the directors to act or to refrain from 
acting in a particular way469. 
However, we have seen that, in practice, these rights are supplemented by various other 
control rights given specifically to the investor(s)470 in the investment documentation471.  As 
a result of concerns about the enforceability of certain constitutional restrictions highlighted 
by the case of Russell v Northern Bank Development Corp Ltd and others472, it is now 
common for such restrictions to be included in the Investment Agreement, either in addition 
to or instead of the Articles473.  The company is usually a party to this agreement, and will 
give undertakings not to undertake the matters without the requisite consent.  However, 
there is also a separate (and severable) undertaking by each of the shareholders to use all 
voting rights and powers of control that they have, to ensure that the company does not do 
any of the restricted matters without the requisite consent.  Lord Jauncey made it clear in 
Russell that such agreements by shareholders to use their voting rights to prevent certain 
acts by the company were enforceable as between the shareholders who were parties.  But, 
                                               
468 Companies Act 2006 Section 168.   
469 Article 4(1) of the model Articles for private companies.  My empirical analysis suggests 
that this right is usually preserved or repeated in the Articles of a private equity-backed 
company – see Chapter 4.3.1 at pages 90-91 above.  Of course, this right, and the right to 
appoint and remove directors, can be exercised by shareholders acting together who have 
the relevant proportion of the votes and are not only available when any one shareholder 
has the requisite number of votes. 
470 Where there is more than one financial investor, these control rights are commonly 
exercised by the investors acting together by some predetermined majority.   
471 See Chapter 4.3.1 at pages 91-98 above. 
472 [1992] 3 All ER 161. 
473 See Cooke (2015) at page 250, who says that it is now common for a “fairly narrow 
range” of consent matters to be included in the Articles as class rights and for a longer list to 
be included in the Investment Agreement. 
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in any event, it seems clear that many of the restrictions included in a typical list of reserved 
matters would be enforceable even as against the company itself.  Most do not relate to 
matters that the company is given the right to do by statute, but include (for example) 
significant capital expenditures, major disposals, and adoption of annual budgets.  There 
seems to be no reason why such restrictions, voluntarily accepted by the company, would 
not be enforceable.  There may, in some cases, be a question of whether the board was 
acting in accordance with its own fiduciary duties, in particular the duty to promote the 
success of the company, in agreeing to enter into such restrictions on behalf of the 
company, but in a typical case, where all shareholders enter into the agreement and clearly 
wish the company to do likewise, this is unlikely to be an issue474.   
However, despite the rule affirmed in Russell that the company cannot agree to constrain its 
future ability to amend the Articles, there is an alternative way to provide some or all of these 
shareholder consent rights in the company’s constitution.  This may be helpful to assist with 
the enforceability of the provisions in practice, because inclusion in an Investment 
Agreement may not limit the power of the board as a body, especially where these relate to 
matters that do not require a shareholders’ resolution as a matter of law.   
The alternative solution is for private equity investors to be issued a separate class of 
shares, and any agreed consent rights to be listed in the Articles as matters that would 
constitute a variation of class rights.  The effect of this is likely to be that any attempt by the 
directors to act in contravention of the class rights could be prevented by way of an 
injunction, and if done without the consent of the class would constitute a breach of Section 
171 of the 2006 Act (the duty of directors to act within their powers).  Whether the act in 
question would bind the company would then be determined by reference to Section 40, 
which would protect a person “dealing with the company in good faith”.  As described in 
Chapter 4.3.1475, nine of the companies in the sample (18%), gave at least some of the 
shareholder protection rights to the investor by way of class rights. 
                                               
474There are two separate questions that need to be addressed here: whether the 
undertaking by the company is enforceable, which is addressed by Section 173(2)(a) and 
discussed at Chapter 6.2.1 at pages 143-144 above; and whether personal covenants by the 
directors to act to ensure that certain matters are undertaken by the company is enforceable, 
as to which see fn 384 above. 
475 See pages 92-93 above.   
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While the use of shareholder consent rights may appear to offer suitable protection for 
investors, there are two further issues worthy of discussion.  The first is whether there are 
legal constraints on the exercise of this shareholder power; and the second is whether 
extensive consent rights on the part of a shareholder would give rise to a risk that the 
shareholder becomes a de facto or a shadow director of the company, and therefore subject 
to additional duties or liabilities with regard to the exercise of those powers, which would 
defeat the object of removing them from the nominated director.  These questions are now 
considered in turn. 
8.2.2 Is there a duty for an investor to act in the best interests of the company as a 
whole? 
The legal position 
The extent to which the exercise of shareholder rights is subject to legal constraints is not 
entirely clear in English law.  The usual starting point for analysis is the case of Allen v Gold 
Reefs of West Africa476, in which Lindley MR said that the power conferred on the general 
meeting to alter the company’s articles must be treated as subject to “the general principles 
of law and equity which are applicable to all powers conferred on majorities enabling them to 
bind minorities”.  He therefore said that the power had to be exercised “bona fide for the 
benefit of the company as a whole”, a formulation that appears somewhat similar to the 
common law fiduciary duty imposed on directors to act in the best interests of the company 
(now restated by Section 172 of the 2006 Act)477.  
Subsequent cases have moved on a little from Lindley MR’s general proposition but it 
remains a reasonably accurate summary of the duty of shareholders when exercising 
corporate power, certainly as regards alterations to the Articles478.  For example, in 
Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas479, Evershed MR said that the “shareholder must proceed 
                                               
476 [1900] 1 Ch. 671-2. 
477 It is clear, however, that the shareholder is not (without more) a fiduciary under English 
law.  This is discussed further below. 
478 For a review of the most relevant cases see Kershaw (2012a) at pages 651 et seq.  For 
an alternative analysis, see also Davies & Worthington (2012), at 19-9 et seq., who argue 
that there is a distinction between cases of expropriation of property (i.e., compulsory 
transfer cases), and those where there is simply a conflict between different groups of 
shareholders. 
479 [1951] Ch. 286. 
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upon what, in his honest opinion, is for the benefit of the company as a whole”.  As noted by 
commentators480, this test does mark a shift in the court’s view of who owes the duty: in 
Allen v Gold Reefs it was expressed to be the general meeting that owed the duty; in 
Greenhalgh it was the shareholder.   
The more recent cases481 clearly confirm that the duty is a subjective one (although, in the 
absence of any evidence as to what a shareholder actually believed, the court will ask 
whether there is a plausible reason why there might have been benefit to the company), and 
differential impact on different shareholders will not necessarily disqualify the act in question.  
No doubt, it will be hard to justify explicit, direct discrimination against particular 
shareholders, but changes to the Articles (and, by analogy, other exercises of shareholder 
voting powers482) for which there is a plausible, rational possibility of benefit to the company 
are unlikely to fall foul of a review by the courts, even if some shareholders lose out.  
However, where the amendment is one that is not for the benefit of the company at all, but 
for the benefit of some or all of the shareholders, there is a constraint on the majority if their 
exercise of power amounts to “oppression of the minority or is otherwise unjust or is outside 
the scope of the power”483. 
A similar question arises where the shareholder protections are included as class rights in 
the Articles.  In cases dealing with class rights, the courts have taken the view that the 
relevant obligation on shareholders is to act in the interests of the class as a whole, rather 
than the company as a whole484.  It may appear that this makes the position easier, if the 
                                               
480 See, for example, Kershaw (2012a) at page 665, who also notes that this shift enabled 
the decision in re Holders Investment Trust Ltd ([1971] 2 All ER 289) because the court 
considered the thought process of a particular shareholder. 
481 See, in particular, Citco Banking Corporation NV v Pusser's Ltd and another [2007] 
UKPC 13, Assenagon Asset Management SA v Irish Bank Resolution Corpn Ltd [2012] 
EWHC 2090 (Ch) and Arbuthnott v Bonnyman and others [2015] EWCA Civ 536.  
482 For an explanation of the policy reasons why the law should apply more broadly than to 
alterations of the Articles and include what are referred to as “indirect exemption” provisions, 
see Lim (2015), pages 288-289; however, it is not clear whether the principle does extend 
that far at present.   
483 Arbuthnott v Bonnyman and others [2015] EWCA Civ 536 at [90(6)], per Sir Terence 
Etherton C.   
484 See Holders Investment Trust, Re [1971] 1 WLR 583, in which Megarry J. was 
persuaded that a purported modification of share rights was invalid because the shareholder 
had acted upon advice as to what would be in their own interests (as owners of both 
preference and ordinary shares) and not what was in the interests of the relevant class of 
preference shareholders as a whole. 
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relevant investor is being asked to agree to variation of a class right when the investor is the 
only holder of shares of that class (or when all holders of that class are in agreement as to 
the appropriate course of action).  A shareholder who is the only shareholder in a class 
acting in its own interests could be said also to be acting in the interests of the class as a 
whole.   
However, the cases that establish that the shareholder must have regard to the class as a 
whole are concerned with cases where a variation of class rights has a different effect on 
one class as compared to another.  In a case where the impact on all shareholders is the 
same, it may be doubted whether the courts would apply the same approach; although not 
yet tested in the courts, here the court might take the view that the more appropriate test is 
what is in the best interests of the shareholders as a whole. 
This legal doctrine may be worrisome to a private equity investor who has bargained for 
certain consent rights to protect its position, whether they are a majority or a minority.  
Although it is true that the cases discussed above deal with the voting power of majorities, a 
shareholder who has power to determine the outcome of a vote by virtue of a consent right 
might be regarded by the courts as being in a similar position and therefore subject to similar 
duties.  In addition, the fact that the rights are structured so that the power is not exercised in 
general meeting but in some other way (for example, by providing that certain actions should 
not be taken by the board without the consent of the investor) might be viewed by the courts 
as functionally equivalent to an exercise of corporate power. 
It is clear from the line of cases following Allen v Gold Reef that a shareholder would have 
no cause for concern in relation to matters where they were exercising a veto right (or a 
positive control right) because their view was that the contemplated action was not optimal 
for the company.  So, for example, a veto of a business plan presented by the board would 
not be challengeable provided that there was an honestly held reason (or, in the absence of 
being able to establish what the shareholder honestly believed, a plausible reason) why the 
proposed business plan would not be in the company’s best interests.  More difficult is a 
case where the shareholder might believe that the proposed action is in the interests of the 
company as a whole (or, to adopt Evershed MR’s formulation in Greenhalgh, the 
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“corporators as a general body”), but does not wish to sanction it for reasons of its own, 
perhaps because it would impede a sale of its shares (an “internal preference” in the terms 
adopted in Part 2), or its own fund documents would not permit it (an “external preference”).  
The question would then be whether exercising the veto right could be subject to any review 
by the court. 
First, it is clear from the cases that shareholders, even controlling shareholders, are not 
subject to a general fiduciary obligation, and they are therefore in a very different category to 
directors.  Even if shareholders are subject to a limited duty when exercising their power to 
vote in general meeting, that does not amount to a fiduciary duty, and there is, for example, 
no restriction on shareholders having interests that conflict with those of the company, nor 
on their ability to vote when they have such an interest485.  Secondly, as mentioned above, 
the restraints on shareholder power have been developed in the context of changes to the 
Articles and, despite policy arguments that they should extend to other exercises of power, it 
is far from clear that the law currently goes that far.  Further, it was clear from Russell, 
discussed above, that shareholders are free to contract with each other as to how they will 
exercise their voting rights and the courts have enforced these rights by an injunction486.  
Therefore, in the absence of any wider fiduciary obligations on shareholders, there do not 
seem to be any grounds to call into question the validity of an undertaking by all (or some) 
shareholders to exercise voting rights in a particular way in order to provide protection to a 
shareholder who bargains for that protection487.   
If the court were called upon to restrain the exercise of these bargained-for rights, it might 
ask why it should impose such restraint.  In these circumstances, the shareholders would 
                                               
485 See for example, Lord Davey in Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83, 94, 71 LJPC 1, 9 Mans 
17: “Unless otherwise provided by the regulations of the company, a shareholder is not 
debarred from voting or using his voting power to carry a resolution by the circumstance of 
his having a particular interest in the subject-matter of the vote”, cited with approval by Lord 
Hoffman in Citco Banking Corporation NV v Pusser's Ltd and another [2007] UKPC 13. 
486 See Greenwell v Porter [1902] 1 Ch 530 and Puddephatt v Leoth [1916] 1 Ch. 200, cited 
by Davies & Worthington (2012) at 19-09. 
487 Some limited restrictions on the ability of a controlling shareholder to extract value from 
the company at the expense of the minority were established in Menier v Hooper’s 
Telegraph Works Limited [1874-80] All ER Rep Ext 2032, but these would only cause 
problems in cases of expropriation, at least in so far as these principles have been 
developed by the courts to date.   
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usually all have been a party to the bargain488 and would have agreed to the protections that 
the investor has required.  They would presumably have done so in the belief that agreeing 
to these protections was in the best interests of the company, because it would facilitate the 
investment or acquisition of shares by the shareholder.  This might persuade the court that 
its intervention was not required to protect shareholders from an abuse of power, and indeed 
is analogous to the position that the courts have taken as regards the ability of directors to 
agree to constrain their future discretion.  It differs from cases that are concerned with 
amendments to the Articles of an existing company by special resolution, because in those 
cases there are shareholders who object to the change and have not agreed to it when they 
acquired their shares; indeed, they would (or at least may) have acquired shares in the 
knowledge that the law does constrain the power of majorities to amend Articles.  It is also 
noteworthy that there is no suggestion in cases dealing with the enforcement of 
shareholders’ agreements that exercising a protection that has been bargained for with the 
other shareholders is subject to any limits on its exercise489.   
Contractual provisions dealing with this issue 
We have seen that the limitations on shareholders who are seeking to use their rights to 
protect their own interests are rather limited.  Nevertheless, some private equity firms (or 
rather their advisers) are clearly concerned about those limits.  36% of the UK companies in 
the sample included a provision in the Investment Agreement to the effect that, as a 
shareholder, the private equity firm could exercise its rights in its own interests and without 
reference to the interests of any other shareholder.  However, the 15 companies in which 
                                               
488 It is normal for all shareholders to execute the Investment Agreement and for transfers of 
shares by shareholders to be restricted.  When a share transfer is permitted it is usually on 
condition that the transferee agrees to execute and be bound by the Investment Agreement.  
For a description of these restrictions in the present sample see Chapter 4.2 at pages 82-87 
above. 
489 See, for example, the judgement of Cooke J. in Growth Management Ltd and another v 
Mutafchiev and another [2007] 1 BCLC 645, in which investment funds had bargained for 
minority protections that prevented the majority from converting the company to a public 
company.  Although there have been many opportunities for a court to make the point that 
minority or majority protection rights are subject to legal constraints, they have not done so.  
In Wilkinson v West Coast Capital [2005] EWHC 3009 (Ch) both the Articles and the 
shareholders’ agreement gave the majority a right to block an acquisition by the company 
and there was no suggestion that this right was subject to any restraint; indeed, a failure to 
support an acquisition by the shareholders meant that the directors were free to pursue it 
personally without liability for breach of duty.  For a critique of that (first instance) decision, 
see Lim (2015) at page 286. 
Page | 186 
 
these provisions appear are accounted for by four private equity firms.  In the case of one of 
these490, all companies in the sample into which this firm has invested include this provision, 
while in the case of the other three491 some but not all of their investments include such a 
provision492.  Whether uncertainty over the scope of this restriction imposes costs for firms is 
not clear, but it would clearly be desirable for this matter to be put beyond doubt. 
8.2.3 Shadow directors, de facto directors and other fiduciary relationships 
Although controlling shareholders are not fiduciaries under English law, they may inherit 
some of the same duties if they play an active role in the management of the company.  This 
may be a concern for private equity investors, who are “active” investors.  If, as investors, 
they are acting to protect their own interests, they will be especially concerned if they inherit 
any obligations that constrain their ability to do that493. 
The relevant question is: could the shareholder (either directly or through an agent) be said 
to be a de facto director of the company494, or a shadow director?  The duties of shadow 
directors have recently been clarified, following a period of some uncertainty as to the scope 
of the duties owed by them, and it is now clear that such persons can inherit liability without 
an express assumption of responsibility; rather they will inherit duties "where and to the 
extent that they are capable of so applying”495.   
                                               
490 Firm B. 
491 Firms C, E and F. 
492 Of the Firm C companies in this sample, 28% include such wording; of the Firm E 
companies, 25% include it; and among the Firm F companies, 75% include it.  There is 
some correlation with the law firm acting for the private equity firm, which suggests that a 
firm does not require its law firm to use this language unless it has standard form 
documents, but relies upon the law firm’s standard forms. 
493 In most private equity structures the question as to where any liability falls may also not 
be straightforward.  The shareholder will typically appoint a manager to act on its behalf, and 
that manager may in turn appoint an advisor to assist it.  The director of an investee 
company, or someone who otherwise exercises influence over its corporate actions, will be 
nominated by the manager or advisor, and may also be its employee, but the nominated 
director may not be the agent of the manager when acting as a director (or is otherwise 
consulting with the board) and, even if she is, may not be a sub-agent of the investment fund 
which is the shareholder.  So, although liability may fall on the nominated director or other 
individual, it may not be possible to trace it to the manager or the fund itself, although if the 
relevant individual is indemnified by the manager or the fund, the economic effect may be 
the same. 
494 The Companies Act 2006 says that the directors of a company include any person 
“occupying the position of director, by whatever name called” (Section 250). 
495 Section 89 of the Small Business Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, amending 
Section 170(5) of the Companies Act 2006.  For a critical examination of this provision, its 
history and consequences, see Witney (2016b).  Some other duties (including the duty to 
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Nevertheless, recent case law makes it clear that the tests for qualification as a de facto and 
shadow director are quite high, even if it is clear that they owe duties once they pass the 
relevant test.  In Re Paycheck496 the Supreme Court focused on “assumption of 
responsibility” as the test for a de facto director, although it seems that acting as a part of the 
governance structure and exercising power in the way that a director does may be all that is 
needed to be deemed to have assumed responsibility.  For a shadow director, the test is 
included in Section 251 of the Companies Act 2006: a shadow director is “a person in 
accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of the company are 
accustomed to act”.  Because Section 251 repeats the wording used in the Companies Act 
1985, it has been subject to some judicial interpretation, especially in the context of the 
Insolvency Act 1986497.  It is clear that there must be “a pattern of behaviour in which the 
board did not exercise any discretion or judgement of its own, but acted in accordance with 
the directions of others”498, and the putative shadow director must be in control of the whole 
board or a “governing majority”499.  This is likely to be a hard to test to pass, at least where 
one has a well-advised board that is cognisant of its own legal obligations to act on the basis 
of its own independent judgement500.  But it is not impossible, and if its consent rights are 
extensive, and the power of the board is therefore heavily constrained on a regular basis, 
this may well be a risk for a private equity fund manager501.    
                                                                                                                                     
declare interests in existing transactions under Section 182 of the 2006 Act and some 
obligations under the Insolvency Act 2006) are explicitly extended to shadow directors by 
statute.   
496 [2010] UKSC 51; [2011] 1 BCLC 141 (also known as Holland v The Commissioners for 
Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs and another).  For commentary see Sealy (2011) and 
for recent judicial discussion of the case and its application see Smithton Limited v Naggar 
[2014] EWCA Civ 939. 
497 In particular, see Hydrodan (Corby) Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 180. 
498 Hydrodan (Corby) Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 180 at 183. 
499 Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding [2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch) at [1272]. 
500 There are some remaining areas of risk in this regard.  For example, the directors 
disqualification regime now includes an ability to disqualify a person who has given 
“directions or instructions” to a person who has himself been disqualified where the conduct 
giving rise to that disqualification was the result of the instructions or directions given – see 
Section 105 of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, inserting a new 
Section 8ZA into the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.   
501 If it is itself a body corporate it might be able to avoid being a shadow director for 
Companies Act (but not Insolvency Act) purposes pursuant to Section 251(3) of the 
Companies Act 2006.   
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It is plausible that the care taken by private equity firms to structure the corporate 
governance mechanism in the ways that they do – with a functioning and well-resourced 
board of directors, a set of negative-only veto rights and very limited use of instruction rights 
– is, in part, designed to limit any residual liability for the investor if it acts to protect its own 
position, having inherited fiduciary duties (perhaps especially in the event of insolvency, 
when enforcement action is most likely).  It may also explain why some “veto” rights are 
given to a nominated director rather than to the investor qua shareholder502.  In general, 
however, a shareholder ought to be able to avoid fiduciary responsibility, so long as the list 
of consent rights is not so extensive that the board is, in effect, unable to act without its 
consent. 
So far in Part 3, we have established that structures and contractual mechanisms to deal 
with UK company law rules are included in the contracts regulating governance in the private 
equity-backed companies in the research sample, as hypothesised in Part 1.  In the final 
Chapter of Part 3, we consider other structural strategies that may be adopted to mitigate 
any residual company law risks, and discuss the extent of their use in practice. 
  
                                               
502 Although liability may be avoided for the investor directly, there is a question as to the 
liability of the non-executive directors that are appointed by the private equity firm, and the 
firm may inherit liability for their breaches of duty through, for example, an indemnity or a 
contractual obligation to carry insurance.    
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CHAPTER 9: THE APPARENT LACK OF STRUCTURAL AND REGULATORY ARBITRAGE 
 
Despite the contractual mechanisms described in the previous Chapters, there are some 
residual risks for private equity investors arising from various mandatory company law rules 
and, in Part 1, it was hypothesised that in such a case we would expect the parties to take 
advantage of structural solutions that might be available to mitigate those risks.  In this 
Chapter, we explore three such potential solutions and their use in practice. 
9.1 Attenuated ownership structures 
When a private equity fund executes a buyout transaction, it establishes a holding company 
below the fund to acquire the target group; it does that to ensure that each portfolio company 
is treated as a separate financial investment with no cross-contamination of financial risk 
across the portfolio.  The fund and other shareholders (including the managers) will usually 
subscribe for shares and (often) loan notes in this holding company, and that is generally the 
company that enters into the Investment Agreement and that houses the corporate 
governance structure for the “group”.  That holding company (or more usually, in order to 
further subordinate the fund to the other lenders, another newly-established wholly owned 
subsidiary of the holding company503) will borrow further funds from a bank (or otherwise 
raise additional finance) and use the proceeds of that financing, together with the capital 
subscribed by the fund, to acquire the target company504.  Sometimes that target company 
will itself be a holding company, and so the actual operating company or companies – which 
hold the assets, employ the staff and conduct the business of the group – will be indirect 
subsidiaries of the holding company, usually at several stages removed505.   
Although, as we have seen in Part 2, non-executive directors are commonly appointed to the 
boards of private equity-backed companies, in fact these directors are generally appointed to 
the board of a holding company, whose only asset may be the shares in a subsidiary 
company, and do not typically act as directors of the operating company.  This holding 
                                               
503 See Gilligan & Wright (2014) at pages 112-113.  
504 In fact, it is quite common for the fund to establish three new companies, together often 
referred to as the “acquisition stack”, which are referred to respectively as “Topco”, “Midco” 
and “Bidco”.   
505 See Talmor & Vasvari (2011) at pages 266-267, who describe the structure and the 
reason for its use. 
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company may have some debt, or may have guaranteed the debt of other group companies, 
but will usually have no business of its own.  All of the private equity houses in the sample 
followed that practice and would typically only appoint directors to one (or sometimes more 
than one) of the holding companies above the operating company when structuring a 
buyout506, and not to the operating companies themselves.  Although they invariably had the 
right to appoint directors to any group company if they so wish, they reported that such a 
right is rarely exercised in practice507.   
In theory, that arrangement might reduce the risk for a private equity appointed director, or at 
least provide the opportunity for the private equity firm to put in place procedures that would 
mitigate the risk.  That is because any allegation of breach of duty would either have to 
relate to the company of which the non-executive director was a director508, or it would have 
to be established that the director concerned was also a de facto509 or shadow director510 of 
the relevant subsidiary or otherwise accepted or inherited liability for its actions511.   
                                               
506 The position is different for a venture capital deals and other investments where there is 
no “acquisition”.  In this sample, all of the “buyouts” were structured with at least one 
intermediate company between the acquired (operating) company and the fund, and in only 
two cases were the investor’s shares held directly in the operating company. 
507 Usually that right arises from a procurement obligation on the part of the holding 
company.  Although sometimes the new companies formed at the time of the acquisition are 
parties to the Investment Agreement and give the investor a direct right to appoint directors, 
that would be rare for the actual operating company.  Instead, control over such subsidiaries 
is achieved by ensuring that the holding company has an obligation to procure that matters 
which are reserved for shareholders may not be undertaken by any subsidiary company 
without the requisite shareholder or investor approval having first been given at the holding 
company level. 
508 See Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34 for a recent and comprehensive 
review of the law, confirming the position clearly laid out in Adams v Cape Industries Plc 
([1990] Ch 433) that group companies should be treated as separate legal entities – see, for 
example, Slade LJ at page 532, quoting Roskill LJ in The Albazero [1977] AC 774 at page 
807.  It is true that – when considering the actual content of the duties owed to the holding 
company, including the duty to avoid conflicts of interest – it seems likely that the court 
would generally equate the interests of the holding company with the interests of the 
operating subsidiary, as the value of the holding company will be (largely) determined by the 
performance of the company whose shares constitute its sole asset.  Such an approach 
would reduce the impact of any apparent liability mitigation, although the risk of enforcement 
may be reduced. 
509 Following the majority of the Supreme Court in Re Paycheck Services 3 Ltd ([2011] 1 
BCLC 141), in order for the holding company director to be a de facto director of the 
subsidiary it would be necessary for her to assume responsibility as a director of the 
subsidiary, and this would be easier to avoid if (as would usually be the case) the subsidiary 
has a separate board with different directors who are also “group” executives employed to 
manage the business on a day-to-day basis.   
510 A holding company director could not be a shadow director of a subsidiary unless it could 
be demonstrated that she (rather than the holding company) gave "instructions or directions" 
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By carefully maintaining separate boards, with records of decisions taken at each level, the 
liability risk of a director of the holding company could, therefore, be considerably mitigated, 
although it is clear that the risk could not be avoided altogether if the holding company 
directors were, in practice, making decisions relating to actions undertaken by other 
companies in the group512. 
However, it is clear from the documentary reviews and interviews undertaken for this thesis, 
that avoidance of liability does not motivate these attenuated ownership structures, nor are 
procedures generally put in place to seek to bolster any such risk mitigation.  Indeed, none 
of the directors interviewed had ever considered this to be a way to avoid liability for breach 
of duty, and all those who addressed their mind to the question513 regarded themselves as a 
director of the “group”, rather than as a director of any specific company.  Those directors 
generally assumed that they would not be able to escape legal liability for their actions only 
                                                                                                                                     
to the subsidiary company board (or a governing majority of the board) that, in practice, the 
subsidiary company board was accustomed to following – see discussion in Chapter 8.2.3 
above at pages 186-188.  Note, however, that a person (including a holding company 
director) only needs to be instructing or directing one (operating company) director to be 
liable for disqualification if the operating company director has been disqualified for 
behaviours that were the subject of the (holding company director’s) instructions or 
directions – see Section 105 of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 
(inserting a new Section 8ZA into the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986).  In 
addition, according to the doctrine of dishonest assistance, it would be possible for a holding 
company director to be liable jointly with a subsidiary company director if the latter simply 
followed instructions given to him by a holding company director.  In such a case, the 
relevant question would be whether an honest person in the position of the holding company 
director, with the knowledge that he had, could have believed that the acts that he instructed 
or assisted were in the best interests of the subsidiary company – see Central Bank of 
Ecuador and others v Conticorp SA and others ([2015] UKPC 11, especially paragraph [50]). 
511 As regards liability for breaches of other laws that impose liability on directors who have 
"consented to" or otherwise been involved with a primary breach by the company, this may 
be more difficult to establish where the director concerned is a director of a holding company 
rather than the operating company that is subject to the primary liability.  For example, 
Section 37 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 attaches liability for "consent or 
connivance" to “any director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body 
corporate or a person who was purporting to act in any such capacity”.  Unless the holding 
company director can be shown to have “purported to act” as a director of the subsidiary, it 
seems unlikely that she could be held liable pursuant to this Section. 
512 It is also possible that the courts would seek to hold directors accountable more directly 
for breaches of duty by holding company directors where an underlying subsidiary entered 
insolvency.  Liability for fraudulent trading under the Section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986 
attaches to persons who were "knowingly parties", and so could include non-directors, but 
the provision requires proof of dishonesty.  Wrongful trading, on the other hand, can only be 
committed by directors (including de facto factors and shadow directors).   
513 Six interviewees (I8, I14, I17, I19, I25 and I26) specifically addressed this question.  One 
interviewee (I26) was even concerned that these attenuated structures could increase risk, 
because she was not attuned to the legal responsibilities in all of the subsidiaries, including 
non-UK subsidiaries, and was concerned that she might have liability for their behaviour as a 
de facto director of them. 
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because they were not a legally appointed director of the operating company.  Further, no 
attempt is made to restrict the business line of the holding company, nor to prohibit it from 
exploiting corporate opportunities that may arise to its directors, in order to seek to mitigate 
potential liability under Section 175 of the 2006 Act514. 
In practice, an assumption on the part of the interviewees that their duties are owed to all 
group companies may be a self-fulfilling prophesy, given the behaviours that they described 
in the interviews.  Although not de jure directors of the companies below the holding 
company/ies, they may well be regarded as de facto directors for most purposes if they were 
actively involved in all board level decisions that affected the behaviour of those companies 
and accepted responsibility as a director of those underlying companies.  This does not 
seem to be an issue that concerns them. 
There is a further issue that the failure to respect the group structures exacerbates, and of 
which the directors of private equity-backed companies seem unaware.  If directors of the 
holding company are, indeed, de facto directors of the subsidiaries, then they owe duties of 
loyalty to each company, and although many of the interests of these companies may 
coincide, there may be times when they differ.  For example, a subsidiary company might 
have a need for cash to pay its creditors, while the parent company might prefer to receive a 
dividend or repayment of an intra-group loan in order to meet its own obligations or return 
capital to the private equity fund.  Simply treating the group as a single economic entity 
would make it difficult for a director of both companies to demonstrate compliance with these 
conflicting duties.  
9.2 The use of alternative jurisdictions 
Despite the efforts that are made to modify or dis-apply certain directors’ duties, the 
research for this thesis reveals that the stakeholders in UK private equity-backed companies 
make no significant use of alternative jurisdictions to avoid these rules entirely.  In the 
research sample of portfolio companies, only 16% chose to incorporate a non-UK corporate 
vehicle to act as the main holding company for the group and the vehicle in which to locate 
the group’s board of directors.  Furthermore, in the eight cases in which a non-UK vehicle 
                                               
514 See further the discussion in Chapter 7.1.4 above, in particular pages 165-171. 
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was used, interview evidence suggested strongly that the driver for that decision was the 
group’s tax structure and not corporate law (although the holding company did need to be 
located in a jurisdiction with both sympathetic tax rules and a workable corporate law)515.  
This finding raises an obvious question: why do we not see more regulatory arbitrage by 
private equity investors, as academics often argue is the case within the United States516?   
Despite some jurisprudential differences between Europe and the US affecting the scope for 
regulatory competition517, there are a number of non-UK corporate vehicles that could be 
adopted by the incorporators of a private equity-backed company, especially as we are 
usually only concerned with the main holding company, whose only business is to own 
shares in one or more subsidiaries; the actual operating company could be a UK company, 
while the vehicle housing the corporate governance arrangements could be governed by the 
law of another country.  That this is possible is evident from the fact that eight of the 
companies in the sample assembled for this research are non-UK companies, two from each 
of Jersey, Luxembourg, Cayman and the Isle of Man.  In the public markets, it is not 
uncommon for companies listed in the UK with no connection with the Channel Islands to 
utilise Jersey holding companies, where company law is not constrained by EU 
Directives518.  In addition, it has in the past been common for UK companies seeking 
                                               
515 None of the interviewees referred to corporate law as a reason to prefer one jurisdiction 
over another, although some acknowledged that the tax-driven choice of holding company 
would sometimes affect the corporate governance board (for example, by the need to 
appoint a certain number of locally resident directors).  In general, the jurisdictions typically 
chosen were sufficiently flexible to accommodate the needs of a private equity investor; one 
interviewee commented: “We’re typically UK, Luxembourg, Cayman, and in each of those 
jurisdictions there’s ample opportunity to do whatever you need to do.”  
516 Academics have written extensively about competition for incorporations in the United 
States; see, for example, Cary (1974), who argues that it results in a “race to the bottom” 
and Winter (1977), who claims that market forces actually mean that the result is a “race to 
the top”.  See also Romano (1993), especially Chapter 2, Bratton (1994) and Cheffins 
(2015).  The freedom to incorporate is often used to substantiate the claim that US corporate 
law is contractarian in nature despite (apparently) mandatory rules and default provisions 
that are often adopted without amendment – see Easterbrook & Fischel (1989) and 
Bainbridge (2008) at page 33. 
517 For commentary on the current state of EU jurisprudence on corporate migration (which 
is now generally permissive) see, for example, Gerner-Beuerle & Schillig (2010) and Gelter 
(2015), and for a discussion of the reasons for the differences between the EU and the USA, 
especially as regards the effect of insolvency law rules, see Mucciarelli (2012).   
518 See Ferran (2016) who identified (at page 818) six Jersey incorporated companies in the 
FTSE 100 (as at December 2015).  Jersey is not a member of the EU, and consequently the 
EU’s harmonised company law rules are not applicable there and Jersey company law is 
more flexible; Professor Ferran identifies which UK company law rules are re-introduced by 
contract by the public companies which have emigrated there.  However, the additional 
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investment from US venture capital funds to incorporate a Delaware company as the 
ultimate holding company so that US investors could invest through that holding company 
rather than into the UK operating company; although avoidance of UK company law rules 
does not appear to have been the main driver of that structure, it is further evidence of the 
dominance of Delaware-incorporated companies among US investors519. 
Whether there is, in fact, significant regulatory competition for UK-headquartered private 
company incorporations (in the sense that governments deliberately amend their laws to 
attract foreign incorporators of private companies) is not clear, and is an interesting research 
question beyond the scope of this thesis520.  However, whatever the drivers of reform, states 
such as Jersey and Luxembourg do regularly innovate their corporate law structures521, but 
have not made any significant modifications to the rules on directors’ duties.  The law of 
Jersey, for example, appears to closely follow the approach of the UK and, although the 
relevant statute does not include the same extensive restrictions on conflicts of interest as 
are included in Section 175 of the Companies Act 2006, the law does not exclude common 
law duties and it is likely that a mandatory restriction on exploitation of corporate 
                                                                                                                                     
flexibility in Jersey law mainly affects public companies, since the “Capital Directive” (the 
Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976, as recast by Directive 
2012/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012) does not 
apply to private companies.   
519 Practitioners argue that US investors are more familiar with Delaware corporations and 
that, if the company later chooses to IPO on NASDAQ it will also be helpful to have a US 
structure; however, the practice has diminished in recent years, mainly for tax reasons, as 
discussed in a blog published by the venture capital firm Notion Capital on 25 March 2015 
(http://www.notioncapital.com/blog/to-flip-or-not-to-flip-should-i-put-a-us-company-over-my-
uk-company/ [Accessed 2.03.2017]).   
520 There is some discussion in Armour (2005), Bratton et al. (2009) and, more recently, 
Gelter (2015); however, these tend to focus on the position in the EU generally and do not 
look more broadly at competition from outside the EU.  Moore (2013) argues (at pages 232-
3) that the UK is not comparable with the US in this regard, although consideration of the 
issue is brief. 
521 For example, Luxembourg has recently introduced a new form of limited liability 
company, the société à responsabilité limitée simplifiée.  There are relatively frequent 
changes to Jersey company law, and these are justified by reference to that vehicle’s use 
“as one of the key tools of the international finance industry” (see Green Paper issued by the 
States of Jersey on 25 November 2011 “to seek views on proposed changes to the 
Companies (Jersey) Law 1991” available at: 
http://www.gov.je/SiteCollectionDocuments/Industry%20and%20finance/R%20Green%20Pa
per%20on%20Companies%20Amendments1%2020111125.pdf [Accessed 2.03.2017]).  
Other European countries frequently seeking to attract international businesses to utilise 
their corporate structures include Guernsey, Ireland and the Netherlands.   
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opportunities applies, notwithstanding its omission from the Act522.  Moreover, Jersey 
company law includes a similar prohibition on exemptions from liability for directors as that 
which is included in Section 232 of the UK Companies Act523.  Given the apparent 
willingness of the Jersey legislator to engage in regulatory competition in other areas, it is 
striking that they have not done so in this area524, and perhaps indicates that there is no 
demand for a different regime525 (or even that there is, in fact, demand for a regime similar 
to that of the UK, perhaps for reasons of familiarity). 
In any case, we do not appear to see significant company law-driven forum-shopping among 
the UK private equity community, at least as regards entities below the level of the fund.  
Interview evidence strongly suggests that practitioners will only consider an alternative 
jurisdiction if there are significant tax benefits to doing so, and these benefits are the main 
reasons for the use of the non-UK holding companies in the research sample.  If a tax-driven 
decision is made, of course, the corporate law must facilitate the use of a suitable limited 
                                               
522 Companies (Jersey) Law 1991 (as amended).  Sections 74-76 deal with directors’ duties 
and provide a mandatory duty to act in the best interests of the company, to act with care, 
diligence and skill, and to disclose interests in transactions where the directors’ interest 
conflicts (or may conflict) with the company’s interests (similar to Section 177 of the 
Companies Act 2006).  However, correspondence on file between the author and a Jersey 
company lawyer confirms that Jersey would follow the approach of the UK courts with regard 
to corporate opportunities law, given that there is nothing to require them to do otherwise in 
the statute. 
523 Companies (Jersey) Law 1991, Article 77. 
524 Indeed, it seems that Jersey law may be more burdensome in this regard than UK law, 
given that there is no equivalent to the procedure in Section 175(4)(b), which allows the 
directors to authorise situational conflicts.  
525 However, an interesting analysis of US LLC agreements by Molk (2016) would seem to 
suggest that there would be demand for an alternative regime if one existed.  In the US, LLC 
laws (in contrast to corporation laws) do generally permit exclusion of fiduciary duties, 
including the corporate opportunities doctrine.  In an analysis of 283 LLC operating 
agreements, the author finds that around 40% of Delaware and New York LLCs take 
advantage of the contractual freedom to waive the doctrine, and exclude or significantly 
modify many other default provisions that are designed to protect owners and that are 
mandatory for other forms of business organisation.  Many such LLCs replace the excluded 
provisions with other measures designed to align manager and owner interests.  However, 
the author also finds some evidence that there are fewer owner protections in LLCs with 
weaker, more vulnerable minority owners, and argues that this could suggest that 
contractual freedom is being used “more with an eye to potential undesirable opportunism, 
rather than in pursuit of economic efficiency”.  See also Rauterberg & Talley (forthcoming), 
who find significant evidence of waiver of the corporate opportunity doctrine in the US, 
discussed further at fn 407 above.  It is also noteworthy that the Cayman Islands has very 
recently introduced a new form of limited liability company that includes no mandatory duties 
other than a duty for managers to act in good faith – see The Limited Liability Companies 
Law 2016 (Cayman Islands) Section 26, especially Section 26(4), (5) and (6). 
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liability structure in that country, meaning that corporate law is a secondary consideration, 
but not one that is driving companies to an alternative jurisdiction.   
In general, interviewees believed that the risks and liabilities associated with UK company 
law were “manageable”526 and/or not “onerous”527, unless the company was facing 
insolvency, in which case there was a general awareness of the risks and of the need to 
manage those risks by taking specific advice or resigning from the board.  They also referred 
to the costs of using alternative vehicles, including the lack of familiarity for management 
teams, as barriers528; these barriers would no doubt be overcome if it were thought that 
significant savings could be made (and there was no cheaper way to make them), but that is 
evidently not the case.  In addition, some doubted whether using these vehicles would really 
avoid UK company law, arguing that the individuals involved in managing the non-UK 
holding company might be held liable at a lower level as a de facto or shadow director529.  
Overall, there was no evidence emerging from the research undertaken for this thesis that 
UK company law rules create problems which market participants believe can be avoided at 
reasonable cost by incorporating elsewhere. 
9.3 Use of alternative corporate vehicles 
It is also notable that all of the private equity fund managers in the research sample chose to 
utilise a limited liability company as the main vehicle to locate the corporate governance 
arrangements for their portfolio companies, and those that used a UK company all chose a 
private company (rather than a public company)530.  To the extent that there are alternative 
vehicles available in the UK that might be suitable and that avoid the problems posed by 
mandatory rules, it is perhaps surprising that these are not adopted. 
                                               
526 I2 made this specific comment, adding that fiduciary duties had also had positive impacts. 
527 I29. 
528 In this regard, see also the comments of I31 quoted on page 200 below. 
529 For example, I29 said: “I think if we’re going to be part of this conversation, we’re part of 
the conversation as a director or shadow director so you may as well be a director.” 
530 As well as a more flexible corporate law regime, UK private companies are permitted to 
give financial assistance for the acquisition of their own shares, while public companies and 
their subsidiaries are subject to a prohibition (with certain exceptions) – see Section 678 of 
the Companies Act 2006.  As it is usual in a buyout for the target company to provide 
security for the debt incurred to finance the target’s acquisition, the absence of financial 
assistance restrictions is likely to be an important driver of the choice of vehicle. 
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The UK Limited Liability Partnership (or “LLP”), a corporate vehicle created by the Limited 
Liability Partnership Act 2000 (the “LLP Act”), offers limited liability for members, whilst 
giving the participants considerable contractual freedom to design the applicable corporate 
governance rules.  There are no equivalent mandatory rules to those that apply to directors, 
and (although members of the LLP can have similar liabilities to directors in the event of an 
insolvency), the existence and content of any fiduciary duties owed by the members to the 
LLP or to each other is a matter of fact to be determined by reference to the circumstances 
of the case and the terms of the LLP Agreement531.   
In addition to the lack of mandatory fiduciary duties, the LLP also has a number of other 
features that could make it more attractive as a holding entity (perhaps sitting above a 
limited company) for a private equity-backed business.  For example, unlike the constitution 
of a company, which is a public document filed at Companies House532, the LLP Agreement 
is a private document, allowing the parties to maintain a greater degree of privacy, and there 
                                               
531 See Section 5(1) of the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 and F&C Alternative 
Investments (Holdings) Ltd v Barthelemy and others [2011] EWHC 1731 (Ch) at paragraphs 
[207] - [259].  There is no equivalent to Section 232 of the Companies Act 2006.  In addition, 
unlike in a company, it is possible for an LLP Agreement to exclude the ability of a member 
to bring an unfair prejudice petition under Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 – see 
Section 48 of The Limited Liability Partnerships (Application of Companies Act 2006) 
Regulations 2009.   
532 Section 18(2) of the Companies Act 2006.  It is not general practice for a private equity-
backed company to file its Investment Agreement (or equivalent) at Companies House, and 
that agreement is usually regarded as a private document.  However, it will not always be 
possible to rely on that privacy for two reasons.  First, Section 29 of the Companies Act 2006 
requires a company to file “any resolution or agreement agreed to by all the members of a 
company that, if not so agreed to, would not have been effective for its purpose unless 
passed as a special resolution”.  Whether this provision applies will obviously depend on the 
content of the Investment Agreement, but in many instances (for example, if pre-emption 
provisions were included in the Investment Agreement in an attempt to maintain their 
secrecy) it could do so.  It is often the case (presumably to avoid the articles becoming 
registrable) that the Investment Agreement will specifically state that it does not purport to 
alter the articles, but instead includes a prospective obligation on the parties to amend the 
articles of the company if they are inconsistent with the Investment Agreement; however, 
seven of the Investment Agreements in this sample specifically provide that its provisions 
will prevail in the event of any inconsistency with the articles.  Secondly, it seems likely that 
the obligation in Section 18(2) of the Act to file “articles of association” would require that 
such articles be a self-contained document, capable of being construed and understood 
without reference to other (private) documents.  Although in most cases the articles that are 
filed by private equity-backed companies do not refer to other documents, in 93% of the 
articles of the UK companies in this sample there were references to the Investment 
Agreement and/or other “private” documents, and it would be impossible to fully understand 
the articles without reference to these other documents.  In that case, it is at least arguable 
that the company is in default of its obligations under the Act. 
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are no significant constraints on its content533.  In addition, when interpreting an LLP 
Agreement, the court will be able to take account of all of the relevant knowledge and 
information that is admissible when construing any contract534, while it is clear that only 
extrinsic evidence which “any reader of the Articles would reasonably be supposed to 
know”535 is admissible when interpreting the Articles.  In the case of a small company, that 
approach could easily lead to injustice. 
Interestingly, the UK private equity industry is familiar with the LLP because it is very widely 
used as a vehicle for the fund manager appointed to manage the private equity fund536.  
However, there does not appear to be any indication that it is commonly used as a vehicle 
below the level of the fund, either as the vehicle for the operating company or as the holding 
company that houses the main corporate governance arrangements.  It is possible that 
complexities associated with tax transparency537 may act as a disincentive, and some 
doubts also remain about the limited liability of passive members (especially in the event of 
insolvency, when they are treated like directors, including in relation to wrongful trading 
rules,538 and may have obligations to repay amounts previously withdrawn539).  However, 
                                               
533 A company’s Articles, and even a shareholders’ agreement, are constrained by company 
law in a number of ways.  For example, Section 168 of the Companies Act imposes a 
mandatory rule that shareholders may remove a director from office by an ordinary 
resolution, and the shareholders cannot dis-apply that rule in the Articles or by agreement.  
This can be an inconvenient rule, for which there is no equivalent in LLP legislation, even 
though its inconvenient effects can be circumvented by the use of weighted voting rights 
(see Bushell v Faith [1970] AC 1099).   
534 See Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 All 
ER 98 at 114-115 for an authoritative summary of the principles.  Lord Hoffman says: 
“Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to a 
reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been 
available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract” 
(emphasis added). 
535 Cosmetic Warriors Ltd v Gerrie [2015] [2015] EWHC 3718 (Ch) at [27].  See also 
Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] UKPC 10 at [36], cited with approval 
in Cherry Tree Investments Ltd v Landmain Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 736 at [129]. 
536 See, for example, BVCA written evidence to Parliament on the Small Business, 
Enterprise and Employment Bill 2014-15, especially paragraphs 34-37, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmpublic/smallbusiness/memo/sb33.ht
m [Accessed 2.03.2017].  Again, the choice of structure is primarily driven by tax 
considerations, although limited liability for members is an important requirement for private 
equity firms.   
537 The UK LLP is (broadly) taxed as a partnership as a matter of UK tax law, despite being 
a body corporate – see Sections 10 and 1(2) respectively of the Limited Liability 
Partnerships Act 2000. 
538 See Regulation 5 of the Limited Liability Partnerships Regulations 2001 applying much of 
the Insolvency Act 1986 to LLPs, including the provisions on fraudulent and wrongful trading 
in Sections 213 and 214, and equating members with directors.  However, note that similar 
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interview evidence suggests that it is not the potential liabilities that inhibit the use of LLPs; 
rather there is a feeling that the UK company law framework is an appropriate one and 
sometimes a helpful one.  A typical interviewee comment (I2) was:  
I don’t think we’ve ever found the corporate structure not working properly to be 
honest.  I’m not sure that we would look to move to something which is more 
contractual versus more statutory in basis. 
Another interviewee (I29) asserted:  
I wouldn’t do any sort of fancy structuring to have an LLP rather than being a 
director.  I think that’s needless. 
Although the precise nature of the legal duties is not well understood, and in particular the 
(so far, largely theoretical) issues relating to corporate opportunities law are not generally 
known, the view expressed by all interviewees who addressed the question was that the 
legal environment is not unduly problematic or (when the company is solvent) constraining, 
and that it is helpful to have duties which oblige those making corporate decisions to have 
regard for the best interests of the company and to disclose any outside interests.  Indeed, 
one interviewee (I10) asserted that it was better that these rules were mandatory to avoid 
having to re-negotiate them on every deal:  
The idea of trying to recreate a set of duties every time you invested fills me 
with administrative horror.   
However, there are reasons to be sceptical about these explanations.  Aside from the fact 
that it is evident that there is very little understanding of the detail of the legal rules, it is also 
                                                                                                                                     
provisions would apply to a shareholder if that shareholder was held to be a “shadow 
director” – see the discussion in Chapter 8.2.3 at pages 186-188 above, but note that 
pursuant to Section 251 of the Insolvency Act 1986, the exclusion for parent companies in 
the definition of “shadow director” in Section 251(3) of the Companies Act 2006 does not 
apply. 
539 See Section 214A of the Insolvency Act 1986, inserted by Schedule 3 to the Limited 
Liability Partnerships Regulations 2001, which provides that property withdrawn is liable to 
recall by the court on the application of a liquidator for a period of two years if the member 
knew or should have known that the LLP was insolvent at the time of withdrawal, or would 
be following the withdrawal.  However, this is similar to the position for a shareholder who 
knew, or had reasonable grounds to believe that, a dividend received was an unlawful 
distribution (in which case there is a potential obligation to repay without limit in time under 
Section 847 of the Companies Act 2006).   
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likely that there is an inherent conservatism in the market, with incentives to change as little 
as possible (including corporate structure) unless there is a very good reason to do so540.  It 
can be tentatively concluded from interview evidence either that market participants do not 
perceive that corporate law poses a problem, or that the problem is recognised but is not 
thought big enough to justify a change of structure541.  In this respect, the comments of a 
private equity lawyer (I31) are interesting: 
A lot of it gets driven by precedent … private equity firms like to roll out 
something they are familiar with. … Generally, the accountants … whoever is 
advising on the tax, is the one who decides jurisdiction for the Newco stack 
and, largely, the form of the entities within that Newco stack. … There [are] a 
number of third parties [involved] … and they and their advisers like to see 
something that they’ve seen before and recognise and understand. 
These conclusions suggest that the choice of structure is the result of path dependence542, 
and the transaction costs of changing to an alternative structure (including those associated 
with educating managers and third parties) are regarded as too high, even if that structure 
would be superior, unless there are compelling tax reasons for doing so.  Such an 
assessment of the costs and benefits may be based on a lack of understanding of the issues 
created by corporate law, or by a mispricing of the risks.  Nevertheless, it is true that the 
analysis in Chapters 6-8 above suggests that the likelihood of enforcement action might 
                                               
540 This inherent conservatism has been found in analogous US contexts; see, for example, 
the finding that US venture capitalists in Silicon Valley adopt the corporate rather than the 
(apparently more attractive) partnership form for their investments that is reported by 
Bankman (1994) and discussed in Klausner (1995) at pages 821-822.  This is explained, in 
part, by the difficulty a venture capitalist may have in persuading managers to adopt an 
unfamiliar structure and, in part, to a “gamblers’ mentality” which failed to recognise the risks 
and costs of failure.  However, see also Fleischer (2003), who suggests some alternative 
reasons for the use of partnerships.  
541 It is interesting that, in the US, the introduction of a new corporate structure that did 
provide significant contractual freedom, the Limited Liability Company (or LLC), has been 
widely adopted by commercial businesses and, according to Chrisman (2009) is now “the 
most popular form of new business entity in the United States” (page 459-460).  Friedman 
(2004) had attributed this success in part to the tax advantages of LLCs, but also highlighted 
(at page 42) limited liability (differentiating them from general partnerships) and default rules 
more suitable for small business than the default rules for corporations.  The freedom to opt 
out of rules that are unsuitable, and the frequency with which this option is taken up, were 
highlighted by Molk (2016), who confirms the dominance of LLCs using 2012 data (see 
further discussion at fn 525 above. 
542 See Bebchuk & Roe (1999) for an interesting discussion on the role of path dependence 
on the corporate structures in any given country. 
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reasonably be regarded as remote, even if the rules create theoretical difficulties and 
necessitate significant contractual tailoring, which clearly reduces the benefits of switching. 
9.4 A need for more contractual flexibility? 
The evidence presented in Part 3 of this thesis is mixed.  On the one hand, it is clear that 
there are significant legal issues to be navigated by a private equity-backed company and its 
directors and shareholders in designing a corporate governance system that achieves their 
commercial objectives, particularly in the mechanisms needed to protect their own interests 
as shareholders.  It is clear that the lawyers who design and negotiate the legal documents 
are well aware of these legal issues, and adopt partial contractual solutions to them, 
confirming my hypothesis that one purpose of governance-related contracting is to modify or 
dis-apply UK company law rules.  These contractual work-arounds seem inefficient, even if 
the use of standard documents mitigates the costs, because in some areas it is not 
straightforward to achieve the commercial objectives without significant contractual provision 
and it seems that, in practice, nominated directors often ignore the structural devices 
established by lawyers and exercise veto rights around the boardroom table.  Furthermore, 
there are limits to the ability to contract out of these apparently mandatory rules at all when 
using a UK limited liability company, compounded by lack of clarity in some areas, which 
gives rise to legal risks that are hard to quantify and may be underestimated.  The current 
equilibrium could easily be disturbed by a high profile claim, especially if the courts refused 
to allow broad capacity authorisations to limit the scope of a director’s fiduciary duties.  In 
the meantime, the costs of adopting alternative corporate forms to avoid the mandatory rules 
are regarded as prohibitive, and those alternatives may themselves give rise to other 
disadvantages. 
On the other hand, there was widespread acceptance among those interviewed that the 
risks arising from UK corporate law were manageable and, indeed, that a general duty of 
loyalty to the company was desirable.  While that is intuitively resonant in so far as it relates 
to the executive directors (especially given that the vast majority of interviewees were non-
Page | 202 
 
executives543), it is perhaps less so as regards the position of non-executives appointed by a 
shareholder, who might be expected to represent the specific interests of that shareholder.  
However, it was repeatedly asserted in interviews that it was helpful to have all directors 
sitting around the same table, unified by their legal obligation to seek to maximise the value 
of the corporate entity, and not to be guided by outside interests or motivations.  One typical 
such comment, reflecting the observations of a majority ofthe interviewees was:  
I think people sitting around that table all have to have the interests of the 
company paramount in what they’re doing and if they’ve got different levels of 
interest in what they’re doing from a different perspective, I mean, that risks a 
divergence rather convergence of view544.   
Notwithstanding that general comment, however, it was also clear that interviewees 
expected to be judged by different standards depending upon their role in relation to the 
company, and in particular whether they were fulfilling an executive or a non-executive role: 
for example, one interviewee (I8) argued that the executive could not be responsible for 
things that were “hidden” from the non-executives by the management team. 
Moreover, as we have seen in Chapter 7, private equity investors are very concerned about 
potential conflicts of interest among the managers, and their contractually negotiated 
protections extend beyond those set out in mandatory and default legal rules.   
The real problem, therefore, is not with the mandatory duty of loyalty per se: managers and 
shareholders in a private equity-backed company would adopt strict rules requiring loyalty to 
the company by both executive and non-executive directors by contractual agreement even 
if the law did not impose them, and in the case of executives the default rules are not strict 
enough.  What is problematic is the difficulty that non-executives face in specific situations, 
when it would be preferable to all concerned to allow specific directors to escape the duty to 
avoid conflicts and other instantiations of the duty of loyalty when acting in separate, 
disclosed and authorised capacities.  Allowing informed parties to contest and agree the 
                                               
543 In some cases, interviewees were general counsel or other employees of the shareholder 
who appointed the non-executive director and who might be expected to share their 
perspectives. 
544 I10.  Seven interviewees specifically referred to the importance of creating a “partnership” 
with management – see fn 195. 
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scope of fiduciary duties in a private company is all that is required in order to eliminate an 
important uncertainty and inefficiency inherent in the law, and the fact that the costs of the 
existing structure are not regarded as so high that they justify using an alternative does not 
mean that law-makers should ignore the benefits of reform.  
Existing academic theories do not justify restrictions on contractual freedom for well-
informed parties and it is clear that, as predicted, extensive private ordering is observed in 
the market.  If and to the extent that the resulting governance systems might give rise to 
negative externalities (as they could in their effect on creditors, for example), those can be – 
and are – dealt with by specific prohibitions or protections, such as restrictions on 
distributions, or workers’ rights.  At the same time, given that I have argued that many of the 
interests of the private equity investor will coincide with the interests of society more broadly, 
it seems possible that the governance processes that private equity firms develop will not 
only contribute to better-run companies, but could also support broader welfare gains.   
That final suggestion – that contractual corporate governance structures ought to be more 
efficient and could even deliver social welfare gains545 – gives rise to an important empirical 
question: is there any evidence that the corporate governance mechanisms do actually 
affect corporate performance?  That is the question addressed in the next and final Part of 
this thesis. 
                                               
545 This echoes a call made by Ferran (2016) for contractible corporate law rules, in part to 
counter the prospect of corporate migrations.  Ferran argues (at page 838) that more 
optionality “could be good for competitiveness” and asserts that “diversity and plurality” could 
help companies to “achieve their social purpose”. 
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PART 4: THE IMPACT OF PRIVATE EQUITY ON PERFORMANCE 
 
CHAPTER 10: HOW DO ACADEMICS EXPLAIN PRIVATE EQUITY OUTPERFORMANCE? 
 
We observed in the Introduction that private equity-backed companies are a significant and 
well-established feature of the corporate landscape, and the first three Parts of this thesis 
proposed and tested an expanded theory of corporate governance for such companies.  
Finally, in Part 4, we consider what evidence there is for the proposition that the decisions 
that these companies make lead to outcomes for stakeholders that, on average, differ from 
those seen in publicly-held companies, or other privately-held companies, and whether they 
lead to “superior” outcomes (in whatever terms we might define that)546.  To the extent that 
such evidence exists, we will examine academic explanations for it, and suggest that the 
contractual governance mechanisms described are a significant (and, until now, 
underestimated) contributory factor.  It will be argued that the agreed decision-making 
process and balance of power enable the closer relationship between managers and 
shareholders to deliver the potential efficiencies that contractarian theorists have suggested. 
10.1 Do private equity-backed companies outperform?  
10.1.1 Fund performance 
Although industry statistics suggest strong absolute and relative performance547, the 
academic evidence comparing net returns from private equity funds with returns from the 
public markets remains mixed.  One relatively recent and prominent study by Harris et al. 
(2014) finds that US buyout funds have outperformed the S&P 500 by around 3% annually, 
and outperformance is seen in most vintages since 1984, and this positive result is 
                                               
546 For a comprehensive overview of the data on private equity fund performance and 
productivity improvements following a buyout, see Gilligan & Wright (2014) at pages 177-
180 and 190-192. 
547 See, for example, British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (2015) who (at 
page 12) give a “since inception” return of 13.8% per annum, excluding funds that were less 
than four years old in 2015; various private equity fund performance measures are 
compared favourably with “All Pension Fund Assets” and the FTSE All Share index at 
page 3. 
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supported by several others548.  On the other hand, several earlier studies had found 
underperformance on average, including Kaplan & Schoar (2005) and Phalippou & 
Gottschalg (2009)549.  Of course, the choice of comparators is very important and not 
necessarily straightforward: Phalippou (2014) finds that, when compared to a small-cap 
index instead of the S&P 500, any outperformance disappears550, and a very recent study by 
L’Her et al. (2016) argues that funds show no outperformance on a risk-adjusted basis.  It is, 
therefore, not yet entirely clear whether the post-fee fund level returns make private equity 
an attractive asset class for the average investor551 (as opposed to an investor who 
manages to select the better performing funds, for whom the rewards are significant552).  
10.1.2 Portfolio company performance 
However, even if it were true that private equity funds did not generate better average 
returns for their investors than the public markets or other asset classes, that would not 
necessarily imply that they did not generate superior returns at the level of the underlying 
investments553; it may be that superior returns are being made, but the fee structure means 
that these are being captured by the fund manager rather than the investors, and/or are 
being consumed by the more costly approach to management that a private equity fund 
entails.  It could also be that the sellers of the assets acquired by private equity firms are 
capturing some of the benefits of the business model; given that most private equity-backed 
companies are now acquired through competitive auctions (often competing with other 
                                               
548 See, for example, Robinson & Sensoy (2013) and Higson & Stucke (2012).  A recent 
meta-analysis by Kaplan & Sensoy (2015) suggests that the outperformance compared to 
the S&P 500 is significant. 
549 Potential flaws in the dataset used for this study were identified by Stucke (2011) and 
subject to analysis by Phalippou (2012). 
550 Phalippou (2014).  See also Driessen et al. (2012) 
551 Phalippou (2012) offers some reasons why definitive conclusions cannot be drawn from 
recent studies, even though they may be using more reliable data than has previously been 
available.  See, also, Phalippou (2014) where it is argued (at page 190) that publicly 
available data are “sufficiently precise”. 
552 The relatively high dispersion of returns in the asset class means that top quartile funds 
significantly outperform the average; see, for example, Kaplan & Schoar (2005), who find (at 
pages 1798-1799) that “funds at the 25th percentile show a cash flow IRR of 3% while the 
funds at the 75th percentile exhibit a cash flow IRR of 22% per year”.  The median return in 
this study is 12% – see Table II. 
553 The converse is, of course, also true: superior fund-level performance would not 
necessarily imply superior portfolio company performance; other factors might account for 
the outperformance, including asset selection and capital structure. 
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private equity firms), it seems likely that they will bid away some of their expected gains in 
the acquisition price that they are prepared to pay at the outset. 
Indeed, it is frequently claimed by industry insiders that portfolio companies owned by 
private equity funds do outperform their listed counterparts, and that – at least in part – that 
outperformance is caused by actions taken in the companies during the private equity fund’s 
period of ownership.  For example, in a review of 307 realised European investments from 
2005 to 2011, Ernst & Young (2012) found significant outperformance in private equity-
backed companies compared to the public markets, and the authors argue that this was 
achieved “by improving portfolio companies’ long-term prospects and value under their 
period of ownership, by growing profitability, productivity and employment”554.  They found 
that the impact of such operational improvement is “far higher” than the impact of other 
factors.  More recently, Ernst & Young (2016) found that the equity return from 64 private 
equity portfolio company exits between 2005 and 2015 was 4.3x the public company 
benchmark, and half of this was attributed to “PE strategic and operational improvement”555.   
Evidence from US academic studies 
There are numerous academic studies, many of them using data from the US, which have 
sought to measure the performance of private equity-backed companies.  For example, 
Lichtenberg & Siegel (1990) found that the relative productivity of plants increased sharply 
after a buyout; Kaplan (1989) identified "valuable operating improvements" (and evidence 
that these are the result of “improved incentives” rather than, for example, wealth transfers 
from employees)556; Groh & Gottschalg (2008) found significant outperformance compared 
to public market investments with an equal risk profile, and Andrade & Kaplan (1998) found 
that the net effect of US highly leveraged transactions in the late 1980s was to create value, 
with low net costs of financial distress for those firms that defaulted.  An extensive 
international study by Graf et al. (2012), using data drawn from a long period, found that 
operational improvements were the main source of value creation in financial institution 
                                               
554 Ernst & Young (2012) at page 5. 
555 Ernst & Young (2016) at page 16, and see also page 44; the other half was the result of 
additional financial leverage.  This report also tells a positive story about the impact of 
private equity on employment, growth and productivity.  
556 There are also studies that suggest that these effects persist, at least for a few years, 
after a “reverse buyout”; see, for example, Bruton et al. (2002). 
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deals, and a recent large-scale study by Davis et al. (2014) confirms that there are 
significant productivity improvements among US buyouts.  Taken together, these studies 
would tend to suggest that private equity-backed companies are taking different corporate 
actions to their peers, on average leading to better financial outcomes. 
To be sure, the academic evidence (especially more recent evidence) is not all consistent 
with these claims of significantly superior performance.  For example, a study of 94 US take 
private transactions between 1990 and 2005 by Guo et al. (2011), although confirming that 
the deals generated large positive returns to invested capital, found gains in operating 
performance that were much less notable than had been evident from Kaplan (1989)557.  
Furthermore, in a comparison of 144 private equity-backed US companies that subsequently 
underwent an IPO between 1996 and 2005, Leslie & Oyer (2008) did not find evidence of 
superior operating efficiency in the private equity-backed firms when compared to public 
firms, even though the private equity-backed firms had managerial incentives that were more 
strongly related to performance, including a lower fixed salary, more variable pay and 
approximately twice as much equity.  In their sample, Leslie & Oyer (2008) found higher 
sales per employee under private equity ownership, but the other measures of operational 
efficiency they use, including Return on Assets and EBITDA / Total Assets, show no 
significant difference.  It is possible, of course, that their sample is not representative of 
private equity-backed companies as a whole because it only includes those that were exited 
by an IPO (and, as they point out, this is the exit route for a relatively small proportion of 
private equity investments558).  However, the authors found similar results in a separate, 
smaller sample of 89 firms that were taken private in a private equity buy-out, and a more 
recent study of 317 previously public firms acquired in LBOs between 1995 and 2007 by 
Cohn et al. (2014) also found “little evidence that LBOs in the 1990s and 2000s result in 
improvements in operating performance, on average”559. 
                                               
557 Guo et al. (2011) described the gains (at page 514) as “either comparable to or slightly 
higher than those observed for benchmark firms matched on industry and pre-buyout 
characteristics”.  The study did find that changes in operating performance accounted for 
around 20% of returns to pre-buyout capital, suggesting that the change in ownership did 
have some impact on corporate actions.   
558 Leslie & Oyer (2008) refer to a figure of 13%, which is taken from Strömberg (2008). 
559 See Cohn et al. (2014) at page 470. 
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Overall, however, the weight of evidence in the US does point to outperformance by the 
sector as a whole (rather than for public to private deals looked at in isolation), and an 
interesting recent study by Bernstein & Sheen (2013) of the restaurant industry in Florida 
seeks to shed more light on how the observed performance improvements are achieved in 
practice.  This study demonstrates a causal link between private equity ownership and a 
reduction in health violations, which they argue is due to improved operational practices.  
Management practices were also the focus of a worldwide study by Bloom et al. (2015), 
which used survey data from over 10,000 manufacturing plants in 34 countries, and found 
that private equity-owned firms had better practices across a wide range of metrics than 
most other ownership models, with the exception of firms with dispersed shareholders560.   
European academic evidence 
In Europe, the available evidence appears to tell a similarly positive story.  Analysis 
conducted by Acharya et al. (2013) considered 395 deals closed between 1991 and 2007 in 
Western Europe and found that 34% of the returns generated during the period of private 
equity ownership came from “abnormal performance”, which is defined by the authors as 
“enterprise-level outperformance of the deal relative to its quoted peers, after removing the 
effects of financial leverage”.  Kaserer (2011), looking at a sample of 332 fully exited mid-
market transactions undertaken by 18 European private equity firms between 1990 and 
2011, found that between two-thirds and three-quarters of the returns achieved were due to 
earnings enhancement during the period of private equity ownership, with the largest 
contribution coming from sales growth561.   
In the UK, several studies have found similar results, including those by Wright et al. (1992), 
Wright et al. (1995), Wright et al. (1996), Amess (2002) and Amess (2003)562.  An article 
authored by Harris et al. (2005) looked at a large number of deals before and after a buyout 
                                               
560 The authors concede that they cannot make any causal claims because their dataset is 
largely cross-sectional, and their results may understate the benefits of private equity 
ownership if private equity firms tend to target firms that are underperforming at the time of 
investment. 
561 See also Achleitner et al. (2010), who found that EBITDA growth was a significant 
contributor to buyout performance in their sample of 206 European buyout transactions 
completed between 1991 and 2005.  
562 Although for criticism of the methodology used in Amess (2002) and Amess (2003), see 
Cumming et al. (2007) at pages 446-447. 
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and found significant “post-buyout productivity gains” in 14 out of 18 industry sectors, and 
research using a sample of 122 UK buyouts and matched companies by Cressy et al. (2007) 
found support for the hypothesis that a buyout leads to improved operating profitability over 
a three-year period.  This latter study also demonstrated that outperformance is greater 
among private equity firms with an industry specialisation, and is consistent with the findings 
of Alperovych et al. (2013), who found both that there are efficiency improvements in UK 
buyouts and that these are positively related to the amount of experience of the private 
equity firm.  Further contributing to the evidence of business improvement, a comprehensive 
UK study covering the period 1995 to 2010 by Wilson et al. (2012)  compared the 
performance of virtually all companies that had been subject to a buyout with the 
performance of those that had not; they found evidence that, both before and especially 
during the global recession, private equity-backed companies outperformed comparable 
firms.  During the recession they had higher growth, productivity, profitability and better 
working capital management than their peers563.  
Kaplan & Strömberg (2009) have argued that, with the possible exception of public to private 
transactions, the evidence is “largely consistent with the existence of operating and 
productivity improvements after leveraged buyouts”564.  That assertion remains true today, 
although it is important to note that many of the studies have relatively short time-frames; it 
is not clear whether observed improvements are sustained over the medium term, and 
whether they survive a change of ownership565.   
Nevertheless, the evidence does provide strong support for the view that the way in which 
these companies are operated while under private equity ownership is different in some way, 
and that those differences are having a largely positive impact on their financial performance 
while they are owned by a private equity firm566.  This outperformance demands an 
                                               
563 See also Wilson & Wright (2013) for similarly positive conclusions in a study written for 
the UK industry association. 
564 Kaplan & Strömberg (2009) at page 133.  See also Wright et al. (2009) at page 369, who 
conclude: “There is clear evidence from our review of improvements in accounting profits 
and efficiency going back over two decades.” 
565 See, for example, a study of the post-exit performance of 1,215 UK buyouts by Jelic & 
Wright (2011).   
566 It is less clear whether all stakeholders, including employees, benefit from these 
efficiency improvements.  That question has been extensively studied with no clear 
conclusion – for a review see, for example, Bacon et al. (2012) and Gilligan & Wright (2014), 
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explanation and, in the next section of this Chapter, we examine existing academic attempts 
to explain it.   
10.2 Explanations for outperformance and their empirical basis 
10.2.1 The Jensen hypothesis 
In a seminal article entitled Eclipse of the Public Corporation, Jensen (1989) noted the 
theoretical attractions of private equity’s ownership model, arguing that the parties may be 
more willing and able to conclude contracts that are welfare-maximising inter se, and 
thereby resolve some of the potential conflicts between the contracting stakeholders 
(essentially managers, shareholders and lenders).  Jensen argued that the private equity 
model would ultimately come to dominate in certain industries; he hypothesised that the use 
of debt, limiting free cash flows available to managers with a demanding and contractually 
binding interest payment schedule, combines with aligned compensation mechanisms and 
more active monitoring to facilitate a reduction in managerial agency costs and, therefore, 
more efficient outcomes567.  
The optimism about private equity expressed by Michael Jensen and others is not founded 
on the view that there are no agency costs in private equity-backed companies per se; 
indeed, as we have already seen, the structure of a private equity-backed company involves 
both delegation to managers and a dominant shareholder.  Rather, the idea is that the 
private equity model is better able to minimise those agency costs through structures and 
                                                                                                                                     
especially at pages 76-77, 118, 181-184 and 193-195.  Some academics have argued that 
improvements for shareholders could be at the expense of employees: see, for example, 
Shleifer & Summers (1988) and Clark (2013) who suggests (at page 146) that, in theory, 
large private equity buy-outs may promote “lower levels of employee entitlement as one 
source of immediate improvement in financial returns".  See also Watt (2008), who 
concludes that, in part, private equity’s outperformance can be attributed to transfers from 
other stakeholders and Olsson & Tåg (2016), who argue that reductions in agency costs 
increase offshoring and automation.  However, the empirical support for these propositions 
is limited; see, for example, Tåg (2012) who, following a review of the existing academic 
studies, concludes (at page 287) that buyouts have either “no or weakly negative effects” on 
employment, and “slight positive effects on wages”.  A full review of these somewhat 
inconclusive studies is outside the scope of this thesis. 
567 Rappaport (1990) and Cheffins & Armour (2008) are among the scholars who have 
identified challenges to the private equity model, but there is no argument with the 
proposition that the marked reduction in managerial agency costs could plausibly improve 
outcomes for shareholders, and perhaps other stakeholders.  It is, however, important to 
note that Jensen was making a case for private equity in contradistinction to public 
companies, rather than other types of privately-held companies. 
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more complete contracts568, and that sophisticated solutions can and will be found to the 
problem of incomplete contracting569. 
There is some academic evidence that supports a causal link between private equity’s 
superior performance and the transmission mechanisms proposed by Jensen, but it has not 
yet been clearly established how contractual mechanisms facilitate the more effective 
“monitoring” that is suggested as a contributing factor, nor is the relative significance of 
these mechanisms fully understood. 
10.2.2 The transmission mechanisms driving outperformance  
There have been a number of academic studies that look generally at the governance and 
incentive aspects of private equity ownership, and some find evidence to suggest that these 
are a source of added value.  For example, one early US study of “reverse LBOs” (which 
describes companies that have been the subject of a buyout and that subsequently return to 
the public markets) by Muscarella & Vetsuypens (1990) concluded that the concentrated 
ownership structure of a private equity-backed company enabled owners to improve 
utilisation of assets and re-direct resources to higher value uses570.  Furthermore, in their 
study of UK buyouts, Thompson et al. (1989), Thompson & Wright (1991) and Thompson et 
al. (1992) analysed the monitoring and incentive arrangements introduced by private equity 
firms, and argued that these were indeed consistent with the agency costs analysis 
presented by Jensen (1989) and others, and did not seem to exhibit company- or industry-
specific variations.  These included enhanced management incentives and a series of 
monitoring and oversight tools, including an ability to nominate non-executive directors 
and/or the chairman.  Apparently confirming that conclusion following a review of the 
available empirical evidence, Cumming et al. (2007) argued that “buyouts and private equity 
transactions appear to be associated with incentive and governance mechanisms that 
enhance performance”571, while Kaplan & Strömberg (2009) additionally identified the capital 
                                               
568 See fn 43 above for definition of the term “contract” in this context.  
569 For example, it is hypothesised that, because monitoring the manager is a public good, in 
a company with widely dispersed shareholders, there are incentives to free-ride (see, for 
example, Berle & Means (1932).  When ownership is concentrated, the free-riding problem 
is eliminated, or at least reduced. 
570 One consequence of this re-direction of resources was a reduction in capex spending, 
which was also found by Kaplan (1989),  Smith (1990) and Long & Ravenscraft (1993). 
571 Cumming et al. (2007) at page 451. 
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structure – and, in particular, the use of leverage – as an important governance device572.  
Those views have found recent UK support in a study of 138 take privates from 1998-2004 
by Weir et al. (2015), who present evidence that companies taken private outperform their 
listed equivalents on some metrics573; they attribute this improvement to reductions in 
managerial agency costs – although the study finds no evidence that buyouts backed by 
private equity firms generate superior outperformance to buyouts that have no private equity 
involvement, suggesting that it is not private equity firms themselves that generated value in 
the second wave of UK take privates, but the ownership and capital structure of the private 
company. 
However, in a review of 321 exited UK buyouts undertaken between 1995 and 2004, Wright 
& Nikoskelainen (2007) found no evidence that for all LBOs “the governance mechanisms 
introduced on buyout are the main drivers of LBO returns”, although they did find evidence 
that for larger buyouts the size of management’s equity stake has an impact on returns.  
Nevertheless, the range of governance mechanisms measured in this study was rather 
limited and did not include, for example, variables relating to the size and composition of the 
board.  Wright et al. (1995) did also seek to measure a range of governance variables in 
their analysis of the longevity of buyouts, including requirements for board representation, 
the ability of the investor to nominate the chairman and requirements for monthly 
management data, but could not find any definitive evidence that these had an impact on the 
time for which a private equity owner remained in place.   
It is perhaps helpful to isolate and analyse separately the key transmission mechanisms that 
are identified by Jensen as likely to lead to improved outcomes and to look at academic 
evidence for their existence in turn. 
                                               
572 Thompson & Wright (1991) had pointed out that the earlier UK buyouts had relied less on 
debt than their US counterparts, but it seems likely that, over time, greater availability of debt 
has increased the prevalence of this feature of the model in Europe. 
573 The measure of “financial health” used by the authors, the “Taffler z-score” discussed in 
Agarwal & Taffler (2007), combines four elements: profitability, working capital, financial risk 
and liquidity.  Firms taken private exhibit an overall improvement in their z-score both 
relative to the year before going private and relative to firms remaining listed; that 
improvement is driven by positive changes to working capital and liquidity. 
Page | 213 
 
Leverage / capital structure  
As noted above, an important part of the Jensen hypothesis574, is that restricting free cash 
flows available to management, helps to reduce the agency costs that otherwise arise from 
the separation of ownership and control.  He argues that debt is “a substitute for dividends – 
a mechanism to force managers to disgorge cash rather than spend on empire-building 
projects with low or negative returns, bloated staffs, indulgent perquisites, and organizational 
inefficiencies”.   
In findings that were consistent with that hypothesis, Lehn & Poulsen (1989) identified that 
undistributed free cash flow was a marginally important determinant of whether a firm was 
taken private in the US between 1980 and 1987, and a highly significant factor between 
1984 and 1987, and Opler & Titman (1993) also found evidence that Tobin’s Q575 and the 
extent of free cash flows combined (as well as the costs of financial distress) are predictors 
of LBOs.  However, Kieschnick, Jr (1998) subsequently cast considerable doubt on the 
methodology used by Lehn & Poulsen (1989) and came to different conclusions with the 
same data.  Furthermore, in the UK, a study of 95 take privates that took place between 
1998 and 2000, by Weir et al. (2005), did not find any evidence that these firms had excess 
free cash flows in the period leading up to the buyout, a finding supported by Renneboog et 
al. (2007) following an examination of take privates concluded between 1997 and 2003576.   
Overall, therefore, the extent to which private equity firms deliberately target firms with 
excess free cash flows in order to create value by restricting managers access to them has 
not been established in the academic literature577.   
                                               
574 See also Jensen (1986) for more detailed exposition of the free cash flow hypothesis. 
575 Tobin’s Q is the market value of a company relative to the replacement cost of its assets 
– see Brainard & Tobin (1968).   
576 See also Halpern et al. (1999), who find evidence inconsistent with the free cash flow 
hypothesis in their study of LBOs undertaken during the 1980s.  They argue instead that 
their “heterogeneity hypothesis”, which predicts that the proportion of prior stock ownership 
by management is a significant predictor of post-buyout behaviour, has more explanatory 
power. 
577 As to the determinants of debt levels, a large study of 1,157 buyout targets by Axelson et 
al. (2013) found that the availability and price of debt is the main factor, unlike in public 
companies where the capital structure is largely determined by firm-level characteristics.  A 
European study by De Maeseneire & Brinkhuis (2012), using a collection of 126 deals 
executed between 2000 and 2007, confirmed that leverage levels are determined by debt 
market liquidity.  In this analysis, 71% of the acquisition finance was raised by debt, a figure 
that increased significantly during the period under study.  However, note that in their 
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However, even if excess free cash flow is not a motivating factor in the decision to undertake 
a buyout, that does not rule out the possibility that the post transaction financial structure 
delivers a benefit, whether intended or not, that reduces agency costs through restriction of 
free cash flows and a greater need to focus on controlling costs.  What is clear is that, on 
average, private equity-backed companies employ more debt than their peers578, no doubt in 
large part because the original acquisition is often part-financed by debt that is then passed 
on to the target company (in the UK, usually by a guarantee of the holding company’s 
indebtedness)579.  Moreover, there is some evidence that private equity firms understand the 
effect of reducing free cash flows: as noted above, Cotter & Peck (2001) suggested that 
lower levels of debt were inversely related to more active monitoring by private equity firms, 
suggesting that they were in part substitutes, and in their survey of private equity firms 
Gompers et al. (2016) found that 40% of fund managers said that they consider “the ability 
of debt to force operational improvements” in making decisions about the appropriate capital 
structure580.   
However, despite the long-standing theory and commonly held perceptions among private 
equity practitioners, there is (to date) only weak empirical support for the proposition that the 
agency cost reductions associated with increased debt have a positive effect on value 
creation.  One example is Phan & Hill (1995), who found that debt does play a role in 
shaping “goals, strategy and structure”; however, they argued that increased management 
ownership plays a more significant role.  Similarly Denis (1994), looking at the 
                                                                                                                                     
survey, Gompers et al. (2016) find that two-thirds of managers say that they consider the 
trade-off between the tax benefit of debt and the costs of an increased risk of financial 
distress in determining capital structure.  The reputation of the private equity firm may also 
be significant: De Maeseneire & Brinkhuis (2012) conclude that firms with better reputations 
are able to attract more debt.   
578 See, for example, Axelson et al. (2007), who say (at page 3) that a reasonable estimate 
of the level of debt in public companies is 20-30% of total equity, while that would be a 
reasonable approximation of the level of equity in a private equity sponsored deal.  Axelson 
et al. (2009) offer a hypothesis that could explain this difference: that the requirement to 
raise ex post finance from a debt provider acts as a tool to control private equity fund 
managers who might otherwise have incentives to make poor investments.   
579 Talmor & Vasvari (2011), Chapter 12 (especially page 255 and Exhibit 12.6).  Such 
arrangements would constitute “financial assistance” pursuant to Section 677 of the 
Companies Act 2006, but the Act does not prohibit financial assistance for a private 
company. 
580 Gompers et al. (2016) at page 460.  Note, however, that the same study finds (at page 
471) that private equity investors are more focused on creating value by increasing revenue 
than by cutting costs. 
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recapitalisation of Kroger and the LBO of Safeway, found that a different capital structure 
does drive increased in performance after the recapitalisation, but that Safeway’s LBO 
generates even greater value and this comes from increased monitoring of management by 
the board and increased equity ownership by management581.  On the other hand, Valkama 
et al. (2013) did not find a correlation between leverage and enterprise value returns in their 
study of 321 private equity-backed leveraged buyouts; and there is evidence – presented by 
Cohn et al. (2014) in their analysis of private firm buyouts – that private equity firms actually 
make significant additional equity contributions after a buyout, thereby lifting financing 
constraints582.   
Equity ownership by management and alignment of interests 
It is well established that management tend to have higher levels of equity ownership in 
private equity-backed companies than in publicly-traded companies, and there is empirical 
support for the view that this has positive governance effects, although the evidence remains 
somewhat inconclusive.   
Kaplan (1989), in a sample of 76 companies, found that after a public to private buyout in the 
US, management’s share of the equity increased from a median of 5.88% to 22.63% and, as 
already noted, he associated this increase with improvements in operating performance583.  
Singh (1990) also found significantly increased management and board equity ownership in 
his study, going from 15% before the buyout to 37% after.  Slightly more recent data, 
collected by Kaplan & Strömberg (2009) from 43 buyouts with a median transaction value of 
over $300 million completed between 1996 and 2004, show that the management team gets 
16% of the upside, while in an early draft of the study by Acharya et al. (2013) (on file with 
the author) the authors reported that top management controlled around 15% of the equity, 
with 5.7% in the hands of the CEO.  Gompers et al. (2016) also found comparatively high 
                                               
581  Singh (1990) reported that he had also found evidence consistent with the Jensen 
hypothesis, but there were other plausible explanations for the improved efficiency identified 
in his research. 
582 That would, of course, not be inconsistent with an agency cost-based hypothesis, 
because the shareholders (rather than the managers) are presumably making case-by-case 
decisions about whether to relax a financing constraint in order for a portfolio company to 
exploit a particular growth opportunity, or avoid the consequences of financial distress. 
583 See Chapter 10.1.2 at page 206 above.   
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levels of equity incentives in their more recent survey of fund managers: an average of 17% 
of equity allocated to management and employees, with 8% reserved for the CEO584.  
In general, the relationship between firm performance and ownership structure is 
controversial.  While the agency costs inherent in the separation of ownership and control 
identified by various theorists have been widely accepted585, empirical studies have found it 
hard to isolate a direct link to performance, with some scholars arguing that there are 
compensating benefits of the separation that obscure any negative impacts.  Demsetz 
(1983) argued that the structure of the firm was the “endogenous outcome of a maximizing 
process in which more is at stake than just accommodating to the shirking problem”586, and 
empirically Demsetz & Villalonga (2001) found no statistically significant correlation between 
ownership and firm performance.  Other studies are, however, more nuanced; for example, 
Han & Suk (1998) found that, as management’s equity rises, agency problems are more 
likely to be resolved, but that when their equity ownership is excessive this has a negative 
impact (which they speculate may be because management become entrenched). 
More specifically, however, research focused on private equity has found support for the 
view that improved management incentives contribute to better operating performance.  For 
example, Smith (1990) suggests this as the reason for observed performance improvements 
in her study of 58 US MBOs between 1977 and 1986, Thompson et al. (1992) found that the 
performance of private equity-backed companies in their sample of 31 companies was 
associated with the size of management’s equity stake and, as noted above, Wright & 
Nikoskelainen (2007) suggest that, among larger buyouts, the increased management stake 
accounts for some of the observed performance improvements587.  In addition, the UK 
studies by Weir et al. (2005) and Renneboog et al. (2007) found evidence consistent with 
the view that one of the motivating factors for a take private is the potential to realign 
incentives.  Following an extensive review, Wright et al. (2009) concluded (at page 359) that 
“the most important governance characteristic is the management equity stake”, although 
                                               
584 Gompers et al. (2016) at page 461. 
585 See Chapter 1.1.3 at pages 25-29 above. 
586 Demsetz (1983) at page 377. 
587 This result is also consistent with the findings of Weir et al. (2015), who find that 
companies taken private outperform those remaining listed, even though the involvement of 
private equity does not appear to be a factor in that outperformance. 
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(citing Wright & Nikoskelainen (2007)), also argue that management ownership of a majority 
stake is associated with negative performance588.  However, Leslie & Oyer (2008), despite 
also finding increased management incentives for private equity-backed companies than in 
public companies – about twice as much equity for the highest paid executive – together 
with lower salaries and higher performance-related pay, are not able to trace any link to 
performance in their sample of US companies from 1996 to 2005.  Furthermore, in a recent 
study of secondary buyouts in the UK, Zhou et al. (2014) found evidence of 
underperformance in comparison to industry peers, even though they found that 
management’s equity stake increased above that in the primary buyout. 
In any event, these findings could not explain any outperformance of private equity-backed 
companies in comparison to other privately-held companies, where management is also 
likely to hold a large equity stake; indeed, in a business that has not yet attracted outside 
investors, the management are likely to have a larger equity stake than after the buyout is 
complete.   
Therefore, the relative significance of capital structure and alignment of interest through 
equity ownership in driving private equity value creation remains, to some extent, open to 
debate, even though there is evidence that they are important, especially management 
equity ownership in previously public companies.  In the next Chapter, we examine the third 
transmission mechanism suggested by Jensen: more “active monitoring” of management – 
which suggests a more effective system of governance – and I argue that my research, and 
the expanded theory of private equity governance proposed in this thesis, can help us to 
better understand this potentially important explanatory factor.  
  
                                               
588 Malone (1989), Phan & Hill (1995) and Denis (1994) also find increases in management 
ownership and associate those with improved performance.  Valkama et al. (2013) find that 
the use of a ratchet (where management’s equity stake increases with performance) is 
positively correlated with enterprise-level returns. 
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CHAPTER 11: IS GOVERNANCE THE DOMINANT EXPLANATION? 
 
11.1 Governance structures and their relationship to “active monitoring” 
Industry participants often argue that they transform corporate governance mechanisms and 
assert that these are an important part of the way in which private equity firms achieve 
successful outcomes.  In the research undertaken for this thesis, that view was strongly 
endorsed by interviewees, and the perceived value creation appears to have two distinct but 
related sources: (i) improvements in operational decision-making causing performance 
enhancements and procedures designed to reduce the risk of value destroying events (such 
as regulatory sanctions or company-level reputational damage); and (ii) the ability to achieve 
a higher valuation on ultimate sale purely because buyers will pay a “governance premium”.  
As to the first, the following quotes are typical of the views expressed by many interviewees 
and demonstrate the perceived importance of robust processes and controls to ensure that 
underperforming or over-exuberant managers are not given a free rein: 
…very good governance, driven properly into a business, will identify issues within 
the business earlier than if you don’t have it, and it will also identify underperforming 
managers quite quickly. (I8) 
…one of the fundamental underlying beliefs in our space in the market [small and 
mid-market deals] is that we can bring better governance to an organisation, make it 
more structured and documented and disciplined and with that, drive incremental 
performance improvement. (I13) 
We’re looking for a CEO that’s got great vision, huge ambition, will not take no for an 
answer, will break down walls, and do something dramatic.  That’s what we want 
from a CEO, somebody with that level of ambition.  What you have to do is to apply 
some level of experience from people of my age that have been there ten times 
before and say, ‘This is too ambitious and too risky, and we need to scale you back 
a bit…’ (I15) 
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This is about having a well-run, well-managed company.  It’s what else it does that’s 
its secret sauce.  So I think this just puts in place a solid foundation for the company 
to do well and be successful. (I16) 
That’s our job: to take [a decision-making process] which is pretty informal, 
entrepreneurial and make it more professional, with a broader, deeper talent pool. 
(I29) 
Many interviewees also argued that in many types of business, it was essential to protect 
against regulatory risks, such as breaches of health and safety or anti-corruption rules, and 
that it was part of a private equity investor’s role to put these in place on acquisition of a 
business.  For example: 
Having a good safety record would add value on exit.  I think when you’re looking at 
bribery probably around the edges, yes, but I guess that’s more protecting against a 
downside risk in case of something occurring which then you end up paying large 
funds for or having worse repercussions. (I18) 
As to the second source of value, the ability to sell a well-governed company for a higher 
price, many interviewees agreed that trade buyers in particular were reluctant to buy 
businesses that could not demonstrate established governance processes.  Typical quotes 
included: 
…it’s very clear to me that when you are building an SME business, that at some 
point, it’s potentially going to be sold to a larger corporate entity, maybe even a PLC.  
Then high standards of governance, or the lack of high standards of governance can 
affect value at the point of an exit, and actually can be an inhibitor of an exit… (I10) 
…we believe that a lot of trade buyers don’t buy directly from founders because they 
know that there’s just a lot of stuff that isn’t being done properly. (I1) 
As described in the Introduction, these views are reflected in materials prepared by Invest 
Europe, who claim that the private equity and venture capital industry “has been and 
continues to be instrumental in developing good corporate governance standards in unlisted 
companies”.  The industry association argues that “good governance creates alignment of 
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interests and the environment for the attitudes, mechanisms and behaviours that 
allow…well-informed decision-making to take place”589.   
These claims by industry insiders certainly provide support for Jensen’s view, founded in 
agency cost analysis, that better monitoring of managers by private equity firms contributes 
to improved efficiency, and the mechanisms described in this thesis help us to understand 
how that monitoring is structured.  However, these insider claims also suggest that the 
governance processes contribute more than just superior "monitoring”, and the expanded 
model of private equity governance put forward in this thesis suggests that they also have 
other, parallel objectives: protection of the investor’s separate interests, and the requirement 
to establish a more robust decision-making process for business decisions.  Clearly, these 
could have an impact on company performance and overall economic efficiency.  There is, 
however, little documented empirical evidence to support that view: although there are 
academic and industry studies that have examined the key features of the governance 
mechanisms used in private equity-backed companies590, clear links between governance 
and value creation have been hard to identify591.  There is some quantitative evidence that 
the ability to undertake more effective monitoring has an impact on the decision of a firm to 
go private592, and on post buyout performance improvements593, but empirical studies 
undertaken to date, even those that assess the composition of the board, rarely explore its 
                                               
589 Invest Europe (2015) at page 4.   
590 However, note that many of these studies use US data, and there are a number of 
reasons why conclusions drawn from US data may not generalisable to the UK; for a 
description of several of the key differences between the UK and the US that make such 
generalisations difficult, see Renneboog et al. (2007) at page 592. 
591 Some studies certainly suggest that the active involvement of the private equity house 
enhances efficiency gains: see, for example, Alperovych et al. (2013), who find that 
efficiency improvements are related to the vendor source, with less significant efficiency 
gains being made in firms acquired from another private equity firm than in those acquired 
from larger companies (“divisional buyouts”), or those acquired from founders or family 
owners.  It may be hypothesised that private equity firms have more to contribute by their 
active ownership and governance structures when the acquired firms have not previously 
been under private equity ownership.  See also Acharya et al. (2013) referred to below at fn 
603, and Zhou et al. (2014) who find no evidence of outperformance among secondary 
buyouts. 
592 See, for example, Weir et al. (2005) and Renneboog et al. (2007). 
593 See Wright et al. (2009), who argue (at page 370) that “the active monitoring role of PE 
firms is an important contributory factor to the gains identified, with more experienced PE 
firms more likely to be more successful in generating performance improvements”.  That 
latter assertion is supported by Alperovych et al. (2013), but does not appear to be 
corroborated by the data presented by Weir et al. (2015), whose analysis of the “second 
wave” of take privates in the UK may suggest that the scope to improve governance in listed 
companies has diminished. 
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role and its relationship to shareholder and management power, and nor do they examine 
the impact of enhanced incentives to avoid reputational damage594.   
To date, such academic analysis of board composition as exists, and the instructive case 
studies that describe the role of the board595, are largely concerned with larger US deals.  
One of the earliest academic studies to consider this aspect of the buyout model was by 
Singh (1990), who noted a significant increase in the number of shareholder representatives 
appointed to the post-buyout board, and identified this “more focused” board as one 
mechanism by which buyout firms deliver operational improvements.  When Cotter & Peck 
(2001) looked at board structures in their analysis of 64 US buyouts completed from 1984 to 
1989, they found that private equity firms tended to have greater board representation than 
other outside investors, but “buyout specialists” did not (on average) have more than 50% of 
the board seats even when the buyout firm owned a majority of the shares.  They also found 
that, when private equity firms controlled a majority of the equity, they would finance the 
company with less debt and would have greater board representation on a smaller board; 
the authors argued that this indicated that active monitoring substituted for tighter debt 
terms596.  These findings seem consistent with those of Holthausen & Larcker (1996) who 
found, in their sample of pre-IPO private equity-backed companies, that on average 
approximately one-third of the board were management, one-third were representatives of 
buyout firms and other capital providers, with the balance being outsiders597.  Thompson & 
Wright (1991) concluded, among other things, that the ability to nominate a board 
representative was negatively related to the size of management's equity holding, leading 
                                               
594 For a theoretical review, integrating agency theory and resource dependency 
perspectives, see Braun & Latham (2007).  There is a literature on the use of boards by 
venture capital (early stage) investors, which is instructive although not directly relevant to 
the buyout model – see, for example, Kaplan & Strömberg (2004).  
595 See, for example, Baker & Wruck (1989), who describe the role of the board in the 
buyout of O.M. Scott and Sons Company.  The private equity firm involved says that the 
board’s purpose was to “monitor, advise and evaluate the CEO” (page 181).  See also Baker 
(1992). 
596 See also Gertner & Kaplan (1996), who found (in a preliminary paper) that private equity-
backed companies had smaller boards which met less frequently than comparators, 
although their sample comprised private equity-backed companies that had already returned 
to the public markets, making it plausible that these boards were not typical of private equity-
backed companies that were not publicly traded. 
597 However, these boards were sampled immediately pre-IPO and, although the authors did 
not find much evidence of board changes immediately before the IPO, these boards may not 
be typical for a privately held private equity-backed company with no immediate plans to 
IPO. 
Page | 222 
 
them to speculate that this monitoring device could be a partial substitute for the bonding 
effect of equity ownership598. 
Braun & Latham (2009) argued that the importance of the board as a governance tool has 
been underestimated in previous studies, and in their sample of 65 reverse LBOs in the US 
from 1979 to 2004, they identified that significant board changes did take place after a 
buyout, and that these involved a small (but statistically significant) reduction in board size, 
with an increased number of outsiders and greater monitoring capability (through increased 
representation of bankers and lawyers, rather than business experts).  They suggest that 
their findings “give strong credence to the argument that boards represent an additional 
source of value creation in leveraged buyouts”599.  Furthermore, in their recent survey of 79 
private equity investors, Gompers et al. (2016) reported600 that over 90% of respondents 
indicated that their boards comprised 5-7 members, with roughly three members drawn from 
the private equity firm, one or two board seats allocated to management and one or two to 
outsiders not affiliated with the investor, and they find evidence consistent with industry 
claims that private equity investors are actively involved in monitoring and governing their 
investments.   
Research among European companies is more limited.  One exception is a study by Cornelli 
& Karakas (2008), which analysed the size and composition of the boards of all companies 
de-listed from the public markets in the UK from 1998 to 2003, and compared the data for 
private equity sponsored take-privates with those in which no private equity fund manager 
was involved.  In all public-to-private deals, the board size reduced considerably and, in the 
case of private equity-backed companies, outside directors were replaced with people 
employed by the private equity firm.  It was also clear that the size of the board was related 
to the “anticipated challenges in the investment”601, suggesting that the board is used as a 
device to influence the management of the underlying business, and some firms tended to 
bring in outsiders while others relied more heavily on their own employees to sit on portfolio 
company boards.  These results are interesting and consistent with my own, although they 
                                               
598 It could, of course, also be due to the more limited bargaining power held by an investor 
taking a smaller share of the equity investment required from shareholders as a whole. 
599 Braun & Latham (2009) at page 722. 
600 Gompers et al. (2016) at page 461. 
601 Cornelli & Karakas (2008) at page 66. 
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only relate to public-to-private deals, which may not be typical of all buyouts, and use data 
that are now quite old.  
Similar findings are evident in research by Acharya et al. (2009), which looked at the 
practices of UK private equity boards and compared them with those in public companies; 
they found significant differences between the two types of board (although the authors 
acknowledged that their study did not give “a comprehensive picture” because of variability 
of practice among private equity firms and listed companies).  Private equity boards were 
rated as more effective overall by the authors; although their approach to “governance” and 
succession was less strong than their plc counterparts, they had greater focus on “value 
creation”, strategic planning and performance management.  As regards governance, this 
was defined rather narrowly in the study, and encapsulated risk management, audit, 
compliance and related activities.  Although plc boards scored more highly than private 
equity boards in this area, the gap between them (a score of 4.2 compared to 3.8) was not 
particularly large, and some concerns were expressed in interviews that the plc boards were 
too focused on box ticking and their governance activities generated little value.  Boards in 
private equity were also found to be significantly smaller, with approximately the same 
balance between executive and non-executive members as plc boards.  However, each 
private equity non-executive board member expended significantly more time on their board 
duties – on average, 54 days a year for a private equity NED, compared to just 19 for a 
FTSE company (rising to 25 for a FTSE 100 company)602.  The overall picture that emerges 
from this interesting study is that private equity board members, other than the chairman, 
tend to be more engaged in their board role, and more involved in, and more focused on the 
performance of, the company’s underlying business.  This evidence is consistent with the 
hypothesis presented in this thesis that private equity governance focuses on improved 
decision-making as regards strategic and operational matters. 
A more recent analysis of a large number private equity-backed companies in transition 
European economies by Cornelli et al. (2013) demonstrates that effective monitoring of 
                                               
602 Interestingly, this finding was not replicated in the case of the chairman, where the 
position is reversed: FTSE 350 chairmen devote more days per year to the company than 
their private equity equivalents, and FTSE 100 significantly more (135 days compared to 
70). 
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corporate actions involves gathering “soft information”, non-verifiable and qualitative 
assessments, as well as “hard” data on performance.  This allows board members to 
develop a sophisticated understanding of the abilities of the CEO and enables them to take 
corrective actions when necessary, but means that they are unlikely to fire the CEO where 
they conclude that poor performance is due to bad luck or due to a decision that was wrong 
ex post but reasonable ex ante.  This would suggest that a more engaged board, with more 
informal interactions, ought to be in a position to make better judgements about the 
competence of the management team.   
Other studies lend further support to the notion that better decision-making plays a part in 
outperformance; a notable recent European example is by Acharya et al. (2013), who found 
evidence that the experience of the partner leading the deal for the private equity firm is 
related to portfolio company performance, with different portfolio company strategies 
requiring different skills from the private equity executive603.  These studies are not, 
however, concerned with the governance structures and decision-making processes per se; 
rather, they focus on the value that might be added by a specific individual or firm.  At the 
same time, Weir et al. (2015) would seem to have cast doubt on whether private equity firms 
themselves add value to the buyout, at least in the context of more recent take privates, 
because (as already noted) they found that the outperformance of private equity-backed 
buyouts of listed firms is not significantly different to that of those without private equity 
involvement. 
Existing studies have not, therefore, settled the question of what role contractual governance 
rules play in improving company performance, nor have they identified the precise 
mechanisms through which this is achieved, although the role of the board does seem 
important.  The design of such studies has often relied upon agency cost analysis.  This 
research has re-conceptualised private equity governance, theorising that detailed attention 
to its multiple purposes both enables more effective monitoring and contributes to 
                                               
603 Acharya et al. (2013) conclude (at page 398) that: “Overall, our results can be interpreted 
as providing a microscopic view of the operational expertise employed by large, mature PE 
houses in improving companies they acquire.  Returns to this expertise are likely the reason 
behind persistent and significant outperformance of funds run by these houses.”  See also 
Alperovych et al. (2013), and Bottazzi et al. (2008), who come to similar conclusions with 
regard to venture capitalists.  See further at fn 623 below. 
Page | 225 
 
performance improvements in other ways.  It certainly seems intuitive that, as practitioners 
clearly believe, the role of governance mechanisms in a private equity-backed company, and 
the skill and experience that facilitates their effective execution, contributes to the 
outperformance of the companies concerned.  The hands-on, informed role of the investor 
with far reaching consent rights and a strong focus on its own separate interests, the more 
engaged and operational role of the board, the inclusion of an informed outsider in the 
decision-making process, and the control of management by reference to an annual 
business plan, all seem likely to contribute to  performance.  The theoretical framework 
explaining private equity governance expounded in this thesis will assist future researchers 
who seek to establish causal links between company performance and these governance 
objectives and mechanisms.   
In the next section of this Chapter, we conclude that agency cost theories, appropriately 
expanded, partially explain how governance might improve performance in private equity-
backed companies, but also consider other theories that might have additional explanatory 
power. 
11.2 The limited explanatory power of existing theories  
We have seen that the managerial agency cost theory of corporate governance, which 
currently dominates academic corporate governance discourse (at least among Anglo–
American scholars) and is reflected in the UK’s legal framework, stems from the 
incompleteness of contracting and the consequent need to find alternative mechanisms to 
determine future actions.  These alternative mechanisms carry agency costs.   
In a private equity paradigm, it is possible for contracts to be more complete, and to cater for 
a wide range of future scenarios.  Indeed, we have observed that – as well as the 
straightforward directions to management included in the investment documentation – the 
initial and then annually updated business plan is a mechanism to extend the coverage of 
the contract.  This more extensive contracting constrains the scope of the agency, and 
therefore reduces the scope for agency costs.  It also enables the parties to deal more 
efficiently with a range of other matters: for example, they amend or dis-apply value-
destructive default company law rules, and mitigate or contract around apparently 
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mandatory ones; they design or adopt structures that mitigate legal risk for active 
shareholders, although there are limits to the extent to which it is regarded as efficient to do 
so; the parties align incentives for executive directors through appropriate remuneration and 
incentive structures, which is facilitated by the fact that management tend to have a 
significant shareholding.  These contractual devices could improve efficiency and therefore 
enhance shareholder returns (or, perhaps, merely facilitate investment in the first place604).  
But, even with relatively comprehensive contracts, there clearly are a wide variety of matters 
in relation to which it will be efficient to give discretion to management, as well as a need to 
police the constraints imposed on their authority.  The agency cost problem does, therefore, 
need to be addressed. 
As pointed out in Chapter 1605, “stealing and shirking” is unlikely to be the main problem for a 
private equity investor but, in the wider form that we have adopted, agency cost theory can 
take account of the costs arising because the agent takes decisions that the principal itself 
would not have taken because it has, for example, a different attitude to risk.  We have 
referred to these as “subjective judgement agency costs”, and they are likely to arise when 
an informed investor holds a significant equity interest in a company but nevertheless finds it 
efficient to delegate significant decision-making authority to a separate management team.  
We have seen that private equity governance mechanisms do indeed address all varieties of 
managerial agency costs (and go significantly beyond the mechanisms established by law in 
doing so), in part by adjusting the balance of power between management and the investor. 
However, a need to control managerial agency costs, even in this expanded form, only 
provides a partial explanation for private equity’s sophisticated governance structures, and 
offers an unreliable guide for law-makers606.  There are, of course, many other functions for 
                                               
604 If it were not possible, or economically efficient, to contract around inappropriate rules or 
to manage the legal risk for active investors, private equity investors might not be willing to 
invest in certain jurisdictions or sectors at all, or would demand a higher return to 
compensate for the additional risk.  
605 See Chapter 1.1.3 at pages 25-29 below. 
606 Even though the role of governance mechanisms in controlling agency costs through 
monitoring managers is most often cited as the central purpose of governance mechanisms 
in publicly-held companies, it is in fact self-evident that governance mechanisms, and most 
notably boards of directors, serve a number of purposes.  In fact, recent literature has 
questioned whether emphasis on monitoring, and the reliance of research and reform 
agendas on agency theory more broadly, has been unhelpful.  For example, Mire (2016) 
calls (at page 37) for regulatory change to encourage listed companies to seek expertise, 
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governance systems in all types of companies, and articulations of them are abundant in the 
management literature607 and (to a lesser extent) among lawyers608.  It is therefore not 
surprising that some existing academic frameworks can help us to understand governance 
structures as they manifest themselves in the private equity paradigm and to predict any 
costs or benefits that might arise from them.  The remainder of this Chapter briefly reviews 
some of the frameworks that may explain the other objectives of the expanded theory that 
has been advanced in this thesis, and that act as helpful points of reference for future 
research. 
11.2.1 Facilitating dominant shareholder agency “costs” 
First, managerial agency costs are only one part of the agency cost theory of corporate 
governance and, as described Chapter 1609, dominant shareholders can extract rents at the 
expense of other stakeholders.  Although less frequently addressed in Anglo-American 
discourse because of the relatively less important role played by dominant shareholders 
among listed companies, this form of agency cost has been identified by scholars and is, to 
some extent, addressed by the legal rules examined in Chapter 8610.  As discussed 
above611, the management team is generally the party that negotiates for protection from 
these costs, but the mechanisms adopted are in general related to control over their 
ownership and sale of shares, and the rights attaching to them, and their service contracts 
rather than through governance mechanisms per se. 
                                                                                                                                     
alongside independence, in their non-executive directors.  She provides a catalogue of the 
contributions expected from outside directors: monitor, strategist, resource gatherer, and 
colleague; and argues that “independence is not as useful as had been hoped, not because 
it has no value, but rather because of the one-dimensional model that has been adopted”.  
Ringe (2013) summarises many academic contributions to the debate on independence and 
the role of corporate governance in the financial crisis more generally, while Daily et al. 
(2003) discuss a range of alternative theoretical perspectives on governance, Donaldson & 
Davis (1991) and Davis et al. (1997), among others, discuss “stewardship theory”, assuming 
collectivist rather than self-interested behaviours in the boardroom, while Roberts et al. 
(2005) criticise the agency paradigm in their analysis of the effectiveness of non-executive 
directors. 
607 In their survey Adams et al. (2010) say (at page 96) that “there are new papers appearing 
nearly every day, outstripping our capacity to write about them!”.  
608 For example, Bainbridge & Henderson (2014) categorise the three main roles of boards 
as “management, oversight and service”; in doing so, they are drawing on Johnson et al. 
(1996), who themselves used the terms (at page 411) “control, service, and resource 
dependence”.  See also Dallas (1996). 
609 See page 29 above. 
610 See, in particular, pages 181-186 above.  In relation to solvent companies, the legal rules 
are designed to protect minority investors from abuses of power. 
611 See Chapter 4.3.3 at pages 108-109 above. 
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However, in the private equity paradigm, there is a sense in which this dominant shareholder 
agency “cost” is actually facilitative of the investment: it is essential that an investor (even if 
– perhaps especially if – it is a minority shareholder) is able to protect its own separate 
interests, and we saw in Chapter 5.2 how private equity-backed companies accommodate 
that requirement, including by instructing managers to operate the company in certain ways, 
and demanding residual decision-rights over certain key matters.  As private equity firms 
become increasingly regulated (by statutory and de facto regulators612, and by agreement 
with their own investors), and increasingly aware of the value of their own reputation and 
legal liability, this aspect of the contractual bargain becomes more important: the need to 
increase investment in systems to prevent spill over reputational damage, legal liability or 
regulatory breaches will only increase.  In many cases, the requirements that these outside 
interests suggest are aligned with those of the company itself, or at least can be credibly 
positioned as such613.  But, whether or not fully aligned, the investor will want to ensure that 
its interests are protected, usually by constraining management discretion in some way.   
Agency cost analysis helps us to understand this objective, but because these shareholder 
requirements are only a “cost” (if at all) when looked upon from the point of view of the 
company as a standalone entity, it may be misleading to view them as welfare-reducing, 
especially if other shareholders also benefit from them or, at least, voluntarily agree to them 
through a fully informed contracting process.  When viewed in terms of overall efficiency for 
the parties involved, rather than as a question to be determined by the impact on the 
company as a standalone entity, these mechanisms can create benefits614.   
                                               
612 De facto regulators would include industry associations and other bodies (for example, 
the UN Principles for Responsible Investment) publishing “voluntary” guidelines and codes 
of conduct.  
613 For example, interviewees often asserted that it made good economic sense for an 
underlying portfolio company to protect its own reputation, just as it made sense for the 
investor to do so.  That might imply, for example, that the company should not engage in 
aggressive tax avoidance.  However, if a company has no domestic customers, no need to 
attract skilled labour and operates in a low-profile and unregulated sector, its corporate 
reputation might be a matter of indifference to it.  The reputation of the investor, on the other 
hand, is likely to be more valuable. 
614 It is true that the concept of limited liability might give rise to issues for creditors, whose 
only claims are against the entity whose value may be diminished and not the entity whose 
value is enhanced, but – to the extent that this issue cannot be addressed by contract – it 
ought to be (and, to some extent, is) addressed by insolvency law. 
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As already discussed615, it can also be speculated that there could be societal benefits in 
these governance mechanisms, to the extent that the economic incentives of the investor 
are aligned with those of society more broadly.  On the other hand, if the incentives of the 
investor do not correspond with those of society more broadly, the overall welfare effect is 
likely to be negative.  Policy-makers who are cognisant of this potential may be better placed 
to design regulatory interventions and this is therefore an area where further research could 
be particularly helpful616.  
Perhaps in one area in particular there may be a concern that decision-making benefits the 
investor at the expense of the underlying company (and its other stakeholders): where 
internal preferences are driving decision-making.  As discussed above617, internal 
preferences arise when the desire of the private equity firm to generate a liquidity event 
within a given time frame lead to decisions being taken that are not in the long-term interests 
of the company, or, more likely, investment decisions being deferred that a longer-term 
investor would prefer to make now.  The corresponding welfare benefits for the private 
equity fund and its manager (and, presumably, the fund’s ultimate investors) might outweigh 
the welfare loss to the company, but there is at least the risk that short- or medium-term 
decision-making has value-destructive consequences.  This aspect of the private equity 
model might concern policy-makers.  However, there is no evidence that private equity firms 
actually engage in short-term behaviours; indeed, there is evidence to the contrary618.  
Theoretically, there is also no particular reason for them to do so if, as will often be the case, 
buyers of private equity-backed businesses are (or might be) sophisticated acquirers with an 
ability to undertake extensive due diligence and to value long-term investments.  There may 
also be welfare benefits in having a deadline for the implementation of important strategic 
                                               
615 See above in Chapter 2.1.6 at pages 44-47 and in Chapter 5.2.4 at pages 129-133. 
616 Any such regulatory interventions would need to be very carefully designed, informed by 
further research.  It is unlikely to be advisable, for example, simply to breach the principle of 
limited liability by imposing strict liability on the private equity fund for transgressions at 
portfolio company level.  Any such move could undermine the private equity investment 
model, which relies upon diversification of risk, and might make it impossible for such 
diversified funds to invest in certain high risk businesses that might frustrate, rather than 
advance, the policy objective. 
617 See Chapter 5.2.1 at pages 123-124 above. 
618 See discussion in Roe (2013) (at pages 988-989), who argues that data supports the 
view that private equity acts as a longer-term alternative to public markets, and see, for 
example, Lerner et al. (2011). 
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changes, which could actually accelerate decisions that are value-enhancing in the long-
term, especially during the early years of a private equity investment.  It is very far from 
established that policy-makers have any reason to fear short-termism among private equity 
firms, even if they have reason to fear it elsewhere619.  
11.2.2 Access to resources and relational functions 
Resource dependence theory and its subsequent development  
It has been observed throughout this thesis that, in part, private equity governance 
mechanisms are designed to hard-wire a system in the company to facilitate better decision-
making.  But that begs a question: how, and in what ways, do those systems facilitate 
"better" decisions?  
In seeking an answer to that question, there is another literature that is potentially 
instructive, and which may have significant explanatory power as regards this objective of 
the governance mechanisms in private equity-backed companies.  Resource dependence 
theory (RDT), as expounded by Pfeffer & Salancik (1978), argues that organisations are 
dependent on various external constituencies and that they employ various tools to manage 
those constraints.  Originally conceived as a way to explain mergers, joint ventures and 
board “interlocks” (cross directorships), RDT suggests that companies co-opt outsiders as 
"another form of interfirm linkage”620 to manage outside dependencies.   
Such a theory would hardly be a satisfactory explanation for the structures we most often 
observe in practice.  However, other scholars, some building on RDT, have looked upon 
boards of directors as offering additional resources to a firm more generally, and not just to 
bridge external dependencies.  Zahra & Pearce (1989) report (at page 298) that resource 
theorists give directors a role “in the strategic arena through counsel and advice to the CEO, 
by initiating their own analyses, or by suggesting alternatives".  Indeed, it is now widely 
accepted that boards of listed companies should do more than merely monitor the board: the 
UK Corporate Governance Code, for example, says that “non-executive directors should 
                                               
619 In that regard, see Roe (2013), who argues that short-termism is much less of a problem 
in (US) public markets than is commonly supposed. 
620 Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) at page 165. 
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constructively challenge and help develop proposals on strategy”621.  In this context, 
management scholars have identified the importance of "board capital"622, a combination of 
experience and expertise (perhaps filling gaps in the expertise of the senior management 
team623) and “relational capital”, which provides links to external organisations or 
stakeholders (and is perhaps more closely related to Pfeffer and Salancik’s RDT).  In this 
context, governance processes might seek to establish “legitimacy” (as described by Roe624) 
and help the company to resist (value diminishing) pressure from wider stakeholders or 
outsiders (such as regulators or law-makers)625.   
Although resource-based views of the board focus on a different aspect of a board's role to 
those of particular concern to an agency theorist, for whom the monitoring function is central, 
attempts to integrate the theories have identified synergies between them.  Hillman & Dalziel 
(2003) have argued that board capital is related to both provision of resource and 
monitoring, and that an approach to board composition that emphasises experience, 
expertise and external relationships is also likely to facilitate more effective monitoring.  
Similarly, they argue that board incentives to monitor (frequently stressed by agency 
theorists) also incentivise the contribution of valuable resources.  However, there may be 
contradictory incentives among “dependent boards” (those predominately comprising current 
or past employees, relations of the management team, and other "insiders"); while agency 
                                               
621 Financial Reporting Council (2016), Principle A4, page 9, emphasis added.  In interviews 
with 45 experienced US public company directors conducted by Lorsch (2012), there was 
clear agreement that management should set strategy, with the board overseeing it.  
However, some academics argue that strategy should be regarded as a “partnership in 
which both the board and management actively participate” – see Palepu (2012) at page 42.  
See also Mire (2016) and the discussion on the relative merits of independence and 
expertise at fn 606 above. 
622 Hillman & Dalziel (2003) at page 383. 
623 As regards the contribution of expertise, Wright et al. (2009) are among those who have 
argued (at page 356) that private equity firms “may provide complementary resources and 
capabilities”, while Meuleman et al. (2009) conclude (at page 233) that private equity firms 
contribute to the performance of portfolio companies through “resources and capabilities that 
buyout specialists bring in terms of monitoring and advice provision”.  See also De Clercq & 
Dimov (2008) for a comprehensive analysis of the knowledge-based view of firms in the 
venture capital context, and research by Alperovych et al. (2013) and Acharya et al. (2013), 
referred to at fn 603 above, demonstrating that the success of private equity investments is 
positively related to the prior experience of the private equity investor and, more specifically, 
the specific knowledge of the individual deal partner responsible for the investment. 
624 See Roe (2008) at pages 375-376. 
625 See also Dallas (1996) who advances the relational theory of boards and points out (at 
page 14) that “the board of directors provides a valuable, and often unique means for the 
corporation to acquire a number of relational resources, including coordination, information, 
support, status, legitimacy, advice, monitoring, and direction”. 
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theorists would expect them to have weaker incentives to monitor management, drawing on 
research by Westphal (1999) – who found evidence that social ties between board members 
of the CEO facilitate the provision of advice and counsel – Hillman & Dalziel (2003) argue 
that such boards might be more likely to contribute valuable resources.   
The empirical evidence is mixed as regards resource dependence theory626, but very limited 
work has been done to explicitly test it among private equity-backed companies.  One 
exception is the work of Braun and Latham627, who applied the resource dependence lens 
(as well as agency theory) to their sample of 65 reverse LBOs (private equity-backed 
companies that subsequently return to the public markets), finding support for the view that 
boards are significantly restructured after a buy-out to improve their ability to link with 
external stakeholders and provide additional expertise to the management.  On the other 
hand, Singh (1990) found that boards are smaller after a buyout and include fewer 
“prominent public figures”628, which would not support the view that the boards of private 
equity-backed companies actively seek outsiders of the type that resource dependence 
theory might predict.   
A theory of private equity governance that focuses on providing access to additional 
resource, as well as protecting interests and overseeing the managers, is therefore one that 
fits well with the structures which I have observed, and which may partially explain 
outperformance.  As repeat players with the right incentives, private equity firms are  
equipped to establish a well-resourced, bespoke decision-making process that can generate 
operational improvements as well as providing links to outsiders that benefit the firm.  The 
board composition and processes described in the empirical findings presented in this 
thesis, and the balance of power between the stakeholders, tend to support that view.   
                                               
626 For a review of the evidence, see Drees & Heugens (2013).  Various studies of public 
company boards shed light on the “advisory” as well as the monitoring function of the board: 
see, for example, Adams et al. (2010) for an extensive survey of existing research.  
627 See Braun & Latham (2007) for a theoretical discussion and Braun & Latham (2009) for 
empirical analysis. 
628 Singh (1990) at page 122. 
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Team production theory  
Building on the work of, among others, Alchian & Demsetz (1972), Bengt Holmstrom (1982) 
and Rajan & Zingales (1998), the team production model of governance proposed by Blair & 
Stout (1999) suggests that – in a public corporation – a board of directors actually increases 
agency costs, because it dilutes shareholder power, but plays a vital role as a “mediating 
hierarchy”.  This role is important because horizontal cooperation between team members is 
vital to an effective business and, by submitting to a central authority, all team members 
benefit from the board’s role in limiting shirking and deterring rent-seeking behaviour.  In 
turn, that encourages firm-specific investments629. 
To some extent, this theory has echoes of resource dependence theory, but it focuses on 
the internal role of the board in providing a legitimate mediator for stakeholder disputes, and 
although confined by its architects to widely-held public companies, it may be instructive 
outside that realm.  Bainbridge (2003) is among those who have argued that, even for the 
companies to which it is intended to apply, the board is an instrument of the shareholders, 
and the board will only consider the interests of others to the extent that doing so increases 
shareholder wealth.  There seems to be no doubt that that is true in a private equity-backed 
company, but if the company has important internal stakeholders, it might be very helpful to 
establish a body that has at least ostensible power to take a more enlightened view of 
shareholder interests, and perhaps a more informed view of the interests of other 
stakeholders, so that it can mediate disputes in a way that may well prioritise non-
shareholder constituencies in the short-term, in order to further shareholder interests in the 
longer-term.  The role of the private equity board in resolving disputes in a more enlightened 
and inclusive way than the managers (who are, of course, generally also shareholders) 
would merit further research.  Of course, such research would not substantiate team 
production theory per se, which purports to explain governance in a different type of 
company, and suggests a more central role for broader stakeholders, but it could provide a 
                                               
629 Blair & Stout (1999), especially pages 271-274.  The authors explicitly limit their analysis 
to public corporations at page 281, arguing that initially a business has less to gain from the 
mediating hierarchy model, but at some point that changes: for example, when he needs to 
raise capital or hire professional managers, a rational entrepreneur may opt-in to it.  For 
criticism of the theory see, for example, Bainbridge (2003), and for a discussion of the 
theory’s applicability to various types of company see Coates (1998). 
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helpful framework in analysing why private equity governance structures seem to deliver 
superior financial results. 
Thinking, fast and slow 
However, as well as the contribution of resources made by the individuals who sit on the 
board (or who speak for the private equity firm qua shareholder) and (perhaps) the board’s 
role as a mediating authority, the decision-making process itself also seems important: as 
described above630, some interviewees argued that restraining management from making 
decisions too quickly and without a solid evidence-base or clear understanding of the risks 
was an important part of “professionalising” governance.  Clearly, this aspect of the 
governance system is most likely to be important to firms investing in smaller, growing 
businesses, where the founders of the business need to be controlled, rather than those 
investing in large businesses that already have sophisticated decision and control systems.   
Perhaps one way to think about the corporate governance system is as a way to make the 
organisation think more slowly (to avoid the errors of “thinking fast”, as described by Daniel 
Kahneman631).  It is true that every (successful) large organisation is likely to have such a 
mechanism, but private equity investors require these systems to be established and 
entrenched in the organisations in which they invest as a condition of investment.  Without 
these systems, and the wherewithal to ensure that they are being operated correctly, the 
investment would be too risky and less likely to achieve its financial objectives.  Private 
equity firms often occupy the territory between listed public companies, which talented 
energetic entrepreneurs may find a difficult cultural fit, and owner-managed businesses, 
where uncontrolled founders may take decisions too quickly and without appropriate checks 
and balances.  For many private equity investors, a key skill is to create an environment in 
which decisions are subject to additional scrutiny and control, whilst creating or perpetuating 
a culture in which entrepreneurs remain engaged and energetic632.   
                                               
630 See, for example, comment of I15 quoted in Chapter 11.1 at page 218 above. 
631 Kahneman (2011), especially at page 418 where Kahneman describes an organisation 
as “a factory that manufactures judgements and decisions” and argues that systems are one 
way to improve the quality of those judgements and decisions. 
632 On the other hand, some academics who have looked for alternative explanations for 
private equity’s apparent success have focused on “entrepreneurial perspectives”.  For 
example, Wright et al. (2001) argue (at page 115) that the removal of “bureaucratic control 
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In addition, resulting decisions, as well as being objectively "better", may also be regarded 
as more legitimate by the insiders.  A respected internal process might act as a binding 
dispute resolution mechanism, helping to ensure that decisions taken are endorsed by those 
charged with implementing them. 
There is a vast economics and finance literature on the role of boards, board effectiveness 
and decision-making dynamics and structures, which is outside the scope of this thesis.  
However, it is sufficient to conclude that further work connecting the governance structures 
observed in private equity – and, no doubt, more widely in large and small companies – to 
the insights provided by this literature would be a very interesting and profitable exercise.  If 
we limit our academic analysis, and legal and regulatory intervention, to agency cost 
analysis and protection of wider stakeholders, we are likely missing an important trick that 
has the potential to enhance welfare for the benefit of shareholders and other stakeholders.  
In a private equity-backed company, with a relatively free hand to design a corporate 
governance system and to ignore or contract-around inconvenient constructs of corporate 
law, the parties can identify a role for the board that best suits the needs of the company and 
its main stakeholders at the relevant time and given the external environment that it faces.  
Protecting the shareholder from managerial agency costs is a part of the purpose of this 
structure, as is protecting the separate interests of the private equity investor.  However, 
establishing internal and external relational roles, assisting the management to reach 
optimal decisions and providing missing resources are all, no doubt, also front of mind for 
the protagonists when they establish the mechanisms to regulate decision-making in the 
firm. 
In this final Chapter, I have argued that it is plausible that governance mechanisms in private 
equity-backed companies are contributing to welfare gains – for the stakeholders involved in 
negotiating those mechanisms, but perhaps also for stakeholders more widely if private 
                                                                                                                                     
and other growth impediments of prior ownership arrangements” enables managers to use 
their own skills more effectively to transform businesses; and see also Green (1992) who 
finds greater managerial motivation arising from a reduction in “inappropriate corporate 
control”.  Such views are consistent with studies such as that by Wright et al. (1992), which 
show more new product development and asset acquisitions after a buyout.  No doubt, in 
some circumstances, it is important to design a decision-making structure that makes faster 
decisions, and gives more autonomy to the managers.  That will depend on the company- 
and manager-specific characteristics. 
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equity fund-level regulation and reputational capital is considered633.  However, there is not 
yet definitive empirical evidence which demonstrates that.  I have proposed and tested, 
within a unique research sample, an expanded theory of private equity corporate 
governance which offers a more holistic view of the ways in which the governance 
mechanisms affect decision-making, and with what specific objectives.  This expanded 
theory could help to establish whether and how private equity’s “governance engineering”634 
affects outcomes, and I have suggested some other academic perspectives that we could 
draw upon in seeking to test the contribution of governance to successful financial results.   
In the conclusion that follows, I seek to draw out some important implications for policy-
makers, as well as identify some significant areas for further research. 
  
                                               
633 As Bratton & Wachter (2013) point out, arguments for shareholder primacy can be 
justified on grounds of economic efficiency, but claims that there are beneficial effects on 
social welfare are “dubious”.   
634 See Kaplan & Strömberg (2009) at pages 130-133. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
“With the benefit of hindsight, that was a pretty important decision – and it could have gone 
badly”, Jane Smith told me, recalling the decision to move Topbox’s office, as described in 
the Introduction to this thesis.  But getting the right outcome was not left to chance: having 
evaluated the private contracts and day-to-day practice that establishes the structures and 
the context in which decisions are taken, it is quite clear that corporate governance is 
critically important for the private equity investors in the research sample assembled for this 
thesis, and a considerable investment is made in getting it right.  I have demonstrated that, 
as contractarian scholars would predict, efficient contracting, made possible by the 
ownership and incentive structure, allows these investors, as a pre-condition of their 
investment, to bargain for a particular decision-making process and balance of power.  The 
process and power dynamic varies according to the needs of the particular company 
concerned (in practice, if not on paper) and will evolve as the company’s needs change.  
The ongoing involvement of the investor ensures that the procedure is applied in practice, 
and applied appropriately rather than rigidly.  In designing this system, I have demonstrated 
that the stakeholders have multiple objectives in mind and, although the language of agency 
costs helps us to understand some of those objectives, it is an incomplete explanation.  I 
have therefore proposed and validated a novel and expanded theory of private equity 
governance. 
It is certainly true that control of managerial agency costs is an important objective, 
necessitated by the autonomy given to management shareholders over various decisions, 
even though managerial discretion is first reduced by more complete contracting.  However, 
it is not managerial agency costs in their most basic form (effort aversion or self-dealing) that 
are the sole concern of private equity investors: they are also concerned to ensure that 
honest but subjective judgements about important business decisions accord with the 
judgements that they would make.  That is important because private equity investors often 
have particular expertise, and in some areas their expertise may be superior to that of the 
managers.  In such cases, they want to be able to control (or at least heavily influence) the 
decision. 
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However, there are at least two other objectives in the corporate governance systems that I 
have described.  First, private equity investors insist that companies marshal all available 
resources to make the best business decisions in the circumstances in which the company 
finds itself.  To that end, the board has considerable decision-making power, is relatively 
small, comprises people who all understand the business intimately, meets regularly, and in 
many cases includes an outside non-executive who is not directly employed by the private 
equity house.  Often the chairman, this outsider is specifically recruited to complement the 
expertise of the other board members and to add resources to the decision-making team 
that would otherwise be lacking.  The board is not characterised as an instrument for 
"monitoring" management or overseeing decisions, but as a body that is well-qualified to 
take – and does take – the important operational and strategic decisions facing the 
company; the objective is to improve the quality of the decision taken.  Such a process also 
has the advantage of legitimising the decision, probably improving its chances of being 
properly implemented.   
So, while it is obvious that good decision-making, facilitated by a well-designed process that 
is staffed by well-informed and competent people, is an essential component of any 
successful organisation, corporate governance processes in a private equity-backed 
company are defined and judged largely according to their fitness for that particular purpose.  
Listed companies and their investors might take note of this aspect of the private equity 
model, and it may be instructive to those interested in the ongoing debate about whether 
independence requirements for directors make it harder to recruit directors with helpful 
expertise. 
A further objective of the corporate governance system in these companies is to protect the 
separate interests of the investor.  In this thesis, I have demonstrated that it is essential that 
investors are able to protect their own interests if they are to make significant, under-
diversified investments in illiquid private companies.  Not only will they have undertaken 
obligations to their own investors that they have to be able to keep (for example, to only 
invest in a sector or geography in which they have expertise), but they will also be 
associated with the actions of the underlying company and must be able to safeguard their 
own reputation and protect themselves from regulatory sanction and legal liability (which can 
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accrue to a significant shareholder notwithstanding that they invest into a limited liability 
vehicle).  A private equity investor will also need to plan for a liquidity event, and will need to 
be in a position to ensure that a sale or listing of the company's shares is achievable within a 
given timeframe and at the best possible price.  It is important to note that these contractual 
protections are motivated by concerns other than value maximisation for the underlying 
company, even if they might be consistent with that parallel objective. 
Far from worrying about this, policy-makers should facilitate it.  If companies do not fully 
internalise the costs of their activities to society, it will be easier for society to regulate and to 
influence their significant (generally regulated) shareholders than those underlying 
companies themselves.  Put simply: private equity managers have more to lose, and greater 
incentives to conform.  In my analysis, for example, I have described how corporate 
governance processes required by an increasing number of private equity investors insist 
upon detailed policies designed to prevent offences under the Bribery Act, and some require 
reporting on a range of environmental and social metrics.  No doubt, to some extent, these 
measures are designed to protect (or even create) value in the underlying company; but we 
might expect a level of "over-investment" (evaluated by reference to the economic self-
interest of the company as a stand-alone entity) in such procedures because of the 
additional liability or reputational risks to which the investor itself is exposed.  On the other 
hand, policy-makers might worry that the investor's need to work towards a liquidity event 
could incentivise short-term behaviour, but the disciplines of the market in setting the price 
for the shares when they are sold (mostly to highly sophisticated buyers) might be expected 
to punish under-investment and short-termism if that has been evident.   
It is true that this governance objective may give rise to costs for other shareholders (who 
are usually managers) but the law does not need to offer them protection, provided that they 
freely agree at the time of investment that these are legitimate functions of the governance 
structures.  And, to the extent that there are negative externalities associated with the 
protection of a shareholder's separate interest in its company, these would be more 
appropriately regulated through specific criminal or civil law rules (such as the Bribery Act), 
rather than through interference with governance (which could, in any event, generally be 
avoided by innovative contracting, or incorporating abroad).  Indeed, such block-holding 
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shareholders, with specific but medium-term time horizons and their own reputations and 
regulatory obligations to consider, might also be of interest to those looking for ways to 
improve the operation of public equity markets.   
So what should the law provide?  I have argued that because managerial (and, to some 
extent, controlling shareholder) agency costs analysis has driven development of the UK’s 
legal framework, we are faced with sub-optimal rules (when applied to private equity-backed 
companies), many of which are (superficially) mandatory.  There is considerable support in 
this thesis for my claim, predicted by contractarian theory, that private equity investors and 
other shareholders do not rely on background legal rules for protection, but bargain for such 
protections contractually, while a number of problematic mandatory rules must be contracted 
around, neutralised or ignored.  Although most of these rules are, in fact, avoidable, and in 
any event hard to enforce, their existence creates some inefficiency and leaves residual, and 
hard to quantify, legal risk.  Making UK private company law clearer and more easily 
contractible – within a framework that recognises different roles, and legitimate interests, for 
different actors – would have undoubted benefits.  Protection of creditors through insolvency 
law, and protection of all (non-shareholder) stakeholders through specific regulatory 
interventions, remains crucial; and such interventions can of course extend to measures 
designed to curb actions that reduce aggregate social welfare.  Such direct and targeted 
intervention is likely to be more effective, and less easily avoidable, than entrenching any 
particular principles in mandatory corporate governance law635.   
But, more positively, academics, policy-makers and industry associations can play an active 
role in encouraging bespoke corporate governance processes that add to economic 
efficiency, if not necessarily to social welfare.  It seems clear that private equity investors (on 
average) improve the financial performance of the companies into which they invest, and it 
has been argued here that – although not yet incontrovertibly established by the available 
evidence – more effective decision-making processes are a part of the reason for that 
                                               
635 Armour & Gordon (2014) summarise (at pages 44-50) the three main transmission 
mechanisms for the internalisation of externalities in a system where shareholder value 
maximisation is the norm adopted by corporate governance rules: contract, tort and 
regulation.  The authors argue that these transmission mechanisms do not function 
effectively in the context of systemically important firms, but (at pages 56-58) conclude that 
private law and government intervention can be expected to be effective in the case of non-
financial firms. 
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success.  Among other things, these processes reduce agency costs, focus actors on the 
imperative to improve the financial performance of companies within a defined time-frame, 
draw upon outside resources in making key decisions, and accommodate the requirements 
of block-holding professional investors.  An important part of the contribution of this 
research, building on the insights of Michael Jensen and others, has been to re-
conceptualise private equity governance and describe the specific transmission mechanisms 
for the performance enhancing impact of private equity’s contractual structures.  Further 
quantitative research, which more precisely identifies the value drivers in private equity-
backed companies’ governance mechanisms, is needed, and it is hoped that this thesis will 
assist the design of such research projects.   
In the meantime, as policymakers mull over law reform proposals636, the expanded theory 
that I have suggested may be instructive, especially if combined with insights from other 
academic disciplines that focus on effective decision-making, because, in the end, a 
company’s relative success is mainly determined by the cumulative impact of its operational 
and strategic choices, and good governance can certainly contribute to sound (and properly 
executed) decisions.  But law reform should aim to facilitate, rather than hamper, the 
freedom for parties to contract for efficient outcomes and, indeed, should relax the existing 
mandatory rules that restrict it. 
Ultimately, once corporate decision-making is wrapped in an effective governance structure, 
it will respond to the economic incentives of those with the final say who, in a UK private 
company, are (and are likely to remain) the residual claimants.  Increased disclosure and 
transparency (as also proposed in the UK government’s November 2016 Green Paper) 
might help to shape those incentives, by creating negative sentiments in the eyes of 
customers, employees and other stakeholders for companies that do not conform to 
society's ethical norms, but well-targeted regulatory interventions (especially those directed 
                                               
636 See, for example, BEIS, Corporate Governance Reform: Green Paper, November 2016 
at pages 46-47, available at:  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/573438/beis-
16-56-corporate-governance-reform-green-paper-final.pdf [Accessed 2.03.2017], which 
tentatively proposes a corporate governance code for large privately-held businesses.  
Some academics have also made similar suggestions; see, for example, McCahery & 
Vermeulen (2008) at page 248, who argue for an “optional set of recommendations” 
combined with a more flexible company law framework. 
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at the shareholders themselves) are more likely to have an immediate and tangible impact.  
And whilst knee-jerk regulatory responses are counter-productive, proportionate measures 
(whether self-regulatory, investor-led, or governmental) that increase the private equity 
intermediary’s incentive to behave in a socially responsible manner, are certainly worthy of 
further consideration. 
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APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY, METHODS AND CODING 
 
Chapter 2 of this thesis included a detailed description of the sample used in this research, 
and the methods used to analyse and summarise the documents and interviews that were 
the source of the data.  In this Appendix, I discuss the approach taken to sample selection 
and methodology, give more specific detail about the methods and, in particular, explain the 
approach taken to coding documents and interview transcripts.  I also discuss the validity of 
the findings and limitations in the claims that can be made from them. 
Sample selection 
The total population of private equity-backed companies in the UK is several thousand637.  
Given the lack of publicly available data, and concerns about confidentiality, it would clearly 
not be feasible for me to study all of them, nor (for reasons of access) to select participants 
randomly.  It was also not feasible to construct and study in sufficient detail a sample group 
that was large and representative enough to enable me to draw statistically robust 
conclusions regarding the impact of governance arrangements on outcomes (however those 
might be defined).   
Therefore, access to data and interview subjects was achieved by identifying industry 
participants who were interested in this research and willing to cooperate.  Inevitably, 
therefore, there was an element of convenience sampling and there are well documented 
problems with that approach, particularly when using it to identify interview subjects638.   
In order to partially address that constraint, various inclusion criteria were applied within the 
sub-set of the population to which access was available, and “purposeful sampling” 
techniques were used to ensure that the companies were reasonably representative and 
interviewees were sufficiently expert, and had enough recent experience, to provide useful 
data.   
                                               
637 See the Introduction to this thesis at pages 12-17. 
638 See, for example, Kumar et al. (1993). 
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It was clearly important to have several different participating private equity firms639, ideally 
across a range of different deal sizes and sector preferences, in order to compare the 
approaches of different private equity owners and to ensure that the sample represented 
companies of differing sizes, stages of development, and industry sectors.  It was also 
important to have at least some of these private equity firms contributing several companies 
to the sample, so that my analysis could compare different approaches to governance 
across a particular investor’s portfolio of companies, especially if these companies varied by 
size and stage of development, industry sector and ownership structure.  For each company 
in the sample, access was needed to all relevant documentation, including confidential 
documents, as well as access to one or (preferably) several people in the private equity firm 
who would be willing to be interviewed to discuss their governance arrangements. 
I discuss further the limitations in the claims that can be made based on the size of the 
sample and the chosen methodology later in this Appendix640; however, the sample was 
large and diverse enough for the purposes of the issues addressed by my research 
questions.  In particular, having completed the document analysis and interviews, I felt that I 
had reached “saturation point” and no new themes were emerging641. 
Research methodology and specific methods 
Although there is a significant amount of research in the finance literature addressing related 
questions642, there is limited existing empirical data directly relevant to my research 
questions.  It was therefore important to adopt a flexible design methodology, facilitating 
refinement of the data collection strategy as the research progressed and it became clearer 
which types of data would be needed to fully address the questions.  In addition, although at 
the outset specific data collection objectives were set, it was not clear how much confidential 
information (if any) would be made available by participants and it was important to build in 
some flexibility to accommodate data constraints.   
                                               
639 In fact, I had 11 firms participating, although two of those firms only contributed one 
portfolio company to the present sample.  Two further firms contributed an interviewee, but 
no documents. 
640 See page 280 below. 
641 See Strauss & Corbin (1998) at pages 181-193. 
642 See Chapter 11.1 at pages 220-225 above. 
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Qualitative (rather than quantitative) research methods were chosen because my research 
questions were predominantly concerned with describing detailed procedures, in relation to 
which subtle differences might be important, and approaches to problems encountered, 
rather than evaluating their effectiveness.  
My research sought to describe a variety of different aspects of corporate governance, 
including the differences between what is prescribed by structures and set out in documents 
and what happens in practice, and it was therefore appropriate to use multiple qualitative 
methods (as discussed by Robson (2011, Chapter 14).  In particular, I organised a focus 
group to develop and refine the areas for research; used document analysis to identify the 
structures adopted and the rights of the various parties; and conducted semi-structured 
interviews to gain insights into the operation of the systems in practice and views on their 
value and efficacy. 
Focus group 
On 13 March 2014 I moderated (and subsequently transcribed the discussion at) a focus 
group to help define the specific terms of my research questions with a mixed group of 10 
private equity investment professionals, in-house and private practice lawyers.   
This focus group discussion was used to draw out the most relevant themes and inform my 
interview topic guide; it was approached in the “exploratory” way that Macnaghten & Myers 
(2004) describe, as a way to help identify “categories, perspectives and links”.  Given that 
this was its purpose, I directed but did not limit the discussion in the focus groups, although 
a topic guide was circulated to participants in advance to specify the main areas for 
discussion.   
It was neither feasible nor necessary to identify a representative sample of the population for 
this discussion; instead, private equity practitioners and lawyers with extensive experience in 
the corporate governance structures of private equity-backed companies were invited to 
participate, including those known to have different views about the appropriate approach of 
governance mechanisms and their effectiveness (applying the concept of a “theoretical 
sample” as described by Glaser & Strauss (1967)).  However, although some differences of 
opinion were important to make the discussion interesting and engaging (for the participants) 
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and helpful for research purposes, participants were selected who broadly agreed about the 
role of private equity and had a very high level of understanding of the way that it operates; it 
was important that the discussion did not become side-tracked with explanations or 
disagreements about some basic ideas. 
The setting was professional but relaxed and naturalistic, around a single table with 
sandwiches and refreshments.  The focus group discussion was recorded using a video 
camera (positioned to be as un-intrusive as possible, although taking care to ensure that all 
participants gave informed consent to be video-recorded), and a back-up audio recording 
was also taken in case of audibility problems with the video.  The discussion was transcribed 
by me, verbatim, and subsequent analysis focused on identifying themes and opinions to 
explore further and test in later research, especially the document analysis and semi-
structured interviews.  Common perceptions or beliefs among the group were also identified, 
as well as areas where there were differences of opinion.  
Several insights emerged from this discussion, and the main themes identified in my 
analysis of the focus group transcript are represented in the chart below.  However, it is also 
important to note that there was some disagreement among members of the group, 
indicating that there could be significant heterogeneity within the private equity community.  
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It was clear that most participants regarded alignment of interests as a key feature of private 
equity, and felt that the corporate governance system should reinforce that aspect of the 
model.  Most felt that adding outsiders to the board, either as chairman or as an external 
non-executive, helped the stakeholders to make more informed and considered decisions 
about strategy and implementation of strategy, which was regarded as an important function 
of the board, even if the shareholders were regarded as the final arbiters of strategy.  Apart 
from establishing mechanisms to improve decision-making, participants also regarded 
oversight and accountability as important functions, while one focused on the need to protect 
the reputation of the private equity investor.  These insights proved very helpful in shaping 
final research and interview questions. 
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Document analysis 
I fully reviewed 147 documents643 and coded 107 of them for the 50 companies in the 
sample644, including 54 Investment Agreements (or equivalent)645 and 50 Articles of 
Association (or equivalent constitutional document)646.   
These documents were analysed using similar methodology to that described as “Directed 
Qualitative Content Analysis” by Hsieh & Shannon (2005): I used my own prior knowledge of 
the structures used by private companies together with practitioner handbooks, the legal 
framework that stipulates various mechanisms or creates various legal challenges, and the 
results of the focus group discussion to create initial coding categories;  the documents were 
coded using those initial codes, and any further relevant variables that the initial codes did 
not cover were identified during the document review.  In some cases, this meant returning 
to documents already coded to code for variables that had not been identified as interesting 
on initial coding.   
NVivo was used as an aid to coding and analysis, and this helped enormously with the 
eventual interpretation and summaries of the coded documents.  Initially, I tagged all 
relevant text in the coded documents, enabling me to run a variety of reports to show 
relevant clauses from all documents and to analyse those separately and by reference to 
each other.  I then applied a simple coding system to describe various characteristics of the 
data, while linking these back to the text in NVivo for easy verification and reference.  In 
some cases, these codes were True / False codes, while in others they were more 
sophisticated, assigning a categorising variable to relevant sections of the document.   
                                               
643 40 documents were fully reviewed but not coded because they were not relevant enough 
to form part of the detailed analysis; however, they were instructive and included loan note 
instruments, audit and remuneration committee terms of reference, NED appointment letters 
and management service agreements, anti-bribery policies, 100 day plans and other 
miscellaneous documents.  Hundreds of other documents were supplied by participating 
firms, but were not fully reviewed on the grounds of lack of relevance to the research 
questions. 
644 One document integrated both the Articles and the Investment Agreement for the 
relevant company and so I have counted it twice. 
645 More than 50 Investment Agreements were coded because in four cases there were 
multiple agreements for the same company, either because the original agreement was 
subsequently amended, or because there were different agreements for different parties. 
646 The three other documents coded were terms of reference for board committees and a 
warranty deed; these were integral to the Investment Agreements coded, but were provided 
as separate documents. 
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The complete list of codes ultimately used is shown at the end of this Appendix, although the 
many codes that were used initially and subsequently discarded are not included. 
Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 30 practitioners, whose profiles are 
described in Chapter 3.2 above647. 
These interviews played an important part in the data gathering process, and were ultimately 
used to formulate and substantiate a number of the conclusions.  It was important to gather 
the views and experiences of experts, including some with personal knowledge of the 
companies in my sample, to add significant detail to the information that could be obtained 
from the documents, to identify any differences between the mechanisms recorded in the 
documents and those actually utilised in practice and to gather the more general 
experiences, perspectives and opinions of experienced and senior (“elite”) industry 
participants. 
Most of the interviews were conducted after the document analysis was completed because 
the document analysis was used to help to frame the interview questions.  In particular, 
interview questions covered how particular features of the formal structures that were 
apparent from the documents operated in practice.   
In order to ensure that each interview was “a conversation that has a structure and a 
purpose”648, a topic guide was prepared and circulated in advance, covering the main areas 
for discussion in the interview, together with a summary of the research project.  The 
questions asked of each interview subject were tailored to their own particular experience 
and the portfolio companies of which they had knowledge, but all interviews covered broadly 
the same areas with similar questions.  The questions were framed as open questions, to 
allow other themes to emerge during the interviews, which they often did.   
                                               
647 See pages 70-71 above. 
648 Kvale & Brinkmann (2009) at page 3. 
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Where possible, interviews were conducted at the subject’s offices, which helped to 
minimise cancellations or late-starts (leading to rushed interviews) and ensured a 
professional and relaxed environment.   
Coding of interview transcripts 
I adopted a transparent, coherent and consistent coding strategy to analyse the interview 
transcripts, using the techniques associated with thematic analysis.  I started with the salient 
codes used for the document analysis, and built on these with some codes relating to actual 
experience and opinions that are relevant to my research questions.  I refined these codes 
and added new ones as I coded the documents in a similar way to that described above 
(under Document analysis).   
Once again NVivo was used to assist in coding the transcripts, and the list of codes used is 
set out at the end of this Appendix. 
Ethical considerations 
The LSE Ethics Policy was strictly adhered to at all times.  All research participants were 
given a clear explanation of the purpose of the research, my own background and 
experience, and the ways in which their data would be used.  Each participant (or, in the 
case of individuals, the organisation for which they worked) gave their written, informed 
consent and had the right to withdraw at any time prior to publication.  Their personal details, 
and those of any organisation they represent or referred to, have not been, and will not be, 
published, and will remain confidential to myself and my supervisors649.   
As noted below, these ethical requirements actually assisted my research.  In order to gain 
access to key individuals and documents, and to ensure that the experiences and views of 
interviewees were presented as openly as possible, it was important that the anonymity and 
confidentiality of the research process was clearly stated and fully trusted by all participants.   
                                               
649 This information, and all data collected, is available to be reviewed by examiners if 
requested, pursuant to a specific provision in the confidentiality agreements. 
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Validity of documentary and interview data and quality indicators 
One important consideration, given the nature of the chosen methodology and sample, was 
the reliability (or credibility) of the information obtained from documents and from comments 
made during interviews by the interview subjects650.   
In relation to data gathered from documents, the principal risk was that structures and 
mechanisms established by documents were not followed in practice.  The main way to 
verify these mechanisms was by asking specific questions of the interview subjects to 
identify divergences between actual behaviours and those envisaged in the documentation.  
In many areas, as discussed in Part 2, these divergences were indeed apparent, and 
became an important finding in themselves. 
As regards the validity of interview evidence, Kvale & Brinkmann (2009) argue (at page 253) 
that "checking, questioning and theorizing the interview findings leads ideally to transparent 
research procedures and convincing evident results".  I sought to apply this rigorous method 
to my own analysis.  
First, analysis of the interview results took account of the fact that I was an active participant 
in the interviews, which was both inevitable and desirable.  As Holstein & Gubrium (2004) 
put it: 
Both parties to the interview are necessarily and unavoidably active.  Meaning is not 
merely elicited by apt questioning, nor simply transported through respondent 
replies; it is actively and communicatively assembled in the interview encounter.   
This “unavoidably collaborative” process was perhaps even more than usually in evidence, 
since I was known by the subjects to have specialist technical legal knowledge in the field.  
Occasionally, this meant that the subjects asked me questions, or (perhaps less obviously) 
may have led to any comments I made partially shaping their own conclusions.  My strategy 
to minimise this potentially distorting effect as far as possible was to limit my interventions 
and seek not to ask “leading” questions, nor to offer my own views unless absolutely needed 
                                               
650 My intention is to make an "analytical generalisation", defined by Kvale & Brinkmann 
(2009) at page 262 as "a reasoned judgement about the extent to which findings of the study 
can be used as a guide to what might occur in another situation”.  I have therefore included 
a detailed description of the research process and analytical methods in order to “allow 
readers to judge the soundness of the generalisation claim”. 
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in the context of the discussion.  This was not always possible, however, and in cases where 
the transcript shows that a comment is made in response to something that I have said, I 
have taken that into account in analysing the content, and have sought to triangulate the 
response in other ways.  In other words, my analysis of the validity of the data drawn from 
the interviews has taken account of the context in which comments were made and opinions 
given, as well as the actual comments themselves.  My analysis has given different weight to 
a perspective according to whether it is based on a pre-existing experience or has been 
previously documented and expressed in some way (for example, it is an opinion supported 
by processes that have been embedded into particular companies), or whether it appears to 
have been formed during the discussion and may therefore be more transient and not fully 
considered.  This is inevitably a subjective process, but I have sought to apply consistent 
criteria. 
Secondly, there was a risk that interviewees may not accurately reflect their true views and 
practices, and may seek to re-characterise their views and experiences to cast themselves 
in a more positive light.  One strategy to help minimise that risk was to ensure that all 
participants were fully aware of the anonymity and confidentiality of the research process, 
and that I was confident that they trusted me to maintain confidentiality, in order to allow 
them to speak openly and frankly.   
This danger of re-characterisation of experiences and views was perhaps more acute given 
that I am a "semi-insider"; I knew some of the interviewees in a professional capacity, and I 
was known to all of them as a lawyer who had worked in the industry for some years.  This 
“semi-insider” status carries many advantages; most notably, the greater access to data, 
and an ability to identify and ask the most pertinent questions.  However, it also carries risks 
that are well documented651, including that participants will not relate experiences fully 
because they will make assumptions about the interviewer’s level of knowledge, and also 
that the interviewer allows his own pre-conceptions and experiences to shape the interview, 
rather than those of the participant.  I have been aware of these risks in conducting 
interviews and in analysing and presenting my findings. 
                                               
651  See, for example, Sidebotham (2003) and Dwyer & Buckle (2009). 
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Having assessed credibility, I also applied the three remaining quality indicators of 
transferability, dependability and confirmability specified by Lincoln & Guba (1985) to 
evaluate the findings emerging from my interviews.  However, above all, I have generally not 
made claims based only on interview evidence; instead, I have regarded the interviews as 
secondary evidence, seeking to support or explain findings from my document analysis.   
More generally, the fact that it was not feasible to construct and analyse in detail a 
representative sample of the portfolio companies in my population has meant that some care 
has been taken in making any generalisations of the findings that I have extracted from my 
data.  The findings accurately describe the companies in my sample, and although there is 
no reason to suppose that the sample is not representative of the population, it is not 
possible to assert that the findings can be generalised to the whole population.  The theory 
proposed in this thesis has been tested in the sample of companies analysed, but it cannot 
be said to have been definitively proven across the population as a whole. 
Codes used to analyse data 
List of sample description codes 
 
Company name 
Company unique identifier 
Private equity (PE) investor name 
Type of deal 
Development capital 
Replacement capital 
MBO 
Secondary MBO (i.e., purchase from another PE firm) 
Take private MBO (i.e., acquisition and de-listing of a listed company) 
Industry sector 
Business services 
Education 
Financial services 
Healthcare 
Industrials 
Retail and consumer 
Telecoms, Media and technology (TMT) 
Travel and Leisure 
Date of initial investment / acquisition 
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Enterprise value on investment / acquisition 
PE house investment amount 
Third party debt amount (net debt) 
Leverage (Debt/Enterprise Value) 
PE house equity share 
PE house equity share (fully diluted) 
Majority of equity for PE house? (Yes/No) 
Turnover of company on investment / acquisition 
Number of employees on investment / acquisition 
Has the PE firm exited the investment? If so, how? 
No 
Yes - private sale to a trade buyer 
Yes - private sale to another PE firm (secondary) 
Yes - IPO (AIM) 
Yes - IPO (LSE) 
Date of exit 
Enterprise value on exit 
Turnover at exit 
Number of employees at exit (or current number if not exited) 
Realised IRR at exit 
Board composition (immediately after investment) 
Number of "investor directors" 
Number of executive directors 
Is there an independent chair? (Yes / No) 
How many other NEDs are there? 
Total board size 
Is there a majority for the investor directors acting alone? 
Is there a majority for investor director and chair / other NEDs acting together? 
Is the board deadlocked between executives and other directors? 
Do executive directors control the board? 
Name of law firm acting for PE firm 
 
List of document analysis codes 
 
Articles of association 
1 = 1985 Table A adopted and modified 
2 = 2006 Act Model Articles for private companies adopted but modified 
3 = 2006 Act Model Articles for public companies adopted but modified 
4 = foreign equivalent model articles / other prescribed standard adopted but 
modified 
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5 = all models disapplied and bespoke Articles adopted 
Country of incorporation of main Holdco 
Are there good and bad leaver provisions? (Yes/No) 
Are the good and bad leaver provisions in Articles or Investment Agreement? (Articles / IA) 
Direct contractual commitments between which parties? 
Company to investor 
Investor to management 
Management to company (otherwise than in service agreements) 
Management to investor 
Company to managers 
Are non-compete covenants given by management directly to the investors? (Yes/No) 
Are management's warranties given directly to the investor? (Yes/No) 
Are veto rights given by the company in favour of the investor? (Yes/No) 
Are investor's veto rights structured as class rights? (Yes/No) 
Do shareholders retain the right to direct the board by ordinary resolution? (Yes/No) 
Are there restrictions on transfer of shares? (Yes/No) 
Is there a prohibition on transfer of shares to competitors? (Yes/No) 
Are there pre-emption provisions applying on transfers of shares? (Yes/No) 
Are there pre-emption provisions applying on issue of new shares? (Yes/No) 
Number of board meetings pa (minimum specified, unless investor consents to fewer) 
Does the investor have the right to veto new issues of shares? (Yes/No) 
Does the investor have the right to appoint a chairman?  
0 = not specified or not known 
1 = absolute right (including after consultation / attempt to agree) 
2 = right of approval for investor 
3 = board decision 
4 = founder / manager has entrenched right 
 
Are there bribery related specific provisions in the Investment Agreement? (Yes/No) 
Committees established: Audit (A), Remuneration (R) and Risk (Ri) Committees 
Is the board's power to approve Section 175 conflicts of interest confirmed or varied? 
(Yes/No) 
Does a board approval under Section 175 also require Investor Consent (when it relates to 
executives) (Yes/No) 
Are executive directors obliged to authorise investor director conflicts? (Yes/No) 
Can the investor approve Section 175 conflicts? (Yes/No) 
Do the Articles include an automatic approval of other capacities for the investor director? 
(Yes/No) 
Do the Articles exclude a duty to account for benefits of authorised matters? (Yes/No) 
Do the Articles specifically exclude the duty not to accept benefits (Section 176) for 
authorised conflicts? (Yes/No) 
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Is there a restatement (without substantive modification) of Section 177? (Yes/No) Does it 
allow interested parties to vote? (Yes/No) 
Is investor consent required for approval of executive interests in contracts? (Yes/No) 
Are executive directors permitted to vote when they are interested in a transaction? (Yes/No) 
Is there a waiver of any duty otherwise imposed on the investor director to disclose 
confidential information to the company? (Yes/No) 
Is permission given to the investor director to disclose the company's confidential information 
to the investor? (Yes/No) 
Provisions dealing with duty to exercise independent judgement by the investor director 
N/S = no specific reference to Section 173, but provisions permitting him to represent 
investor interests 
S = provisions allowing him to represent investor interests with specific reference to Section 
173 
Are shareholders contractually obliged to ratify breaches of duty by nominated director? 
(Yes/No) 
Are investor director's statutory duties purportedly dis-applied when giving investor 
consents?  (Yes/No) 
Do the Articles include permission for indemnities and insurance for directors? (Yes/No) 
Is there a provision purporting to allow the investor to exercise its shareholder rights in own 
interests and/or an exclusion of duties to other shareholders? (Yes/No) 
Does the investor have the right to conduct, or direct, litigation against executives (including 
for breaches of their Service Agreement)? (Yes/No) 
Does this right to conduct litigation include actions for breach of duty? (Yes/No) 
Does the investor have the right to control the board (including by making additional 
appointments)? (Yes/No/Yes, but conditionally upon occurrence of a "default event") 
Is the company required by contractual commitment to the investor to maintain insurance? 
(Yes/No) 
Is the company required by contractual commitment to the investor to comply with the 
general law? (Yes/No) 
Is there a business plan which constrains or defines management authority? (Yes/No) 
Is there a requirement imposed on management to disclose significant events "forthwith" or 
similar? (Yes/No) 
Are managers explicitly given authority to take operational decisions? (Yes/No) 
 
List of interview codes (relevant text marked for analysis) 
 
Relevance of business plan or 100 day plan 
Balance of power between management, board and shareholder 
Interviewee asserts that balance of power changes over time 
Use of boilerplate and ongoing irrelevance of documentation legal 
Comparisons drawn with US corporate governance 
Corporate vehicle used and corporate law chosen 
Comparison with Delaware law 
Use of LLPs instead of companies 
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Relevance of the legal framework for directors 
Reference to "capacities" and/or "hats" 
Apparent irrelevance of attenuated ownership structure on behaviour  
Legal framework only or mainly relevant on insolvency / focus on 
creditor protection when company insolvent 
Use of the phrase; "We're all in this together" or similar 
Mention of "partnership" relationship with management 
Assertion that tax drives jurisdiction of vehicle and corporate law is irrelevant 
Differences between private equity houses indicating heterogeneity 
Does governance add value? 
Extent of value added varies by sector 
Descriptions of what PE adds to governance 
The role of the "operating partner" 
Aim of governance is (partially) protection of the investor (external preferences) 
Impact of LPs on external preference protection 
Governance mechanisms used to express hidden shareholder interests 
Aim of governance is (partially) to maintain focus on exit (internal preferences) 
Risk matters 
Anti-trust procedures 
Corruption procedures 
Centralised procedure at PE firm for ensuring compliance with corruption 
laws by underlying companies 
Corruption procedures are primarily the responsibility of board 
Impact of UK Bribery Act on anti-corruption rules 
General reputational issues 
Health and safety 
Modern slavery and child labour 
Sanctions 
The board 
Board committees 
Board composition 
Does PE firm control board? 
NEDs and the chair 
Co-operative process for NED or chair appointment 
No independent chair 
Qualities and role of NED or chair 
Why NEDs are not just appointed as advisers 
Nominated directors 
Dealing with board conflicts 
Corporate opportunities 
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Nominated director awareness of legal duties 
Nominated directors sit at Topco level only 
Pre-IPO board changes 
Frequency of board meetings 
Reasons for holding monthly board meetings 
Ideal board size 
Liability of observers and others (shadow directors) 
Preference for unitary board 
Role of the board 
Comparison with plcs 
Why have a board? 
To arbitrate disputes 
To act as a liability shield for the shareholder 
To make better decisions for the benefit of the company 
Importance of having the right people and process 
To monitoring management 
To impose control mechanisms 
Investor imposed board agenda items 
Veto rights 
Purpose of shareholder veto rights 
When shareholder veto referred to investment committee 
 
 
